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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a new simple theoretical framework 
for understanding the sterilisation of foreign exchange intervention within a 
monetary policy framework where a short-term interest rate is the main policy 
instrument. Another aim is to carry out new empirical analysis that compares and 
contrasts the effects of intervention on base money growth with its effects on broad 
money growth, and to investigate if these effects are associated with common 
country characteristics in terms of the nature of intervention, balance of payments 
flows and monetary policy frameworks.  
Using a portfolio balance model and simple balance sheet constraints, it is 
shown that base money sterilisation does not imply broad money sterilisation. 
Incomplete broad money sterilisation, when intervention is a positive money supply 
shock, leads to looser monetary and financial conditions, even as base money growth 
is completely sterilised in an interest rate-targeting framework. With a progressively 
lower degree of broad money sterilisation, the policy interest rate in an optimal 
monetary policy reaction function needs to respond more strongly to the exogenous 
factors affecting the output gap and inflation. 
The empirical analyses of the contemporaneous and long-run effects of real 
intervention on real base money growth and real broad money growth are carried out 
using multivariate autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) regressions for individual 
countries. These regressions include controls for demand factors. The focus on a 
reasonably large sample of 30 countries, with individual country heterogeneity taken 
into account, and the emphasis on broad money sterilisation represent a clear 
departure from existing empirical literature.  
The empirical results reveal that on average, the real intervention effect on 
real broad money growth is higher than and disconnected from the effect on real base 
money growth. The baseline group average short-run and long-run coefficients are 
0.122 and 0.496 respectively for real broad money growth and 0.075 and 0.111 
respectively for real base money growth (excluding outliers, Egypt and Taiwan, in 
both instances). With regard to the relevance of country characteristics, a general 
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lack of statistical significance is observed across mean and median equality tests and 
bivariate regressions. This is not unexpected with regard to real intervention effects 
on real base money growth, but indicates that the real intervention effects are very 
much country-specific in the case of real broad money growth. In particular, there is 
no evidence of a difference in real intervention effects on real broad money growth 
between inflation-targeting and non-inflation-targeting countries. The short-run and 
long-run real intervention effects on real base money growth are found to be robustly 
associated with differences in capital account openness although these differences 
are not of a monotonic nature. Meanwhile, the short-run real intervention effects on 
real broad money growth have a positive, monotonic association with current 
account surpluses and concurrently a negative monotonic association with capital 
account surpluses. On the other hand, the long-run real intervention effects on real 
broad money growth do not appear to be robustly linked to any particular country 
characteristic in a statistically significant manner.  
 A key implication of the thesis is that broad money sterilisation matters, not 
base money sterilisation, in understanding how balance of payments flows and 
intervention permeate the economy. Complete broad money sterilisation, however 
rarely occurs. Furthermore, regardless of the degree, broad money sterilisation, seen 
as a blunt instrument, may have unpredictable and undesirable effects, owing to 
uncertainties over money demand and money supply shocks, and mismatches in asset 
demand and supply. The model presented provides a framework for understanding 
the continued reliance on measures such as prudential policies and restrictions on 
capital flows in dealing with financial imbalances; this despite seemingly successful 
sterilisation by way of the containment of base money growth.  
 
Keywords:  monetary policy, exchange rate, foreign exchange intervention, money, 
sterilisation, emerging markets, inflation-targeting 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
³7KHRQHWKLQJDFHQWUDOEDQNFDQGR 
LVWRIORRGWKHPDUNHWZLWKOLTXLGLW\´ 
Alan Greenspan,  
Chairman of the Federal Reserve (1987-2006)  
LQWKH%%&¶V7KH/RYHRI0RQH\ 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
 The main motivation for this thesis is to provide a simple theoretical 
framework for understanding the sterilisation of foreign exchange intervention within 
a monetary policy framework where a short-term interest rate is the main policy 
instrument; and to carry out new empirical analysis on the extent of sterilisation in 
emerging market economies according to this conceptual structure. It is our 
assessment that such cohesiveness appears to be lacking in recent empirical 
literature. 
 The concept of the impossible trinity states that a country cannot 
simultaneously attempt to achieve the three goals of monetary policy independence, 
exchange rate stability and free international capital mobility. The ability to intervene 
in the foreign exchange markets enables the central bank to manage the exchange 
rate. At the same time, the capacity to neutralise the impact of liquidity generated 
from intervention ± that is to sterilise, allows the central bank to focus monetary 
policy on domestic considerations. Policy difficulties arise from the ease of 
substitutability between domestic and foreign assets; the availability, balance sheet 
costs and macroeconomic consequences of sterilisation methods; and when resisting 
exchange rate depreciation, reserves depletion. The experiences of emerging market 
economies have come under renewed scrutiny over the last 10 to 15 years as vast 
amounts of foreign exchange reserves have been accumulated amidst large global 
capital flows and widening current account imbalances.  
Many theoretical and empirical studies pertaining to sterilisation in developed 
countries were carried out in the 1970s and 1980s. These include Argy and Kouri 
(1974), Herring and Marston (1977) and Obstfeld (1983). The analyses are carried 
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out based on the portfolio balance framework which synthesises the monetary 
approach to the balance of payments with equilibrium conditions in several asset 
markets, namely the bond and money markets. The change in the FHQWUDOEDQN¶VQHW
domestic assets (ǻNDA) is assumed to be the monetary policy instrument, and the 
sterilisation coefficient is typically embedded in a monetary policy reaction function 
of the form:  ? ? =Į+ȕ ?	 ? ?Ȗ ? ? ?  ?                      (1.1)  ? ? ƍ. 	 ? ? ƍǡ   Ǥ  ? ? ? which represent the objectives of the central bank. 
Ȗ  ?  ? ? ?. 
 
In (1.1),ȕmeasures the degree of sterilisation, with a value of minus one indicating 
full sterilisation. We refer to ȕ as the measure of base money or narrow sterilisation.  ? represents a set of explanatory variables that capture the domestic objectives of 
monetary policy. The sterilisation equation may be estimated as part of a system of 
simultaneous equations, where the second equation is the offset equation, which 
estimates the extent to which a monetary policy action is countered by a balance of 
payments effect. The offset equation thus relates to capital mobility1. The  ? set tends 
to be rather arbitrarily determined.  
 Recent empirical studies have continued to employ this general estimating 
equation (equation (1.1)), with variations in the choice of control variables. Brissimis 
et al. (2002) provide a unifying theoretical framework in which both the monetary 
policy reaction function and foreign exchange intervention can be jointly determined. 
With the resulting just identified simultaneous equations, they estimate sterilisation 
and offset coefficients for Germany over the period 1979-1992. Ouyang et al. (2008, 
2010) and Ouyang and Rajan (2011) make small modifications to the Brissimis et al. 
model, and use it to estimate sterilisation and offset coefficients for various Asian 
economies covering the 2000s.  Some other studies follow simple money demand 
type specifications in the choice of control variables, for instance Aizenman and 
                                                          
1
  A monetary policy action through ǻ1'$OHDGVWRFKDQJHVLQGRPHVWLFLQWHUHVWUDWHVZKLFKDIIHFW
FDSLWDOLQIORZVDQGWKHUHIRUHǻ1)$  
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Glick (2009) who estimate sterilisation coefficients for several Asian and Latin 
American economies. Where large samples of countries are involved, the analysis 
can be fairly rudimentary, such as the bivariate static UHJUHVVLRQVRIǻ1'$RQǻ1)$
in Cardarelli et al. (2009). The empirical findings across the studies generally point 
to a fairly high degree of base money sterilisation. 
 The narrative provided by the recent empirical work on the extent of 
sterilisation is open to criticism on three accounts.  First, most studies continue to 
DVVXPH WKDW ǻ1'$ LV WKH SROLF\ LQVWUXPHQW ZKHQ LQ UHDOLW\ PDQ\ FRXQWULHV KDYH
shifted from monetary-targeting to interest rate-targeting. As pointed out by Disyatat 
(2008), the meaningfulness of equation (1.1) is thus questionable when liquidity, 
regardless of the source, is absorbed to the extent that is necessary to maintain the 
target interest rate level. Furthermore, as we will show, with base money consisting 
only of currency in circulation, required and excess reserves, ȕ will inevitably be 
high unless reserve requirements are actively used or if there is a deliberate policy of 
base money expansion.  
 Second, there is hardly any consideration of how foreign exchange 
intervention affects broad money. This is true even for the older empirical studies on 
sterilisation. Mohanty and Turner (2006) suggest that the sector from which liquidity 
is absorbed ± whether banks or non-banks, determines the completeness of 
sterilisation. Although the authors do not state as such, their definition ties in with 
broad money sterilisation.  
 Third, the estimation of sterilisation coefficients tends to be disconnected 
from the analysis of the wider implications of varying degrees of sterilisation. Base 
money sterilisation coefficients that are estimated with econometric rigour are 
seldom related to wider macroeconomic outcomes; while in some of the literature 
that discusses the challenges of managing capital flows (for example Reinhart and 
Reinhart (2008), and Cardarelli et al. (2009)), the sterilisation coefficients are 
estimated in a simplistic manner and appear incidental to the analysis.  
 We view all three accounts as symptomatic of the lack of an underlying 
conceptual framework that considers how balance of payments flows and 
intervention affect base money and broad money, and permeate the economy. Argy 
and Kouri (1974), Argy and Murray (1985) and Frankel (1994) provide useful 
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conceptual frameworks of how returns on assets are affected depending on the nature 
of disturbances (recognising differences in money demand and money supply 
shocks), and the sterilisation response, albeit only Frankel makes the distinction 
between narrow and broad sterilisation. However, recent empirical works appear 
detached from these studies. Consequently, there is a misunderstanding of the 
consequences, or lack thereof, of sterilisation; as well as a misrepresentation of 
different monetary policy frameworks, particularly in pooled and simple panel data 
analysis.  
1.2  RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTION 
 
 The research objectives of this thesis are to: 
i. Provide a simple theoretical model for discussing the optimal 
monetary policy reaction function for a stylised emerging market 
economy, given a set of structural equations for the economy, the 
policy instrument is a short-term interest rate, and the central bank 
carries out sterilised intervention. 
ii. Provide a simple conceptual framework to illustrate how balance of 
payments flows, foreign exchange intervention and sterilisation affect 
base money and broad money. 
iii. Investigate the effects of foreign exchange intervention on base 
money and broad money for a sample of countries, and identify 
country characteristics that may explain these effects. 
 This thesis aims to contribute to the research on sterilisation of foreign 
exchange intervention on both the theoretical and empirical fronts. As far as we 
know, there is no theoretical framework that merges the portfolio balance approach 
to sterilisation with an interest rate reaction function, whilst recognising the 
distinction between base money and broad money sterilisation.  We explicitly take 
LQWRDFFRXQWWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQVWHULOLVDWLRQDWWKHEDQNV¶OHYel and sterilisation 
at the non-bank private sector level.  
 Empirically, we extend the current literature by providing detailed analysis 
for a reasonably large and diverse group of countries, supported by a thorough 
conceptual framework and without oversimplifying the econometric analysis. There 
are only a few existing studies that cover a large group of countries, and these tend to 
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use comparatively simple empirical approaches. We carry out multivariate dynamic 
regression analysis on an individual-country basis. Crucially we devote equal 
attention to base money and broad money sterilisation. The empirical analysis on 
broad money sterilisation represents a clear departure from existing literature which 
has an emphasis on base money sterilisation. 
1.3 THESIS OUTLINE 
 
  The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. In Chapter 2, we provide a 
literature review. The topics covered are the definition of sterilisation, the main 
strands of approaches to measuring sterilisation, and the macroeconomic effects of 
sterilisation. In Chapter 3, the first of our three main chapters, using a simple 
theoretical model of a stylised economy, we derive an optimal monetary policy 
reaction function that shows how the policy interest rate responds to various 
exogenous factors given varying degrees of broad money sterilisation. The standard 
aggregate demand curve is augmented with a term to capture broad money growth. 
We explore the literature on the role of money in modern models to support this 
inclusion, and largely draw on the argument put forth by Meltzer (1995, 1999). This 
argument states that money serves as proxy for yields on other financial and real 
assets which are important for economic activity. The short-term policy interest rate 
is not a sufficient summary of these wider monetary and financial conditions.  
 
  In the baseline model, changes in broad money are assumed to be driven by 
foreign exchange intervention. With a portfolio balance framework, we show that 
incomplete broad money sterilisation, when intervention is a positive money supply 
shock, leads to looser monetary and financial conditions. This in turn, entails a 
higher policy interest rate in the monetary policy reaction function. However, the 
central bank faces a dilemma as an increase in the policy interest rate would lead to 
further capital inflows. Such a scenario may warrant a change in the exchange rate 
policy or the use of alternative policy instruments. An important illustration in this 
chapter is the difference between base money sterilisation and broad money 
sterilisation. Even if there is base money sterilisation, with liquidity absorbed from 
banks, balance of payments flows and intervention will still permeate the economy 
through changes in broad money. Thus, broad money sterilisation is what matters.  
6 
 
 In Chapter 4, we take a step back from Chapter 3 and analyse the mechanics 
that account for the effects of intervention, or lack thereof, on base money and broad 
money respectively. We lay the conceptual foundations for the empirical analysis of 
the effects of foreign exchange intervention on the two money variables, and explore 
issues related to econometric methodology and data measurement. A main 
hypothesis is that the effects of intervention on broad money are expected to be more 
variable and statistically significant than its effects on base money, depending on the 
types of balance of payments flows and the sectors involved, sterilisation methods, 
and the monetary policy stance. We make a distinction between short-run and long-
run effects, the latter capturing the indirect effects on broad money growth generated 
through credit creation by banks and government spending. We hypothesise that 
intervention and reserve accumulation associated with current account and capital 
account surpluses of the non-bank private sector will likely have relatively 
significant positive short-run and indirect effects on broad money growth. The 
effects may be mitigated if sterilisation occurs at the non-bank private sector level; 
there is monetary tightening including through required reserves which limits the 
indirect effects; or if foreign exchange swaps have been used, as these would break 
the link between intervention and broad money growth.  
 For the specification of our two econometric models, with real base money 
growth and real broad money growth as the respective dependent variables, we 
combine the monetary approach to the balance of payments with behavioural money 
demand analysis in the choice of control variables. Such an approach avoids the 
explicit treatment of either base money or broad money as the monetary policy 
instrument. We use the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach which 
allows us to estimate contemporaneous and long-run effects of intervention on the 
two money variables. Our sample of 30 countries comprise 24 emerging market 
economies across Asia (10 countries), Latin America (six countries), Europe, the 
Middle-East and Africa (eight countries, cumulatively); and six developed 
economies. 
 In Chapters 5 and 6, our remaining two main chapters, we carry out the 
individual country regressions to estimate the effects of real intervention on real base 
money growth and real broad money growth respectively. We then compare the 
coefficients on real intervention effects against country characteristics by way of 
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mean and median equality tests and simple bivariate regressions. The country 
characteristics are in terms of region; intervention volatility and reserve 
accumulation; income levels; current account and capital account openness and net 
positions; exchange rate flexibility; and monetary policy frameworks - whether the 
countries are inflation-targeting or non-inflation-targeting. Empirical analyses consist 
of the baseline scenario and robustness checks.  
 The results in Chapter 5 reveal that, on average, the real intervention effect on 
real base money growth is low, with baseline group average short-run and long-run 
coefficients of 0.075 and 0.111 respectively (excluding outliers: Egypt and Taiwan). 
For a subset of countries with relatively high coefficients, these can be related to the 
use of reserve requirements and monetary deposit auctions; and unique monetary 
policy frameworks ± quantitative easing in Japan, and a currency board in Hong 
Kong. There are only a few instances of statistical significance in terms of the 
differences in country characteristics. There are robust differences in capital account 
openness but not of a monotonic ordering to match the monotonic ordering of the 
coefficients on real intervention effects.  
 In Chapter 6, we find that on average, the real intervention effect on real 
broad money growth is higher than the effect on real base money growth. The 
baseline group average short-run and long-run coefficients are 0.122 and 0.496 
respectively (excluding outliers: Egypt and Taiwan). Equality tests and correlation 
analysis indicate that there is no relationship between the effects of real intervention 
on real base money growth with its effects on real broad money growth. Similar to 
the case of real base money growth, there are only a few instances of statistical 
significance for the relevance of country characteristics to differences in real 
intervention effects. We observe a tentative link between intervention volatility and 
intervention effects on real broad money growth, but not between the latter and 
reserve accumulation. There are indications that higher short-run real intervention 
effects on real broad money growth are associated with current account surpluses 
(and correspondingly capital account deficits) of a monotonic ordering. For the long-
run real intervention effects, there is even less evidence of the relevance of balance 
of payments characteristics, with no statistical significance of test statistics across the 
equality tests and bivariate regressions under the baseline scenario. Nevertheless, 
based on the relative strengths of the test statistics, current account and capital 
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account openness appear to be the most likely important characteristics. As for 
monetary policy frameworks, there does not seem to be a difference in intervention 
effects between inflation-targeting and non-inflation-targeting countries. This is in 
contrast to the results for real intervention effects on changes in real base money, 
which suggest that non-inflation±targeting countries exhibit higher real intervention 
effects. This latter result, however, is influenced by the uniqueness of Hong Kong 
and Japan.   
 In the final chapter, Chapter 7, we summarise the key findings of the thesis 
and their significance to current literature. We discuss the limitations of our 
undertaking and areas for improvement, and suggest directions for future research. 
We also examine possible policy implications.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
In this chapter, we provide an overview of selected existing studies which 
explore the concept, empirical estimation and macroeconomic effects of sterilisation. 
At the outset, a clarification of the definition of sterilisation is required. Sarno and 
Taylor SDJHVWDWHWKDW³2IILFLDOH[FKDQJHUDWHLQWHUYHQWLRQLQWKHIRUHLJQ
exchange market occurs when the authorities buy or sell foreign exchange, normally 
DJDLQVW WKHLURZQFXUUHQF\DQG LQRUGHU WRDIIHFW WKHH[FKDQJH UDWH´2QSDJH
the authoUV JR RQ WR QRWH ³2IILFLDO LQWHUYHQWLRQ LV VDLG WR EH sterilized when the 
authorities - simultaneously or with a very short lag - take action to offset or 
³VWHULOL]H´WKHHIIHFWVRIDFKDQJHLQRIILFLDOIRUHLJQDVVHWKROGLQJVRQWKHGRPHVWLF
monetary base´ 
 2EVWIHOG DQG 5RJRII  SDJH  H[SODLQ ³2IWHQ JRYHUQPHQWV WU\ WR
influence the exchange rate without changing the money supply through a financial 
policy known as sterilized intervention. In a non-sterilized intervention operation, the 
government might buy foreign currency denominated bonds with domestic currency. 
7R³VWHULOL]H´WKHILUVWVWHSRIWKLVLQWHUYHQWLRQWKHJRYHUQPHQWUHYHUVHVLWVH[SDQVLYH
impact on the home money supply by selling home-currency-denominated bonds for 
domestic cash.´ 
Immediately obvious is the difference in monetary aggregates being referred 
to ± ZLWK6DUQRDQG7D\ORUIRFXVVLQJRQ³PRQHWDU\EDVH´DQG2EVWIHOGDQG5RJRII
XVLQJWKHWHUP³PRQH\VXSSO\´1HYHUWKHOHVVLQDVOLJKWO\PRUHGHWDLOHGH[SRVLWLRQ
through pages 597-599 of their book, it becomes evident that Obstfeld and Rogoff 
YLHZWKHWHUPDVLQWHUFKDQJHDEOHZLWKPRQHWDU\EDVH³WKHFHQWUDOEDQN³VWHULOL]HV´
the effects on the monetary base by selling a corresponding quantity of home-
currency-denominated bonGVWRVRDNXSWKHLQLWLDOFXUUHQF\LQFUHDVH´± (page 599).  
 Frankel (1994) makes the distinction between sterilisation, defined broadly, 
where offsetting policy actions are taken to keep aggregate money supply 
unchanged, and a narrower definition where policy actions namely open market 
10 
 
operations are conducted to leave the monetary base unchanged. The central bank 
practice of keeping a quantity, whether base money or a broad monetary aggregate 
unchanged is, however, generally associated with a monetary-targeting framework. 
In contrast, when the interest rate is the monetary policy instrument used to achieve 
inflation and output stabilisation goals, there may not be deliberate actions to restrain 
money growth to a certain level. Sterilised intervention is then, as Hutchinson (2003, 
page 1) states ZKHQ ³WKH FHQWUDO EDQN RIIVHWV WKH SXUFKDVH RU VDOH RI IRUHLJQ
exchange by selling or purchasing domestic securities so as to keep the domestic 
LQWHUHVWUDWHDWLWVWDUJHW´,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRQRWHWKDWWKLVGRPHVWLc interest rate target 
is typically a single short-term interest rate in the interbank money market.   
These definitions indicate that sterilisation is a tool to insulate domestic 
liquidity and monetary policy from foreign exchange market intervention. The issue 
arises as to whether these definitional differences have material implications when 
one evaluates the completeness and consequences of sterilisation.  Several questions, 
from empirical and theoretical perspectives, can be raised as follows: 
(a) How is the degree of sterilisation measured, and what does empirical 
evidence say about the extent of sterilisation? 
(b) Can an economy fulfil the criteria of the narrow sterilisation definition but 
fail that of the broad definition of sterilisation? 
(c) What are the effects of sterilisation on monetary and financial variables under 
different monetary policy frameworks and sterilisation methods? 
(d) How autonomous is monetary policy with sterilisation?  
Clearly a complete understanding of the dynamics of intervention and 
sterilisation, and monetary policy implementation is required to answer the questions 
above. In the context of existing literature related to sterilisation, four broad strands 
can be identified. The first and second have a greater consideration of theoretical 
underpinnings to support empirical estimation, the third is mostly empirical tests of 
the degree of sterilisation, and the fourth attempts to examine the consequences of 
reserve accumulation.   
The first relatively large strand from the 1970s and 1980s expands on a 
financial model of the economy and elaborates on asset market (normally money and 
bond) equilibrium conditions. A primary focus is estimating the offset equation, the 
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extent to which a monetary policy action is offset by a balance of payments effect, 
and represents a gauge of the degree of financial market integration. The offset 
coefficient is derived from structural estimates of asset demand functions and capital 
flow equations, or through reduced-form equations. Typically an equation is derived 
ZKLFKUHODWHVWKHFDSLWDODFFRXQWWRFKDQJHVLQWKHFHQWUDOEDQN¶VQHWGRPHVWLFDVVHWV
ǻ1'$ ZKLFK LV DVVXPHG WR EH WKH PRQHWDU\ SROLF\ LQVWUXPHQW DQG RWKHU
exogenous variables. The sterilisation equation or monetary policy reaction function 
tends to be set up separately or sometimes as part of a system of simultaneous 
equations, but the choice of explanatory variables can be quite arbitrary.  
The second strand attempts to present a unifying theoretical framework to 
estimate offset and sterilisation equations and has as its base a central bank loss 
minimisation function. This strand attempts to address the somewhat ad hoc 
specification of the monetary policy reaction function and some of the possible 
misspecification issues of the first strand evident in insignificant or perceived 
wrongly signed variables.  
We present these strands in turn, and detail the results of selected empirical 
studies in Appendix 1: Selected Recent Studies on Sterilisation in Developing 
Countries. The selected studies represent key references which we return to in later 
empirical chapters.  
2.2 EQUILIBRIUM IN ASSET MARKETS APPROACH 
Argy and Kouri (1974) show theoretically that different sterilisation policies 
can have different economic effects in terms of the volatility in income and 
international reserves.  The authors evaluate the effect of sterilisation based on three 
GLIIHUHQW UXOHV ZLWK UHJDUG WR ǻ1'$ 7KLV LV GRQH E\ ³PDQLSXODWLQJ D .H\QHVLDQ-
W\SH PRGHO RI DQ RSHQ HFRQRP\´ UHSUHVHQWHG E\ WKH IROORZLQJ HTXDWLRQV in the 
context of a narrowly pegged exchange rate regime. The asset market equilibrium 
conditions and wealth constraint are standard in studies on sterilisation which employ 
the combined monetary approach to the balance of payments and portfolio balance 
model.    ?  ?ǡ ǡ  ? ?   ?  ? ?                                             (2.1)        Ǣ ǡ ǡ ǡ  
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 ?	  ?   ?  ? ? ?  ? ?  ?                                           (2.2)  ? ?  ?ǡǡ ǡ  ?ǡ  ? ? ?  ? (2.3)  ? ?  ?ǡǡ ǡ  ?ǡ  ? ? ?   ? (2.4)  ? ?  ?ǡǡ ǡ  ?ǡ  ? ? ? (2.5)  ? ?  ? ?  ? ?   ?  ?   ?  ? ? (2.6)  ? ? ?  ?  ?  ?	  ? (2.7)  ?  ?  ? ?  ?                (2.8)   ?    ?   ? ?   ? ?  ? ?  ? ?'RPHVWLFUHVLGHQWV¶ZHDOWK is apportioned between three assets ± base 
money, domestic bonds and foreign bonds. 
  ? ?  ? ?  ? ?  ?ǡ   ? ǡ ǡ  ?ǡ  ? : Any increase in the demand for money must be identically 
equal to the decreases in the demand for domestic and foreign securities.  
The three alternative rules are:  
1.  ?  ?  ?	ǡ ?ǡ implying no sterilisation, 
2.  ?  ?  ?	  ?  ?  ?  ?ǡ ǡ  
3.  ?  ?  ?ǡ ?ǡ Ǥ 
The authors explore the impact of disturbances to ǡ ǡ ?ǡ  ? on the 
volatility of international reserves, domestic interest rates and income, by working 
out impact multipliers. For all disturbances, the authors find that the volatility of 
reserves is greater with sterilisatioQ WKDQ ZLWKRXW ³:KHUH WKH PRQH\ VXSSO\ LV
allowed to respond to developments in the balance of payments there is a partial self-
DGMXVWPHQW DW ZRUN ZKLFK LV DEVHQW ZKHQ VWHULOL]DWLRQ SROLFLHV DUH LPSOHPHQWHG´
(page 214).   
The effects of sterilisation on the volatility of income, however, depend on 
the type of disturbance. The authors assess these effects through the impact of 
sterilisation on interest rates which would either have an expansionary or 
contractionary impact on income. Changes in expenditure, which occur when 
financial integration is high, and changes in exports are more stabilising on income 
with sterilisation than without. As the central bank intervenes, in the absence of 
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sterilisation, the resulting effects on money supply and interest rates lead to greater 
variability in income.  
The authors show that it is a different case with money demand shocks. An 
autonomous increase in money demand reduces the demand for domestic and foreign 
securities, the former driving up domestic interest rates. An inflow of capital is 
induced, which to some extent accommodates the increase in demand for money. By 
(completely) sterilising the inflows of capital, domestic interest rates remain 
relatively higher, and the effects on income tend to be larger than without (full) 
sterilisation. Hence a case for incomplete sterilisation can be made in the face of 
money demand shocks.  
A rise in foreign interest rates, meanwhile, may induce shifts out of both 
money demand and domestic securities. As long as the central bank offsets the 
effects of the shifts out of domestic securities, the domestic interest rates does not 
rise, and there are no adverse effects on income. However, by sterilising the effects 
of shifts out of domestic money, the authorities force the public to hold unwanted 
money at the original interest rate. Hence, the domestic interest rate declines.  
Thus, the authors conclude that complete sterilisation while almost certain to 
moderate fluctuations in income is not necessarily more stabilising to income than a 
fixed interest rate policy. If fluctuations in expenditure (including shifts in export) 
are more important than fluctuations in the demand for money and foreign interest 
rates, then a money supply rule is likely to be more stabilising then an interest rate 
rule. This result bears similarity to that of the instrument choice problem discussed in 
Poole (1970), where in a stochastic setting, if there are more money demand shocks 
than aggregate demand shocks, the interest rate should be used as the monetary 
policy instrument.  
In a practical context, it may be difficult to identify money demand shocks 
and for a central bank to alternately choose between a money supply rule and an 
interest rate rule in its sterilisation response. Nevertheless, given widespread 
instability in empirical estimations of money demand, in reality many central banks 
in more recent times have chosen to target interest rates by default. Operationally, 
central banks tend to target a very short-term interest rate, relying on effective 
transmission to the rest of the spectrum of interest rates in order to meet their 
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stabilisation goals. Thus, many central banks do in fact practise a fixed interest rate 
policy for sterilisation, at least in terms of a short-term interest rate.  
$UJ\DQG.RXUL¶s theoretical exposition of the effects of sterilisation policy 
illustrates the importance of asset market portfolios and the nature of disturbances 
affecting an economy. There are, however, several simplifications that result in some 
degree of ambiguity in assessing the effects of sterilisation. For instance, only base 
money demand is considered and implicitly a money multiplier of one is assumed. In 
addition, non-residents and banks are excluded from the model. One can endeavour 
to trace out how the dynamics between the different sectors of the economy ± the 
non-bank private sector (foreign and domestic), the banking sector and the central 
bank, affect base money, broad money and asset returns. 
Argy and Murray (1985) examine the effects of sterilising different types of 
balance of payments surpluses on domestic yields, namely bond and equity returns. 
This is done through a multiple-asset portfolio balance model, and with full 
sterilisation defined as keeping base money unchanged.  With full sterilisation, bond 
returns are shown to rise under the scenarios of an exogenous inflow of capital, a 
current account surplus and a fall in foreign interest rates, while the effect on equity 
returns is ambiguous. Their model serves as a key reference in our simple model set-
up in Chapter 3 and we therefore, discuss further details later.  
Aside from the theoretical model, Argy and Kouri (1974) also estimate a 
V\VWHPRIVLPXOWDQHRXVHTXDWLRQVZLWKQHWFDSLWDOLQIORZVDQGǻ1'$DVGHSHQGHQW
variables in each regression respectively, to gauge offset and sterilisation effects in 
Italy, Netherlands and Germany for the period 1964-1970. The two-stage least 
squares method is used on quarterly data to address the bias arising from the 
HQGRJHQHLW\ RI QHW FDSLWDO LQIORZV DQG ǻ1'$ 7Ke control variables in the 
sterilisation equation comprise the capacity utilisation rate, a time trend and seasonal 
GXPPLHV7KHDXWKRUV¶UHVXOWVVXJJHVWWKDWFDSLWDOIORZVKDYHSDUWO\RIIVHWWKHHIIHFWV
of monetary policy on the monetary base and that sterilisation policies have been 
pursued but not to the full amount of payment surpluses or deficits. The authors, 
however, note that the results ought to be interpreted with caution, particularly the 
sterilisation equation which, at best, is a rough approximation to central bank 
behaviour.  
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Herring and Marston (1977) investigate the trade-off between monetary 
autonomy and control over foreign exchange reserves. They provide a simple model-
based approach to understanding the degree of offset ± the extent to which a policy- 
induced change in bank reserves is offset by capital flows, and estimate offset and 
sterilisation coefficients for Germany. Key elements that distinguish their work 
include the explicit introduction of the supply and demand for bank reserves that 
determine the domestic interest rate, and a consideration of various policy 
instruments in their version of the monetary policy reaction function.  
The supply of bank reserves is positively related to the domestic interest rate 
in a fixed exchange rate regime, since higher interest rates trigger inflows, and 
therefore foreign exchange intervention. The demand for bank reserves meanwhile is 
a proportion of bank deposits based on the required reserves ratio. Since the demand 
for bank deposits is negatively related to the home interest rate, so is the demand for 
bank reserves. The demand and supply of bank reserves together determine the level 
of bank reserves and the interest rate on home bonds. The supply of bank reserves is 
determined by the quantity of foreign exchange reserves and home bonds held by the 
central bank (open market operations).   
 A policy-induced contraction in bank reserves leads to higher interest rates, 
which triggers inflows. To maintain a fixed exchange rate, however, an expansion in 
bank reserves is required. Thus only a fraction of the initial contraction takes place.  
The degree of offset depends positively on the ease of substitutability between 
foreign bonds and home bonds. It depends negatively on the interest rate sensitivity 
of the demand for bank deposits and the required reserves ratio. Nevertheless, if 
foreign exchange reserve flows can be sterilised, a high offset coefficient does not 
necessarily imply the loss of monetary autonomy. 
 The authors explain that if the central bank was exclusively committed to the 
attainment of domestic targets, it would sterilise completely. If the central bank was 
only concerned about external balance, the central bank might permit changes in 
foreign reserves to be fully reflected in bank resHUYHV³6WHULOLVDWLRQWKXVKDVRSSRVLWH
effects on capital flows and bank reserves. If sterilisation is increased to reduce the 
impact of capital flows on bank reserves, a price must be paid since capital inflows 
induced by a disturbance are thereby increased. As a result, choosing a sterilisation 
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policy implicitly involves choosing a point on the trade-off between control over 
IRUHLJQH[FKDQJHUHVHUYHVDQGFRQWURORYHUEDQNUHVHUYHV´SDJH 
Herring and Marston estimate a monetary policy reaction function for 
Germany over the period 1960q3 ± 1971q1. In deriving the monetary policy reaction 
function, the change in the monetary policy instrument is defined as the sum of the 
effective change in non-borrowed reserves and the change in borrowed reserves2. 
The effective change in non-borrowed reserves is the change in non-borrowed 
reserves net of swap commitments and the change in required reserves due to a 
change in the required reserves ratio.    ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? +  ? ?                                                     (2.9)  ? ? ? ?  (Change in holdings of government securities)   ?    ?    ? 3  ?  ?  
 
The change in monetary policy is then related to the change in domestic 
target variables,  ? and foreign exchange reserves, FXR (equation 2.10). The 
monetary targets are scaled by the average reserve requirement ratio to reflect the 
fact that when the reserve requirement is higher, it takes a proportionately larger 
increase in bank reserves to achieve a given expansionary effect. In the equation 
estimated, using two-stage least squares, the indicators used for domestic objectives 
are the inflation rate, the percentage change in manufacturing orders, and the change 
in trend income.   ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?	 ?              (2.10)
        
Higher inflation and manufacturing orders (leading cyclical income indicator) lead to 
a decline in effective bank reserves, while an increase in trend income would lead to 
an increase in bank reserves (in order to finance the increased volume of economic 
                                                          
2
  The authors do not  explicitly introduce the constituents of bank reserves but it can be gauged from 
their discussion that not unlike the US Federal Reserve system, bank reserves comprise required reserves, excess 
reserves, non-borrowed reserves (reflecting open market operations) and borrowed reserves (discount window 
operations). 
3
  The authors make the distinction between required reserves that increase due to an increase in deposits 
and that which increase due to a change in the ratio itself.  
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activity). A high sterilisation coefficient of 0.9 is found indicating that the 
Bundesbank placed primary emphasis on the pursuit of its domestic objectives rather 
than on the maintenance of external balance. While Herring and Marston attempt a 
more refined measure of the monetary policy instrument; like Argy and Kouri, the 
focus is still on base money components and the domestic target variables are also 
set in a rather arbitrary manner. 
 Obstfeld (1983) also uses a portfolio balance model to illustrate intervention 
and sterilisation under imperfect asset substitutability. He examines whether the 
German Bundesbank pursued a sterilisation policy during the years 1975-1981 and if 
sterilised intervention had significant effects on the exchange rate. He states that 
even under flexible exchange rates, a conflict between internal and external 
REMHFWLYHV PD\ DULVH SDJH  ³0RQHWDU\ H[SDQVLRQ LQGXFHV H[FKDQJH UDWH
depreciation which feeds into domestic prices and wages. This in turn, shortens the 
short run in whiFK HDV\ PRQH\ FDQ NHHS QRPLQDO LQWHUHVW UDWHV ORZ´ 6WHULOLVHG
intervention then provides an independent policy instrument through which the 
central bank can resolve the policy conflict between domestic policies and balance of 
payment considerations in the short run.  
With an expansionary monetary policy,  the supply of high powered money 
increases, leading to a decline in the stock of outstanding Government debt with the 
purchase of bonds, and a decline in interest rates. The exchange rate would 
depreciate as a result. Sterilised intervention, however, would allow the central bank 
to lower the interest rate without affecting the exchange rate, with further bond 
purchases to offset its intervention activity which caused a decline in its foreign 
assets and high powered money.  
In terms of the monetary policy reaction function for the Bundesbank, along 
the lines of Herring and Marston, the change in domestic credit ( ?) is defined as 
WKH LQFUHDVH LQ WKH FHQWUDO EDQN¶V QHW GRPHVWLF DVVHWV ? ? ? minus the reserves 
impounded by any increase in required reserves. The latter component is calculated 
as:   ? ? ?  ? ? ? ?Ǥ ? ? ? ?                                                                        (2.11)   ? ;  ?  ?  ? 
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Obstfeld estimates a reaction function of the following form using non-linear least 
squares. ( ?) is assumed to respond to the change in reserves which excludes 
valuation adjustments, the current output gap (measured as the percent excess of 
trend output over actual output) and lagged inflation:  ? ? ? ɩ ? ?	 ? ?ɩ ?
 ? ?ɩ ?	 ? ? ? ?  ?                   (2.12) 
The estimation results support the hypothesis that the Bundesbank had used 
domestic credit policy to attain domestic policy objectives while engaged in 
sterilized foreign exchange intervention in order to influence the exchange rate. Over 
the period 1975-1981, the sterilization coefficient does not differ significantly from 
minus one, the coefficient on the output gap is positive and significant, but that on 
inflation is insignificant. 
 2EVWIHOGQRWHVKRZHYHUWKDWWKHUHDFWLRQIXQFWLRQFDSWXUHVWKHFHQWUDOEDQN¶V
behaviour but does not necessarily indicate the efficacy of policies. Specifically, he 
uses a structural model of asset markets and prices with simulation experiments to 
gauge the effects of sterilised intervention on the exchange rate. His experiments 
LQGLFDWH WKDW ³WKH %XQGHVEDQN¶V DELOLW\ WR LQIOXHQFH WKH H[FKDQJH UDWH ZLWKRXW
DOWHULQJPRQHWDU\FRQGLWLRQVLVYHU\OLPLWHG´SDJH 
2.3 CENTRAL BANK LOSS FUNCTION MINIMISATION APPROACH 
In response to the ad hoc specification of reaction functions and the problem 
of endogeneity of the monetary policy instrument and foreign exchange reserves, 
Roubini (1988) proposes an analytical model where the sterilisation and offset 
coefficients are derived from an explicit maximisation problem faced by the 
monetary authority. The optimal intervention and sterilisation policies are shown to 
be dependent on the different disturbances hitting the economy and the preference of 
the monetary authorities. Like other research output in the literature, Roubini 
considers a simple financial model of a small open economy with a fixed exchange 
rate. Similar to previous models, money and bond market equilibrium conditions 
form the basis of this model. Incomplete asset substitutability is assumed. Roubini 
suggests a short-term loss function with weights given to stabilising foreign 
exchange reserves and interest rate-smoothing.  
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The loss function of the central bank is written as,   ?  ? ? ? ? ? Į  ? ? ? ? ?, 
where Įis the weight placed on the foreign reserves objective (R) relative to the 
interest rate smoothing goal (r) in the loss function. These are the short-run 
objectives of the central bank. The loss function is solved with regard to the domestic 
credit component RIEDVHPRQH\'ZKLFKLVWKHFHQWUDOEDQN¶VSROLF\LQVWUXPHQWWR
control its two objectives, and subject to reduced-form equations for r and R, which 
are derived from the asset market equations. The reduced-form equations for D and 
R show these two variables depending only on the exogenous variables (namely 
foreign interest rate, domestic financial wealth (current account), domestic real 
income, and the stock of domestic bonds), and not on each other which is different 
from the standard equations found in the literature.  Under different domestic and 
foreign exogenous disturbances, the optimal central bank response will lead to a 
negative (positive) correlation between movements in D and R if the central bank 
places more (less) emphasis on interest rate-smoothing relative to stabilising foreign 
exchange reserves.  The assumption of imperfect asset substitutability enables the 
central bank to exercise some degree of control over the domestic interest rate via D 
(the offset coefficient is less than one).  
Brissimis et al. (2002) also seek to address the simultaneous equation bias 
associated with the offset and sterilisation literature. In particular, they note that 
while this is partly addressed in Herring and Marston (1977) with the offset 
coefficient calculated based on estimates of parameters from structural equations, 
such an approach is limited by the possibility of misspecification and the lack of 
data. The authors provide a unifying theoretical framework in which both the 
monetary policy reaction function and foreign exchange intervention can be jointly 
determined. They ensure that the resulting semi-reduced equations are identified, 
thus enabling better estimates of the offset and sterilisation coefficients. The authors 
postulate the following central bank loss function:  ? ?Į ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?ȕ ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?Ȗ ? 愋? ? ? ?į ?ı ? ? ? ? ?Ȧ ?ı ? ? ? ?         (2.13) 
The central bank seeks to minimise deviations of the exchange rate and 
inflation from some target levels, as well as to minimise cyclical income; interest rate 
and exchange rate volatility. The measure of loss in terms of exchange rate level and 
volatility contrasts with previous literature which measure loss in terms of changes to 
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foreign exchange reserves. Brissimis et al. choose exchange rate measures as the 
foreign exchange reserves measure assumes that the exchange rate target is always 
met. The loss function is minimised by the central bank choosing foreign exchange 
intervention ( ?	 ? and domestic money market intervention  ? ? ? subject to a 
number of constraints, in terms of inflation; cyclical income; the balance of payments 
and the exchange rate; interest rate volatility; and exchange rate volatility.  
Inflation:  ? ?=ȝ ? ? 	 ? ?  ? ? ? ?ȝ ? ? ? ? ?             (2.14) 
Inflation depends on past inflation and the change in current base money 
Cyclical income:  愋? ? ĳ ? ? 	 ? ?  ? ? ? ?ĳ ? 愋? ? ?            (2.15) 
Current cyclical income depends on base money and the cyclical position of the 
economy in the previous period.  
 
Balance of payments and the exchange rate:  ?	 ? ?   ?  ? ?    (a)  ? ? ?  ? ?  ? ? ??? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ?     (b)  ? ? ?   ?Ĳ ? ?    (c) 
Replacing (b) and (c) into (a) and rearranging for the exchange rate gives:  ? ?  ?	 ? ?   ?  ? ? ? ?Ĳ ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?          (2.16) 
  ? ? is the foreign interest. c is the degree of relative risk aversion between domestic 
and foreign assets. If c=0, then domestic and foreign assets are perfect substitutes 
and capital is perfectly mobile ± any deviation from uncovered interest rate parity 
will lead to an infinite capital flow.  
 Interest rate volatility: 
ı ? ? ? șı ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ?                                                             (2.17)  ?  ?  ? when the money market is in surplus, 0 when the money market is in deficit. 
Interest rate volatility depends positively on past levels of volatility and negatively 
on the absolute amount of money market intervention undertaken by the central 
bank.  
 Exchange rate volatilityǣ 
 
ı ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?İ ? 	 ? ?  ? ?	 ? ?                         (2.18) 
  ?= 2 when there is excess demand for foreign currency (and the central bank is 
losing reserves), 0 when there is excess supply of foreign currency (and reserves are 
rising).  
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 Solving the system of equations, semi-reduced-form equations for  ?(sterilisation equation) and  ?	 (offset equation) are derived such that:  ? ?  ?  ? ? ?	 ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ?), -  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ? ? ?ǡ  ? 愋? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ? ?  ? ?ı ? ? ? ??              (2.19)  ?	 ?  ?  ? ? ? ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ?), -  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? 愋? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ? ?  ? ?ı ? ? ? ??              (2.20) 
 ³7KHYRODWLOLW\RIWKHGRPHVWLFLQWHUHVWUDWHDQGWKHH[FKDQJHUDWHLGHQWLI\WKH
money market intervention rule and the foreign exchange intervention rule 
respectively. Thus, the two equations are independent of each other and it is possible 
to solve for reduced-form equations for both  ?and  ?	´ SDJHWKRXJKWKH
authors do not do this in their paper.  
 The authors use three-stage least squares to estimate the sterilisation and 
offset coefficients for Germany over the period 1979-1992. In the sterilisation 
equation, income and inflation are found to be insignificant. The authors attribute 
this to inflation being more of a concern than income deviations from trend, and to  ?and  ?	 being rather volatile, which is not the case for the inflation series. 
The other explanatory variables are found to be significant. The long-run sterilisation 
coefficient for Germany is found to be not significantly different from one.  
 Ouyang et al. (2008, 2010) and Ouyang and Rajan (2011) modify the loss 
minimisation framework of Brissimis et al. (2002) in order to investigate the 
sterilisation and offset coefficients for eight Asian economies through panel data 
analysis4; and individually for China; and Singapore and Taiwan respectively, over 
sample periods that encompass the 2000s. The key changes made by the authors are 
dropping the deviation of the exchange rate from a target level from the loss 
function; endogenising the current account by assuming it is affected by both income 
and the exchange rate (  ? Į ? ?ǡ ? ?Į ? ? ? ? ? ?. incorporating government 
spending as a factor affecting cyclical output; and having inflation and cyclical 
                                                          
4
  The countries in the panel data analysis are India, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Korea, 
Indonesia and Taiwan. According to Ouyang et al., the Hausman test indicates no significant difference in the 
estimations using fixed and random effects. Only the empirical results of the random effects estimation are 
reported.  
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output depend positively on the change in money supply ( ? ? ?  while the interest 
rate is negatively influenced by  ? ?5Ǥ ? ? is defined to result from changes in 
base money and the money multiplier:  ? ?= ( ? ? ?  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?. 
The authors solve the system of equations to arrive at the following semi-reduced 
sterilisation and offset equations:   ? ?  ?  ? ? ?	 ?ǡ  ? ? ?ǡ -  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ? ? ?ǡ  ? 愋? ? ?ǡ  ? ?
 ?ǡ  ? ? ? ?,  ? ? ? ?  ? ?ı ? ? ? ??          
                                                                                                                             (2.21)   ?	 ?  ?  ? ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?ǡ -  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ? ? ?ǡ  ? 愋? ? ?ǡ  ? ?
 ?ǡ  ? ? ? ?,  ? ? ? ?  ? ?ı ? ? ? ??              (2.22) 
 
For the panel data analysis (Ouyang et al., 2008), emprical results from two-
stage least squares panel regression for pre-crisis (1990q1-1997q1) and post-crisis 
(1998q3-2005q3) sample periods under two alternative assumptions on the formation 
of exchange rate expectations indicate a lower offset (capital mobility) coefficient in 
the second sub-sample. The results on the sterilisation coefficient are hard to assess, 
rising under one scenario in the post-crisis period (and exceeding one) and declining 
under the other, but do suggest that the extent of sterilisation has remained high 
(above one in the perfect foresight model and around 0.9 in the static expectations 
model). Of the other explanatory variables in the regressions, the money multiplier is 
the only regressor displaying consistent statistical significance, with negative 
coefficients across sub-samples for the sterilisation and offset equations. The authors 
expect negative signs which are interpreted as reflecting contractionary monetary 
policy in the sterilisation equation in response to a rise in the multiplier, and outflows 
in the offset equation on account of a rise in the multiplier which expands money and 
pushes down interest rates.  
The framework used by Ouyang et al. (2008) to generalise across recent 
experiences of several countries raises several issues, particularly since the countries 
are a mixture of interest rate-targeting and monetary-targeting. The authors state that 
                                                          
5
  In Brissimis et al. (2002), base money is used in the cyclical income and inflation equations while the 
domestic interest rate is negatively related to  ? ?Ǥ 
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they do not attempt to specify a policy rule and hence it is reasonable to derive an 
HTXDWLRQIRUǻ1'$DVRSSRVHGWRLQWHUHVWUDWHV+RZHYHUWKHLULQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH
coefficients on the regressors LQWKHVWHULOLVDWLRQHTXDWLRQYHU\PXFKWUHDWVǻ1'$DV
a monetary policy instrument. In particular, we would intepret the negative 
coefficient on the the money multipler differently ± a decline in the money multiplier 
reflects higher reserve requirements, which, following the identity of base money 
FRPSRQHQWVZRXOG LPSO\ DSRVLWLYHǻ1'$7KDW LVZLWKPRUH OLTXLGLW\ DEVRUEHG
WKURXJK UHTXLUHG UHVHUYHV WKHUH LV OHVV QHHG IRU DEVRUSWLRQ WKURXJK ǻ1'$ 7KH
model also assumes a direct link between money, and inflation and cyclical income, 
and that the interest rate is determined by the change in money supply ± all 
suggesting an exogenous, policy instrument role for money. 
2.4 STERILISATION: A SURVEY OF OTHER RECENT EMPIRICAL 
 CONTRIBUTIONS 
More recent studies in the 1990s and 2000s tend to take a looser approach to 
theoretical foundations in the empirical estimation of the extent of sterilisation. The 
methods of estimation however are wide-ranging, from simple ratios to single-
equations, simultaneous equations, vector auto-regressions (VAR) and vector error 
correction models (VECM). In addition, the specifications of the equations tend to 
vary with different explanatory variables assumed. As with previous literature, 
studies tend to focus on base money sterilisation rather than broad money 
sterilisation, and oscillate between adjusting and not adjusting for reserve 
requirements.  
 Cardarelli et al. (2009) develop a sterilisation index for 52 countries ± eight 
advanced and 44 developing countries over the period 1991-2007. Pooled regressions 
RI FHQWUDO EDQNV¶  ? on  ?	 are carried out for each year using monthly 
observations. There is no inclusion of other explanatory variables.  ? ? ? = ? ?+ȕ ? ? ?	 ? ? ?  ? ?                                                                             (2.23) 
 The authors also estimate a broad sterilisation index, which they view as 
reflecting sterilisation efforts primarily through reserve requirements to prevent an 
increase in base money from causing a broad money expansion. The regression 
equation for the broad measure takes the following form: 
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 ? ? ? ? = ? ?+į ? ? ?	 ? ? ?  ? ?                                                                                 (2.24)                          
A value of į  ?  ? in (2.24) implies full sterilisation. The authors indicate that 
the results for this broad index were found to be consistent with the ones using the 
narrow index but do not reproduce the results and instead choose to focus on the 
QDUURZLQGH[DV³LWPDWFKHGVRPHFRXQWU\H[SHULHQFHVEHWWHU´SDJH7KHDXWKRUV
briefly acknowledge the use of alternative measures including adding additional 
H[SODQDWRU\ YDULDEOHV EXW VWDWH WKDW WKH\ DLP WR ³VWULNH DQ DSSURSULDWH EDODQFH
between technical sophistication and cross-couQWU\FRQVLVWHQF\´SDJH 
Their results of the narrow sterilisation index suggest some convergence in 
WKHGHJUHHRIVWHULOLVDWLRQDFURVVUHJLRQVSDJH³7KHKLJKYDOXHVRIWKHLQGH[LQ
the early 1990s and the early 2000s-the beginning of the two waves of large capital 
inflows ± suggest an aggressive sterilization effort when capital begins to pour in. 
The index subsequently tapers off around 2006, perhaps indicating that as 
intervention continued, the authorities became increasingly conscious of its FRVW´ 
While the authors do not delve into specific country experiences to quantify 
WKHLPSDFWRIVWHULOLVDWLRQRQPRQHWDU\DQGILQDQFLDOFRQGLWLRQVWKH\DVVHUWWKDW³$
policy of aggressive sterilization usually raises domestic interest rates. The standard 
mechanism for the increase in interest rates works as follows: to induce investors to 
hold increased supply of short-term paper owing to open market operations, the price 
of this paper need to fall and yields to increase. In other words, a decrease in central 
EDQNV¶ 1'$ OHDGV WR DQ LQFUHDVH LQ LQWHUHVW UDWHV 7KHUHIRUH PRYHPHQWV LQ VKRUW-
WHUPLQWHUHVWUDWHVFDQEHVHHQDVFRXQWHUSDUWVRIFKDQJHVLQFHQWUDOEDQNV¶GRPHVWLF
DVVHWVDQGWKXVRIWKHVWHULOL]DWLRQHIIRUW´SDJH7KLVZRXOGKRZHYHUGHSHQG on, 
as Argy and Kouri (1974) point out, the nature of the sterilisation policy, as well as 
possibly the demand for short-term paper. In addition, while Cardarelli et al. (2009) 
do not explore the mechanics of sterilisation under an interest rate-targeting 
IUDPHZRUN WKH\ QRWH SDJH  ³WKH LQFUHDVH LQ WKH PRQHWDU\ EDVH ORZ
sterilization) may not reflect expansionary monetary policy, but simply the 
DFFRPPRGDWLRQRIDKLJKHUGHPDQGIRUPRQH\´ 
 Takagi (1999), in contrast, focuses exclusively on measuring the broad 
definition of sterilisation for five Asian countries (Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia and the Philippines) over the period 1987-1997.  He explains that the broad 
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definition allows for the estimation of the degree of sterilisation whilst setting aside 
the question of how sterilisation has actually been carried out, since the countries in 
the sample have used various sterilisation methods. He carries out Granger causality 
tests between central bank foreign assets (FA) and monetary aggregates (M1 and 
M2), and the following regression, which resembles a real money demand equation:   ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ?   ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ?  ? ?  ?                                                                        (2.25)                          
In the above equation, v is a vector of other explanatory variables including the 
change in real output, the change in money market interest rates and seasonal 
dummiesǤ Lagged FA is used in the estimation because it is expected to affect broad 
money over time through the banking sector. Overall, the causality tests and the 
regression analysis appear to suggest that sterilisation was effective in limiting the 
growth of monetary aggregates in all countries. Granger causality tests suggest no 
relationship running from foreign assets to money market rates, which the author 
QRWHVSDJH³PD\PHDQWKDWVWHULOL]DWLRQZDVHIIHFWLYHQRWQHFHVVDULO\LQUDLVLQJ
WKHOHYHORILQWHUHVWUDWHVEXWLQNHHSLQJLWIURPIDOOLQJWRZDUGVZRUOGLQWHUHVWUDWHV´ 
Lavigne (2008) meanwhile computes simple ratios of  ?to  ?	, with 
the former adjusted for reserve requirements, WR PHDVXUH ³WRWDO´ VWHULOLVDWLRQ 7KH
ratios, however, still belong to the category of the narrow definition of sterilisation as 
the focus is on base money. The following ratios are used:  ? 嘋? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? or, 
equivalently,  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ?ǤRD and CC are reserve deposits and currency in circulation 
respectively. These ratios are calculated for 35 countries covering emerging Asia, oil 
producing countries, Latin America and other emerging market economies in 
Europe, the Middle East and Africa. The author focuses on 2000-2006 with 1990-
1996 as a reference period, noting that over the past three decades, the latter has been 
the only other major instance of protracted sterilisation roughly comparable to 2000-
2006. Lavigne notes however, that most of the reserve accumulation in the early 
1990s was driven by capital account surpluses but over 2000-2006 most countries 
were running current account surpluses. Based on the analysis of ratios, sterilisation 
ratios have been high and there appears to be higher sterilisation over 2000-2006. We 
highlight, however, that Lavigne is essentially measuring the growth in currency in 
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circulation versus reserve accumulation. The usefulness of this measure and more 
generally, base money sterilisation is discussed in Chapter 4. 
 Aizenman and Glick (2009) estimate sterilisation equations for selected 
countries in Asia and Latin America6 based on the narrow definition of sterilisation. 
The authors attempt to analyse how sterilisation depends on the underlying source of 
reserve accumulation ± whether net exports or different forms of capital inflows. The 
authors find that for some countries, the sterilisation of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflows is typically less than for current account surpluses and non-FDI flows 
³VXggesting that misgivings about monetary instability depend on the composition of 
EDODQFH RI SD\PHQWV LQIORZV´ SDJH   WKDW LV WKHVH FRXQWULHV DUH OHVV DQ[LRXV
about the monetary impact of direct investment flows. However, no explanation is 
provided for the possible different treatment of the flows. We are of the view that it 
is difficult to reconcile the different treatment of flows with an interest rate-targeting 
framework. As long as there is intervention, the liquidity associated with such 
operations will be absorbed to keep interest rates stable regardless of the balance of 
payments source. It is then a question of whether there is more intervention for some 
flows relative to others. The differences in treatment that Aizenman and Glick find 
may instead reflect the larger-sized current account and non-FDI flows and higher 
associated intervention driving the regression relationship. It should be noted that no 
information is available on the extent of intervention that is actually involved for the 
different types of balance of payments flows.  
 Aizenman and Glick estimate the degree of sterilisation by regressing  ? 
on  ?	 (and in an alternative specification, the subcomponents of the balance of 
payments). The change is measured over four quarters and scaled by the level of 
reserve money stock four quarters ago. The four-quarter growth rate of nominal GDP 
is included as an exogenous variable to control for other explanatory variables,  ?, 
that might influence the demand for money. The authors thus do not model the 
regression as a monetary policy reaction function.   ? ?Ȁ ? ? ? ? +ȕ ?	 ?Ȁ ? ? ? ?į ? ? ?  ?                                               (2.26) 
                                                          
6
  7KHFRXQWULHVLQWKHDXWKRUV¶VDPSOHDUH&KLQD,QGLD.RUHD0DOD\VLD6LQJDSRUHDQG7KDLODQGLQ
Asia; Argentina, Brazil and Mexico in Latin America.  
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 The equation is estimated for each country with OLS over sample periods 
that end 2007q2 but have varying start points in the 1980s or 1990s.  The coefficient 
RQ QRPLQDO *'3 JURZWK LV SRVLWLYH ³LPSO\LQJ WKDW WKH FHQWUDO EDQN VXpplies 
liquidity to the economy by increasing its claims in response to greater economic 
DFWLYLW\´ SDJH7KHDXWKRUVDOVRHVWLPDWH WKHHTXDWLRQZLWK LQIODWLRQDQG UHDO
GDP growth instead. The coefficients on these variables are found to be generally 
positive and significant, consistent with the positive sign on nominal GDP. We note 
that these results are different from other studies in that the coefficients are 
significant, and the positive signs are in fact the expected signs. In contrast, in a 
monetary policy reaction function, negative signs on the coefficients for inflation and 
output gap would be expected.  
2.5 MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES AND LIMITS OF  
 STERILISATION 
 In the previous sections, we mainly dealt with the definition and 
measurement of sterilisation. We found that research focus has generally been 
skewed towards base money sterilisation and that there is no consensus, empirically, 
on the method to estimate the degree of sterilisation. 
 We also partly covered the question of how monetary and financial variables 
evolve amidst sterilisation, mainly drawing on Argy and Kouri (1974) who theorise 
that the effects of sterilisation on interest rates depend upon the nature of shocks and 
the extent of sterilisation in response to these shocks. Argy and Murray (1985) show 
that if changes to base money are fully sterilised, bond returns will unambiguously 
increase under different positive balance of payments shocks.  
 Frankel (1994), with reference to broad money sterilisation, also states that 
the desirable strategy in the treatment of capital inflows depends on the nature of the 
disturbances. For instance, when there are shifts in preference from foreign bonds to 
domestic bonds, driven by either external or domestic factors, such as market reform, 
there is a case for sterilising these flows by supplying the domestic bonds to meet 
LQYHVWRUV¶ GHPDQG :KHQ LQVWHDG WKHUH LV DQ LQFUHDVHG GHPDQG IRU PRQH\ IRU
example in response to an exchange rate stabilisation programme, there should not be 
an attempt to sterilise the increase in money. He notes however, in a situation with 
multiple assets, if there was increased demand for corporate bonds and equities and 
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central bank securities were poor substitutes for these other assets, then interest rates 
on the sterilisation bonds may increase whilst the returns on the other assets decline7. 
 Cardarelli et al. (2009) note that it is generally expected that sterilisation 
would lead to a rise in interest rates8. Takagi (1999) however, found evidence to the 
contrary.  In this section, the macroeconomic consequences of reserve accumulation 
and sterilisation are taken up more comprehensively, along with the practical limits 
and challenges associated with carrying out sterilisation.  
At the crux of the matter is whether central banks are still able to achieve 
their domestic stabilisation goals and, given lags, how reserve accumulation and 
sterilisation affect elements that may have implications for the achievement of these 
goals in the medium to long run. These elements would include the degree of 
monetary policy independence (being able to influence interest rates towards 
attaining domestic goals; and the degree of correlation with global interest rates), the 
relative accommodativeness of monetary conditions (changes in the spectrum of 
interest rates and prices on other financial and real variables) and the effectiveness of 
the monetary transmission mechanism. There appears not to be a single piece of 
literature that brings all these elements together, although there are various studies 
that have addressed these issues separately9.  
 Reinhart and Reinhart (1998) explore the effects of sterilised intervention on 
interest rates, spreads and capital flows in several episodes of large inflows including 
                                                          
7
  Frankel (1994) argues that the contrasting views of Calvo et al. (1993) and Reisen (1993) are both 
correct under different circumstances. The Calvo et al. view is that sterilisation perpetuates a high domestic-
foreign interest rate differential and increases the fiscal burden (in a primarily Latin American context). Reisen 
points to the more successful sterilisation efforts in South-East Asia compared to Latin America. Frankel 
attributes the differences to the nature of disturbances to reserve inflows. In particular, he suggests that only with 
an increase in the demand for money, or an increase in demand for domestic goods is the interest rate higher with 
the disturbance then without it. As for the relatively more successful sterilisation in South-East Asia, he suggests 
that the countries in question may have been able to retain the ability to sterilise while undertaking international 
financial liberalisation because domestic financial liberalisation was delayed, such that it was not the domestic 
interest rate that mattered most for domestic demand.  
8
  Cardarelli et al. (2009) find that greater real exchange rate appreciation has been associated with 
stronger acceleration of CPI inflation, more sterilised intervention and rising government expenditure. These 
results are taken to indicate that a policy of sterilised intervention is unlikely to prevent real appreciation and 
often tends to be associated with higher inflation. Increasing quasi-fiscal costs of sterilisation may eventually 
induce policymakers to give up complete sterilisation efforts. The additional liquidity from incomplete 
sterilisation may then add to inflationary pressures.  
9
  We note that there has been substantial debate on the effectiveness of sterilised intervention in terms of 
influencing exchange rates, generally with evidence of short-term influence but questionable persistent effects. 
See, for instance, Sarno and Taylor (2001) and Disyatat and Galati (2005) for overviews, and Siklos and 
Weymark (2007) for empirical analysis in the context of emerging market economies. We do not focus on this 
aspect of the sterilisation literature, but rather assume that central banks, particularly in emerging market 
economies, are able to influence exchange rates given evidence of active intervention operations and reserve 
accumulation.  
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those in Chile (1990), Colombia (1991), Indonesia (1991-1992), and Malaysia (1991-
1993). They highlight that six empirical regularities characterise these episodes:  
(1) A considerable amount of international reserves were accumulated. 
(2) Despite heavy foreign exchange intervention, either the rate of exchange rate 
devaluation slowed or there was a revaluation.  
(3) Issuance of central bank notes increased dramatically.  
(4) Domestic short-term interest rates (deposits, prime loan rates, and central 
bank paper) rose when sterilisation began. This may support the imperfect 
asset substitutability argument of Frankel (1994). In addition, since capital 
inflows may coincide with periods of strong economic growth, it is possible 
that money demand also increased. As such, monetary policy may have been 
inadvertently tight, in that increases in money demand were not 
accommodated.  
(5) Interest rate spreads were kept high by sterilisation policies. Sterilisation 
policies were either abandoned altogether, scaled back, or complemented by 
capital controls, as it became evident that the high domestic interest rates 
were attracting more inflows.  
(6) In addition to attracting further short-term flows, the rise in short-term 
interest rates associated with sterilised intervention dampened investment 
demand when sustained for a sufficient period. That is, as a result of the 
intervention, holding all else equal, the cost of capital rose with the returns on 
less risky assets (such as government paper).  
5HLQKDUW DQG 5HLQKDUW¶V FRQFOXVLRQV LOOXVWUDWH KRZ VWHULOLVDWLRQ FDQ OHDG WR
increases and variability in interest rates which may be undesirable from the 
standpoint of domestic goals10 and also self-defeating in that it reinforces capital 
flows. It would also seem that while imperfect asset substitutability between foreign 
and domestic assets is necessary for sterilisation to work, imperfect asset 
substitutability between domestic assets or the mismatch between assets supplied (by 
central banks) and demanded (by investors) could be detrimental to the effectiveness 
of sterilisation.  Thaicharoen and Ananchotikul (2008), in discussing the challenges 
                                                          
10
  Reinhart and Reinhart, however, do not clarify if indeed, the interest rates were deliberately increased 
to reflect the general PRQHWDU\WLJKWHQLQJVWDQFHDWWKHWLPH)XUWKHU7DNDJL¶VUHVXOWVDSSHDUWRFRQWUDGLFW
Reinhart and Reinhart as the former does not find that a rise in foreign assets leads to a rise in interest rates, 
though this may reflect the differences in interest rates considered and the sample period.  
30 
 
faced by Thailand that led to the imposition of unremunerated reserve requirements 
in December 2006, also highlight the difficulty of carrying out large scale 
intervention and sterilisation with regard to interest rates. They note (page 439): 
³WRRPDQ\ERQGLVVXHVEXQFKLQJXSWRJHWKHULQDVKRUWSHULRGRIWLPHFRXOG have 
an adverse impact on the yield curve. Special attention was therefore paid to the 
WLPLQJYROXPHDQGPDWXULW\RIWKHERQGLVVXHVLQRUGHUWRPLQLPLVHWKHLPSDFW´ 
Mohanty and Turner (2006) explore how prolonged reserve accumulation and 
sterilisation can lead to other adverse consequences even if near-term inflation is not 
readily apparent. These include monetary imbalances; overheated asset markets; 
distortions and reduced efficiency in the banking system which could affect financial 
intermediation; and balance sheet losses for central banks.  
The authors highlight that large scale reserve accumulation typically raises 
WKH XQGHUO\LQJ OLTXLGLW\ SRVLWLRQ RI WKH EDQNLQJ V\VWHP ³7KLV FDQ EH SDUWO\
neutralised by selling long-term government bonds to banks. If such bonds are then 
sold to non-banks, sterilisation can be thought to be reasonably complete: households 
or non-bank firms lower their holding of monetary assets and increase that of non-
PRQHWDU\DVVHWVVXFKDVJRYHUQPHQWERQGV´SDJH)RFXVLQg on the period 2000-
2006, the authors find that among a number of emerging market economies, 
sterilisation debt securities are often of short-term tenures and mostly held by banks. 
,I EDQNV ZLWK VXFK OLTXLG DVVHWV ³IHHO EHWWHU SODFHG´ WR H[SDQG FUHGLW WKen the 
restraining influence of sterilised intervention could prove temporary, and there 
could be excessive credit growth and investment in asset markets. The authors 
highlight easier financing conditions with particularly sharp lending to the property 
sector, across some emerging market economies in the post-crisis period roughly up 
to 2005. Additionally, there has been rapid growth in equity prices in some countries.  
The authors define complete sterilisation conditional on the use of long-term 
bonds based on Kumhof (2004). Kumhof presents a formal micro-founded model to 
explain why higher interest rates need not reduce inflation during episodes of capital 
LQIORZV 7KH EDVLV RI .XPKRI¶V WKHRUHWLFDO PRGHO LV WKDW VKRUW-term sterilisation 
bonds have monetary characteristics and can often be used to settle large 
WUDQVDFWLRQV+RXVHKROGV¶KROGLQJVRIEDQNGHSRVLWVDQGgovernment bonds both then 
serve transaction purposes. Lower foreign inflation reduces the opportunity cost of 
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domestic assets and the price of consumption of tradables, which lead to capital 
inflows and a current account deficit. Temporarily higher interest rates raise the 
relative opportunity cost of deposits but not the overall opportunity cost of domestic 
liquidity (deposits and bonds) versus foreign bonds. 
In terms of implications for financial intermediation, Mohanty and Turner 
suggest that prolonged sterilised intervention could alter the behaviour of banks as 
easy profits from investing in sterilisation securities could weaken the pressure for 
banks to become more efficient. Meanwhile the use of reserve requirements may 
encourage financial disintermediation while direct credit controls compromise the 
HIILFLHQF\RIUHVRXUFHDOORFDWLRQ,QWKHDXWKRUV¶FKRLFHRIVDPSOHSHULRGWKH\IRXQG
that there was still relatively limited use of non-market instruments.  
)URP WKH SHUVSHFWLYH RI WKH FHQWUDO EDQN¶V EDODQFH VKHHW WKH XVH RI VKRUW-
WHUP VHFXULWLHV LQFUHDVHV WKH FHQWUDO EDQN¶V H[SRVXUH WR IXWXUH LQWHUHVW UDWH
fluctuations.  Strong demand for risk-free assets by banks appeared to have helped 
central banks avoid large increases in sterilisation costs, but if this was to reverse, 
market based sterilisation could become more difficult and costly. The authors point 
to concerns raised by the Bank of Korea in 2005 about rising interest costs. In terms 
of carrying costs (the difference between the average return on central bank liabilities 
and that earned on foreign assets), approximated in June 2006, more Asian 
economies experienced negative carrying costs as compared to Latin American 
countries. The authors note this carrying cost is dependent on the interest rate cycle.  
Another effect of large reserve accumulation on the central bank balance 
sheet is potential valuation losses arising from currency apprHFLDWLRQ+RZHYHU³LWLV
debatable how far valuation losses might matter for the sustainability of intervention 
policy. The direct economic consequences might be limited...Valuation losses might 
matter however, if they were to undermine a central bank¶V FUHGLELOLW\ RU
LQGHSHQGHQFH´SDJH 
2RL  LQ GHWDLOLQJ 0DOD\VLD¶V PRUH UHFHQW H[SHULHQFH LQ PDQDJLQJ
capital flows, provides counter-DUJXPHQWV WR 0RKDQW\ DQG 7XUQHU¶V GLVFXVVLRQ RI
sterilisation leading to banks holding highly liquid assets and making easy profits. In 
terms of instruments used by the central bank, Ooi notes that while direct 
XQFROODWHUDOLVHGERUURZLQJFOHDUO\OHDGVWRDQLQFUHDVHLQEDQNV¶OLTXLGDVVHWV WKH
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effect of issuing monetary notes/securities is less straightforward as not all the 
securities are taken up by banks. A substantial portion has instead been taken up by 
non-residents. Ooi also states that the perceived incentive to reap easy profits from 
WKH VWHULOLVDWLRQ VHFXULWLHV PD\ EH RYHUVWDWHG ³,Q SUDFWLFH EDQNV Iind it more 
profitable to invest in other assets given larger risk premiums embedded in loans and 
non-sterilisation papers. In fact banks in Malaysia have been competing with each 
other to increase lending, amid ample liquidity, on price and non-price factRUV´
(page 336).  
Ho and McCauley (2008), also attempt to analyse the extent to which the 
adverse domestic consequences associated with reserve accumulation, in terms of 
monetary control and central bank balance sheet risks, have actually materialised. 
Their focus is on 13 countries in the Asia Pacific over the period 2002-2006, and 
thus the authors note that their findings may differ from Mohanty and Turner (2006), 
who focus on a larger sample of economies. Monetary control is assessed in terms of 
successful technical sterilisation11, whether inflation goals have been compromised 
and trends in credit growth. Technical sterilisation is assessed in terms of central 
EDQNV¶ PHHWLQJ WKHLU DQQRXQFHG RSHUDWLQJ WDUJHWV DQG WKH H[WHQW RI EDVH PRQH\
growth. The authors find that central banks12 with explicit short-term interest rate 
operating targets or official rate corridors were able to manage money market 
liquidity such that the relevant interest rates did not fall and stay below their 
announced targets or their UHOHYDQWORZHUERXQGV³,WLVDOVRQRWDEOHWKDWHYHQWKRXJK
quantities are in principle endogenous in interest rate-targeting economies such as 
Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand, liquidity draining operations nonetheless 
managed to constrain their econoPLHV¶ EDVH PRQH\ JURZWK DV HYLGHQFHG IURP WKH
large gaps between net foreign asset growth and base money growth...Thus, in both 
price and quantity terms, sterilization was technically effective in these economies, 
and monetary control at the operational leYHOUHPDLQHGLQWDFW´7KHDXWKRUVLQGLFDWH
WKDWWKHFDVHRI&KLQDLVGLIILFXOWWRLQWHUSUHWDVWKHFHQWUDOEDQN¶VPRQHWDU\RSHUDWLRQ
                                                          
11
  Ho and McCauley recognise that in practice many central banks define their operating targets in terms 
of a short-term interest rate, leaving quantities endogenous. The liquidity eventually absorbed would depend on 
(1) the net liquidity position of the system after taking into account all autonomous factors and (2) the central 
EDQN¶VRSHUDWLQJREMHFWLYH³7KXV sterilization is in practice more an interpretation rather than a separate policy: 
sterilized intervention can be said to have occurred if the surplus liquidity that is being mopped up originates 
SUHGRPLQDQWO\IURPIRUHLJQH[FKDQJHSXUFKDVHV´0RQHWDU\FRQWURODVSHUWKHFHQWUDOEDQN¶VRSHUDWLRQDOJRDO
does not require fully sterilising each unit of foreign exchange purchase. The automatic offsetting liquidity 
operations in an interest rate-targeting framework are also discussed by Disyatat (2008) who covers various 
misconceptions about the implementation of monetary policy.  
12
  This includes India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. 
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goals are not explicitly stated. Nevertheless, they draw on the results of Yu (2008) 
and Hong Kong Monetary Authority (2008) which suggest that large amounts of 
excess liquidity have been absorbed through reserve requirements.  
In terms of the effects on inflation, Ho and McCauley (2008) find no apparent 
link to reserve accumulation. Though inflation was less than benign in China and 
India, there is in fact an inverse relationship between reserve accumulation and 
average inflation performance in Asia over the period 2002-2006.  The top reserve 
accumulators all had relatively low inflation or deflation. In contrast, two economies 
that saw the least reserve accumulation (Indonesia and the Philippines), given 
currency weakness through 2005, were the ones that overshot inflation targets and 
experienced the highest inflation in the region. The authors state that the heavy 
intervention in Asia in the early 2000s might be seen as reflecting the 
macroeconomic slack prevalent in the Asian economies.  
 In the absence of goods price inflation, the authors also examine credit 
JURZWK³,I LQWHUYHQWLRQHYHQ LI VWHULOLVHGFUHDWHG ORRVHU-than-otherwise conditions 
WKDWHQFRXUDJHGH[FHVVLYHFUHGLWJURZWKDNLQGRI³RYHUKHDWLQJLQGLVJXLVH´ZRXOG
UHVXOW´7KHDXWKRUVGRQRWILQGDWLJKWOLQNEHWZHHQUHVHUYHDFFXPXODWLRQDQGSULYDWH
FUHGLW JURZWK ,Q WKH DXWKRUV¶ DVVHVVPHQW RQO\ WZR ODUJH UHVHUYH accumulators, 
Korea and India, displayed both strong credit growth and a rise in the loan-deposit 
ratio. Although China and Taiwan registered relatively strong credit growth in 2002-
2006 compared to the other countries in the sample, their loan-deposit ratios did not 
increase during this period. For the sample as a whole, the change in the loan-deposit 
ratio exhibits a negative relationship with the extent of reserve accumulation13³6XFK
a relationship suggests that rather than being an independent policy that has a side-
effect of fuelling loan growth, the heavy intervention in Asia might have been a 
UHVSRQVHWRWKHODFNRIORDQJURZWK´ 
Another aspect Ho and McCauley focus on is central bank valuation losses 
and quasi-fiscal costs of sterilised intervention. The authors note that while the 
carrying cost is significantly positive only for India, the exposure to exchange 
valuation losses applies more widely across the region.  
                                                          
13
 Ho and McCauley run regressions of reserve accumulation against average annual inflation, change in 
private sector credit, and change in loan-deposit ratio (all as a percentage of GDP) respectively.  
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Overall, while macroeconomic slack and low interest rates may have allowed 
central banks to avoid the adverse consequences associated with reserve 
accumulation and sterilisation there could still be cause for concern in the future. In 
particular, the authors state that the link to asset prices merits further investigation, 
especially in light of the surge in Chinese equity prices in 2006 and 2007.  
+RDQG0F&DXOH\¶VXVHRIWKHORDQ-deposit ratio as a reassuring indicator of 
non-overly expansionary monetary conditions, however, may be somewhat 
misleading as a stable or falling ratio could reflect deposits/money growing at a 
faster pace compared to loans. Strong money growth may have implications for asset 
SULFHLQFUHDVHVZKLFKWKHDXWKRUV¶KLJKOLJKWKDYHWDNHQSODFHHYHQLIWKHUHZHUHQR
immediate signs of goods price inflation.  
The above research studies are silent on the implications of reserve 
accumulation on the monetary transmission mechanism, but some others do highlight 
the possible complications that arise from surplus liquidity. Bank of Thailand (2004) 
for instance, notes that a by-product of excess market liquidity is that commercial 
banks as a whole are net lenders in the money market. As a result, changes in short-
term interest rates, which the Bank of Thailand can influence closely, do not impact 
GLUHFWO\RQEDQNV¶FRVWRIIXQds but instead affect their returns on investment. In this 
setting, the influence of short-WHUPLQWHUHVWUDWHVRQEDQNV¶UHWDLOGHSRVLWDQGOHQGLQJ
UDWHV LV VRPHZKDW GLPLQLVKHG ³2YHUDOO ZLWK YLUWXDOO\ QR FRPSHWLWLYH SUHVVXUH IRU
deposits but a very high degree of competition on loan extension, the existence of 
H[FHVV OLTXLGLW\ LQ 7KDLODQG¶V ILQDQFLDO V\VWHP LPSOLHV WKDW WKH SDVV-through from 
short-WHUPLQWHUHVWUDWHVWREDQNV¶UHWDLOLQWHUHVWUDWHVLVZHDNHUDQGPRUHGUDZQ-out 
WKDQ XVXDO´ SDJH  7KLV conclusion is supported by empirical evidence which 
indicates that the degree of pass-through in Thailand had fallen after the 1997 crisis.  
2.6 CONCLUSION 
From the literature review in this chapter, we can draw several summary 
observations. The conceptual framework underlying most studies assumes that the 
monetary SROLF\ LQVWUXPHQW LV WKH FKDQJH LQ WKH FHQWUDO EDQN¶VQHW GRPHVWLF DVVHWV
and not interest rates. The empirical estimation of the extent of sterilisation is 
primarily in terms of the impact of changes in net foreign assets on changes in net 
domestic assets or changes in base money. There is limited exploration of broad 
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money sterilisation and whether differences, or lack thereof, with base money 
sterilisation have meaningful implications. Because of the absence of an underlying 
consistent conceptual framework, particularly with regard to more recent empirical 
work, some estimations follow policy reaction function specifications while others 
opt for money demand type specifications. In some instances, where large samples of 
countries are involved, only rudimentary analysis such as bivariate regressions and 
ratios are carried out. The empirical findings generally point to a fairly high degree 
of base money sterilisation.  
There appears to be a disconnect between the literature that discusses the 
conceptual framework of monetary policy implementation and the challenges of 
managing capital flows including through sterilised intervention, with the studies that 
carry out rigorous empirical analysis of sterilisation coefficients.  Recent literature 
that explores aspects of monetary policy implementation raises questions about the 
sufficiency of measuring base money sterilisation, especially in the context of 
interest rate-targeting, since any source of liquidity, including intervention, is 
absorbed to the extent that is necessary to keep the level of the policy interest rate 
stable. Mohanty and Turner (2006) suggest a definition of the completeness of 
sterilisation, which depends on the sectors from which liquidity is absorbed, although 
they themselves do not formally introduce a corresponding empirical measure. Once 
there is an explicit recognition of different sectors (namely banks and the non-bank 
private sector), this requires consideration of broad money sterilisation. These are 
issues not addressed in recent empirical work.  
In terms of the macroeconomic consequences of sterilisation, Argy and Kouri 
(1974), Argy and Murray (1985) and Frankel (1994) provide conceptual frameworks 
of how returns on assets are affected depending on the nature of disturbances and the 
sterilisation response. The explanations provided appear to be congruent with the 
case studies detailed in Reinhart and Reinhart (1998) and the empirical analysis of 
Ho and McCauley (2008). Sterilisation appears to drive up interest rates and seems 
less effective under scenarios of strong economic growth/current account deficits 
than in situations of economic slack or benign inflationary conditions. Nevertheless, 
in the latter case, with the build-up of excess liquidity within the banking system, 
there may be adverse implications for asset prices and the monetary transmission 
mechanism.  
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The literature review exposes several gaps which we set out to address with 
our research. One, we provide a simple theoretical framework, with explicit 
recognition of the banking and non-bank sectors that shows how base money and 
broad money sterilisation relate to the policy interest rate. We incorporate different 
balance of payments scenarios which have varying effects on asset returns and 
therefore imply different broad money sterilisation strategies. Two, we provide a 
detailed conceptual framework, that is relevant to current times, to underpin the 
empirical estimation of base money and broad money sterilisation. In this context, 
we also address in further detail issues related to data definition and measurement, 
and empirical methodology. Three, we estimate and compare the degree of base 
money and broad money sterilisation across a reasonably large sample of countries 
using individual country multivariate dynamic regressions. We then compare these 
coefficients across various country characteristics to better understand the drivers of 
the results.  
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CHAPTER 3 
A SIMPLE MODEL OF MONETARY POLICY WITH 
STERILISED INTERVENTION  
 
3. 1 INTRODUCTION 
In emerging market economies, the exchange rate is important for two key 
reasons. One, from the monetary policy perspective, abrupt and persistent 
movements in the exchange rate can have adverse repercussions for inflation when 
pass-through from the exchange rate to domestic prices is high, and on output, via 
the tradables sector. Two, exchange rate policy also matters for financial stability in 
countries susceptible to sudden reversals of large capital inflows and in which 
foreign exchange markets are relatively thin. In either case, the monetary policy 
response, typically by way of a short-term policy interest rate14, to the exchange rate 
may depend on whether the central bank can use other instruments. As Mohanty and 
.ODXSDJHQRWH³These can include not only the conventional types such 
as foreign exchange intervention but also less conventional ones such as temporary 
capital controls, debt swaps and exchange rate-linked instruments to stabilise 
exchange rate expectations´. 
On one hand, while thin markets provide a reason to intervene to avoid 
excessive exchange rate volatility, on the other, they also allow for effective foreign 
exchange intervention in emerging markets as the central bank is a large player in the 
market for its own currency (Engel, 2009). Thus, intervention, with effective 
sterilisation ± successfully insulating domestic liquidity and maintaining policy 
independence, offers the possibility of separating exchange rate policy from 
monetary policy, as well as the possibility of using the exchange rate as an additional 
policy instrument.   
 
 
                                                          
14 
 Based on the 21 countries that currently make up the membership of the Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI) index for emerging market economies, 14 have adopted the inflation-targeting framework, 
with most having done so post-1998. While not exclusive to inflation-targeting countries, a key element of the 
framework is the use of a short-term interest rate as the primary policy instrument.  
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There is a gap in the literature in terms of analysing sterilisation and 
incorporating sterilised intervention into monetary policy reaction functions, 
especially where present reality is concerned.  Empirical studies, including those 
based on theoretical models, that attempt to assess the extent and effectiveness of 
sterilisation tend to assume the change in the central EDQN¶V QHW GRPHVWLF DVVHWV
(ǻNDA) as the monetary policy instrument. These include older studies such as Argy 
and Kouri (1974), Herring and Marston (1977) and Obstfeld (1983), which were 
reflective of conditions prevailing at the time, and newer studies such as Brissimis et 
al. (2002) which attempts a historical study of Germany over 1979-1992, and 
Ouyang et al. (2008), which though dealing with a more recent sample period (1990-
 DQG HLJKW $VLDQ FRXQWULHV DOVR DVVXPHV ǻ1'$ DV WKH SROLF\ LQVWUXPHQW
Studies that dwell on more recent developments ought to consider more carefully the 
monetary policy frameworks of countries under focus, and the fact that most central 
banks now operate through a short-term interest rate. See for instance, Disyatat 
(2008, 2011) and Borio and Disyatat (2009) for discussions on the liquidity 
management aspect of monetary policy implementation, and in particular, the 
³GHFRXSOLQJSULQFLSOH´ZKHUHE\DJLYHQOHYHORI WKHVKRUW-term interest rate, which 
reflects the official monetary policy stance, can be consistent with a range of 
TXDQWLWLHV RI EDQNLQJ LQVWLWXWLRQV¶ UHVHUYHV ZLWK WKH FHQWUDO EDQN DQG WKHUHIRUH
ǻ1'$15  
The focus of studies also tends to be on the narrow definition of sterilisation, 
comparing FKDQJHVLQEDVHPRQH\ǻ50 RUǻ1'$ against changes in central bank 
QHWIRUHLJQDVVHWVǻNFA), as opposed to the broad definition of sterilisation which 
compares changes in broad monH\ǻ%0 against ǻNFA. Sterilising broad money in 
fact has different implications for financial variables than sterilising base money. 
Mohanty and Turner (2006) suggest that the type of instruments used, and the sector 
from which liquidity is absorbed ± whether non-bank private agents or banks, 
                                                          
15
  For example, Disyatat (2008) explains that the demand for bank reserves, consisting of required 
reserves and excess reserves, are fundamentally highly interest rate inelastic and depend on factors such as the 
size of reserve requirement, uncertainty regarding payment flows and seasonal variations in demand for cash. The 
PDLQIXQFWLRQRIRSHQPDUNHWRSHUDWLRQVLVWKHQWRHQVXUHWKDWEDQNV¶GHPDQGIRUUHVHUYHEDODQFHVLVVDWLVILHG
given autonomous factors affecting the supply of reserves such as shifts in government deposits between the 
central bank and banks, and the non-EDQNSULYDWHVHFWRU¶VGHVLUHWRVZLWFKEHWZHHQFDVKKROGLQJVDQGEDQN
deposits. Failure to meet the demand for bank reserves would result in extreme interest rate volatility.    
39 
 
determine the completeness of sterilisation.16 Although the authors do not make an 
explicit note nor calculate broad sterilisation coefficients, these two factors influence 
the relative impact of ǻNFA on broad money. Further, as Argy and Murray (1985, 
page 223 QRWH ³WKHUH LV VXUSULVLQJO\ OLWWOH LI DQ\ OLWHUDWXUH FRQFHUQHG ZLWK WKH
effects of sterilisation per seRQILQDQFLDOYDULDEOHV´ 
Meanwhile, estimation of Taylor-type monetary policy rules, while cognisant 
of the shift to interest rate-targeting (the interest rate as policy instrument) and which 
have as model set-up, the New Keynesian style approach, focus on whether central 
banks react to exchange rate changes or misalignments with the policy interest rate. 
However, as Engel (2009, page 22) states, ³WKHUHLVYHU\OLWWOHDQDO\VLVRIVWHULOL]HG
LQWHUYHQWLRQLQWKHQHZ.H\QHVLDQIUDPHZRUN´,QSDUWLFXODUPRVWVWXGLHVSHUWDLQLQJ
to emerging market economies seek to assess whether central banks have an 
additional objective in managing the exchange rate, beside inflation and output 
stabilisation. Mohanty and Klau (2004) for instance find a strong response of interest 
rates to persistent exchange rate shocks in Asian and Latin American economies over 
1995-2002.  
With these gaps in mind, in this chapter, we attempt to bring together the 
elements of interest rate-targeting, intervention and sterilisation using a simple 
theoretical model. We solve for the optimal monetary policy reaction function given 
the central banN¶VREMHFWLYHV DQG WKH VWUXFWXUDO FKDUDFWHULVWLFVRI WKH HFRQRP\:H
give attention to the effects of different sterilisation methods, crucially by 
(re)introducing a role for money into the model. We consider the existing arguments 
about the relevance of money and discuss how these may be pertinent in the context 
of analysing balance of payments flows, intervention and sterilisation. The resulting 
monetary policy reaction function shows how the policy interest rate behaves given 
various exogenous factors and how potential policy issues may arise with varying 
degrees of intervention and sterilisation.  
 
 
                                                          
16
  The authors state that liquidity in the banking system driven by large scale reserve accumulation can be 
partly neutralised by the sale of long-term Government bonds. If these bonds are then sold on to households and 
non-bank firms, it can be viewed as complete sterilisation.  
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3.2 THE MODEL 
3.2.1  Central Bank Loss Minimisation Function 
We assume that the representative central bank focuses on inflation and 
output stabilisation as its monetary policy objectives. The exchange rate is important 
for the achievement of these goals, and this is reflected in aggregate supply and 
aggregate demand. This, however, does not require that exchange rate stability be 
specified explicitly in the FHQWUDOEDQN¶V ORVVPLQLPLVDWLRQIXQFWLRQ17. As Cecchetti 
SDJHQRWHV³7KHGHFLVLRQWRIRFXVRQWKHH[FKDQJHUDWHSDWKLVWKHFKRLFH
of an instrument, or intermediate target, not an objective. Under normal 
circumstances, policy-makers should not be concerned with the volatility of the 
exchange rate per se, but with the domestic inflation and growth outcomes produced 
E\WKHSDWKWKH\FKRRVHIRUWKHLULQVWUXPHQWVWRIROORZ´6LPLODUO\ZKLOHWKHUHPD\
be several explanations for minimising interest rate volatility, Cecchetti (2000, page 
 VWDWHV ³2SWLPDO SROLF\ PD\ HQWDLO LQWHUHVW UDWH VPRRWKLQJ EXW WKHUH LV QR
MXVWLILFDWLRQ IRU WKLV WR EH DQ H[SOLFLW REMHFWLYH´ 7KXV IURP D PRQHWDU\ SROLF\
perspective, and to maintain the simplicity and generalLW\RIWKHPRGHO¶VH[SRVLWLRQ, 
WKHFHQWUDOEDQN¶VORVV minimisation function is written as follows:  ? ? ? ? ? ?ʌ ? ?ʌ ? ? ? ? ? Ƚ ? ? ? ? ?                                                (3.1) 
Where: Ɏ ? ?  ? 
ʌ ? ? ?  ?  ? ? Ǣ ? ?  Ƚ  ?  ?  ? 
t = short- to medium-term horizon 
                                                          
17
  In reality, there are instances where countries have price stability and currency stability as separate 
monetary policy objectives. Based on legislation and extra-statutory elements, Ortiz (2009) finds that for 33 out 
of 45 central banks (across industrial and emerging market economies) price stability is usually the dominant 
monetary policy objective. In most cases it is a singular objective or is superior to other macroeconomic 
objectives specified in the law (general welfare, general economic health, growth and development). 
Nevertheless, the author highlights scenarios where there could be potential conflicts, in particular, seemingly 
equal ranked price and real economic objectives  (for example, the US), and when the objective of currency 
stability is not equivalent to price stability (i.e. both are specified as objectives). The author also notes that in a 
2006 sample of 36 central banks, 64%  had a single quantifiable price stability objective, 11%  had an exchange 
rate target, 6% had multiple targets, while 17% had no explicit target or a monitoring range.  
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The central bank seeks to minimise inflation and output growth deviations around a 
target inflation rate and potential output respectively. It minimises the loss function 
by manoeuvring the instruments at its disposal subject to several constraints that 
characterise the economy. It is assumed that the central bank operates primarily 
through a short-term interest rate. The following sections detail the structural 
equations for the economy and the derivation of the monetary policy reaction 
function.  
3.2.2 Inflation  
The inflation equation is defined as follows: 
 Ɏ ? ? Ⱦ ?Ɏ ? ? ? ? Ⱦ ? ?Ɏ ? ? ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ? ?  ? ? ? Ɏ ? ? ? ?Ⱦ ? ? ?  ? ?            (3.2) 
( ?  ? Ⱦ ? ?  ?ǡ  ?  ? Ⱦ ? ?  ?ǡ Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ? ?  ?ǡ Ⱦ ? ?  ? ? ?Ɏ ? ? ? ?  ?Ǣ  ? ? Ǣ Ɏ ? ? ?  ?; 
  ? ? =cost-push shock 
 
Equation (3.2) relates current inflation to lagged inflation,Ɏ ? ? ?ǡ expected 
inflation,  ?Ɏ ? ? ?ǡthe output gap, ?, change in the nominal effective exchange rate,  ? ?ǡwith an increase indicating depreciation (defined as a percentage change), 
foreign inflation,Ɏ ? ?ǡand cost-push shocks,  ? ?.  
The inclusion of both lagged inflation and expected future inflation is in line 
with the Fuhrer and Moore (1995) model of relative contracting that leads to inflation 
persistence. Fuhrer and Moore assume that agents negotiate real wages relative to the 
expected average of real contract wages over a two-period life (t, t+1). Contracts in 
effect in period t partly reflect past real wages. Fuhrer and Moore argue that the 
model provides a realistic reflection of the cost of disinflation policy and fits U.S. 
data.  
The variables  ? ? ? ? Ɏ ? ? ?capture the influence of variations in import prices 
on inflation. Long-run homogeneity (long-run Phillips curve verticality) is imposed, 
that is, the right-hand side coefficients in the equation, with the exception of the 
coefficient on the output gap, sum to one.  
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3.2.3 Aggregate Demand 
Aggregate demand is represented by the following output gap equation: 
 
  ? ? ɀ ? ? ? ?  ? ɀ ? ? ? ?  ?Ɏ ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ɀ ? ? ?  ? ?                          (3.3) 
( ?  ? ɀ ? ?  ?Ǣɀ ? ?  ?Ǣ ɀ ? ?  ? ?  ? ? ǡ   ?Ɏ ? ? ? ?  ?  ? ? ? natural real interest rate  ? ?  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? Ǣ  ? ?  ? ? ?  ? ? ?   ? ?= aggregate demand shock 
 
The output gap depends negatively on the difference between the real short- 
term interest rate and the natural real interest rate, ? ? ?  ?Ɏ ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?;  and positively 
on the lagged output gap, ? ? ?ǡ and the depreciation in the real effective exchange 
rate, relative to its equilibrium level, ?.  
3.2.4 Foreign Exchange Intervention and the Balance of Payments 
We make the simplifying assumption that any accumulation of net foreign 
assets by the domestic economy is due solely to the central bank. Net inflows 
through the capital and financial accounts,  ? ?, reflect changes in the holdings of 
domestic assets by non-residents and do not encompass any transactions by domestic 
residents. Essentially, domestic residents do not invest abroad.  The change in the 
FHQWUDO EDQN¶V QHW IRUHLJQ DVVHWV  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? is the sum of  ? ? and the current 
account surplus,  ?Ǥ 18 
   ?	 愋?ǡ ? ?  ? ?  ? ?                  (3.4) 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18
  Without FHQWUDOEDQNDFWLYLW\&$DQGǻ1.EDODQFHRXWZLWKRXWFKDQJHVWRGRPHVWLFEDQNLQJ
LQVWLWXWLRQV¶QHWIRUHLJQDVVHWVRUOLDELOLWLHV 
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The current account surplus is made up of the trade surplus and net 
investment income (receipts less expenditure) as in (3.5) below. For simplicity, 
compensation to employees and transfers are excluded. Given that the accumulation 
of net foreign assets is due solely to the central bank,  ? ?ǡ ? ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? reflects inflows 
due to investment income earned by the central bank 
( ? ?ǡ ? ? ?19. Net investment 
income should actually be net of interest paid on non-resiGHQWV¶KROGLQJVRIGRPHVWLF
asset ( ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ ? ?) 
but for simplification purposes, we omit this term or consider it subsumed under  ? ?ǡ without material consequences for the analysis.   ? ?  ? ?  ? ?ǡ ? ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ?                   (3.5)
 
From (3.4) and (3.5):  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ?  ? ?  ? ?ǡ ? ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?  ? ?                             (3.6)  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ?  ? ?ǡ ? ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? ?                (3.7) 
 
Assuming that WKH FHQWUDO EDQN¶V foreign liabilities are zero, and foreign assets 
consist only of foreign exchange reserves (	 愋?ǡ ? ?ǡ  ?	ǡ  ? ?	 愋?ǡ ?ǡ his gives an expression for central bank foreign exchange intervention as 
follows:  ?	 ? ? ?ǡ ? ?  ? ?  ? ?                  (3.8) 
 Where  ?	 愋? ?ǡ ? ?  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ?  ? ?ǡ ? ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ?ǡ  
 
Based on (3.8) above, central bank intervention is driven by the trade surplus 
and capital inflows. The real trade surplus as a ratio to lagged real output ( ? ? ?) in 
(3.9) below is determined by an exogenous component and increases as the real 
                                                          
19
  The same interest rate is assumed to apply to both, foreign assets and foreign liabilities.  
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effective exchange rate depreciates relative to the equilibrium exchange rate level20. 
In (3.10), net real capital inflows as a ratio to  ? ? ? depends on an exogenous 
component21, which is not influenced by short-term speculation; and imperfectly on 
the variables that constitute the uncovered interest rate parity condition. In the 
equation, c represents the degree of international asset substitutability22. If c ?, 
domestic and foreign assets are perfect substitutes and capital is perfectly mobile. If c  ?  ?ǡdeviations from the uncovered interest parity would not lead to infinite capital 
flows. +HUHLWLVDVVXPHGWKDWF23.  
 ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? Ʌ ?                                      (3.9) 
 
 ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ?  ?  ? ?  ?ȟ ? ? ?  ? ? ?  ? ? ?                       (3.10)  ?   ? ?  ? ?  ?  ? ?  ?  ? ? (increase reflects depreciation)  ? ? ? ?= current expectation of the exchange rate at time t+1  ?ȟ ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?  
 
It is generally accepted that a random walk forecast of the exchange rate tends 
to outperform other models in out-of-sample forecasting, and thus one can assume 
that ? ? ? ? ?  ?. Incorporating this assumption into (3.10) would eliminate the 
termȟ ? ?Ǥ Nevertheless, empirical evidence on the random walk hypothesis, where 
emerging markets are concerned, is mixed (see for instance Azad (2009)). Results are 
sensitive to the methodology employed, the sample period and the data series. 
Rejection of the random walk hypothesis, however, is not inconsistent with active 
foreign exchange intervention. As such, an alternative assumption is to have the 
expected nominal exchange rate change as a function of the extent of perceived real 
exchange rate misalignment24. That is,  ?ȟ ? ? ? ? ɔ ?Ǥ The expectation of a nominal 
                                                          
20 
 The Marshall-Lerner condition is assumed to hold without inertia. 
21
  Expressing the trade balance and net capital inflows as ratios to output ensures stationarity. The use of 
lagged output as the denominator is consistent with assuming that the exogenous determinants on the right-hand-
side of the equations primarily reflect the effects of lagged relative incomes (foreign and domestic). 
22
  The parameter c captures capital account restrictions and risk characteristics.  
23
  The discussion on international asset substitutability draws on Brissimis et al. (2002).  
24
  We assume perceived = actual for ease of exposition, but clearly this need not be the case, and the 
difference would influence the complexity of the resulting monetary policy reaction function.  
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exchange rate appreciation in the next period is a function of the perceived real 
exchange rate undervaluation in the current period. Using this assumption, (3.10) can 
be written as: 
 
 ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  ?  ? ?  ?ɔ ? ?  ? ? ?  ? ? ?                                                  (3.11) 
Expressing the elements of (3.8) in real terms by deflating through with a 
common price index, then taking ratios to  ? ? ?, and substituting (3.9) and (3.11) 
result in the following: 
 ? ? ? ? ?	 嘋? ? ?ǡ ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ?  ? ?ǡ ? ?                                                (3.12) 
 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ?  ?  ? Ʌ ? ?  ? ?  ?ɔ ? ?  ? ? ?  ? ? ?                                       (3.13) 
Rearranging (3.13) gives: 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ?  ?  ?  ? ? ?Ʌ  ? ɔ ? ? ?   ? ? ?  ? ? ?                           (3.14) 
In (3.14), the amount of real central bank intervention, as a ratio to  ? ? ?, is 
determined by exogenous trade and capital flows, the real exchange rate 
disequilibrium which matters for exchange rate sensitive trade flows (as reflected by 
the coefficient Ʌ) and capital flows (as reflected by the coefficient ɔ ?, the interest 
rate differential which influences capital flows, and the degree of international asset 
substitutability, c. The higher is c, the higher are capital inflows and consequent 
intervention if  ?Ȁ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? are larger than zero. 
3.2.5 The Role of Money  
 
This section deals with the question as to whether there should be a role for 
money in the model, particularly when sterilised intervention is a policy option for 
central banks. As evident in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 above, money does not figure 
explicitly as a variable in the inflation and output gap equations that tend to typify 
current models of monetary policy. There has been a general decline in the 
importance placed by policymakers on money, with the shift away from monetary 
targeting, either with base money as the policy instrument and/or a monetary 
aggregate as the intermediate target. As a result, money is endogenous, with 
whatever changes to demand being accommodated whilst the policy interest rate 
46 
 
remains unchanged. Existing literature dealing with sterilised intervention, 
meanwhile, have tended to assume a direct relationship between money and inflation. 
As mentioned in the literature review, the models in these studies, however, do not 
adequately reflect the current state of policy-making25. In this section, we attempt to 
provide some reconciliation between these two opposing frameworks.  
Whilst the long-run correlation between money and inflation is an accepted 
empirical phenomenon, the short-to medium-term effects of money on output and 
inflation are much less clear and the subject of considerable debate. Rudebusch and 
6YHQVVRQ  SDJH  ZULWH ³$V D JHQHUDO FKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQ FHQWUDO EDQNHUV
typically hold the view that movements in the monetary aggregates play no role in 
the direct quarter-by-quarter determination of either output or prices; however a 
sizeable fraction also concedes that money may have some value as an indicator of 
HFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQWV´:RRGIRUG ZKLOHDUJXLQJ WKDW WKHUH LV QRQHHG WR
assign money a particulaUO\SURPLQHQWUROHjODWKH(XURSHDQ&HQWUDO%DQN(&%¶V
³PRQHWDU\DQDO\VLV´SLOODUQHYHUWKHOHVVFRQFHGHV WKDW Where is no a priori reason to 
exclude monetary variables from the set of indicators that are taken into account in a 
FHQWUDOEDQN¶VLQIRUPDWLRn set. There exists, however, pockets of research in support 
of money containing unique information beyond that which are obtained from other 
economic indicators.  
King (2002), and Bridges and Thomas (2012)26 provide useful overviews of 
the literature on the plausible role for money in the monetary transmission 
mechanism. King, for example, acknowledges the limitations inherent in old and new 
macroeconomic models which do not account for a multitude of real and financial 
assets which are imperfect substitutes. He highlights the portfolio rebalancing effect, 
the real balance effect, and the liquidity service effect of money.  
The portfolio rebalancing effect is the adjustment of the prices and yields on 
other assets concomitant with changes in money. For a given level of the short-term 
real interest rate, Meltzer (1999) finds that real base money growth matters for 
                                                          
 
25
 The studies present models where a monetary aggregate is still the operating or intermediate target of 
monetary policy. For instance, Brissimis et al. (2002) posit the following money-inflation relationship:  ? ?=  ? ? ? 	 ? ?  ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?as the monetary policy instrument.  
 
26
 Bridges and Thomas (2012) is an example of recent research reflecting the renewed interest in the 
role of money in providing a framework for the analysis of the effects of quantitative easing in the wake of the 
global financial crisis.  
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consumption growth in the US. Nelson (2000) reaffirms this in the case of economic 
growth for the US and the UK. The theoretical postulation for the results is that there 
are many real interest rates and asset prices that are relevant for economic activity 
and the real short-term interest rate is not adequately representative of these yields. 
Instead, real money balances act as a proxy for changes in relative yields and real 
wealth which supplement the effect of a change in a specific short-term interest 
rate27. Meltzer (1995), in a three-asset model (with interest rate on securities and 
asset prices determined by equilibrium in the base money and bond markets), 
illustrates the interplay of relative prices. A change to base money and at the same 
time a change to the stock of securities have similar effects on the interest rate for 
securities but different effects on the asset price level ± an open market operations 
purchase of securities lowers the interest rate and raises the asset price on a net basis. 
In an interest rate-targeting framework, the money supply adjusts to meet money 
demand, as the interest rate is kept steady. However, in equilibrium asset prices also 
FKDQJHZKLFKDIIHFWVVSHQGLQJDQGRXWSXW7KXV³&ontrol of the interest rate does 
not avoid portfolio or output market responses anG PD\ DPSOLI\ WKHVH UHVSRQVHV´
(page 56), when the money and asset markets are interrelated.  
As an example of the portfolio rebalancing effect, King (2002, page 170) 
describes the satiation point in the context of monetary policy at zero interest rates: 
³if the demand for money is satiated at a finite level as interest rates tend to zero, 
then the creation of money beyond that point would be translated into a demand for 
other assets and higher incomes. ...changes in household portfolios lead to changes in 
relative yields on different financial and real assets, and hence on asset prices and, in 
turn, real spending. Despite interest rates remaining at zero, monetary policy, in this 
world, can influence nominal spending and incomes´ 
                                                          
27
  Meltzer (1999) uses two stage least squares and carries out regressions with base money and M1 
respectively, with consistent results of coefficient significance. The sample period covered is 1950q4-1995q4. 
Nelson (2000) uses lagged real base money and carries out regressions for the sample period 1961q1-1999q2, 
with sub-sample regressions for robustness. Nelson notes that standard optimising models provide little rationale 
for the findings of statistical significance of real money balances. He develops a general equilibrium framework 
with a forward-looking partial adjustment equation for real money balances such that long-term real interest rates 
enter the equation. He finds that real money balances are more negatively correlated with long-term rates than 
with short-WHUPUDWHV+HVXJJHVWVWKDWIRUKLVPRGHO³conditioning on the real long rate would be sufficient to 
remove the incremental information contained in money growth about economic activity. But it is conceivable 
that in more general cases, where many yields enter both the aggregate demand and money demand functions, the 
information in money about aggregate demand would be beyond that contained in securities market interest rates, 
both short-term and long-WHUP´SDJH7KHPRGHOGRHVQRWDOORZIRUH[RJHQRXVPRQH\VXSSO\VKRFNVEXWLI
an exogenous money supply rule is implemented, this magnifies the impact of money on real interest rates and 
aggregate demand.  
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.LQJ  SDJH  IXUWKHU QRWHV ³Post finance theory is based on the 
assumption that equilibrium yields on assets, including risk premia, are independent 
of the quantities of the supplies of different assets. Hence the search for a better 
model of the monetary transmission mechanism is, in part, a search for evidence of 
supply effects on financial asset yields. That is why the view that money matters, 
over and above interest rates, is intimately bound up with a question of whether the 
supplies of different assets affect yields, and hence whether the composition of 
government debt affects both money and real economic behaviour´ 
 The real balance effect, associated with Pigou (1943) and Patinkin (1965), 
suggests that a monetary expansion raises net real money holdings, which represents 
an increase in net wealth, and in turn stimulates aggregate demand. King (2002) 
objects to the significance of this effect based on the notion that only an increase in 
³RXWVLGH´PRQH\EDVHPRQH\FRQVWLWXWHVDQLQFUHDVHLQQHWZHDOWK³,QVLGH´PRQH\
(broad money) on the other hand has a mirror debt commitment. We suggest 
however, that this may not necessarily be true in an open economy since domestic 
assets need not equal domestic liabilities at the aggregate level for the non-bank 
private sector.  
 King (2002) highlights the role of money in providing a liquidity service 
which reduces financial frictions in the form of transaction costs (building on 
Sidrauski (1967)), as well as borrowing constraints. Ireland (2004) presents money 
and consumption as non-separable in the utility function, with the result that real 
money balances adjusted for shifts in money demand shocks appear in both the 
forward-looking IS curve and the forward-looking Phillips curve. Empirical 
estimations for the US over 1980q1-2001q3 using M1 and M2, however, fail to 
provide evidence that real money balances enter either equation. Goodfriend (2000, 
2005) and Chadha et al. (2008) investigate the relationship between broad money 
and the external finance premium via micro-founded theoretical modelling. 
Goodfriend discusses the broad liquidity services yield which is derived from the 
reduced exposure to the external finance premium with increased holdings of broad 
liquidity assets. An increase in broad liquidity assets reduces this yield and leads to 
portfolio rebalancing. This results in higher asset prices and net worth, which bring 
credit spreads down. Chadha et al. endogenise the supply of money via bank loans 
and show that money and financial spreads become negatively correlated when loan 
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supply shocks in the form of loan monitoring and collateral dominate money demand 
or goods sector productivity shocks.  
 Aside from the above, there is also literature relating money to steady-state 
inflation, and advocating the usefulness of money as a cross-checking mechanism in 
the presence of measurement error. Gerlach (2003, 2004) provides an empirical 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH(&%¶VWZR-pillar monetary policy strategy, with a non-structural 
augmentation to the standard Phillips curve. The monetary analysis pillar captured by 
trend monetary growth accounts for changes in steady-state inflation by influencing 
inflation expectations while the economic analysis pillar captured by the output gap 
accounts for short-run movements in inflation around the steady-state rate*HUODFK¶V
empirical work suggests that M3 growth contains information about future inflation 
in the Euro Area that is not already embedded in the current inflation rate. Gerlach 
nevertheless views the results as neither suggesting M3 as the best indicator of 
inflation nor that a separate pillar for monetary growth is required.  
 Nelson (2008), in a critique of Woodford (2008), also alludes to the long-run 
importance of money for the determination of steady-state inflation in New 
Keynesian mRGHOV 1HOVRQ¶V FULWLTXH LV QRW LQ WHUPV RI PRGHO DGHTXDF\ EXW UDWKHU
concerns the lack of explanation with regard to how steady-state inflation or the 
inflation target is determined if, in the long run, the central bank has no control over 
the short-term interest rate and cannot affect real interest rates. The short run/long 
run distinction has important implications for the central bank to affect interest rates. 
Open market operations affect nominal and real interest rates only with nominal 
price rigidity. In the long run, prices move by the same percentage as the nominal 
money stock. As such, an understanding of how a centraOEDQN¶VDFWLRQVGHWHUPLQH
long-run inflation expectations when the real interest rate cannot be controlled is 
needed, and this is where steady-VWDWH PRQH\ JURZWK PDWWHUV 7KH FHQWUDO EDQN¶V
open market operations continue in the long run to affect nominal money growth. 
Thus, the steady-state money growth, delivered by a specified quantity of open 
market operations, provides a guide for hitting the desired inflation rate.  
 Beck and Wieland (2008) highlight that while potential output cannot be 
assessed with any certainty, research with Keynesian-style models has nevertheless 
emphasised the importance of the output gap. They develop a justification for 
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including money in the policy reaction (interest rate) rule by allowing for imperfect 
knowledge regarding unobservable variables such as potential output and the 
equilibrium interest rate. Through simulations based on US and Germany in the 
1970s, the authors show that the misperceptions about potential output, which cause 
a bias in policy setting, make the long-run relationship between money growth and 
inflation quite apparent, based on filtered measures of inflation and money growth. 
Essentially, the increase in average money growth and inflation is due to the same 
source - SHUVLVWHQW FHQWUDO EDQN PLVSHUFHSWLRQV DERXW SRWHQWLDO RXWSXW ³&URVV-
FKHFNLQJ´ DQG FKDQJLQJ WKH LQWHUHVW UDWH LQ UHVSRQVH WR VXVWDLQHG shifts in filtered 
money growth helps the central bank overcome the bias.  
 From the literature presented in this section, it is clear that there is an active 
debate on the role of money. We acknowledge that we have only provided an 
overview and that there are clearly more technical details and issues pertaining to the 
empirical evidence and the link to rigorous general equilibrium theoretical 
foundations. Bridges and Thomas (2012) note that there is not yet a generally 
accepted way of integrating money, especially broad money, into current DSGE 
models. We rely on a simple approach particularly since we attempt to integrate three 
elements ± interest rate-targeting, the role of money, and intervention and 
sterilisation. For our purposes, the literature provides sufficient support for the 
inclusion of money in our simple model, particularly in connection to the aggregate 
demand equation, and the role of money as a proxy for monetary conditions not 
summarised by the short-term interest rate. The issues of imperfect substitutability 
among a range of financial and real assets; the demand for and supply of assets, 
including money; and portfolio rebalancing are all relevant to emerging market 
economies. These economies experience large external inflows which affect the 
supply of and demand for money, and tend to carry out sterilisation, both of which 
affect the demand for and supply of other assets and hence their yields. Consequently 
we augment equation (3.3), with a term representing real broad money growth as 
follows28: 
                                                          
28
  A question that arises is whether both  ? ? (consistent with a closed output gap over the medium-term) 
and  ? ?ǡ ?need to appear in the output gap equation. Given the difficulties in measuring  ? ?and since  ? ?ǡ ? is ǡ  ? ?ǡ  is a case for dropping  ? ?, though this is best addressed in a micro-founded 
model (see for example, Berger and Weber (2012)). For our purposes, we retain  ? ?, and to an extent, see having 
both as a cross-checking device.  
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  ? ? ɀ ? ? ? ? ? ɀ ? ? ? ?  ?Ɏ ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ɀ ? ?ɀ ? ? ?ǡ ? ?  ? ?               
        ? ?ǡ ? ?                 (3.15) 
 
Conceptually, in terms of the money determinants identity, the change in the 
supply of broad money is made up of changes in net foreign assets and changes in 
net domestic assets, the main driver of which is credit growth. A simplification seen 
in Section 3.2.4 was that any accumulation of net foreign assets is solely due to the 
central bank. We take this simplification further in the following sections, by 
DVVXPLQJ WKDW WKH FHQWUDO EDQN¶V IRUHLJQ H[FKDQJH LQWHUYHQWLRQ LV WKH RQO\ IDFWRU
driving broad money growth. Essentially, we exclude the credit growth portion.  
The mechanics of the impact of foreign exchange intervention via ?ǡ is 
explored in detail using a portfolio balance model in subsection 3.2.6.2 (a). For now, 
we highlight that the underlying assumption is that  ? ?ǡ ?functions mainly as a 
proxy for the possible wedge that may arise between the policy interest rate and 
market interest rates due to portfolio rebalancing, and also captures some real 
balance effects via changes in net wealth. To illustrate the former point, we consider 
that there is some composite market interest rate,  ? ?, taking into account various 
yields on financial assets, which is the actual interest rate that affects aggregate 
demand. Then, broad money demand and supply deviations from trend ( ?ǡ ? ?and  ?ǡ ? ? ? are specified as functions of the output gap ( ? ?,  ? ?ǡas 
follows29:  ?ǡ ? ? = ? ? Ɂ ? ? ?  ? ?ǡ ?              (3.16)  ?ǡ ? ? = ? ? ɘ ? ? ?  ? ?ǡ ?              (3.17) 
Equalising money demand and money supply, and solving for  ? ?ǣ  ? ? =  ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ ? ?  ? ?ǡ ? ?              (3.18) 
Equation (3.18) indicates that  ? ? is affected by positive money demand and money 
supply shocks in opposite directions, with the latter having dampening effects. As 
                                                          
29
  Our simple illustration with these functions is done solely to provide an intuitive expression of the link 
between money demand and supply shocks with market interest rates. The functions are separate from the model 
presented in this chapter.  
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such, a positive money supply shock not offset by a demand shock, or a negative 
money demand shock without a countervailing supply shock reduces  ? ? so that 
equilibrium is restored; this whilst the policy interest rate remains unchanged. There 
are asymmetrical responses in  ? ? depending on the nature of shocks to broad money 
even as the central bank accommodates all shocks to base money demand to keep the 
policy interest rate stable in an interest rate-targeting framework. 
3.2.6 Monetary Policy Reaction Function 
We have thus far framed the discussion in the context of a monetary policy 
framework with an interest rate as the main policy instrument. Ho (2008) provides 
support for such an assumption for this model of a stylised emerging market 
economy, though there are a few exceptions among the countries that enter the MSCI 
index for emerging market economies. The author finds, in a study of monetary 
operating frameworks in 17 countries as of March 2007, that most central banks 
express their official monetary policy stance in terms of an interest rate, for example, 
a central bank facility/operation rate, or a target for a market rate. At the same time, 
the day-to-day operating objective of central banks has focused more on stabilising 
some measure(s) of short-term interest rate, less on targeting quantities (such as 
reserve money). In terms of the nature of instruments, there has been reduced use of 
direct controls, and more use of indirect instruments based on market mechanisms 
and incentives. 
The monetary policy reaction function is derived by minimising (3.1) with 
respect to the policy instrument,  ?, subject to the constraints described in Sections 
3.2.2 to 3.2.5.  
We explore three cases. First we leave money as exogenous and derive the 
monetary policy reaction function, as the baseline case. Then we consider the cases 
of the monetary policy reaction function with intervention, in scenarios of complete 
and incomplete sterilisation.  
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3.2.6.1 Monetary policy reaction function with exogenous money 
 
 As expected inflation in the next period,  ?Ɏ ? ? ?, is endogenous, we assume 
that it depends on the current inflation target and lagged inflation. The relative 
weight on the former ?ɉ) can be viewed as reflecting the credibility of the central 
bank.   ?Ɏ ? ? ? ? ɉʌ ? ? ? ?  ? ɉ ?Ɏ ? ? ?                                                                               (3.19) 
 
We incorporate (3.19) into the augmented output gap equation (3.15) to obtain 
(3.20). A reduced-form of the inflation equation (3.2) is also derived, by substituting 
(3.15) and (3.19) into (3.2). This gives us equation (3.21).  
  
  ? ? ɀ ? ? ? ? ? ɀ ? ? ? ɀ ? ?ɉʌ ? ? ? ?  ? ɉ ?Ɏ ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?  ?ɀ ? ? ?ɀ ? ? ?ǡ ? ?  ? ?                                                                                   (3.20) 
        Ɏ ? ? ?Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ? ?  ? ɉ ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ?  ? ɉ ? ?Ɏ ? ? ? ? ?Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ?ɉʌ ? ?  ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ? ?  ? ? ? Ɏ ? ? ? ?Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ? ? ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ? ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ? ?Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ? ?ǡ ? ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
   (3.21)    
Then, the reduced-form inflation equation and the output gap equation are substituted 
into the loss function: 
 
 ? ?  ? ? ? ?ʌ ? ?ʌ ? ? ? ? ? Ƚ ? ? ? ? ? 
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 ?  ? ? ? ? Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ? ?  ? ɉ ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ?  ? ɉ ? ?Ɏ ? ? ? ? ?Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ?ɉʌ ? ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ? ?  ? ? ? Ɏ ? ? ? ?Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ? ? ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ? ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ? ?ǡ ? ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?ʌ ? ? ? ? ? Ƚ ?ɀ ? ? ? ? ? ɀ ? ? ? ɀ ? ?ɉʌ ? ? ? ?  ? ɉ ?Ɏ ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ɀ ? ?ɀ ? ? ?ǡ ? ?  ? ?? ? ? 
 
  (3.22) 
The loss function is minimised with respect to  ?ǣ  ? ? ? ?  ?  ? ?Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ? ?  ? ɉ ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ?  ? ɉ ? ?Ɏ ? ? ? ? ?Ⱦ ?ɉ  ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ?ɉ  ?  ? ?ʌ ? ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ? ?  ? ? ? Ɏ ? ? ? ?Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ? ? ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ? ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ? ?ǡ ? ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ?  ? ?? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ? ? Ƚ ?ɀ ? ? ? ? ? ɀ ? ? ? ɀ ? ?ɉʌ ? ? ? ?  ? ɉ ?Ɏ ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ɀ ? ? ?ɀ ? ? ?ǡ ? ?  ? ? ? ? ɀ ? ? ?  ? 
  (3.23)        
 
Solving for  ?: 
 ? ?  ?Ⱦ ? ?Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ? ?  ? ɉ ? ɀ ? ?Ⱦ ? ? ? Ƚ ?  ? ?  ? ɉ ? ?Ɏ ? ? ? ?  ?Ⱦ ? ?Ⱦ ?ɉ  ?  ? ?ɀ ? ?Ⱦ ? ? ? Ƚ ? ? ɉ ?ʌ ? ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ?Ⱦ ? ? ? Ƚ ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ? ?  ? ? ? Ɏ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ɀ ?ɀ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?ɀ ?ɀ ? ? ? ɀ ?ɀ ? ? ?ǡ ? ?  ?ɀ ? ? ? 
   (3.24) 
Equation (3.24) is the solution for the optimal interest rate policy in terms of 
various exogenous factors that determine inflation and the output gap30. By 
                                                          
30
  The second derivative of the loss function with respect to  ? is  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ?  ?Ⱦ ? ? ? Ƚ ?ɀ ? ?. Since  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ?  ?ǡthis 
confirms that we have solved for a minimisation problem. 
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assumption, with no intervention,  ? ?ǡ ?=0 in (3.24). This is effectively a floating 
exchange rate regime. The exchange rate nevertheless still matters for interest rate 
policy decisions as the nominal exchange rate affects inflation directly through  ? ?ǡ 
(an increase (depreciation) leading to a rise in inflation, and triggering an increase in 
the policy rate) and the real effective exchange rate affects the output gap. A positive 
deviation of the real effective exchange rate from equilibrium, ? ?  ?ǡsignals 
undervaluation and widens the output gap leading to a rise in the policy interest rate.  
 
Higher lagged inflationǡ Ɏ ? ? ?, a rise in foreign inflation,Ɏ ? ?, and cost-push 
shocks, ? ?ǡ directly lead to higher inflation and a higher policy interest rate. 
Meanwhile, a lower inflation target ʌ ? ?requires a higher policy rate ?    ?   ? ?   ? ? ?   ? ?   ? ?   ? ǡ  ?Ⱦ ?ɉ  ?  ? ? ?  ? ?. However, the higher isɉ(the credibility of the 
inflation target) andȾ ? (the impact of the output gap on inflation), the smaller is the 
movement needed in the policy interest rate as agents will recognise that a lower 
inflation target and a concomitant rise in the policy rate will depress aggregate 
demand and inflation. A higher ɉ also reduces the extent of persistence emanating 
from Ɏ ? ? ? and the cost of disinflation policy.  
 
An increase in the lagged output gap,  ? ? ?ǡ, a rise in the natural real interest 
rate, ? ?  (which signals a wider gap against the actual real short-term interest rate and 
hence an easing of policy), and aggregate demand shocks,  ? ? lead to a higher output 
gap,  ?  which requires a higher policy interest rate.  
 
As set forth in (3.1), the parameter Ƚ reflects the weight the central bank 
places on output stabilisation relative to inflation stabilisation. From (3.24), it can be 
observed that as this parameter increases in size, the smaller are the coefficients on 
the factors affecting inflation directly. The coefficient on  ? ? is    ? ?   ? ? ?   ? times the size 
of the coefficient on  ? ?. The policy rate response to  ? ?is smaller than the response 
to  ? ? if Ƚ  ? Ⱦ ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ?Ǥ 
 
Finally, in a floating exchange rate regime, it appears that the interest rate 
policy decision is independent of the foreign interest rate, given the specification of 
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the inflation and output gap equations, and the assumption that  ? ?ǡ ?= 0. With this 
assumption, there is no sustained nominal exchange rate depreciation or appreciation 
± trade flows and net capital flows tend to offset one another.  
 
3.2.6.2 Monetary policy reaction function with intervention and sterilisation 
 
In this section, we consider how the optimal monetary policy reaction 
function would look like when there is intervention, with complete sterilisation as 
well as with less than complete sterilisation. In order to do this, we first clarify how 
intervention and sterilisation affect broad money and define complete sterilisation. 
Our approach is to use a portfolio balance model of the financial sector, drawing on 
Argy and Murray (1985), and this is discussed in the following subsection. 
(a) Money, portfolio balance and sterilisation 
The goal of sterilisation is to insulate domestic liquidity from foreign 
exchange intervention and maintain monetary policy independence. Under a flexible 
exchange rate regime, large current account and capital account inflows result in 
exchange rate appreciation which offsets some of the imbalances and inflationary 
risk associated with an increased money stock, and leads to adjustments in inflows. 
In a fixed or closely managed exchange rate regime, the build-up in domestic 
liquidity and inflation pressures have to be managed in other ways, including through 
effective sterilisation. 
With a short-term interest rate as the operating target, changes in base money 
ǻ50DQG WKHFHQWUDOEDQN¶VQHWGRPHVWLFDVVHWV ǻ1'$ZKLFKHQFRPSDVVHs its 
monetary operations,31 become endogenous with the amount supplied depending on 
WKH GHPDQG IRU WKHVH EDODQFHV JLYHQ WKH FHQWUDO EDQN¶V PDQGDWH WR PDLQWDLQ D
specific interest rate level consistent with inflation and output stabilisation. The 
central bank conducts its monetary operations, injecting or withdrawing liquidity, 
depending on the factors affecting liquidity including foreign exchange intervention. 
Since any amount of money is supplied to meet demand, incomplete base money 
sterilisation is possLEOHHYHQ LI LWGRHVQRW UHIOHFWDQ LQDELOLW\ WR³FRQWURO´ OLTXLGLW\
                                                          
31
  By monetary operations, we mean market based mechanisms, namely open market operations through 
repos/reverse repos and outright sales and purchases of securities, as well as the issuance of central bank 
securities.  
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'LV\DWDW  SDJH  VWDWHV ³WKH OLTXLGLW\ LPSDFW RI IRUHLJQ H[FKDQJH
intervention in the money market is much the same as any other autonomous factor 
affecting liquidity and thus must be offset by the central bank to hold interest rates 
VWHDG\´:HZRXOGUHILQHWKLVVWDWHPHQWE\FODULI\LQJWKDWWKH extent to which any of 
the factors affecting liquidity are offset, regardless of their source, depend on the 
SULYDWHVHFWRU¶VGHPDQGWRKROGPRQH\EDODQFHV 
Base money sterilisation, does not, however, imply broad money sterilisation. 
Monetary operations have varying effects on broad money depending on the sector 
from which liquidity is absorbed, whether non-bank private agents or banks. 
Crucially, as suggested in Section 3.2.5, depending on how broad money evolves, 
yields on financial assets which signal monetary conditions are affected even if the 
short-term policy interest rate is unchanged. This can be illustrated with a simple 
asset portfolio model of the financial sector in the domestic economy. In the model 
that follows, we examine the effects of sterilisation of broad money under scenarios 
of different portfolio preferences when there are trade and portfolio capital inflows 
respectively.  
There are three financial assets available to the domestic non-bank private 
sector: money, bonds and equity32. The sum of these three assets is assumed to 
comprise total gross financial wealth. For consistency with the discussion in Section 
3.2.4, it is assumed that no foreign assets are held by the domestic non-bank private 
sector33: 
 
 ? ? ? = ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?  ?             (3.25) 
 
 ? ? ? = ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?  ?             (3.26) 
 
 ? ? ? = ? ? ?  ? ? ?  ?             (3.27) 
                                                          
32
  It is assumed that Ricardian equivalence does not hold, and holdings of Government bonds are 
considered as wealth, without implied future tax liabilities. Intergenerational transfers as described by Barro 
(1974) are not in operation.  
33
  Argy and Murray (1985) consider three-asset (without equity) and four-asset (with equity) models 
respectively, and include foreign assets as one of the wealth components. There is no explicit distinction between 
sectors. We base our model on Argy and Murra\¶VIRXU-asset model set-up to describe the gross financial wealth 
of the non-bank private sector but exclude foreign assets. Additionally, we introduce simple supply-demand and 
balance sheet constraints to explicitly illustrate the interplay between the non-bank private sector, the central 
bank, banks and non-residents.  
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   ?   ?  ? ?  ?              (3.28) 
W = gross financial wealth of the domestic non-bank private sector 
BM  ?  (currency in circulation and deposits of the non-bank  
         private sector)  ? = domestic equity held by the domestic non-bank private sector  ? = domestic bonds held by the domestic non-bank private sector  ? = return on domestic bonds, current yield = interest rate/market price  ?= return on domestic equity, market capitalisation rate =  
      (dividend paid +capital gain)/market price 
 
A rise in  ? leads to a reduction in the combined share of wealth held as broad money 
and equity ( ? ?  ? ?  ?). Similarly, a rise in  ? leads to a reduction in the combined 
share of wealth held as broad money and bonds ( ? ?  ? ?  ? ?Ǥ We assume that 
EURDG PRQH\¶V RZQ UDWH RI UHWXUQ LV ]HUR DV D VLPSOLILFDWLRQ $ ULVH LQ ZHDOWK, 
through a trade surplus, may change the proportion of wealth held in each type of 
asset ( ? ?  ? ?  ? ?  ? ?Ǥ Portfolio capital inflows cause a shift out of equity and 
bonds into money, as non-UHVLGHQWV¶GHPDQGIRUexisting equity and bonds reduces 
their returns. There is no effect on total wealth (capital gains are not built into the 
wealth constraint).  
 Equity within the domestic economy ( ? ? ? is held by the domestic non-bank 
private sector ( ? ?and non-residents  ? ? ? ?: 
   ? ? ?  ? ?  ? ?               (3.29) 
Total domestic bondsǡ  ? ? ? ?are held by the domestic non-bank private sector ? ? ?, 
domestic banking institutions ( ? ? ? non-residents ( ? ? ?:  ? ? ?  ? ?  ? ? ?  ? ?              (3.30) 
 
The supply of bonds consists of bonds issued by the Government (
 ?, the central 
bank (BCB), and the non-bank private sector (BR): 
  ? ? ? 
  ?   ?              (3.31) 
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7KHFHQWUDOEDQN¶VEDODQFHVKHHWFRQVWUDLQWLVDVIROORZV34: 
  	 愋? ?  ? ?   ?  ? ? ?              (3.32) 
     NDA 
RM = base money (currency in circulation (CIC) + required reserves (RR) + excess reserves 
(RR)) 	 愋? = foreign exchange reserves  ? = Government deposits 
BCB = stock of outstanding central bank securities  ? ?= Net borrowing from the banking system through repos, outright sales of securities 
(non-central bank securities) and deposit facilities ( ? ? ? 
 
The EDQNLQJV\VWHP¶VEDODQFHVKHHWFRQVWUDLQWLVDVIROORZV  ? ? ?  ? ? ?  ?  ? ?  ?  ? ? ?  ?           (3.33) 
  ? ? = loans by the banking system to the domestic non-bank private sector  ? ? = holdings of securities, includes all liquidity operations with the central bank which 
involve securities  ? ? = deposits with the central bank  ? = deposits of the non-bank private sector, equivalent to BM less currency in circulation 
 
 To illustrate the effect of intervention and sterilisation, we assume that the 
central bank intervenes in the full amount of current account and capital account 
inflows. Complete sterilisation would entail completely offsetting the impact of 
foreign exchange intervention/balance of payments flows on broad money. 
Regardless, the central bank conducts its liquidity operations with the banking 
system to keep the policy interest rate stable.  
We consider as the first case, a rise in financial wealth due to a trade surplus  ? ?  ? ?. If the domestic non-bank private sector chooses to hold the full amount of 
this rise in wealth as money ( ? ?  ?ǡ  ? ?  ? ? ?  ?), then their portfolio 
adjustment would not lead to changes in bond and equity returns, as demand for and 
supply of these assets are unchanged while the demand for money is fully 
accommodated ( ? ? ?  ?ǡ ? ? ?  ?ǡ ? ? ?  ? ?. If the central bank attempts to directly sterilise any 
                                                          
34
  We assume the central bank is in a net debtor position with the banking system, that is, the starting 
position is one of surplus liquidity.  
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amount of the increase in broad money, thus changing the initial proportions of asset 
holdings by the non-bank private sector, the return on domestic bonds must rise in 
order to induce residents to switch from money to bond holdings 
(ǣ  ? ?. The increase in bond returns will, in turn, 
lead to an increase in equity returns as demand for equity is reduced given the shifts 
in relative returns for bonds and equity. This effect is partly mitigated by attempts to 
shift out of money into equity. If the central bank wants to avoid an increase in bond 
and equity returns arising from its operations, then it would allow broad money to 
increase, and will not sterilise the new funds of the non-bank private sector.  
It is important to note however, that under an interest rate-targeting 
framework, the central bank would still absorb the resulting net domestic liquidity 
increase in the banking system arising from its intervention operations to the extent 
that is required to keep the short-term interest rate target stable (	 愋? ?  ?Ȁ ? ? ? ?35. Note that the banking system has higher deposits,  ? 
arising from the trade surplus ± this represents excess liquidity which needs to be 
invested. Thus, the liquidity operations by the central bank with the banking system 
are unlikely to drive up bond returns. The increase in deposits, however, may have an 
impact on monetary conditions. It could constitute a loan supply shock which drives 
down lending rates and leads to credit growth.  
In the second case, if the domestic non-bank private sector chooses to hold 
the financial wealth arising from the trade surplus in equal proportions in all three 
assets ± money, bonds and equity ( ? ?  ? ?  ? ?  ?), there would be downward 
pressure on bond and equity returns, assuming supplies of these assets are 
unchanged. In addition to the proportion of new wealth held as money, broad money 
still increases to the extent that bonds and equity are purchased from other domestic 
non-bank residents, as opposed to banks and non-residents. In this scenario, the 
central bank, by partially sterilising the increase in broad money, can avoid the 
downward pressure on bond returns by supplying bonds to the non-bank private 
sector. As bond returns remain steady, downward pressures on equity returns are 
                                                          
35
  Monetary operations keep base money relatively stable. Since broad money is a multiple of base money 
through the reserve-deposit and currency deposit ratios, what is observed is a fluctuation in the multiplier. Broad 
money, BM = ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ?   ? ?  ?, where cr = currency-deposit ratio, rrr = required reserves ratio, err 
= excess reserves ratio. The multiplier, m =  ? ?  ? ? ?  ?   ? ?Ǥ If we assume that the trade surplus is held 
as deposits, there is little change to RM, while cr falls, and m and BM increase.  
 
61 
 
somewhat alleviated as demand for equity is reduced given shifts in relative returns. 
Whether or not equity returns remain steady or decline will depend on the balance of 
the two opposing forces ± the desire to hold the new wealth as equity versus the 
desire for higher return. It is worth noting that without the central bank attempting to 
sterilise broad money, compared to the first scenario, in addition to the possibility of 
the loan supply shock ( ? ?  ? ? ?  ?, bond and equity 
returns are lower. The looser conditions reflect the lack of an accompanying money 
demand adjustment that was present before, which meant that the non-bank private 
sector willingly held the full amount of the wealth increase as money.  
We consider as a third scenario, a situation where there are non-resident 
inflows which are invested in existing assets ( ? ?  ? ?, purchased from residents (the 
non-bank private sector and banks); these flows are only invested in bonds and 
equity, and not broad money. Similar to our second scenario on the trade surplus, the 
increase in demand by non-residents for an existing pool of assets pushes returns 
down. The non-bank private sector adjusts its portfolio, increasing broad money 
holdings as the returns on bonds and equity fall ( ? ? ?  ?ǡ ? ? ?  ?ǡ ? ? ?  ? ?ǤThe central bank can 
avoid the fall in bond returns through the issuance of new securities to non-residents 
( ? ? ?   ?  ? ?  ? ?. If non-residents are indifferent between bonds and 
equity, and the central bank fully absorbs the inflows, then bond returns are stable 
and so too are equity returns36,37. The BM sterilisation in this case also mitigates the 
loan supply shock within the banking system.   
Table 3.1 provides a brief comparison of the effects across the three scenarios 
discussed.  Overall, from our analysis, several observations can be made in summary.  
                                                          
36
   It is assumed that the bonds issued are perfectly substitutable for the type of bonds that non-residents 
demand. This may not be the case in reality. Securities issued for monetary policy and liquidity management 
purposes tend to be of short-term maturities (as opposed to securities used as collateral for repos, which may 
display more varying maturities). While we have assumed normal yield curves that move together, there may 
actually be market segmentation. Furthermore, there is the issue of coordination between government debt 
management and monetary policy, if the central bank partly relies on government securities for its operations or if 
both the government and central bank issue securities of similar maturities. In many countries where Treasury 
bills are actively issued, central banks do not rely on their own bills. See Nyawata (2012) for discussions on the 
use of central bank bills versus Treasury bills for draining excess liquidity.  
37
  By similar mechanics, the sale of bonds and equity by non-residents will have upward pressures on 
bond and equity returns inducing the non-bank private sector and banks to make purchases. The impact on bond 
and equity returns may be mitigated if there is a reduction in the supply of bonds by way of buyback/redemption 
by the central bank.  
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(i) Absorbing the net increase in domestic liquidity from banks as part of 
operations to keep the short-term policy interest rate target (and base 
money) stable does not necessarily offset the impact of external inflows 
on bond and equity returns. Monetary and financial conditions can still 
be looser, with lower bond and equity returns, and possibly lower retail 
interest rates among banking institutions due to excess liquidity.  
(ii) Absorbing liquidity or sterilising inflows at the source (exporters and 
non-residents) by increasing the supply of bonds to meet demand can 
offset the downward pressure on bond and equity returns, and limit the 
increase in BM and the build-up of excess liquidity among banks.  
(iii) However, attempting to induce the non-bank private sector to hold more 
bonds (and less money) than it wants to would lead to higher bond 
returns. In our examples, without broad money sterilisation, monetary 
conditions are increasingly looser as we progressively relax the extent of 
demand for money. This helps to illustrate the difference between trade 
surpluses and portfolio capital inflows.  
(iv) In all three scenarios, as we move from zero BM sterilisation to full BM 
sterilisation, the same amount of liquidity is absorbed by the central 
bank. The difference lies in the sectors which end up as holders of the 
sterilisation instruments; from banks, to a mix of banks and the non-bank 
private sector, to just non-residents. On a parallel basis, the addition to 
banking system excess liquidity is progressively smaller.  
(v) The desire to hold assets other than money, changes in supply and/or 
GHPDQG DQG WKHUHIRUH UHWXUQV UHVXOW LQ ³KRW SRWDWR´ HIIHFWV DV PRQH\
gets passed around among agents until there are sufficient changes in 
returns and prices to equalise demand and supply. BM sterilisation 
contributes to these effects, unless the bonds supplied fulfil a very 
specific demand.   
 
 At this stage, it is useful to point out the difference between sterilising 
inflows related to the non-bank private sector and non-residents. With the former, 
sterilisation bonds still constitute a portion of financial wealth. Wealth has still 
increased, and the effects of this will still be felt. Furthermore, these bonds are likely 
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to be of short-term maturities. As such, they may constitute monetary assets (having 
characteristics similar to broad money components) more so than non-monetary 
assets. At maturity, and with possible shifts in portfolio preferences, these funds may 
permeate the economy. Higher returns may be required to rollover the sterilisation 
bonds. In the case of liquidity absorption from non-residents, the channel for wealth 
increase of the non-bank private sector via the sales of assets to non-residents is shut 
down.  
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Table 3.1: Sterilisation of an External Sector Surplus 
 Scenario Without Broad Money 
Sterilisation 
With Broad Money 
Sterilisation 
1. Trade surplus,    ? .  ? ?  ?ǡ  ? ?  ? ? ?  ?ǣ 
The non-bank private sector has 
corresponding demand for 
money and no desire to invest 
in bonds or equity. 
ȟ	 愋? = X ȟ ? ? ȟ  ?  
 
No demand for bonds and 
equity: No change to  ? and ?. 
 
Excess liquidity in the banking 
system: ȟ ? ? . 
 
Liquidity operations with the 
banking system (net absorption 
by central bank): ȟ ? ? ? ?  ?  ? ? ? = X. 
 
Sterilisation, S>0 
Supply of bonds exceeds 
demand:  ? increase to 
equaliseȟ  ? ȟ ?;  
Demand for equity reduced or 
stable (fixed supply):  ?. 
 ȟ ? ? ȟ  ?   ? ȟ ? 
 
Liquidity operations with the 
banking system (net absorption 
by central bank): ȟ ? ? ? ?  ?  ? ? ? =   ? ȟ ? 
 
2. Trade surplus,    ? .  ? ?   ? ?   ? ?  ?ǣ 
The non-bank private sector 
apportions the wealth increase 
equally across money, bonds 
and equity. 
ȟ	 愋? = X  ȟ ? ? ȟ  ?   ? ǣ  
Assume some bonds (Z) 
purchased from banks  ? ?ȟ ? ? ?.  
 
Demand for existing bonds and 
equity: Lower  ? and ?. 
 
Excess liquidity in the 
banking system: ȟ ? ?  ? ?ȟ ? ? ?  ? Ǥ  
 
Liquidity operations with the 
banking system (net absorption 
by central bank): ȟ ? ? ? ?  ?  ? ? ? = X. 
 
0<S<1,  
Demand for bonds met with 
increased supply,  ȟ ?ȟ ?ǣ   ? stable;  
Stable or higher demand for 
equity (fixed supply):  ?Ǥ 
 ȟ ? ? ȟ  ?   ? ȟ ? 
 
Liquidity operations with the 
banking system (net absorption 
by central bank): ȟ ? ? ? ?  ?  ? ? ? =   ? ȟ ? 
 
3.  Portfolio capital inflows,  ȟ  ? .  
Non-residents demand for 
bonds only. 
ȟ	 愋? = X  ȟ ? ? ȟ  ?   ? ;  
Assume some bonds (Z) 
purchased from banks  ? ?ȟ ? ? ?Ǥ 
 
Demand for bonds: Lower  ? 
and ?. 
 
Excess liquidity in the 
banking system: ȟ ? ?  ? ?ȟ ? ? ?  ? Ǥ  
 
Liquidity operations with the 
banking system (net absorption 
by central bank): ȟ ? ? ? ?  ?  ? ? ? = X. 
 
S=1,  
Demand for bonds met with 
increased supply,   ȟ  ? ȟ ? ?ǣ  ? and ?Ǥ 
 ȟ ? ? ȟ  ?  ? 
 
Excess liquidity in the banking 
system =0.  
 
No liquidity absorbed from 
banks; ȟ  ? ȟ ? ?  ? Ǥ 
 
Notes:  
It is assumed that for all scenarios, with and without broad money sterilisation, there are no bond or equity 
sales by non-residents. There are no bond sales by banks in all scenarios with broad money sterilisation.  
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In Argy and Murray (1985), the analysis indicates that full sterilisation -
keeping money supply unchanged, unambiguously raises the interest rate on 
domestic securities38, while the effect on equity returns is ambiguous depending on 
assumptions made about the substitution of different assets in a portfolio. If 
sterilisation is meant to immunise the domestic real economy from the liquidity 
effects emanating from the external sector, it would have to be less than complete. 
This is so because the increases in money represent money demand shocks. Our 
results are generally consistent with theirs; in particular, our example of the trade 
surplus which increases money demand. We, however, also consider the cases of 
trade surplus and capital inflows as money supply shocks. Additionally, we make the 
distinction between sterilisation at the banks level, which constitutes liquidity 
management to maintain the policy interest rate, and sterilisation at the non-banks 
level which constitutes sterilisation of the wider effects of external inflows.  
Based on the above, for the next stage of analysis, we make the assumption 
that there is a desire on the part of exporters and non-residents to channel trade 
inflows and portfolio capital inflows respectively into bonds. As such, a complete 
sterilisation of these inflows by supplying the sought after assets offsets their impact 
on BM and alleviates the downward pressure on bond returns, and at the same time 
does not cause a rise in returns.  
We now consider the impact of intervention, and sterilisation on broad money 
in the wider context of the model presented in this chapter. Any change in real broad 
money,  ? ? is assumed to arise only from real foreign exchange intervention, ȟ	 嘋? ? ?. We write  ? ?ǡ ? which appears in (3.24) as: 
         ? ?ǡ ? ?  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ?               (3.34) 
    
 
 ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? = ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ?                      (3.35) 
 
                                                          
38
  The cases examined are an on-going current account surplus, a fall in the foreign interest rate and an 
H[RJHQRXVLQIORZRIIRUHLJQFDSLWDODGHFOLQHLQUHVLGHQWV¶IRUeign assets). These are instances of surpluses with 
no direct real effects.  
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Then, substituting (3.14) into (3.35) gives39: 
  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?Ʌ  ? ɔ ?  ?  ?  ?  ? ?               (3.36) 
 
We next define s as the sterilisation coefficient. When s=1, complete 
VWHULOLVDWLRQ RFFXUV DQG WKXV WKH FHQWUDO EDQN¶V LQWHUYHQWLRQ RSHUDWLRQV KDYH QR
impact on broad money.  
 
 ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? = ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ?                    (3.37) 
 
 ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?Ʌ  ? ɔ ?  ?  ?  ?  ? ?               (3.38) 
 
Setting v =  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ?, which is the lagged velocity of money:  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ? ?   ? ? ?Ʌ  ? ɔ ?  ?  ?  ?  ? ?               (3.39) 
 
From (3.39), if the central bank is concerned about incomplete sterilisation 
(s<1), then it would have to consider the impact of the interest rate differential and 
possible real effective exchange rate disequilibrium on capital flows, particularly if it 
operates a closely managed exchange rate regime. The effects of these on the interest 
rate setting decision are more prominent when c is higher. Reducing the degree of 
intervention and increasing uncertainty about the direction of the exchange rate could 
alleviate some of the pressure of capital inflows. The central bank would also be 
concerned about the overheating consequences of large trade inflows driven by an 
undervalued exchange rate.  
 
                                                          
39
   ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ?   ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? 
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We next solve for the monetary policy reaction functions under two cases ± 
with complete sterilisation of trade and capital inflows, and less than complete 
sterilisation of these inflows. 
(b) Monetary policy reaction function with complete sterilisation 
Endogenising money, we substitute  ? ?ǡ ?  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? = ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? in 
the augmented output gap equation (3.20), the reduced-form inflation equation (3.21) 
and the monetary policy reaction function (3.24) to arrive at the following: 
  ? ? ɀ ? ? ? ? ? ɀ ? ? ? ɀ ? ?ɉʌ ? ? ? ?  ? ɉ ?Ɏ ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?  ?ɀ ? ? ?ɀ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ?  ? ?  ? ?  
                 (3.40) 
 Ɏ ? ? ?Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ? ?  ? ɉ ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ?  ? ɉ ? ?Ɏ ? ? ? ? ?Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ?ɉʌ ? ?  ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ? ?  ? ? ? Ɏ ? ? ? ?Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ? ? ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ? ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ? ?Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ? ?  ?  ? 	 嘋? ? ?ǡ ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
                 (3.41) 
 
 ? ?  ?Ⱦ ? ?Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ? ?  ? ɉ ? ɀ ? ?Ⱦ ? ? ? Ƚ ?  ? ?  ? ɉ ? ?Ɏ ? ? ? ?  ?Ⱦ ? ?Ⱦ ?ɉ  ?  ? ?ɀ ? ?Ⱦ ? ? ? Ƚ ? ? ɉ ?ʌ ? ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ?Ⱦ ? ? ? Ƚ ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ? ?  ? ? ? Ɏ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ɀ ?ɀ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?ɀ ?ɀ ? ? ? ɀ ?ɀ ? ? ?  ?  ? 	 嘋? ? ?ǡ ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  ? ?ɀ ? ? ? 
 
        (3.42) 
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If sterilisation is complete (s=1), (3.42) would be similar to (3.24), with  ? ?ǡ ? ?  ?. The policy interest rate would also be independent of the foreign interest 
rate. The difference would be that in (3.42),  ? ? would be smaller than in (3.24), as 
the central bank intervenes to limit nominal exchange rate volatility. In a fixed 
exchange rate regime,  ? ? ?  ?ǡ which shuts down the direct channel of the exchange 
rate effect on inflation. However, the effect of the deviation of the real effective 
exchange rate from its equilibrium level, ?ǡ . In particular, in a fixed 
exchange rate regime,  ? remains relatively stable at a particular level, which 
arguably makes the exchange rate more susceptible to disequilibrium and possibly 
having a greater effect on the output gap than in (3.24). In addition, if for instance,  ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?  ?ǡ while based on the reaction 
function, this would entail a lower policy interest rate, at the same time it would lead 
to capital outflows. The central bank can support the particular level of the exchange 
rate with intervention without having to raise interest rates, but risks running down 
its foreign exchange reserves.  
(c) Monetary policy reaction function with incomplete sterilisation 
If sterilisation of trade and capital inflows is incomplete, then the policy 
interest rate would need to rise. To consider the case of incomplete sterilisation more 
closely, we substitute  ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? with its components following (3.39), into (3.40) 
and (3.41): 
 
  ? ? ɀ ? ? ? ? Ȃ  ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ?  ?  ? ? ? ? ɀ ? ?ɉʌ ? ? ? ?  ? ɉ ?Ɏ ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?  ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ?  ?  ? ?Ʌ  ɔ ? ? ?  ?ɀ ? ?  ?  ?  ?  ? ? ? ɀ ? ?  ?  ? ? ? ?  ? ?  
                  (3.43) 
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Ɏ ? ?  ?Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ? ?  ? ɉ ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ?  ? ɉ ? ?Ɏ ? ? ? ? ?Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ?ɉʌ ? ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ? ?  ? ? ? Ɏ ? ? ? ?Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ? ? ? ? Ⱦ ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ? ?  ?  ? ? ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ? ? ? Ⱦ ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ?  ?  ? ?Ʌ  ɔ ? ? ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ?  ?  ?  ?  ? ? ?Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ?  ?  ? ? ? ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
 
                  (3.44) 
 Compared with (3.40) and (3.41), which reflect full sterilisation, three new 
variables now appear in the output gap equation and reduced-form inflation equation 
(3.43 and 3.44 respectively) when s<1. These are ? (exogenous trade flows),  ? 
(exogenous capital flows), and the foreign interest rate,  ? ?. The first two positively 
affect the output gap while  ? ?has a negative impact since a lower value leads to more 
capital inflows. These unsterilised money supply shocks lead to looser monetary 
conditions with lower bond and equity returns, and possibly lower lending rates with 
the build-up of excess liquidity in the banking system. While these reflect cheaper 
financing conditions, from the perspective of savers, the shocks reflect real balance 
effects including from changes to asset prices, which mirror the lower returns. The 
extent of the effects are positively influenced by the degree of international asset 
substitutability, c; lagged broad money velocity, v; and the sensitivity of the output 
gap to looser monetary conditions, ɀ ?. At the same time, the effect of the policy 
interest rate on the output gap is now reduced reflecting the wedge between the 
policy rate and wider monetary conditions. 
 We next proceed as before, minimising the loss function to arrive at the 
monetary policy reaction function: 
 
70 
 
 ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ?Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ? ?  ? ɉ ?  ?Ⱦ ? ? ? Ƚ ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ? ?  ?  ? ? ? ɀ ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ? ?  ?  ? ? ?  ? ɉ ? ?Ɏ ? ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ?Ⱦ ?ɉ  ?  ? ? ?Ⱦ ? ? ? Ƚ ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ? ?  ?  ? ? ? ɀ ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ? ?  ?  ? ?ɉ ?ʌ ? ? ? Ⱦ ? ?Ⱦ ? ? ? Ƚ ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ? ?  ?  ? ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ? ?  ? ? ? Ɏ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ɀ ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ? ?  ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ɀ ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ? ?  ?  ? ? ? ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ? ?  ?  ? ?Ʌ  ɔ ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ? ?  ?  ? ?  ? ?  ɀ ? ?  ?  ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ? ?  ?  ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ɀ ? ?  ?  ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ? ?  ?  ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ? ?  ?  ? ? ? ? 
                 (3.45) 
 
 As in the earlier two equations,  ?ǡ   ? ?now appear in the monetary policy 
reaction function and thus affect the policy interest rate,  ?.  The response of  ? to all 
exogenous variables and shocks is influenced by c, v and ɀ ?. Higher values of c, v 
and ɀ ?require a stronger policy response compared to the no intervention and full 
sterilisation scenarios respectively, provided:  ?  ?  ? ? ?  ?  ?  ? ɀ ?Ǥ  
The incomplete sterilisation of trade and capital inflows, as discussed in 
subsection 3.2.6.2(a), implies looser monetary conditions and that the policy interest 
rate should be higher than it is. The foreign interest rate complicates monetary policy 
independence, particularly when c is large. A lower foreign interest rate triggers 
capital inflows, which if incompletely sterilised, entails a higher policy interest rate.  
If c approaches zero (very low international asset substitutability), then the interest 
rate differential and perceived disequilibrium in the real effective exchange rate 
would not induce capital inflows. The foreign interest rate would not matter for the 
policy interest rate ( ? ?  ?  ? ?.  
With  ?  ?  ? ? ?  ?  ?  ? ɀ ? the policy rate response coefficients are higher on 
all the predetermined variables affecting the output gap and inflation 
( ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ Ɏ ? ?ǡ ʌ ? ?ǡ Ɏ ? ? ? ?ǡand on the aggregate demand and cost-push shocks 
respectively ( ? ?Ɏ ?) compared to the no intervention and intervention with full 
sterilisation scenarios. The policy interest rate needs to respond more strongly as its 
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effect on the output gap and inflation is partly muted with the incomplete sterilisation 
of supply-driven broad money growth. Broad money growth serves as a proxy for the 
wedge between the policy interest rate and actual monetary conditions.  
When ɀ ? ?  ?  ?  ? ɀ ?ǡthere is a switch in the signs on all coefficients ± 
turning positive for  ? ?and possibly, ʌ ? ?  ?    ?ɀ ? ?   ? ? ?   ? ?    ? ?   ?  ? Ǣwhile turning negative 
for all other exogenous variables. The reaction function now indicates that the best 
policy option is to give up the pursuit of monetary policy independence and have the 
domestic policy interest rate track the foreign interest rate. This is when the central 
bank is faced with relatively freely moving capital inflows which cannot be sterilised 
and which have a strong impact on  ?, whilst the policy interest has a relatively less 
potent effect  ?ɀ ? ?on  ?. 
Incomplete sterilisation of broad money growth complicates the monetary 
policy reaction function and makes recourse to additional policy instruments/options 
more critical. On one hand, complete sterilisation keeps yields on assets relatively 
stable, which may prolong inflows. On the other, partial sterilisation results in lower 
yields, which may cause inflows to dissipate. However, domestic monetary 
conditions are looser with partial sterilisation. The implied stronger policy interest 
rate response may encourage inflows yet again, which also depend on the real 
effective exchange rate disequilibrium and foreign interest rates.  
An obvious policy option would be to allow greater flexibility in the 
exchange rate ?  ? which alleviates full reliance on the interest rate in the face of 
aggregate demand and cost-push shocks, and also facilitates adjustments in external 
inflows. Other alternative policy options include the imposition of capital account 
restrictions which reduce c and limit the amount of non-resident funds that enter the 
domestic asset markets. Higher reserve requirements on banks limit the loan supply 
VKRFN UHIOHFWLQJ IRUFHG DEVRUSWLRQ RI OLTXLGLW\ DV RSSRVHG WR WKH ³YROXQWDU\´
absorption through open market operations and issuance of central bank securities.  
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3.2.7 Model Extension ± Additional Broad Money Determinants 
 Two key assumptions about the model presented throughout Section 3.2.6 are 
that only ȟ	 愋? drives broad money growth and that it represents money supply 
shocks. In reality, with regard to broad money determinants, there are two other 
LPSRUWDQWHOHPHQWVFKDQJHVLQEDQNLQJLQVWLWXWLRQV¶QHWIRUHLJQDVVHWVȟ	 ? ?? and 
changes in net domestic assets (ȟ ? ?). Trade surpluses and portfolio capital 
inflows are reflected in either ȟ	 ? ? ? or ȟ	 ? ?. More so than portfolio capital 
inflows, trade inflows can entail corresponding money demand adjustments, since 
surpluses move in tandem with higher domestic income/wealth. A positive supply 
shock to ȟ ? ?, which is essentially an increase in the provision of loans by the 
banking system, leads to a lower lending rate to equilibrate the supply of and demand 
for credit.   
We consider in turn two cases, one with ȟ	 ? ? ? and ȟ ? ? as broad 
money determinants, and the other with ȟ	 ? ? and ȟ ? ? as the determinants. 
For the first case, we express  ? ?ǡ ? with the determinants in real terms as follows:  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? = ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ?        
 = v  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  ?                (3.46)   
           =  ? ? ?  ?  ? ? ?  ? ? ?Ʌ  ? ɔ ? ? ?  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  ?         (3.47) 
 
We incorporate (3.46) into the monetary policy reaction function to give:  
  ? ?  ?Ⱦ ? ?Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ? ?  ? ɉ ? ɀ ? ?Ⱦ ? ? ? Ƚ ?  ? ?  ? ɉ ? ?Ɏ ? ? ? ?  ?Ⱦ ? ?Ⱦ ?ɉ  ?  ? ?ɀ ? ?Ⱦ ? ? ? Ƚ ? ? ɉ ?ʌ ? ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ?Ⱦ ? ? ? Ƚ ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ? ?  ? ? ? Ɏ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ɀ ?ɀ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?ɀ ?ɀ ? ? ? ɀ ?ɀ ? ? ?  ?  ? 	 嘋? ? ?ǡ ?  ?  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  ?  ? ?ɀ ? ? ? 
                     (3.48) 
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As before we assume that full sterilisation (s=1) takes place if the supply of 
sterilisation bonds meets a specific demand from the non-bank private sector or non-
residents ± trade and portfolio capital inflows are money supply shocks. If s <1, the 
issue of whether the external inflows represent money supply or demand shocks is to 
some extent addressed with the broad money determinants expressed as ratios to  ? ? ?Ǥ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  and  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  are simple money and credit gap measures 
respectively. If these ratios increase, coupled with high value for lagged velocity, v, 
the implication is that the policy interest rate should be higher.  
 While  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  captures the wealth/asset effect and cheaper financing 
conditions associated with external inflows, in particular with regard to bond and 
equity returns,  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  captures the actual impact on banking system credit to the 
non-bank private sector, in terms of loans and bond holdings. The link to external 
inflows can be observed from equation (3.33). We note that  ? 嘋? ?ǡ ? can increase 
by the total amount of new deposits less forced absorption that is ȟ ? ?- RR). 
 For the second case, since  ?	 ? ? ?ǡ ? ?  ?	 ? ?ǡ   ?  ? ?  ? ?ǡwith the 
additional real broad money determinants, we can write  ? ?ǡ ? as follows: 
 
 ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? = ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ?        
 = v  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  ?                               (3.49) 
           =  ? ?  ? ? ?Ʌ  ? ɔ ?  ?  ? ? ?  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  ?          (3.50) 
We incorporate (3.49) into the monetary policy reaction function but assume  ?	 嘋? ? ?ǡ ? ?  ?Ǥzero foreign exchange intervention and therefore, no 
sterilisation:  
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 ? ?  ?Ⱦ ? ?Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ? ?  ? ɉ ? ɀ ? ?Ⱦ ? ? ? Ƚ ?  ? ?  ? ɉ ? ?Ɏ ? ? ? ?  ?Ⱦ ? ?Ⱦ ?ɉ  ?  ? ?ɀ ? ?Ⱦ ? ? ? Ƚ ? ? ɉ ?ʌ ? ? ? Ⱦ ?ɀ ? ?Ⱦ ? ? ? Ƚ ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ? ?  ? ? ? Ɏ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ɀ ?ɀ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?ɀ ?ɀ ? ? ? ɀ ?ɀ ?  ? ?	 嘋? ?ǡ ?  ?  ? 嘋? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?ɀ ? ? ? 
                 (3.51) 
With  ?	 嘋? ?ǡ ? ?  ?(which leads to exchange rate appreciation), note that the same 
portfolio adjustments for the non-bank private sector that was discussed in Section 
3.2.6(a) still apply. In the respective scenarios of exporters (trade surplus) and non-
residents wanting to hold bonds and equity as assets, broad money increases and 
bond and equity returns fall. The contrast with the case of intervention (with base 
money sterilisation at the banks level) is that now excess liquidity among banks is 
reflected in ȟ	 嘋? ?ǡ ?  rather than in domestic currency lending to the central 
bankȟ ? ?Ǥ Instead, since the policy interest rate level must be maintained, via 
monetary operations, central bank domestic currency lending to banks increases. 
( ? ? ?  ?  ? ? ? ?Ǥ The new banking system balance sheet constraint is: 	ǡ  ?  ? ? ?  ? ? ?  ?  ? ?  ?  ? ? ?  ?                      (3.52) 
The loan supply shock is still relevant since  ? is higher40. As such, the issue of a 
wedge between the policy interest rate and wider monetary conditions still remains. 
Using (3.50) in our loss minimisation problem, we arrive at the following monetary 
policy reaction function: 
 
                                                          
40
 For example, assume a trade surplus. 	 ? ? ?ǡ ?Ĺ ? ? ?  ?  ? ? ?. The non-EDQNSULYDWHVHFWRU¶V
deposits/money holdings increase ( ? ? ?. This leads to excess liquidity in the banking system, which is absorbed 
by the central bank ( ? ? ?  ?  ? ? ? ?.  
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 ? ?  ?Ⱦ ? ?Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ? ?  ? ɉ ?  ?Ⱦ ? ? ? Ƚ ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ? ? ɀ ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ? ?  ? ɉ ? ?Ɏ ? ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ?Ⱦ ?ɉ  ?  ? ? ?Ⱦ ? ? ? Ƚ ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ? ? ɀ ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ?ɉ ?ʌ ? ? ? Ⱦ ? ?Ⱦ ? ? ? Ƚ ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? Ⱦ ? ?  ? ? ? Ɏ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ɀ ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ? ? ? ? ? ɀ ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ? ? ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ? ?  ?  ? ?Ʌ  ɔ ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ?  ? ?  ɀ ? ?  ?  ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?ɀ ? ?  ?  ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ? ? ? ? ɀ ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ? ? 嘋? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  ?  ? ?ɀ ? ? ɀ ? ? ? ? 
                 
                                 (3.53) 
 
The above equation is similar to the monetary policy reaction function in (3.45). The 
only variations are that we do not include the degree of non-sterilisation of 
intervention (1-s) and there is now a new variable,  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ǤThe reaction function 
indicates that even without foreign exchange intervention, current account surpluses 
and capital inflows lead to broad money growth and hence looser monetary 
conditions, which suggest that the policy interest rate should be higher than it is. The 
key difference is that  ? ? is more volatile, and works as an adjustment mechanism. 
This may mitigate the persistence element and hence prevent the build-up of 
imbalances.   
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3.3 CONCLUSION 
 The simple model in this chapter offers a fresh perspective by combining the 
elements of balance of payments flows, foreign exchange intervention and 
sterilisation within a monetary policy framework where the primary monetary policy 
instrument is the short-term interest rate. This is consistent with actual practice 
among central banks, where the liquidity management aspect of monetary policy is 
carried out so as to keep the operating target for the short-term policy interest rate 
stable so long as there is no change to the policy stance.  
 Base money sterilisation does not imply broad money sterilisation. 
Depending on the instruments used and, crucially, the sectors from which liquidity is 
absorbed (banks versus non-EDQNV WKH FHQWUDO EDQN¶V PRQHWDU\ RSHUDWions have 
varying implications for broad money growth. Broad money growth, in turn, serves 
as a proxy for returns on financial assets which matter for aggregate demand, and 
also reflects real balance effects. As such, broad money growth is indicative of a 
wedge between the policy interest rate and wider monetary conditions. On this basis, 
broad money growth is included in the output gap specification. The model presented 
shows the differences in the optimal monetary policy reaction function when the 
central bank does not intervene, and intervenes but either completely sterilises or 
only partially sterilises the impact of balance of payments flows on broad money 
growth.  
With foreign exchange intervention, exchange rate volatility is reduced and 
there is less need for the central bank to adjust its policy interest rate in response to 
the effects of nominal exchange rate changes. At the same time however, the central 
bank still has to be concerned with the possibility of real effective exchange rate 
disequilibrium. Additionally, using a portfolio balance framework consisting of three 
assets (broad money, bonds and equity) with intervention as the only source of broad 
money growth, it is shown that the incomplete sterilisation of intervention drives a 
wedge between the policy rate and wider monetary conditions as bond and equity 
returns fall and excess liquidity in the banking system increases. This is provided that 
balance of payments flows to which intervention is related are not willingly held as 
money and instead the demand for other assets, given a fixed supply, drives returns 
down.  
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With complete broad money sterilisation, by supplying assets to meet 
demand, the central bank is able to maintain monetary independence and 
effectiveness, as returns remain stable and there is no increase in banking system 
excess liquidity. Pressures are asymmetric, however, in the sense that intervention to 
prevent currency depreciation, as opposed to currency appreciation, runs the risk of 
running down reserves, and thus raising interest rates may be an inevitable option if a 
closely managed exchange rate regime is to be maintained.  
Incomplete sterilisation reduces monetary policy independence and 
effectiveness. Three new variables enter the monetary policy reaction function: 
exogenous trade and capital inflows, and the foreign interest rate. Positive 
unsterilised money supply shocks lead to looser monetary conditions. The effects are 
stronger, requiring a larger policy interest rate response, when international asset 
substitutability, broad money velocity, and the output gap response to broad money 
growth are high. At the same time, the policy rate response to factors affecting the 
output gap and inflation needs to be higher than in the complete sterilisation scenario 
since a wedge has developed between it and wider monetary conditions. An increase 
in the policy interest rate triggers another round of capital inflows, as the interest rate 
differential against the foreign interest rate widens. A change in the way the central 
bank manages its exchange rate and recourse to additional policy instruments 
become more critical in the incomplete sterilisation scenario.  
Extensions to the model to include changes to net foreign assets of banking 
institutions and changes to broad money net domestic assets indicate that even 
without intervention, external inflows will still permeate domestic asset markets, and 
as such a wedge still arises between the policy interest rate and wider monetary 
conditions. The difference when compared to the scenario of intervention with 
incomplete sterilisation is that the nominal exchange rate is more volatile and serves 
as an adjustment mechanism, in which case persistent imbalances are arguably less 
likely.  
In this chapter, we have shown that even if there is base money sterilisation, 
with liquidity absorbed from banks, balance of payments flows and intervention will 
still permeate the economy through changes in broad money. Thus, broad money 
sterilisation is what matters. In Chapters 5 and 6, we estimate the real intervention 
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effects on real base money growth and real broad money growth respectively for our 
sample of 30 countries. We find that in most countries base money is completely 
sterilised but broad money is not. According to the model presented here, with 
incomplete sterilisation of broad money, an inflow of money across the exchanges 
will require an increase in interest rates in economies operating an interest rate-
targeting framework, as is the case in most emerging markets today. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE INTERVENTION  
ON MONEY: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Foreign exchange intervention and the nature of sterilisation affect money 
growth. In turn, theory suggests that money growth has short-to medium-run effects 
on wider monetary and financial conditions while the long-run link between money 
and inflation is an accepted empirical phenomenon (see Chapter 3, sections 3.2.5 and 
3.2.6.2(a) for discussions on the role of money, and with reference to intervention 
and sterilisation, respectively).  
In this chapter, we seek to provide a conceptual framework and discuss the 
empirical methodology required to answer the following two questions: 
(i) What are the effects of foreign exchange intervention on base money and 
broad money growth respectively? and 
(ii) What are the factors influencing these effects?  
 
 In particular, because of the operational elements of the monetary policy 
framework in most countries, the effect of foreign exchange intervention on base 
money growth is not expected to be significant unless reserve requirements are an 
important policy instrument or if the monetary policy framework in operation is a 
strict currency board or involves base money targeting with either a long-term 
expansion or quantitative easing mandate.  
 
 When the stance of monetary policy is expressed through a short-term interest 
rate, money market liquidity is managed so as to maintain the policy interest rate at a 
desired level. The sterilisation of intervention is a by-product of this liquidity 
management process. In contrast, with a strict currency board, intervention is 
typically unsterilised. In the case where base money expansion is the focus of policy, 
WKHEXLOGXSLQEDQNV¶reserve balances with the central bank may reflect unsterilised 
intervention.  
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 On the other hand, the effect of foreign exchange intervention on broad 
money growth is expected to be relatively more significant and varied across 
countries. These variations may occur on account of the development stage of 
various economies, the types of balance of payment flows and the sectors or agents 
to which tKHVHIORZVSHUWDLQDVZHOODVHDFKFRXQWU\¶VPRQHWDU\SROLF\IUDPHZRUN
and associated sterilisation methods.  
 
 The degree of sterilisation in both developed and developing countries has 
been the subject of extensive literature. However, most of the recent studies tend to 
focus almost exclusively on base money sterilisation. These studies also do not 
provide a clear conceptual framework for the mechanisms through which foreign 
exchange intervention affects both base money and broad money, and are largely 
silent on the role played by the actual practice of monetary policy implementation by 
central banks. Consequently, the use of several different types of specifications and 
estimation methods is prevalent. Furthermore, the thrust of the empirical work is on 
obtaining the estimates for the sterilisation coefficients with relatively less emphasis 
on the wider implications of these results. See Chapter 2 for a literature review and 
Appendix 1: Selected Recent Studies on Sterilisation in Developing Countries for 
further details of selected empirical studies that encompass developing countries.  
 
 The rest of this chapter is organised as follows:  In Section 4.2, we discuss the 
theoretical framework and choice of econometric methodology. We describe the 
specification used in the regression analysis of the effects of foreign exchange 
intervention, which is based on the monetary approach to the balance of payments 
and behavioural money demand analysis (Section 4.2.1); discuss issues related to the 
choice of a proxy for foreign exchange intervention (Section 4.2.2); and address 
potential questions about the econometric approach (Section 4.2.3). We then provide 
a detailed explanation of the expected effects of intervention on the money variables, 
and the consequent hypotheses that are to be tested through the empirical analysis in 
Chapters 5 and 6 (Section 4.2.4). In Section 4.3, we describe the data and sample 
choice, and discuss the results from preliminary data testing. We include in this 
section details of the calculation of our proxy for intervention and a comparison 
against other possible measures.   
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4.2  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND ECONOMETRIC 
 METHODOLOGY 
 
4.2.1   The Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments and Behavioural 
 Money Demand Analysis 
 
,Q RUGHU WR DVVHVV WKH HIIHFWV RI FKDQJHV LQ WKH FHQWUDO EDQN¶V IRUHLJQ
exchange reserves (the proxy for intervention)41 on base money and broad money, 
the money determinants (supply) identity is combined with a behavioural money 
demand equation. This is based on the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments, which is essentially taking money market equilibrium and equating money 
supply with money demand42. Such an approach avoids the explicit treatment of 
either base money or broad money as the monetary policy instrument, and instead 
allows for more flexibility in the interpretation of coefficients across different 
monetary policy frameworks.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, many recent studies tend to assume net domestic 
assets of base money as the monetary policy instrument, even when this is not 
consistent with the reality of monetary policy implementation. The focus thus tends 
to be on base money sterilisation and the estimating equation is effectively a 
monetary policy reaction function. An alternative approach is to use a money 
demand specification. The type of explanatory variables may be similar, for instance 
measures of output (an output gap measure in the case of a monetary policy reaction 
function) and inflation. However, the theoretical understanding of the underlying 
relationship between variables and thus the expected signs on coefficients would 
differ.  
It is the case that while base money is very much within the control of the 
central bank and thus can be a monetary policy instrument, broad money is a lot less 
controllable, as it evolves based on the interaction between the central bank, banks 
and the non-bank sectors. Thus it may function as an intermediate target but not as a 
monetary policy instrument. It follows that within the context of an interest rate- 
targeting framework, typically with an interest rate as the monetary policy 
instrument, or even in an exchange rate targeting framework, it makes conceptual 
                                                          
41 
 We discuss the issues pertaining to the measurement of intervention in subsection 4.2.2.2 of this 
chapter.  
42
  See Blejer and Frenkel (2008) for a short overview of the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments. 
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sense for the effects of intervention on the monetary aggregates to be measured with 
some reliance on a money demand specification in the selection of control variables.   
The monetary approach to the balance of payments has been used explicitly 
by Bernstein (2000), who analyses the effects of foreign exchange reserves on base 
money for a group of six industrial countries. Aizenman and Glick (2009) and 
Takagi (1991), in analysing sterilisation in emerging market economies, also appear 
to use simple versions of money demand type specifications. In contrast, Ouyang and 
Rajan (2011) and Ouyang et al. (2008, 2010) use a monetary policy reaction 
function, derived from a loss minimisation framework based on Brissimis et al. 
(2002), to assess sterilisation and offset coefficients for Singapore and Taiwan 
individually, a panel group of Asian economies, and China respectively.  
We now turn to describing the conceptual framework for analysing the effects 
of intervention beginning with the following identities for the determinants of base 
money and broad money.  
Change in base money: ǻ ? ?ǻ 嘋?ǡ ? ?ǻ	 愋?ǡ ?            (4.1) 
Where 
ǻ 嘋?ǡ ? ?  
ǻ	 愋?ǡ ?  = the change in net foreign assets of the central bank, which includes           
the change in foreign exchange reserves, ǻ	 愋?ǡ ? 
 
Change in broad money:ǻ ? ?  ? ?ǻ 嘋?ǡ ? ?ǻ	 愋?ǡ ?) ?ǻ ? ? ? ?       (4.2)  
Where m = money multiplier        
          
Broad money can also be expressed as: 
ǻ ? ?ǻ ? ?ǡ ? ?ǻ	 愋?ǡ ?+ǻ	 ? ?ǡ               (4.3) 
     
 
Where 
ǻ ? ?ǡ ? = the change in broad money net domestic assets ȟ	 ? ?ǡ   = the change in net foreign assets of banking institutions 
Balance of payments 
(BOP) related 
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 The identity (4.3) in simple terms indicates that growth in broad money 
supply is driven by domestic credit creation and the balance of payments. When 
there is foreign exchange intervention, this would be reflected in ǻ	 愋?ǡ ? 
(specifically ǻ	 愋?ǡ ? ? and when there is no intervention, the impact of balance of 
payments flows would be captured in ȟ	 ? ?ǡ ǤThe effects of foreign exchange 
intervention, and more generally, the effects of balance of payments flows are 
LQIOXHQFHG E\ WKH FHQWUDO EDQN¶V VWHULOLVDWLRQ SROLF\ )RU H[DPSOH DV GLVFXVVHG LQ
Chapter 3, sustained balance of payments inflows, and intervention to limit exchange 
rate appreciation, lead to liquidity expansion which can fuel further credit creation 
and also affect market interest rates and asset prices. In an interest rate-targeting 
framework, sterilisation allows the central bank to mitigate some of these adverse 
effects and thus be able to focus interest rate policy on domestic economic 
conditions.  
 Next, we consider a portfolio-oriented behavioural money demand equation. 
In equation (4.4) below, which is a variant of equation (3.25), the change in real 
broad money demand is expressed as a function of income and various opportunity 
cost variables related to the returns on alternative assets. These explanatory variables 
are included based on the money demand literature and are discussed in detail in 
section 4.2.2.1. For ease of illustration, a static equation is used with all variables 
expressed in change/first difference terms. ȟ ?ǡ ? ? Ⱦ ? ? ? Ⱦ ? ?ȟ ? ? Ⱦ ? ?ȟ ? ? ? Ⱦ ? ?ȟ ? ? ? Ⱦ ? ?ȟ ? ? ? Ⱦ ? ?ȟ ? ?Ⱦ ? ?ȟ˒ ? ? ɂ ?        
                  (4.4) 
Where,  ȟ ?ǡ ? = change in the logarithm of real broad money demand ȟ ? ?  ȟ ? ? ? FKDQJHLQPRQH\¶VRZQUDWHRIUHWXUQ ȟ ? ? ? rate of return on an alternative domestic asset ȟ ? ?  ?  ȟ ? ?  ȟ˒ ? ?  ? ɂ ? ?  
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Then, real foreign exchange intervention, approximated by the change in the central 
EDQN¶VUHDOIRUHLJQH[FKDQJHUHVHUYHVȟ	 愋?ǡ ? ? is incorporated into equation 
(4.4). Expressing the change in real broad money demand as a growth rate (which is 
approximately equal to the difference in logarithm values where small changes are 
concerned) and scaling ȟ	 愋?ǡ ? by the level of real broad money lagged one 
period, we arrive at the following equation: ȟ ? ?ǡ ? ?ǡ  ? ? ? Ⱦ ? ? ? Ⱦ ? ?ȟ ? ? Ⱦ ? ?ȟ ? ? ? Ⱦ ? ?ȟ ? ? ? Ⱦ ? ?ȟ ? ? ? Ⱦ ? ?ȟ ? ? Ⱦ ? ?ȟ˒ ?  ?Ⱦ ? ? ? 嘋? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? 嘋? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ɂ ?      
                    (4.5) 
 
 Equation (4.5) allows for the estimation of the unique real intervention effects 
on real broad money change while controlling for demand factors (and viewed 
another way, factors affecting the non-intervention portion of the money supply 
determinants, namely  ǻ ? ?ǡ ? and ȟ	 ? ?ǡ  ?ǤAs we illustrated with the simple 
model in Chapter 3, a lack of broad money sterilisation, particularly when 
intervention is a money supply shock not matched by demand, can drive a wedge 
between the policy interest rate and wider monetary and financial conditions as 
portfolio rebalancing occurs.   
  Sriram (1999) notes that there exists a consensus that a log-linear 
specification is the most appropriate functional form for money demand analysis. 
Thus in (4.4) the money, income and exchange rate variables are typically expressed 
as logarithms while the interest rate variables are expressed in levels. Meanwhile, the 
inflation rate is measured as the change in the logarithm of the consumer price index. 
³Money demand functions are generally specified in real terms on the assumption 
that the price elasticity of nominal money balances is unity. The implication of this 
assumption is that the price level changes alone will not cause changes in the demand 
for real money balances, or alternatively that the demand for nominal balances is 
proportional to the price level. As such, the public is free from money illusion in its 
demand for real money balances´- (Sriram, 1999, page 28).  
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 4.2.2   The Choice of Explanatory Variables 
4.2.2.1  Traditional Money Demand Determinants  
Equation (4.4) in the previous section contains a broad selection of 
explanatory variables that typically appear in money demand specifications and can 
be grouped into two types.  These are ± a scale variable, for example current 
income to capture transaction demand, or wealth, based on the portfolio approach to 
money (Santoni, 1987); and measures of the rate of return on money, and the rates 
of return on alternative assets which together capture the opportunity cost of 
holding money.  
In theoretical portfolio balance models, money is one of several assets in 
which wealth is held. It is often assumed that while holdings of different assets 
increase proportionately with wealth, an increase in the level of economic activity 
is associated with an increase in the demand for money for transaction purposes, 
requiring a shift out of other assets. Santoni (1987) explains that when current 
income is not proportional to wealth, then wealth influenced changes in money 
demand can lead to changes in income velocity, ceteris paribus. However, 
measuring wealth is not a straight forward task based on either the discounted value 
of expected future income streams or present value of the stock of net assets. 
Consequently, the scale variable is usually some measure of national income ± 
GNP, NNP or GDP. Substituting one for another does not present significant 
differences (Sriram (1999), page 21, quoting Laidler (1993)).  
With regard to the opportunity cost of money, this involves some measure 
of the return on money when the focus is on a broad aggregate; the yields on 
domestic financial and real assets in a closed economy, and additionally the returns 
on foreign assets in an open economy setting.  
,QWHUPVRIWKHUHWXUQVRQDOWHUQDWLYHGRPHVWLFILQDQFLDODVVHWV³UHVHDUFKHUV
adopting a transactions view typically used one or more short-term rates like the 
yields on government securities, commercial paper, or savings deposits with a 
notion that these instruments are closer substitutes for money and their yields are 
especially relevant among the alternatives that are foregone by holding cash. Those 
considering a less narrow view of the demand for money have used 
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correspondingly a broader set of alternatives including the return on equities, yields 
on long-WHUPJRYHUQPHQWRUFRUSRUDWHERQGV´6ULUDPSDJH 
 An alternative to including interest rates in levels is to consider interest rate 
spreads particularly when analysing broad money demand, which has its own rate of 
return. The role of spreads in money demand does not necessarily refer to the 
maturity or term structure of interest rates, but to the risk, default and/or liquidity 
structure of interest rates (Sriram 1999, page 24). In empirical estimation, it should 
be highlighted that having a spread term implies that the coefficients on the two 
interest rates are of equal magnitude but have opposite signs. 
The return on real assets is generally represented by the expected rate of 
inflation. Sriram (1999, page 25, quoting Arestis (1988)) notes that when 
inflationary expectations are strong, economic agents have an incentive to hold real 
assets rather than money as the real value of money falls with inflation. However, 
the real value of real assets is maintained. The expected rate of inflation is 
sometimes the only opportunity cost variable in countries with underdeveloped 
financial sectors, and in countries experiencing high inflation as the rate of return 
on alternative financial assets is dominated by the rate of inflation. While some 
argue that the nominal interest rate is sufficient to capture the expected inflation 
rate, others argue that the nominal interest rate might not fully incorporate the 
expected inflation rate when there is some degree of regulation of interest rates 
(Sriram, 1999, quoting various other studies). 
The returns on foreign assets are usually represented by foreign interest 
rates and the expected rate of depreciation of the domestic currency (Sriram, 1999, 
page 24). The inclusion of the exchange rate variable is underpinned by the direct 
currency substitution literature - portfolio shifts between domestic and foreign 
money occur on account of expectations of changes in the exchange rate. The 
capital mobility or indirect substitution literature, on the other hand, suggests that 
the foreign interest rate becomes an important variable especially if foreign 
securities provide a relevant investment alternative. Some studies do not include the 
foreign interest rate on the basis that it moves in line with the domestic interest rate; 
and when both move together, it is the domestic rate that matters for the private 
VHFWRU¶VGHPDQGIRUPRQH\(see for instance, Bahmani-Oskooee (1991)).  
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The effect of the exchange rate on money demand is mixed. On one hand, as 
Arango and Nadiri (1981) note, depreciation in the exchange rate would lead to an 
increase in the wealth of domestic individuals holding foreign securities and 
investments, and correspondingly domestic money demand. On the other hand, if 
the currency depreciation leads the public to anticipate further depreciation, then it 
exerts a negative influence on money demand (there is an increase in the expected 
return from holding foreign assets). However, if an exchange rate appreciation 
leads to an anticipation of further appreciation, then the exchange rate appreciation 
has a positive influence on money demand (Bahmani-Oskooee and Pourheydarian, 
1990). 
 Regarding the extent to which all the explanatory variables associated with 
the money demand framework are included in the specification for analysis, Sriram 
 SDJH  VWDWHV ³,Q WKHRU\ DOO WKHVH YDULDEOes need to be included as the 
opportunity cost of holding money, in practice various combinations of these 
variables are attempted in estimating money demand functions. It is an empirical 
LVVXH´ 
 If all the possible explanatory variables are included in the money demand 
specification, multicollinearity is a potential problem. Nevertheless, on the basis of 
the portfolio balance model, domestic assets are not perfect substitutes with one 
another, nor are they perfect substitutes with foreign assets. Hence, we would not 
expect there to be particularly strong correlations between domestic interest rates, 
and between domestic interest rates, foreign interest rates and the exchange rate. 
Another concern is that there is likely to be some correlation between ȟ	 愋?ǡ ? 
and the other explanatory variables. Since ȟ	 愋?ǡ ?is a policy tool used to 
manage the exchange rate and thus mirrors some of the balance of payments flows, it 
is quite possible that it would be correlated with interest rates and income. We do not 
however, expect the correlations to be high, as these other explanatory variables are 
influenced by external flows that do not involve intervention, and also by various 
domestic developments. At the same time, we also do not anticipate a strong 
relationship between  ȟ	 愋?ǡ ? and the exchange rate since the former is used to 
mitigate volatility in the latter.  
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More generally, there is an important point to note, that is particularly 
relevant when broad money demand is the subject of analysis. In allocating wealth or 
income between broad money and alternative assets depending on how the returns on 
both move, it is important to consider that, assuming credit creation is nil, broad 
money only increases or decreases if assets shift between the non-bank private sector 
and banking institutions, non-residents or the government (the money holders 
exclude non-residents and the government). Thus, outside of these instances, the 
negative impact of an increase in domestic interest rates on broad money demand, for 
example, could be capturing the fall in credit creation while the negative impact of 
higher inflation expectations could be capturing the adverse effects associated with 
higher inflation.  
4.2.2.2  The Proxy for Foreign Exchange Intervention  
Attempting to proxy foreign exchange intervention is a standard procedure in 
the literature, as for many countries, time series data oQ WKHFHQWUDO EDQN¶VRIILFLDO
foreign exchange intervention activity is not readily available. The proxy we use is 
the change in the US dollar (USD) value of foreign exchange reserves. The level 
VHULHVLVDYDLODEOHLQWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO0RQHWDU\)XQG,0)¶s International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) data on central bank accounts. This is the component of the central 
EDQN¶V IRUHLJQDVVHWVZKHUH IRUHLJQH[FKDQJH LQWHUYHQWLRQZRXOGEH UHIOHFWHG7KH
IMF definition for foreign exchange reserves is as follows: 
ForHLJQ([FKDQJH5HVHUYHVLQFOXGHVPRQHWDU\DXWKRULWLHV¶FODLPVRQQRQ-residents 
in the form of foreign banknotes, bank deposits, treasury bills, short- and long-term 
government securities, European Currency Units (ECUs, for periods before January 
1999), and other claims that are usable in the event of balance of payments need. 
Neely (2000) explains that changes in foreign exchange reserves may not, 
however, correspond to foreign exchange intervention for several reasons. The value 
of foreign exchange reserves may change due to revaluation effects arising from 
changes in the exchange rate, interest income or coupon payments and changes in the 
value of the underlying asset. Takagi (1991, page 149VWDWHV WKDW³RIILFLDOUHVHUYHV
should preferably be valued in foreign currency in order to avoid attributing 
exchange rate induced valuation changes to the intervention behaviour of 
DXWKRULWLHV´ +RZHYHU LI IRUHLJQ H[FKDQJH reserves are valued in USD based on 
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conversions from national currency (NC) values (or other foreign currency values), 
this may address the revaluation changes that have arisen from the NC/USD 
exchange rate but not the effects arising from changes in the NC (or USD) against 
other currencies. This is of particular concern if assets are substantially held in 
foreign currencies other than the USD. Neely (2000) notes that an accurate 
compensation exercise for such revaluation effects requires knowledge of the 
FXUUHQF\ DQG DVVHW FRPSRVLWLRQ RI D FRXQWU\¶V IRUHLJQ H[FKDQJH UHVHUYHV DQG the 
institutional procedures for revaluation.  
Foreign exchange reserves may have a poor correlation with actual 
intervention if reserves are used for transactions other than intervention operations, 
for example the payment of foreign currency denominated government loans. As 
Kamil (2008) observes, the distinguishing characteristic of these transactions is that 
they are not related to influencing the level of the exchange rate. However, one could 
argue that such transactions alleviate the need for governments to source foreign 
currency funds from the banking system which in turn would put pressure on 
exchange rates. 
Intervention operations may also not result in corresponding changes in 
foreign exchange reserves if intervention is deliberately disguised by having 
nationalised industries conduct transactions and if there are substantial foreign 
exchange swap operations by the central bank which leads to a discrepancy between 
intervention and changes in reserves (Neely, 2000).  
In the context of analysing the effects of intervention on the growth rates of 
base money and broad money, three points can be made with regard to the foreign 
exchange reserves proxy series. One, since intervention is an explanatory variable in 
the regression analysis, the inclusion of valuation changes will bias the coefficients 
on intervention effects towards zero as these changes do not constitute intervention 
that is related to actual private sector inflows and outflows. In particular, interest 
income may offset declines and exaggerate increases in reserves due to intervention 
while exchange rate revaluation effects can misrepresent intervention in any 
direction. Secondly, transactions by nationalised industries, for instance, of keeping 
IRUHLJQFXUUHQF\HDUQLQJVDEURDGGRQRWDIIHFWWKHFHQWUDOEDQN¶VIRUHLJQH[FKDQJH
reserves and limits the need to create domestic liabilities for sterilisation. Thus, these 
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transactions need not be included in our approximation of central bank intervention. 
Thirdly, swap operations break the connection between the timing of changes to 
reserves with actual intervention and the balance of payments flows to which they 
relate. Consequently, extensive swap operations not accounted for will likely bias the 
coefficients on intervention effects towards zero. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to 
note that reductions in reserves arising from swap operations also entail reductions in 
domestic liabilities associated with sterilisation of domestic liquidity.  
As it stands, there is no one proxy for intervention that is strictly adhered to 
in the literature that analyses sterilisation. Recent empirical studies tend to use 
foreign exchange reserves or the broader variable, foreign assets, to proxy 
LQWHUYHQWLRQ DQG W\SLFDOO\ SURFHHG WR QHW RII WKH FHQWUDO EDQN¶V IRUHLJQ OLDELOLWLHV
Foreign assets include items, termed non-currency reserves by Dominguez (2012), 
such as monetary gold, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) and the reserve position with 
WKH,0)ZKLFKPD\QRWUHIOHFWLQWHUYHQWLRQDFWLYLW\SDUWLFXODUO\ZLWKUHJDUGWR³WKH
H[FKDQJH UDWH VWDELOLW\ PRWLYH IRU UHVHUYH DFFXPXODWLRQ´ 'RPLQJXH] SDJH
5)43. Changes to non-currency reserves may correspond to changes in foreign 
exchange reserves when portfolio adjustments between the two take place, thus 
affecting somewhat the accuracy of the latter as a proxy for intervention. However, 
these non-currency reserves44 are also independently affected by factors such as the 
monetisation or demonetisation of monetary gold, new SDR allocations, changes to 
IMF quotas, and valuation effects, which in turn, may negate the usefulness of 
foreign assets as a proxy for intervention. The IMF quota consists of foreign 
currency and domestic currency components, with the latter not part of the reserve 
position with the IMF (reserve asset) but still classified as a foreign asset. Foreign 
assets also include items which have limited usability in the event of balance of 
payments need, such as claims arising from bilateral payments agreements.  
Foreign liabilities include Fund credit (Stand-By or Extended Fund Facility 
(EFF)); loans from the IMF (for example through the Poverty Reduction and Growth 
                                                          
43
  7KH,0),0)SURYLGHVIRUWKHIROORZLQJGHILQLWLRQRIWKHFHQWUDOEDQN¶VQHWIRUHLJQDVVHWV
(NFA): NFA = Claims on Non-Residents ± Liabilities to Non-Residents. 
 Claims on non-residents: monetary gold, SDR holdings, foreign currency, deposits, securities other than 
shares, loans, financial derivatives, and other items.  
  Liabilities to non-residents: deposits, securities other than shares, loans, financial derivatives, and other items. 
44
  See IMF (2000, 2008, and 2009) for further explanation on the definitions and balance sheet 
classifications of non-currency reserves, and transactions with the IMF more generally. 
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Facility (PGRF)); SDR allocations45; deposits of the IMF46; and deposits by other 
central banks, international organisations and non-residents47. Fund credit and loans 
from the IMF work towards meeting payment imbalances and may contribute to 
changes in foreign exchange reserves. In this regard, changes in foreign exchange 
reserves may be misinterpreted as active intervention when resources are obtained 
from the IMF and when repayments are made. Nevertheless, netting off foreign 
liabilities may introduce additional distortions since it includes other items, which 
differ across countries, and for which the relevance to foreign exchange intervention 
cannot be ascertained.  
In some instances, adjustments are made to exclude the effects of exchange 
rate revaluation effects and in other cases, no adjustments are made.  Ouyang and 
Rajan (2011) and Ouyang et al. (2008, 2010), for example, use foreign exchange 
reserves, net of foreign liabilities, and exclude exchange rate revaluation effects. 
Even less common are attempts to exclude the interest income on foreign reserves. 
:DQJ  DVVXPHV IRU WKH FDVH RI &KLQD WKDW DOO RI WKH FRXQWU\¶V UHVHUYHV DUH
invested in US 10-year treasury bonds while an earlier study of Japan, Takagi (1991), 
uses the average US Treasury bill yield as the rate of return on reserves.  
 Dominguez (2012), in an analysis of changes to reserves among individual 
countries during the global financial crisis, notes that the IFS data on the balance of 
payments subcomponent, USD value of reserve assets, can be used to proxy 
intervention. This variable is a flow item and thus excludes exchange rate revaluation 
effects. However, it includes non-currency reserve items. The author compares these 
data against the changes in international reserves, also available in the balance of 
payments statistics, to estimate exchange rate revaluation effects. Meanwhile, 
interest income on reserves is approximated using recently available data from the 
IMF that allows for the approximation of the asset shares (securities versus deposits) 
                                                          
45
  SDR allocations are the liability entry corresponding to SDR holdings, classified as foreign liabilities 
beginning 2009. These were previously classified as a component of shares and other equity.  
46  The IMF No.1 Account is the foreign liabilities counterpart to the domestic currency component of the 
IMF quota subscription. 
47
 In some instances, foreign liabilities may include claims by non-residents arising from sterilisation 
operations, where central bank instruments are held by non-residents rather than banking institutions.  
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and the currency denomination of reserves48.  The derived revaluation effects and 
interest income are then subtracted from the foreign exchange reserves series.  
 In summary, the foreign exchange reserves series which we use to estimate 
intervention excludes non-currency reserves and exchange rate revaluation effects. 
We do not use the net foreign assets series since, given its breadth of subcomponents, 
this may introduce more distortions to the proxy for intervention compared to the 
foreign exchange reserves series, which provides for a uniform measure across 
countries49. We also do not exclude interest income on reserves given the lack of 
related data and information, and to avoid the risk that exclusions based on 
approximations may compound distortions. We note that by not excluding interest 
income, some of the reserve accumulation we observe may be purely on account of 
interest earned rather than a reflection of intervention activity. Finally, we 
acknowledge that as an alternative, the appropriately adjusted reserve assets series, as 
highlighted by Dominguez (2012), can be utilised in our analysis. We find, however, 
that the data are not as extensively available on a time series basis when compared to 
the foreign exchange series, particularly with regard to the countries in our sample. 
Further details pertaining to the measurement of the variable we use in our analysis 
are provided in Section 4.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
48
  7KHGDWDLVDYDLODEOHWKURXJKWKH,0)¶V6SHFLDO'DWD'LVVHPLQDWLRQ6WDQGDUG6''65HVHUYH
Template and the Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER) database. In the 
former case, the earliest start date of the data for most countries is 2000. The latter provides data only on an 
aggregate basis. In both instances, there is a limitation in terms of the extent of country coverage.  
49
  From the aspect of data availability of the net foreign assets series, we find the occasional short series 
and lack of updates; possible breaks in foreign assets and foreign liabilities arising from the shift to Standardised 
Report Forms (SRFs); and instances where the foreign assets are smaller than the foreign exchange reserves, 
which contradicts the reporting structure of the latter being a subset of the former. The data on foreign exchange 
reserves, on the other hand, appear to be more reliable.  
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4.2.3   Discussion of Issues Related to the Choice of Econometric Methodology  
4.2.3.1  Short Run and Long Run Dynamics of Specification 
 The current standard procedure to the estimation of money demand involves 
cointegration analysis and error correction modelling (ECM), allowing for 
information on the long-run (equilibrium) level relationship between I(1) variables 
(equation (4.4) but in levels) and analysis of short-run dynamics. The analysis of 
short-run dynamics may involve a greater number of variables than those that enter 
the long-run relationship, as the inclusion of exogenous I(0) variables is possible in 
an unrestricted specification of an ECM.  
 The Johansen maximum likelihood method (Johansen, 1988), being a 
multivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) model based approach allows for a 
consideration of multiple cointegrating relationships as well as tests of weak 
exogeneity and causality. This is an advantage over the two-step approach of Engle 
and Granger (1987). In an unrestricted error correction specification or a short-run 
equation within the vector ECM (VECM), an allowance can be made for the 
consideration of contemporaneous effects emanating from the regressors on the 
independent variable. Given the use of maximum likelihood, however, the Johansen 
method is primarily a technique for large sample testing and analysis. In an economic 
model of considerable complexity, there are likely to be several cointegrating 
vectors, which, without prior economic information or theoretical support, can be a 
source of puzzlement. Such a system is often also sensitive to misspecification. See 
for instance Wickens (1996) who discusses the problems of interpretation associated 
with the VECM. The method also usually involves pre-testing the order of 
integration of the variables involved in the estimation, a task which in itself is also 
subject to much uncertainty. An alternative methodology developed in more recent 
times is the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds testing for cointegration 
(Pesaran and Shin, 1999). A key advantage of this method is that it can be employed 
regardless of whether the underlying variables are I(0), I(1) or fractionally integrated. 
Additionally, it has been shown that the method produces robust results in small 
samples (Pesaran and Shin, 1999). 
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 As mentioned, the focus of our empirical analysis are the effects of real 
intervention, that is the change in real foreign exchange reserves (ȟ	 愋?ǡ ?)50, 
on changes in real base money and real broad money. As such, the more likely 
equation specification is one made up of variables that are stationary or requiring 
differencing to become I(0) (hence the expression of equation (4.5) with variables in 
differences).  The focus is not on the relationship between the levels of money and 
foreign exchange reserves. Appealing to economic theory, one would not necessarily 
expect there to be a long-run level relationship between money and foreign exchange 
reserves analogous to the relationship between money and the traditional money 
demand determinants. This is primarily because reserves are a policy variable, the 
reaction to which is non-standard, and dependent on changing circumstances and 
active policy manoeuvring. That being said, findings of long-run relationships are 
nevertheless still plausible (see for example, Bernstein (2000) and Wu (2009) both of 
whom use the Johansen cointegration method). Furthermore even if reserves do not 
feature in the long-run relationship, there is a case for evaluating the existence of a 
more traditional long-run money demand relationship and then estimating the short-
run money demand dynamic equation which would include an error correction term 
as well as ȟ	 愋?ǡ ?  and its lags as explanatory variables.  
 The baseline empirical analysis in section 4.3.2 constitutes dynamic 
regression analysis using an ARDL approach for individual countries ± thus 
involving a minimum of two regressions (base money and broad money) for each of 
the 30 countries in our sample. Given the breadth of focus, we choose not to include 
cointegration analysis, instead, assessing the dynamics between the change in the 
money variables (change in real base money,  ? ? ? ? and change in real broad 
money,  ? ? ? respectively) and ȟ	 愋? along with the change in other 
money demand factors.  
 We assume that the relationships betweenȟ	 愋?, and  ? ? ? ? 
and  ? ? ? respectively, are additive in nature, based on the money 
determinants identity. This contrasts with the standard money demand analysis 
framework which postulates a multiplicative relationship between most variables. 
                                                          
50
  See for instance Alberola and Serena (2007) who focus on the µchange in¶ rather than µlevel¶ of foreign 
assets (FA), explaining that their study is concerned with evaluating the factors affecting reserve accumulation 
(the change in FA) instead of reserve adequacy (the level of FA).  
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The additive relationship would thus complicate any assessment of cointegration. 
The studies that assess cointegration adopt logarithmic transformations of base 
money, broad money and foreign exchange reserves such that the coefficient 
estimates for the effects of reserves represent elasticities. Although results appear 
feasible, this choice of a multiplicative form over an additive representation for these 
particular variables is perhaps questionable in terms of interpretation and consistency 
with theory. 
 The baseline model specification in section 4.3.2 is thus centred on two 
elements: (1) the short-run effect/contemporaneous effect of ȟ	 愋? on  ? ? ? ?and  ? ? ?, and (2) the long-run effect of ȟ	 愋? on  ? ? ? ? and  ? ? ?. The second element 
can be viewed as a dynamic equilibrium, illustrating the relationship between the 
growth in foreign exchange reserves and the growth in base money/broad money 
over time. This contrasts with the static equilibrium that is the equilibrium 
relationship between levels, within a cointegrating relationship.  
4.2.3.2  Regressor Endogeneity 
 Aside from the possible multicollinearity between explanatory variables as 
discussed in section 4.2.2 (page 87), there is also the possibility of a much more 
serious issue, that of the endogeneity of regressors. The direction of causality 
between real money balances and regressors such as income and domestic interest 
rates are not entirely clear. For instance, domestic interest rates may be endogenous 
with respect to supply shocks to real money balances, such as through balance of 
payments flows. 
 The literature also discusses the bias that arises from assuming that the 
change in foreign exchange reserves,ȟ	 愋?ǡ ? is exogenous in estimations. It is 
conjectured that changes in the net domestic assets of base money, ǻ 嘋?ǡ ?(see 
identity 4.1), indicative of monetary conditions, could in fact lead to changes in ȟ	 愋?ǡ ?. This negative response of ȟ	 愋?ǡ ? to increases in ǻ 嘋?ǡ ? in an 
estimating equation is known as the offset coefficient and is considered a gauge of 
capital mobility and monetary independence. One way to address the endogeneity of 
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ȟ	 愋?ǡ ? and ǻ 嘋?ǡ ? is via appropriate estimation methods for simultaneous 
equation systems.  
For instance, Ouyang and Rajan (2011) and Ouyang et al. (2008, 2010) use 
two-stage least squares (TSLS). A set of simultaneous equations are specified such 
that each of the two equations (to estimate the sterilisation and offset coefficients 
respectively) is just identified. As is the case generally with simultaneous equations, 
the nature of the identifying restrictions is questionable. The TSLS estimation 
method can be viewed as a special case of the method of instrumental variables (IV). 
The IV approach requires the availability of variables that are highly correlated with 
the endogenous variables ȟ	 愋?ǡ ? and ǻ 嘋?ǡ ?but not with the errors. Such 
variables can prove quite difficult to find particularly when lagged values of 
regressors already form the baseline set of right-hand-side variables in a dynamic 
specification. 
There are however several factors that may render the endogeneity of ȟ	 愋?ǡ ?contentious. Firstly, as highlighted, in an interest rate-targeting framework, 
ǻ 嘋?ǡ ? is not the monetary policy instrument, and therefore changes to it do not 
necessarily imply changes in interest rates that may in turn have effects on capital 
flows. This is even harder to visualise in the context of broad money net domestic 
assets, ǻ ? ?ǡ ?(see identity 4.3). Second, reserve accumulation reflects a policy 
decision with respect to central bank intervention across trade and capital flows 
depending on the nature of the exchange rate regime. Therefore, changes in ȟ	 愋?ǡ ? need not exactly equal changes in capital flows.  
Moreover, our empirical analysis focuses on the impact of ǻ	 愋?ǡ ? on 
changes in base money (ǻ ? ? and broad money (ǻ ? ?respectively with an a 
priori expectation of a positive relationship in both instances. A positive causal 
relationship running from changes in the money variables to ȟ	 愋?ǡ ?, on the other 
hand, seems hard to justify on a theoretical basis.  
The problem of endogeneity involving more variables can be addressed with 
VAR models with only lagged values of variables as regressors, whilst still allowing 
for dynamics. The dynamic structure involved in this method, nevertheless, may not 
be appropriate when one considers the mechanism of intervention and sterilisation, 
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DQG WKHFHQWUDOEDQN¶VPRQHWDU\RSHUDWLRQVPRUHJHQHUDOO\ZKHUH WKHFHQWUDOEDQN
responds immediately to the factors affecting liquidity.  
In particular, VAR models would not be able to account for a 
contemporaneous relationship between intervention and the money variables. On the 
other hand, lags are sensible in the analysis of the effects of ǻ	 愋?ǡ ?, particularly 
on broad money. Depending on the nature of flows and transactions as well as the 
type of sterilisation, ǻ	 愋?ǡ ?may or may not have a contemporaneous effect on 
changes in broad money. There may however, be subsequent or lagged effects on 
changes in broad money for instance via an indirect credit creation channel.  
Takagi (1999), having not found cointegration in most of the Asian countries 
studied, proceeds with assessing the effects of foreign assets on the monetary 
aggregates, M1 and M2, through granger causality and a structural equation, where 
the first difference of the logarithm of the real money aggregate is regressed on the 
lagged first difference of the logarithm of real foreign assets (FA), and other 
explanatory variables including money demand factors, namely income, and interest 
UDWHDQGVHDVRQDOGXPP\YDULDEOHV/DJJHG)$LVXVHG³DQGQRWFXUUHQW)$because 
a change in FA is believed to affect M1 or M2 over time through the banking sector. 
Use of lagged FA also has an additional advantage in that it alleviates the potential 
GLIILFXOW\ZLWK0RU0DIIHFWLQJ)$FRQWHPSRUDQHRXVO\´ (page 13). The problem 
with such an approach is precisely that it assumes only an indirect channel of 
intervention effects and neglects the possibility of important contemporaneous 
effects. Both, direct and indirect effects and the related relevance of a dynamic 
structure are theoretically explored in detail in section 4.2.4. 
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4.2.3.3  Individual Country Regressions versus Panel Data Methods 
 Panel data methods have several advantages, namely providing efficiency 
gains by taking into account common structures, increasing degrees of freedom, 
reducing multicollinearity and removing the impact of some forms of omitted 
variable bias (Brooks, 2008).  
 However, basic fixed effects and random effects models have a limitation in 
that slope homogeneity is assumed for the cross section and over time, even if 
intercept terms account for omitted variables that vary across entities but are time 
LQYDULDQWRUYLFHYHUVD³7KHXVHRISDQHOWHFKQLTXHVUDWKHUWKDQHVWLPDWLQJVHSDUDWH
time series regressions for each object or estimating separate cross sectional 
regressions for each time period thus implicitly assumes that the efficiency gains 
IURP GRLQJ VR RXWZHLJK DQ\ ELDVHV WKDW PD\ DULVH LQ WKH SDUDPHWHU HVWLPDWLRQ´
(Brooks, 2008, page 490).  
 Because it is our hypothesis that there are indeed differences in the 
coefficients on ǻ	 愋? across countries and we do not assume one particular type 
of economic relationship to hold, we utilise individual-country time series 
regressions in our empirical analysis.  
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4.2.4 The Effects of Intervention on Base Money and Broad Money: 
 Conceptual Points and Hypotheses for Empirical Analysis 
 In our Chapter 3 set-up of a simple theoretical model, we presented some of 
the workings related to base money and broad money sterilisation from the 
standpoint of an interest rate-targeting framework and using an analysis of portfolio 
balances (see section 3.2.6.2 of Chapter 3). In this section, we discuss conceptual 
issues in more detail, and present specific hypotheses which set the stage for the 
empirical analysis on the effects of intervention on both base money and broad 
money which we undertake in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively.  
4.2.4.1  Issues with Measuring the Effects of Intervention on Base Money 
 
 Disyatat (2008, pages 17-18) notes that central banks tend to offset the 
liquidity impact of their foreign exchange intervention like any other autonomous 
factor affecting liquidity to maintain aggregate bank reserve balances in line with 
demand. The idea of partial or incomplete sterilisation thus seems erroneous as 
central banks either maintain aggregate reserve balances or they do not, with the 
result being large fluctuations in interest rates in the latter case. As such, he argues, 
attempts to quantify the degree of base money sterilisation with estimating equations 
like  ǻ 嘋?ǡ ? ? Ƚ ? ? Ⱦ ?ǻ	 愋?ǡ ? ?  ? ?  ? ? are not meaningful exercises. If base 
money is constant, Ⱦ ? ?  ? ?.  If base money changes, and to the extent that the 
factors for these changes are not entirely captured by Z, control variables for money 
demand, then the coefficient will be different from -1. 
 Similarly, as noted in Chapter 2, Ho and McCauley (2008) point to many 
central banks having short-term interest rates as operating targets which leaves 
quantities, specifically base money, endogenous. The liquidity eventually absorbed 
would depend on the initial impact on liquidity of all autonomous factors and the 
ceQWUDOEDQN¶VRSHUDWLQJREMHFWLYH&RQVHTXHQWO\ WKHUH LVQRGHOLEHUDWHVWHULOLVDWLRQ
policy that requires the offsetting of each unit of foreign exchange intervention.  
 ,0)  SDJH  LQWHUSUHWV IXOO VWHULOLVDWLRQ DV ³UHVWRULQJ OLTXLGLW\
conditions tRDVWDQFHWKDWLVLQOLQHZLWKWKHFHQWUDOEDQN¶VSROLF\REMHFWLYH)RUDQ
inflation-targeting central bank, full sterilisation entails adjusting liquidity post- 
intervention so as to keep the short-term money market rates close to the policy rate. 
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In contrast, for a central bank that targets the exchange rate, full sterilisation results 
LQ DGMXVWLQJ EDQNV¶ FDVK EDODQFHV VR DV WR NHHS WKH UHODWLYH VXSSOLHV RI GRPHVWLF
foreign and currencies in line with the exchange rate target´ It is unclear, but 
perhaps can be inferred that this study suggests that with an exchange rate target, the 
effects of intervention on bank reserve balances and interest rates are less of a 
concern operationally.  
 Following from the above, we now attempt to provide clarification on several 
key points about base money expansion. The narrower is the definition for base 
money, and the less movement there is in the aggregate, then by default there is more 
OLNHO\ WREH³FRPSOHWH´ VWHULOLVDWLRQ%DVHPRQH\HVVHQWLDOO\ FRPSULVHV FXUUHQF\ Ln 
circulation, required and excess reserves (see equation 4.6 below).  
 For many countries, currency in circulation is likely to be on a gradual 
upward trend unless there is a strong demand for cash balances which may be 
inversely related to the level of financial development. In which case, ǻ	 愋?ǡ ? could 
have a discernible positive effect on currency in circulation, as agents choose to hold 
some portion of external inflows as cash balances.   
 
 ǻ 嘋?ǡ ? ?ǻ	 愋?ǡ ? ?  ? ? ?  ? ? ?  ? ?                        (4.6) 
                                                ? ? 
          (CIC = currency in circulation; RR= required reserves; ER = excess reserves) 
 
 Required reserves are unlikely to contribute significantly to the size of base 
money if the reserve requirement ratio is low or not actively used as a policy 
instrument (in which case, required reserves is endogenous and rises with broad 
money). If required reserves increase by large amounts, for instance through a policy 
change, then ǻ 嘋?ǡ ? would naturally be lower than otherwise would be the case. 
7KLVLVEHFDXVHDQ\OLTXLGLW\³ORFNHGLQ´WKURXJKUHTXLUHGUHVHUYHVRUIRUWKDWPDWWHU
voluntarily held in excess reserves, requires less use of open market and open market 
type operations by the central bank (see Diagrams 4.1 and 4.2 for detailed 
descriptions of the central bank balance sheet and components of base money). 
  
101 
 
 Excess reserves held by banking institutions are also likely to be relatively 
small and on a gradual upward trend unless there are extraordinary events that 
precipitate unusually large precautionary balances. Policy wise, excess reserves may 
be large if there is deliberate quantitative easing, or a currency board is in operation, 
in which case, the central bank does not focus on controlling short-term interest rates.  
 The effects of ǻ	 愋?ǡ ? on  ? ?are thus influenced by private sector 
demand for money balances (which affects cash balances, required and excess 
reserves), actual reserve requirement changes in reaction to ǻ	 愋?ǡ ?, and the nature 
of the monetary policy framework.  
4.2.4.2  The Usefulness of Measuring the Effects of Intervention on Broad  
  Money 
 As discussed in section 4.2.4.1, there is a mechanical slant to the effects of 
ǻ	 愋?ǡ ?on  ? ?, if we take the view that it primarily concerns liquidity 
management in the interbank money market and therefore the relationship between 
the central bank and banking institutions. Furthermore, as shown in Table 3.1 of 
Chapter 3, regardless of the sector from which liquidity is absorbed (banks versus 
non-banks), ǻ 嘋?ǡ ? responds in a similar manner to (approximately) offset 
ǻ	 愋?ǡ ? leaving base money relatively steady.  
 In contrast, the analysis of the effects of ǻ	 愋?ǡ ? on changes in broad money 
( ? ? ?centres on how intervention related to trade and capital flows permeates the 
economic system and affects private sector liquidity, depending on the types of 
balance of payments flows, the sterilisation instruments used, as well as the monetary 
policy stance. It is possible to have a scenario where ǻ	 愋?ǡ ? does not have an 
impact on  ? ?  whilst having different implications for  ? ?,, and therefore, wider 
macroeconomic conditions (see sections 3.2.5 and 3.2.6.2 of Chapter 3 for related 
discussions on the relevance of broad money; and the effects of intervention and 
sterilisation, respectively).  
 Important questions include: to what extent does ǻ	 愋?ǡ ?drive  ? ? 
directly ± via the first-round impact of intervention related to trade and capital flows? 
To what extent does ǻ	 愋?ǡ ?affect  ? ? indirectly, through credit creation and 
  
102 
 
spending? How do different sterilisation methods influence these effects and 
therefore their implications on wider monetary and financial conditions?   
 The above relates to the distinction that Disyatat (2008, page 18) makes 
between sterilised intervention and sterilising capital flows ³7KH IRUPHU FRQFHUQV
the liquidity impacts of intervention which is a rather moot issue given automatic 
offsetting operations, while the latter concerns the broader and more pertinent 
question of how the monetary policy stance may be adjusted to offset the 
macroeconomic impacts of capital flows´  
The following scenarios explain, from a balance sheet accounting approach, 
how the kind of transactions that take place, the sectors involved, and the sterilisation 
methods used, can account for the effects, or lack thereof, of ǻ	 愋?ǡ ?on  ? ?. 
Diagram 4.3 which shows the determinants and components of broad money is used 
to illustrate these points: 
i. Liquidity is directly absorbed from non-residents by the central bank in the 
event of capital inflows, for example through the sales of central bank 
securities. As such, in Diagram 4.3, NFACB (item 1) increases with the 
offsetting entry through an increase in central bank securities held by non-
residents (item 5). There is no change to BM. 
ii. Capital inflows/outflows mainly involve transactions between banking 
institutions and non-residents. 
x For example, in a scenario of non-resident capital inflows, foreign 
exchange intervention takes place, raising NFACB, and the inflows are 
channelled towards the purchase of securities (for example, government 
securities) from banking institutions. This leads to a reduction in net 
claims on the central government (item 3 in Diagram 4.3).  
iii. Capital inflows/outflows are mainly related to banking institutions, that is, 
WKHVHIORZVFRUUHVSRQGWRFKDQJHVLQEDQNLQJLQVWLWXWLRQV¶H[WHUQDODVVHWVDQG
liabilities. There are thus changes to NFACB and NFABS (item 2) in 
Diagram 4.3 but no change to BM. 
iv. Capital inflows/outflows and current account inflows (for instance, 
commodity related inflows) mainly involve transactions between the central 
government and non-residents. Consequently, deposits of the central 
  
103 
 
government (item 3 of Diagram 4.3) adjust with changes to NFACB but there 
is no change to BM. 
v. While current account surpluses are expected to lead to broad money growth, 
intervention need not necessarily have an impact on BM during current 
account surplus periods.  
x Firstly, there may actually be less intervention when there is a current 
account surplus compared to a capital inflows episode.  
x Secondly, there could be more use of swap arrangements when there is 
intervention during current account driven surplus months. Swap 
arrangements imply smaller changes in NFACB and larger changes in 
NFABS in Diagram 4.3.  
 
 The above points are applicable primarily to contemporaneous effects and to 
some extent, long-run effects. For instance, in ii, iii and iv, despite the lack of 
immediate effects, there can still be long-run effects through subsequent credit 
creation by banking institutions and spending by the government. The effects as 
discussed are premised on the assumption that broad money is defined to exclude 
the government, banking institutions and non-residents as money-holding sectors. 
,QHVVHQFHZKLOHWKHFHQWUDOEDQN¶VOLTXLGLW\RSHUDWLRQVZLWKEDQNLQJLQVWLWXWLRQVLQ
the money market may leave base money relatively unchanged, intervention related 
WRWKHSULYDWHVHFWRU¶VFXUUHQWDFFRXQWDQGFDSLWDODFFRXQWIORZVZRXOGVWLOOLPSDFW
on broad money. If sterilisation instruments are held by non-residents, then there 
would not be an impact on broad money. If instruments are held by the domestic 
non-bank private sector, and these are included as part of broad money, then there 
would be an increase in broad money corresponding to intervention. However, in 
this case, as we analysed in Chapter 3, the indirect effects associated with excess 
liquidity in banking institutions is less than if liquidity where absorbed from 
banking institutions. 
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Diagram 4.1: Stylised Central Bank Balance Sheet51 
Assets Liabilities  
    
1 Claims on non-residents 6 Liabilities to non-residents 
 1.1 
 
Monetary gold and SDR holdings  6.1 Foreign currency deposits 
from non- residents 
 1.2 Foreign currency  6.2 Securities other than shares  
 1.3 Foreign currency deposits  6.3 Loans from non-residents in 
foreign currency 
 1.4 Securities other than shares in 
foreign currency 
 6.4 Use of IMF facilities 
 1.5 Foreign currency loans to non-
residents 
 6.5 Other foreign debt 
 1.6 Other foreign assets    
      
2 Claims on the central government 7 Liabilities to the central government 
 2.1 Securities  7.1 Deposits  
 2.2 Loans and advances  7.2 Other liabilities 
 2.3 Other claims    
      
3 Claims on other depository corporations 
(ODCs) 
8 Liabilities to other depository 
corporations (ODCs) 
 3.1 Refinancing facilities  8.1 Current accounts  
(required reserves and 
 3.2 Repurchase agreements (repos)   excess reserves) 
 3.3 Other claims  8.2 Vault cash 
    8.3 Deposit facilities 
    8.4 Reverse repos 
    8.5 Other liabilities 
      
4 Claims on other sectors 9 Liabilities to other sectors52 
 4.1 Other financial corporations  9.1 Other financial corporations 
 4.2 Non financial corporations  9.2 Non financial corporations 
 4.3 Other resident sectors  9.3 Other resident sectors 
      
   10 Currency in circulation 
      
   11 Central bank securities 
      
   12 Capital and reserves 
      
   13 Revaluation accounts 
      
5 Other assets 14 Other liabilities 
      
 
 
                                                          
51
  Details reflect a combined adaption of presentations in Schaechter (2001, page 11) and IMF (2000, 
page 87) with minor adjustments by us. 
52
  Liabilities to other sectors may comprise of deposits and securities other than shares. These may or may 
not be included in broad money. If included in broad money, these would also form part of base money (IMF, 
2000).  
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Diagram 4.2: Stylised Determinants and Components of Base Money 
Assets Liabilities 
   
Net foreign assets, NFACB (1-6) Currency in circulation (10) 
Net domestic assets, NDA: Monetary reserves (8.1+8.2) 
 Net claims on the central government  
(2-7) 
 
+ Net claims on ODCs  (3-8.3-8.4-8.5)  
+ Net claims on other sectors (4-9)  
+ Net other items (5-11-12-13-14)  
   
NFACB+NDA=Base money (RM) =Base money (RM) 
Notes:  
This summary table is based on items from the full balance sheet detailed in Diagram 4.1. 
Money market operations (outright sales and purchases, repos, direct borrowing) are subsumed in net claims 
on ODCs. In surplus liquidity conditions, money market operations would reflect net borrowing from ODCs. 
The issuance of central bank securities is captured in net other items. These are the market based instruments 
used to manage liquidity depending on the autonomous factors affecting banking system liquidity which 
includes government flows and changes in NFACB.   
Revaluation gains/losses and interest income/payments are reflected in net other items. Thus, for instance, an 
exchange rate revaluation gain leads to a positive increase in NFACB and a negative increase in net other 
items.  
 
     
Diagram 4.3: Stylised Determinants and Components of Broad Money 
Determinant (Assets) Components (Liabilities) 
1 Net foreign assets of the central bank 
(NFACB) 
6 Currency in circulation 
2 Net foreign assets of banking  7 Deposits  
 
Institutions (NFABS)  (of the domestic non-bank private 
sector) 
3 Net claims on the central government 
    Loans and advances; securities 
    less Deposits 
  
4 Claims on other sectors   
5 Net other items   
 
   Central bank securities held by 
   non residents 
  
 
   
 
   
Broad money net domestic assets, 
BMNDA = 3+4+5 
= Broad money (BM) 
NFACB +NFABS + BMNDA  
= Broad money (BM) 
Notes: 
Since broad money determinants (assets) to some extent involves the offsetting of counter entries on the 
balance sheets of the central bank and ODCs respectively, monetary operations that involve these two do not 
have an impact on broad money. Monetary operations conducted by the central bank involving other sectors 
(namely the private sector and non-residents) however would have an impact on broad money.  
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4.2.4.3  Hypotheses for Empirical Analysis 
 We now turn to the specific hypotheses that will be investigated through 
empirical analysis in Chapters 5 and 6. The hypotheses concern the short-run and 
long-run effects of ȟ	 愋? on  ? ? ? ? and  ? ? ? respectively.  
 The effect of ȟ	 愋? on  ? ? ? ? is only expected to be positive 
and significant if: 
(i) reserve requirements are an important policy tool used in reaction to balance 
 of payments flows and foreign exchange intervention;  
(ii) there is a policy stance to support money growth via foreign exchange 
 reserves accumulation; or 
(iii) the monetary policy framework in operation is that of a strict currency board 
 or involves a monetary base expansion or quantitative easing mandate.  
 As a baseline prior conjecture, the effect of ȟ	 愋? on   ? ? ? is 
expected to be positive and relatively more significant. However, as discussed in 
section 4.2.4.2, the effects may not be as straightforward. Transactions between 
banks or the central government with the rest of the world may not impact broad 
money, at least not immediately, but may have a long-run impact. While current 
account surpluses, given the wealth element, are expected to lead to broad money 
growth; ȟ	 愋?  many not necessarily have an impact on  ? ? ? if there 
is less intervention during current account surplus periods. In terms of sterilisation, in 
some cases central banks may choose to sterilise at the point of the private sector, 
that is, absorbing liquidity directly from non-bank residents and non-residents, 
limiting the effect of ȟ	 愋? on   ? ? ?  (the assumption being that 
holdings of sterilisation instruments by non-bank residents and non-residents are not 
part of money). We expect that the relationship between ȟ	 愋? and   ? ? ? will be more ambiguous with overall balance of payments deficits 
(ȟ	 愋? ?  ? ?Ǥ For instance, capital inflows may impact positively on  ? ? ?, but current account deficits need not have a negative impact, 
particularly if associated with strong economic growth and increased money demand.  
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  More generally, it is hypothesised that: 
(i) The level of economic and financial development matters. A high level of 
 development may render the effects of intervention limited on an already 
large  and domestic asset driven money stock but at the same time may 
facilitate in the intermediation process and therefore support greater 
intervention effects on broad money; 
(ii) The more persistent is reserve accumulation, the stronger the effects will be 
on broad money growth, particularly in the long run;  
(iii) The use of required reserves and instruments to sterilise liquidity at the point 
of the private sector will limit intervention effects on broad money; and  
(iv) Given the presence of control variables such as income and interest rates, the 
statistically significant effect of ȟ	 愋? on   ? ? ? captures the 
influence of ȟ	 愋? that is uniquely different from these other factors 
that affect the demand for money. 
 Postulations on the factors for the differences in effects between the short run 
and the long run are illustrated in Diagrams 4.4 and 4.5.  
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Diagram 4.4: Hypotheses on Real Intervention Effects  
on Real Base Money Change 
LR High LR 
effect, 
Low SR 
effect 
x Increased non-market- 
based sterilisation in the 
long run (switch from 
open market operations 
to reserve requirements) 
x Some indirect effects 
present in the long run 
(intervention-driven 
broad money growth 
leads to base money 
growth on account of 
high reserve 
requirement ratios and 
increased demand for 
currency) 
 
x Limited sterilisation 
(currency board/policy of 
base money expansion) 
x Sterilisation of 
intervention operations 
through reserve 
requirements 
x Some indirect effects due 
to high reserve 
requirement ratios  
High SR 
and LR 
effects 
Low LR 
and SR 
effects 
x Market-based 
sterilisation 
x Low reserve 
requirement ratios 
 
x Limited sterilisation in 
the short run 
x Sterilisation through 
reserve requirements in 
the short run 
x Increased market-based 
sterilisation in the long 
run (switch from high 
reserve requirements to 
open market operations) 
 
 
High SR 
effect, low 
LR effect 
SR 
 SR: short run; LR: long run 
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Diagram 4.5:  Hypotheses on Real Intervention Effects  
on Real Broad Money Change   
LR High LR 
effect, Low 
SR effect 
x Indirect effects present 
in the long run (credit 
creation through 
banks; public sector 
spending) 
 
x Intervention related to 
BOP flows of the non-
bank private sector 
which permeate the 
economic system in the 
short run  
x Indirect effects present 
in the long run (credit 
creation through banks; 
public sector spending) 
 
High SR 
and LR 
effects 
Low SR 
and LR 
effects 
x Intervention related to 
BOP flows that are 
mainly bank-based or 
government-related 
x BOP flows of private 
sector sterilised 
(sterilisation 
instruments held by 
non-residents/non-
bank residents rather 
than banks) 
x Limited indirect 
effects 
 
x Intervention related to 
BOP flows of the non-
bank private sector 
which permeate the 
economic system in the 
short run  
x Limited indirect effects 
x Increased 
sterilisation/monetary 
tightening in the long 
run 
 
High SR 
effect, low 
LR effect 
SR 
SR: short run; LR: long run 
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4.3 DATA DESCRIPTION, MODEL SPECIFICATION AND   
  PRELIMINARY TESTING 
4.3.1 Data Description 
 Table 4.1 contains explanatory notes on the measurement of the variables that 
are used in the baseline regressions. Specific definitions and sources of data for 
individual countries are provided in Appendix 2, Section C: Country Data Notes.   
 Of particular note, the change in real foreign exchange reserves,  ?	 愋?ǡ ?ǡ ǡ  ? ?ǡexcludes exchange rate revaluation 
effects. The starting point of this series is the product of the monthly change in the 
USD-denominated foreign exchange reserves ( ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?with the average exchange 
rate during the month ( ? ? ? ?Ǥ. = NC/USD)53.  ? ? ? ?Ǥis an approximation for the actual 
exchange rate corresponding to each transaction during the period.  
 ?	 愋?ǡ ? ?  ? ?	 愋?ǡ ?  ?  ? ? ? ? ? 
               =  ? ? ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ?  ?	ǡǤ Ǥ ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
       where T=1989q1 	 愋?ǡ ? ? 	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?Ǥ  ? 
                    (4.7) 
A limitation of the above is that we have assumed that all foreign exchange reserves 
are held in USD assets. However,  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? potentially includes the exchange rate 
revaluation effects of the conversion of non-USD-denominated foreign exchange 
rHVHUYHVLQWRWKH86'HTXLYDOHQW7KHFXUUHQF\FRPSRVLWLRQRILQGLYLGXDOFRXQWULHV¶
IRUHLJQH[FKDQJHUHVHUYHVLVQRWNQRZQ7KH,0)¶V&2)(5GDWDEDVH54 indicates that 
                                                          
53
  The national currency value of foreign exchange reserves is given by:  	 愋?ǡ ? ? 	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?Ǥ  ? ? ? 	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?   ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?;   ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?Ǥ  ? ? ?Ǣ ? ? Ǣ  ? ? ? Ǥ 
Rearranging to exclude exchange rate revaluation effects gives:  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?Ǥ  ? ? ? 	 愋?ǡ ? ? 	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ?  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?. 
Our adjustment is essentially the left-hand-side of the above equation and is slightly different from the method 
used in Ouyang and Rajan (2011), Ouyang et al. (2008, 2010) and Wang (2010). All of these studies make the 
adjustment,  	 愋?ǡ ? ? 	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? and appear not to account for  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?Ǥ 
54
  Source: http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/cofer/eng/index.htm 
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on an aggregate basis there has been diversification away from USD assets ± USD 
assets represented approximately 60%  of reserves in 2010 compared with 75% over 
1995-1998. However, the currency composition is only known for a portion of 
reserves belonging to a segment of countries, and this portion, known as allocated 
reserves in the database, has dwindled over time.  
 The common definition of base money across countries is the narrowest form, 
FRQVLVWLQJRIFXUUHQF\LQFLUFXODWLRQDQGEDQNLQJLQVWLWXWLRQV¶FXUUHQWDFFRXQWVZKLFK
encompass required and excess reserves. We indicate in Appendix 2, Section C: 
Country Data Notes, where there are deviations from this definition, for instance, 
when countries have additional central bank liabilities classified as base money. In 
general, for each country, the broad money variable reflects the broadest national 
definition of money that is available, which excludes the central government and 
non-residents from the money-holding sectors55. Non-transferable deposits and 
securities other than shares account for the predominant portion of broad money 
components other than currency and demand deposits (IMF, 2000). National 
definitions of broad money may include repurchase agreements, negotiable 
certificates of deposits, commercial paper issued by depository corporations, 
EDQNHUV¶ DFFHSWDQFHV DQG GHSHQGLQJ RQ WKHLr liquidity, shares in money market 
funds. There will, therefore be, differences across countries in the range of financial 
assets considered as part of broad money.  
 In the theoretical framework for money demand analysis, it is the expected 
inflation rate that matters. Here, actual inflation, as measured by the consumer price 
index (CPI) is used as a proxy for expected inflation.  
 With regard to capturing foreign influence, many studies do not include both, 
a foreign interest rate and an exchange rate variable, opting instead to include one or 
the other, and more commonly the exchange rate (see Tables 1 and 2 of Sriram 
(2001)). The relevance of a foreign interest rate may be small if the domestic non-
EDQNSULYDWHVHFWRU¶V LQYHVWPHQW LQ IRUHLJQDVVHWV LV OLPLWHG$GGLWLRQDOO\ IURPWKH
perspective of non-resident flows, there is uncertainty over the most appropriate 
foreign interest rate that captures the returns on a combination of foreign monetary 
                                                          
55
  The principal money-holding sectors are the same in almost all countries (IMF, 2000). Nevertheless, 
there may be some exceptions with regard to the classification of government units other than the central 
government, and non-residents.  
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and non-monetary assets. Furthermore, non-resident flows influence the domestic 
non-EDQNSULYDWHVHFWRU¶VGHPDQGIRUPRQH\WKURXJKWKHSXUFKDVHRIGRPHVWLFQRQ-
monetary assets. Thus, the returns on these domestic non-monetary assets are those 
that matter. As such, for our model specification we include interest rates on 
domestic money and bonds, as well as an exchange rate variable, but not a foreign 
interest rate variable.  
 The exchange rate variable has been represented in numerous ways in the 
existing literature with no one dominating expression. See Sriram (1999) for details. 
Here, the real effective exchange rate (REER) is used since it is relevant for 
competitiveness and the trade balance whilst at the same time having an effect on 
capital flows via the expectations channel.  
 All variables have not been seasonally adjusted. This is to avoid the risk of 
seasonal adjustment affecting the dynamics of the equations being estimated, 
resulting in a loss of information. See for instance Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) 
who discuss the views on seasonal adjustment and in particular highlight the problem 
of biased coefficients arising from the use of linear filters when specifications have 
lags of the dependent variable. To account for seasonality, a set of seasonal dummy 
variables are included in the estimating equations. 
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Table 4.1: General Explanatory Notes on Variables 
Variable Description of Measurement 
   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  Quarterly change in real broad money relative to the real 
broad money level in the preceding quarter. Real broad 
money is valued in national currency (NC) and deflated by 
the CPI. 
  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  Quarterly change in real base money relative to the real 
base money level in the preceding quarter. Real base money 
is valued in NC and deflated by the CPI. 
  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  Quarterly change in WKHFHQWUDOEDQN¶V real foreign 
exchange reserves relative to the real broad money level in 
the preceding quarter, both valued in NC. 
The raw foreign exchange reserves (FXR) series is in USD 
(IFS code: .1D.DZF). 
The level nominal series in NC, FXR (NC), is derived by 
sequentially adding monthly nominal changes, which 
exclude exchange rate revaluation effects, to the 1989q1 
level. The monthly change is derived as follows: 
ǻ);51& ǻ);586'[ ? ? ?Ǥ   ? ? ? ?Ǥ ?NC/USDǡ  ? 
FXR (NC) is then deflated by the CPI and differenced on a 
quarterly basis. 
  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  Quarterly change in real foreign exchange reserves relative 
to the real base money level in the preceding quarter. See 
the previous entry for notes on the measurement of  ?	 愋?ǡ ?. 
   ? ?
 ? ? Quarterly change in the logarithm of gross domestic 
product (GDP) valued at constant prices (base years vary 
across countries) / logarithm of nominal GDP deflated by 
the CPI. 
  ? ? ? ? Quarterly change in the interest rate on money, typically a 
time deposit rate which is expressed in percent per annum.  
  ? ? ? ? Quarterly change in the government/corporate bill/bond 
rate which is expressed in percent per annum.  
  ? ? ? ? Quarterly change in the logarithm of the real effective 
exchange rate. 
   ? ? ? ? ? Quarterly change in the annual inflation rate. The annual 
inflation rate is calculated as the annual change in the  
logarithm of the CPI,    ? ?   ? ? ?. 
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4.3.2 Baseline Model Specification 
 Individual country estimations are based on quarterly observations over the 
sample period 1990q1 to 2010q2. This is the maximum sample size, and sample sizes 
are smaller for some countries due to the lack of availability of long time series data 
for certain variables. The following are the two standard model specifications 
estimated for each country.  ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  ? Į ? ?  ? Į ? ? ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? Į ? ? ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?  ? Į ? ? ? ?
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? Į ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? Į ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?   ? Į ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? Į ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?İ ? ? 
           
                    (4.8)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ?  ? Ⱦ  ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ  ? ? ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ?
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ɂ ? ? 
                
                    (4.9) 
  
 
 
 
  
115 
 
 The main results of interest concern the short-run and long-run effects of the 
growth in real foreign exchange reserves on the growth of real broad money and real 
base money respectively, that is, the effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
on ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  in the real broad money regression (equation (4.8)); 
and the effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? on  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  in the 
real base money regression (equation 4.9)). The short-run coefficients are Į ? ? and Ⱦ ? ?, while the long-run coefficients are derived as follows: 
Į ?ǡ  ?  ? Į ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ?Į ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
           
                              (4.10) 
Ⱦ ?ǡ  ?  ? Ⱦ  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
               
                  (4.11)
            
 Since the regressors and the regressands share the same denominator, the 
interpretation is that a unit increase in  ?	 愋?ǡ ? will lead to a change of Į ? ? and 
Į ?ǡ ? ? in broad money in the short-run and long-run respectively; and a change of Ⱦ ? ? 
and Ⱦ ?ǡ ? ? in base money in the short-run and long-run respectively. Generally all 
these coefficients are expected to have positive signs. The long-run coefficients 
capture the effects of the growth in foreign exchange reserves which occur indirectly 
and with a time lag.  
 Unfortunately theory does not provide much guidance on the appropriate 
dynamic specification. A lag of up to one year (four lags for each explanatory 
variable) could perhaps be viewed as plausible and consistent with the horizon of 
monetary policy, as well as sufficient to take into account of the time needed for 
banking system intermediation and credit creation to take place. Furthermore, the 
inclusion of higher order lags is limited by the potential loss of degrees of freedom 
given the large number of explanatory variables and the small sample sizes. 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of lagged values of the dependent variable allows for the 
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possibility of changes in the independent variables having effects that persist for 
longer than there are lags of the independent variables.  
 With respect to the control variables, in Table 4.2 we list the short-run and 
long-run coefficients based on equations (4.8) and (4.9) respectively and their 
expected signs. The coefficients on real GDP, the REER and inflation are elasticities 
while those on the interest rates are semi-elasticities of base money and broad money 
growth with respect to the changes in these variables. An increase in the REER 
reflects appreciation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
117 
 
Table 4.2: Control Variables in Baseline Model Specification 
Control 
Variables 
Short-run Effect Long-run Effect* Expected Sign 
on Coefficients 
Equation Equation Equation 
 (4.8) (4.9) (4.8) (4.9) (4.8) (4.9)  ? ?
 ? Į ? ? Ⱦ ? ? Į ?ǡ  ?  ? Į ? ?? ? ? ? ?   Ⱦ ?ǡ  ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?   + +  ? ? ? Į ? ? Ⱦ ? ? Į ?ǡ  ?  ? Į ? ?? ? ? ? ?   Ⱦ ?ǡ  ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?   + í  ? ? ? Į ? ? Ǥ Ǥ Į ?ǡ  ?  ? Į ? ?? ? ? ? ?   ǤǤ í N.A.  ? ? ? Į ? ? Ⱦ ? ? Į ?ǡ  ?  ? Į ? ?? ? ? ? ?   Ⱦ ?ǡ  ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?   +/í +/í  ? ? ? ? Į ? ? Ⱦ ? ? Į ?ǡ  ?  ? Į ? ?? ? ? ? ?   Ⱦ ?ǡ  ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?   í í 
*Note: X =( ?  ? ? Į ? ?? ? ? ? ; Y= ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ?? ? ? ? . 
N.A.: Not Applicable. 
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4.3.3 Descriptive Analysis of Foreign Exchange Reserves of Sample Countries 
 The focus of our study is primarily on emerging market economies with 
varying degrees of foreign exchange intervention. There are, however, no clear rules 
on how countries are classified as emerging markets. Our interest lies with 
developing economies that have embraced market-oriented policies and have 
relatively significant de facto trade and financial openness. We determine our sample 
of emerging market economies guided by the Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(MSCI) index for emerging market economies. The MSCI consists of 21 countries56. 
We note that since our analysis period spans two decades, the constituents of the 
index may not hold historically.  
 For comparison purposes, we also include advanced economies in our sample 
which cut across regions and are relatively small, open economies; the exception is 
Japan, a large open economy, which has accumulated a substantial amount of 
reserves. Besides Japan, the advanced economies are Australia, Canada, Denmark, 
+RQJ.RQJ ,VUDHO-DSDQ1HZ=HDODQG1RUZD\DQG6LQJDSRUH7KH,0)¶V:RUOG
Economic Outlook (WEO) database classifies the Czech Republic, Israel, Hong 
Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan as advanced economies although some of the 
,0)¶V UHVHDUFK VWXGLHV IRU H[DPSOH &DUGDUHOOL et al. (2009)) classify these 
economies as emerging markets. In our empirical analysis, we group these countries 
with the emerging market economies. 
 In Tables 4.3(a) and (b), we indicate the relative degree of accumulation and 
volatility of changes in foreign exchange reserves held by our sample of 30 countries 
when considered within a much larger set of countries. On an absolute basis, our 
sample encompasses the majority of the top 30 reserve-accumulating countries 
(columns (1) and (2) of Table 4.3(a) which reflect the stock position at end-2010 and 
accumulation in reserves over 2000-2010 respectively). The chosen economies are 
interspersed among numerous oil-rich Middle-Eastern and North-African countries, 
including Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Libya and the United Arab Emirates, as well as 
                                                          
56
  The countries are China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Egypt, Morocco, South Africa and 
Turkey. Our group differs slightly as we include Argentina and exclude Morocco.  
Source for the countries in the MSCI Index:  
http://www.mscibarra.com/products/indices/tools/index_country_membership/emerging_markets.html.  
The website was last accessed on 8 June 2010. 
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several developed economies (namely Switzerland, Sweden, the UK and the US), 
and a few developing central and eastern European countries. In Table 4.3(b), foreign 
exchange reserves are scaled by GDP to take into account the relative size of the 
economies. This alters the relative rankings of reserve accumulation by our sample 
countries, within the sample itself, and also among the world list of countries. With 
regard to reserve accumulation world rankings (columns (1) and (2)), the sample 
countries appear to be more evenly distributed within the list. In column (3), we 
measure the volatility of changes in reserves which is indicative of two-way 
intervention to mitigate exchange rate depreciation and appreciation respectively.  
The countries in our sample are fairly distributed across the rankings, with 18 
countries in the top half of the list. The positive and statistically significant 
correlation coefficient between columns (2) and (3) indicates that countries with 
higher volatility in reserves also tend to be those that have accumulated reserves, 
more so in the case of our sample countries compared with the full set of countries.  
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Table 4.3(a)6L]H5DQNLQJVRI6DPSOH&RXQWULHV¶ 
Foreign Exchange Reserves 
Sample  
Countries 
Foreign Exchange Reserves (FXR),  
World Ranking 
(1) (2) 
Outstanding Amount, 
USD billion,  
end-2010 
Change, USD billion, 
2000-2010 
Emerging Market Economies 
Asia 
China 2,874.3 1 2,692.7 1 
Taiwan 362.4 5 275.8 5 
Korea 286.9 6 213.2 8 
Hong Kong 268.6 8 172.4 10 
India 267.8 9 235.8 7 
Singapore 223.7 10 147.2 12 
Thailand 165.7 13 131.9 13 
Malaysia 102.3 16 72.7 16 
Indonesia 90.0 18 63.7 17 
Philippines 54.0 23 40.8 22 
Latin America 
Brazil 280.6 7 245.3 6 
Mexico 114.9 15 83.9 15 
Argentina 46.6 27 20.5 38 
Peru 41.7 32 32.9 24 
Colombia 26.3 41 18.9 41 
Chile 26.3 43 12.1 47 
Other Emerging Market Economies 
Russia 432.9 3 424.5 3 
Poland 86.3 19 60.2 18 
Turkey 79.0 20 55.9 19 
Israel 69.3 22 46.8 21 
Hungary 43.6 29 32.9 25 
Czech Republic 40.3 33 27.5 30 
South Africa 35.4 35 29.4 28 
Egypt 32.4 38 18.1 43 
Developed Economies 
Japan 1,036.3 2 758.5 2 
Denmark 70.3 21 49.2 20 
Norway 49.7 25 27.2 31 
Canada 44.9 28 20.5 39 
Australia 32.8 37 13.3 46 
New Zealand 15.1 49 11.1 50 
 
The data are drawn from the IMF IFS world table on foreign exchange reserves, which 
UHSRUWVLQGLYLGXDOFRXQWULHV¶KROGLQJVLQ6'5XQLWV:HKDYHFRQYHUWHGWKHDPRXQWVLQWR
USD based on the USD/SDR exchange rate. 
The countries are listed in descending order based on their respective outstanding foreign 
exchange reserves in column (1).  
The rankings in columns (1) and (2UHIOHFWWKHVHFRXQWULHV¶UHODWLYHSRVLWLRQVLQ
descending order, among a total of 153 countries. The total number excludes countries 
with missing values in their data over 2000q1-2010q4.  
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Table 4.3(b)6L]H5DQNLQJVRI6DPSOH&RXQWULHV¶ 
Foreign Exchange Reserves as a percentage of GDP 
Sample  
Countries 
Foreign Exchange Reserves (FXR) as % of GDP, World Ranking 
(1) (2) (3) 
(FXR/GDP) x 100, 
at end-2010 
ǻ);5$YHUDJH*'3 
x 100, 2000-2010 
(Standard Deviation  
in 4XDUWHUO\ǻFXR/ 
Average GDP) 
 x 100, 2000-2010 
Hong Kong 102.7 1 89.4 8 3.64 15 
Singapore 101.5 2 108.3 4 3.65 14 
Taiwan 78.7 6 76.0 9 1.90 60 
China 57.2 10 102.0 6 2.11 49 
Thailand 51.9 15 66.4 13 2.38 41 
Malaysia 42.6 17 47.8 22 3.96 10 
Israel 35.5 21 32.5 38 1.43 95 
Peru 29.1 27 37.0 28 1.89 63 
Philippines 26.7 31 34.2 36 1.44 93 
Hungary 25.1 34 29.9 42 1.78 71 
Korea 25.1 35 27.0 49 1.25 107 
Japan 19.9 51 16.7 89 0.64 138 
Denmark 19.4 53 18.9 84 1.76 75 
Russia 18.5 59 42.3 24 2.92 28 
India 17.9 63 27.2 48 1.35 99 
Poland 16.8 70 18.7 85 1.30 101 
Egypt 16.7 71 15.4 99 0.78 136 
Czech Republic 16.6 72 19.9 78 1.20 111 
Indonesia 15.3 84 18.9 83 0.87 130 
Brazil 15.2 86 23.7 60 0.90 128 
Chile 14.7 93 10.0 122 1.05 121 
Colombia 12.2 101 14.0 106 0.50 141 
Argentina 11.6 109 8.4 129 0.96 125 
Mexico 10.9 113 10.6 119 0.49 142 
South Africa 10.5 117 13.1 108 0.39 143 
Norway 10.4 121 8.6 128 1.10 119 
Turkey 9.8 125 11.4 117 0.59 140 
New Zealand 9.6 126 10.7 118 1.27 105 
Australia 2.8 140 1.8 141 0.85 134 
Canada 2.6 142 1.8 142 0.15 144 
Correlation (significance level: ***1%, **5%, *10%) 
Columns (1) and (2) All countries 0.92*** 
 Sample countries 0.94*** 
Columns (2) and (3) All countries 0.61*** 
 Sample countries 0.79*** 
 
The FXR data are drawn from the IMF ,)6ZRUOGWDEOHRQ);5ZKLFKUHSRUWVLQGLYLGXDOFRXQWULHV¶KROGLQJVLQ6'5
units. We have converted the amounts into USD based on the USD/SDR exchange rate. 
The GDP data are valued in current prices, USD billion, and are drawn from the IMF WEO Database. 
The countries are listed in descending order based on their respective reserves as a percentage of GDP positions in 
column (1). 
7KHUDQNLQJVLQFROXPQVDQGUHIOHFWWKHVHFRXQWULHV¶UHODWLYHSRVLWLRQVLQGHVFHQGLQJRUGHUDPRQJDWRWDORI
147 countries. The total number excludes countries with missing values over 2000q1-2010q4 in either their foreign 
exchange reserves or GDP data.  
The standard deviation in column (3) is measured based on the quarterly data of the change foreign exchange reserves 
over 2000q1-2010q4. The GDP value used as the denominator in column (1) is for 2010, and in columns (2) and (3), it is 
the average of annual values over 2000-2010. 
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 In Table 4.4, we present the correlation coefficients between different 
approximate measures of foreign exchange intervention for the countries in our 
sample. In column (1), we report the correlation coefficients between the change in 
the national currency value of foreign exchange reserves with and without 
adjustments for exchange rate revaluation changes ( ?	 愋?ǡ ?and  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ?. The former is the proxy we use in our empirical 
analysis of the effects of intervention on base money and broad money growth. The 
correlations vary across countries, with 20 displaying a correlation of more than 0.50, 
but only 10 with a correlation of more than 0.75, indicating relatively strong 
distortions from exchange rate revaluation effects. Some correlations are especially 
low, namely for South Africa, Korea and Japan. The correlations are influenced by 
the value of the exchange rate (NC/USD), the extent of exchange rate volatility and 
the degree of intervention.  On one hand, even small revaluation effects on account 
of a low NC/USD exchange rate can cause divergence in the signs and co-movement 
of values for the two measures, particularly when there is relatively substantial 
exchange rate volatility coupled with limited intervention, as is the case for South 
Africa. On the other hand, large revaluation effects, especially when the value of the 
NC/USD exchange rate is high, can occur with small amounts of exchange rate 
volatility but relatively extensive intervention, as in the instances of Korea and 
Japan. Consequently, while some countries with relatively stable exchange rates 
against the USD, like Hong Kong and China, exhibit strong correlations; lower 
exchange rate volatility, as measured by the coefficient of variation, is not strongly 
associated with a higher correlation coefficient in our sample of countries.57  
 Column (2) contains the correlation coefficients between the change in the 
national currency value of foreign exchange reserves and the change in the national 
currency value of net foreign assets, both adjusted for exchange rate revaluation 
effects ( ?	 愋?ǡ ?and  ?	 愋?ǡ ? respectively). Low correlations 
would primarily reflect the difference in components between the two measures with 
additional foreign assets and the netting off of foreign liabilities in the latter. The 
correlations are, however, fairly high across countries, with 20 countries exhibiting a 
correlation of more than 0.75. There are notably low correlations for Japan and 
                                                          
57
  The correlation coefficient between results in column (1), Table 3.4, and coefficients of variation for 
NC/USD exchange rates is -0.42, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Canada which we attribute to possible misclassification or reporting error since for 
both,	 愋?ǡ ?	 愋?ǡ ? several times 
over.  
 In column (3) we present the correlation coefficients between the change in 
the USD value of foreign exchange reserves and the USD value of reserve assets 
flow from the balance of payments ( ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? and  ? ? ? 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? respectively). The 
latter includes flow in non-currency reserves as mentioned earlier. The correlation 
coefficients serve as a check of the accuracy of the proxy for intervention that we 
have used. Low correlations can arise from differences in components, and 
importantly, if a substantial portion of reserves are held in assets denominated in 
foreign currency other than the USD, the exchange rate revaluation effects for which 
we have not made an adjustment. We find, however, that the correlation coefficients 
are relatively high across the countries, with 28 countries displaying a coefficient of 
more than 0.75. The two exceptions are Norway and Singapore.  
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Table 4.4:  Correlation between Different Approximate Measures  
of Foreign Exchange Intervention 
Country 
Correlation Coefficient 
(1) (2) (3)  ?               ? ?   ?    ǡ  
and                     ? ?   ?    ǡ               ? ?   ?    ǡ  and ?               ? ? ? ?    ǡ   ? ?   ?    ǡ  ? ?  and  ? ? ?? ? ﴆ? ?    ǡ  ? ? 
1990m1-2010m6 1990q1-2010q2 
Argentina 0.81 0.79(a) 0.93 
Australia 0.93 0.58 0.98 
Brazil 0.49 0.69 0.98 
Canada 0.82 0.00 0.86 
Chile 0.67 0.97 0.95(b) 
China 0.98 0.71 0.99(c) 
Colombia 0.33 0.81 0.92(d) 
Czech Rep 0.37(e) 0.91(e) 0.78(f) 
Denmark 0.90 0.81 0.91 
Egypt 0.70 0.29 0.96(g) 
Hong Kong 1.00(h) 0.71(h) 0.95(i) 
Hungary 0.66 0.76(j) 0.87 
India 0.72 0.87 0.83 
Indonesia 0.37 0.84 0.92 
Israel 0.75 1.00(k) 0.96 
Japan 0.29 0.16 0.94 
Korea 0.12 0.69 0.96 
Malaysia 0.88 0.76 0.95(l) 
Mexico 0.63 0.94 0.79 
New Zealand 0.85 0.93 0.98 
Norway 0.88 0.80(m) 0.64 
Peru 0.84 0.89 0.96 
Philippines 0.74 0.74 0.92 
Poland 0.48 0.85 0.93(n) 
Russia 0.58(o) 0.99(o) 0.98(p) 
Singapore 0.57 0.99 0.70(q) 
South Africa 0.02 0.78 0.89 
Taiwan n.a.(r) n.a.(r) 0.90 
Thailand 0.68 0.93 0.95 
Turkey 0.36 0.81 0.92 
 
(1) The adjusted change in the national currency value of foreign exchange reserves which excludes  
      exchange rate revaluation changes ( ?	 愋?ǡ ?) is equal to ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?Ǥ  ? ? ? ?Ǥ. 
      The unadjusted change in the national currency value of foreign exchange reserves which includes  
      exchange rate revaluation changes ( ?	 愋?ǡ ?) is equal to	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?Ǥ  ?- 	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ǥ  ? ? ?. 
(2) The adjusted change in the national currency value of net foreign assets which excludes exchange  
      rate revaluation changes ( ?	 愋?ǡ ?) is equal to 	 愋?ǡ ? ? 	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?. 
(3)  ? ? ? 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? is the change in reserve assets in USD taken from the balance of payments account  
      and excludes exchange rate revaluation effects.  
Unless otherwise indicated below, the correlation coefficients in (1) and (2) are based on monthly data 
over 1990m1-2010m6, and those in (3) are based on quarterly data over 1990q1-2010q2: 
(a)1990m2-2010m6, (b)1991q1-2010q2, (c)Annual data, 1990-2009, (d)1996q1-2010q2, (e)1993m2-
2010m6, (f)1993q2-2010q2, (g)Annual data, 1990-2009, (h)1997m1-2010m6, (i)1999q1-2010q2, 
(j)2000m1-2010m6, (k)1990m1-2010m5, (l)1999q1-2010q2, (m)1990m1-2010m4, (n)2000q1-2010q2, 
(o)1996m1-2010m6, (p)1996q1-2010q2, (q)1995q1-2010q2, (r) End-period exchange rate not available.  
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4.3.4 Unit Root and Stationarity Tests 
 The exposition pertaining to the baseline regression specifications 
presupposes that all the control variables are expressed in first differences to ensure 
stationarity and that the money growth and intervention variables are indeed 
stationary. In order to verify the data generating process (DGP) of each of the 
variables that are meant to enter the estimating equation, two unit root tests and one 
stationarity test are carried out for all the relevant variables on a country-by-country 
basis. The unit root tests are the commonly utilised Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
test and the Philips and Perron (PP) test, while the stationarity test is the 
Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (KPSS) test.  
 An important aspect of the ADF test is the choice of lag length for the lagged 
difference terms in the test regression. We use the sequential method based on the 
significance of t-statistics, as advocated by Campbell and Perron (1991), and begin 
with a lag length of 12. The PP test controls for serial correlation, but can be subject 
to nontrivial size distortions. Since both the ADF and PP tests tend to have low 
power against stationary alternative hypotheses that are very close to non-
stationarity, the KPSS test, which has trend or level stationarity as the null 
hypothesis, serves as a check to either confirm or call into question the results of the 
other two tests.   
 7ZR LVVXHV WKDW DGYHUVHO\ DIIHFW WKH HYDOXDWLRQ RI WKH YDULDEOHV¶ UHspective 
DGPs for each country are the relatively short span of data, and the high likelihood 
of the presence of structural breaks and additive outliers (one-off significant events).  
The maximum length of the data is 1989q1-2010q2, covering roughly two decades, 
given that this corresponds to the time period of the empirical analysis, taking into 
account lag dynamics. Structural breaks can generate spurious non-stationarity while 
the presence of additive outliers can lead to spurious stationarity (see Perron (1989) 
and Maddala and Yin (1999)). The time period covered encompasses numerous 
crises among our sample of countries, for example the Mexican peso crisis in 1994, 
the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the Russian and Brazilian crises over 1998-1999, 
the Argentine currency board collapse in 2002, and the global financial crisis of 
2007-2009. These events may have led to breaks in our data.  
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 We note that there are unit root tests that allow for break dates to be 
endogenously determined, thus addressing the issue of uncertainty with regard to the 
precise timing of shifts in the data. These tests include the Zivot and Andrews (1992) 
(hereafter referred to as ZA) procedure for a single structural break, and the models 
of Clemente-Montañés-Reyes (1998) which allow for two mean shifts in the data ± 
the Additive Outliers (AO) model for instantaneous changes in the mean of a series, 
and the Innovational Outliers (IO) model for gradual shifts in the mean of a series. 
Since the AO and IO models are essentially for non-trending data, we opt to focus on 
the procedure developed by ZA as a complementary test to the three basic tests 
mentioned in the beginning of this section. Although a single break test, the ZA 
procedure¶VEUHDN-stationary alternative hypothesis allows for changes in level, trend 
or both. 
 The tests are performed for variables in levels and first differences for each 
country. The first difference transformations of the variables reflect the forms used in 
the regression specifications. The results are detailed in Appendix 2, Section B: Unit 
Root and Stationarity Tests for Variables in Levels and First Differences. See page 
284 for the corresponding explanatory notes.  
 For the variables in levels, the results among the ADF, PP and KPSS tests are 
mixed, in that there are variables that appear to have unit roots and others which are 
stationary, and this differs across countries. Furthermore, there are instances of 
inconsistencies between the three test results. For the variables in first differences, 
the tests provide relatively more conclusive results. It appears that the ADF test tends 
to under-reject the null hypothesis of a unit root, although clearly stationarity is more 
prevalent than unit roots. Both the PP and KPSS tests, however, tend to consistently 
point to stationarity. The KPSS test, which tests for a unit moving average root, also 
generally does not suggest overdifferencing of the variables. The ZA test results for 
break-stationarity in the levels of variables are not noticeably contradictory of the 
results of the unit root tests without structural breaks, especially when all three of the 
latter are considered.    
 From a practical point of view, unit roots in inflation and interest rates raise 
TXHVWLRQV DERXW WKH SROLF\PDNHUV¶ DELOLW\ WR LQIOXHQFH WKHVH NH\ PRQHWDU\ SROLF\
transmission and goal variables; and draws attention to whether there is mean 
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reversion in the real interest rate. Many of the countries in our sample, however, have 
undergone significant changes over the last few decades. On one hand, it may be that 
structural breaks have not been properly pinned down, but on the other, it is also 
questionable as to whether the forms of DGP have actually remained the same over 
time.  On balance, we err on the side of possibly over-differencing rather than under-
differencing by specifying the control variables in first differences, given that the 
unit root and stationarity tests tend to indicate stationarity in first differences, the 
dependent variables themselves are growth terms and since we pay attention to 
checking for serial correlation in the regression residuals.  
4.4 CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter, we provided the background set-up for the empirical analysis 
of the effects of real foreign exchange intervention on real base money and real 
broad money respectively. The baseline estimating equations reflect the combination 
of the monetary approach to the balance of payments and behavioural money 
demand analysis, rather than monetary policy reaction functions. This avoids treating 
either of the money variables as explicit policy instruments. The choice of an ARDL 
specification allows us to capture short-run (contemporaneous) and long-run 
(indirect) effects of foreign exchange intervention on the money variables. The 
conceptual framework of how intervention affects the money variables underpins the 
testable hypotheses, key of which is that intervention will affect broad money 
differently than base money, with more statistically significant and variable effects 
expected in the former case.  
 An important element of the discussion in this chapter was the choice of a 
proxy for foreign exchange intervention. We use the change in foreign exchange 
reserves, adjusted to exclude exchange rate revaluation effects (arising from changes 
in the national currency against the US dollar), and show that the inclusion of these 
effects can cause significant variations which do not reflect intervention. We have 
highlighted limitations to our choice, namely that the series is not adjusted for 
interest income effects, other exchange rate revaluation effects, swap operations and 
IMF-related transactions. Nevertheless, on balance, it is our assessment that the 
foreign exchange reserves series is the most suitable proxy for our purposes.  
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CHAPTER 5 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF  
FOREIGN EXCHANGE INTERVENTION ON BASE MONEY 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 In this chapter, we investigate the effects of real intervention (as measured by 
the change in real foreign exchange reserves) on changes in real base money as a 
prelude to the investigation of the effects of intervention on changes in real broad 
money. In Chapter 4, we provided a detailed conceptual framework and presented 
our hypothesis that even if the effect of intervention on base money is statistically 
and economically insignificant, there can still be a significant effect on broad money. 
The effect of intervention on base money partly depends on the implementation and 
WDFWLFDO FKDUDFWHULVWLFV RI D FRXQWU\¶V PRQHWDU\ SROLF\ IUDPHZRUN ± namely the 
choice of operating target and instruments utilised by the central bank. All these 
important elements have not been adequately addressed in the existing empirical 
literature. There appears to be a gap between the literature that touches upon the 
mechanisms of monetary policy implementation, for example Disyatat (2008) and 
Ho and McCauley (2008), and the literature that focuses on the econometric analysis 
of intervention effects on base money. 
 There have been various studies of the effects of intervention on base money 
in emerging market economies either as the focal point or as a subcomponent of 
issues related to capital flows and reserve accumulation. However, among these, 
there are only a few recent studies that cover a group of countries that cut across 
regions, for example Aizenman and Glick (2009), Cardarelli et al. (2009) and 
Lavigne (2008).  The first covers nine countries, of which six are Asian economies 
and three are Latin American economies; while the second and third encompass 52 
and 35 countries respectively. Methods differ across the three studies. Aizenman and 
Glick (2009) adopt a static multivariate regression specification based on a simple 
version of the monetary approach to the balance of payments and allow for real GDP 
and inflation as control variables. Cardarelli et al. (2009) use pooled bivariate 
regressions. Both studies have the change in net domestic assets of base money 
ǻ1'$ DV WKH GHSHQGHQW YDULDEOH %RWK VWXGLHV KRZHYHU GR QRW FRQVLGHU KRZ
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GLIIHUHQFHV LQ FRXQWULHV¶ PRQHWDU\ SROLF\ IUDPHZRUNV DQG FKRLFH RI LQVWUXPHQWV
namely reserve requirements, may have affected their estimation results. Lavigne 
(2008) takes into account the effect of reserve requirements, but uses straightforward 
ratios, essentially comparing the cumulative change in currency in circulation against 
WKHFXPXODWLYH FKDQJH LQQHW IRUHLJQDVVHWV ǻ1)$'HWDLOVRI WKH WHFKQLTXHVDQG
results of these studies, along with several others, are provided in Appendix 1: 
Selected Recent Studies on Sterilisation in Developing Countries. 
 Our contribution is to extend the current empirical literature by providing a 
detailed analysis for a reasonably large and diverse group of 30 countries, supported 
by a thorough conceptual framework. We carry out multivariate dynamic regression 
analysis on an individual country basis drawing on the monetary approach to the 
balance of payments and behavioural money demand analysis in our model 
specification and choice of control variables. Our approach allows us to disentangle 
short-run and long-run effects of intervention on changes in base money and to 
highlight individual country peculiarities which otherwise may distort group-based 
analysis. Crucially, we are mindful of differences in monetary policy frameworks 
across countries and conduct tests of possible country characteristics that may 
account for variations in individual country results.  
 This chapter is organised as follows:  In Section 5.2 we describe our 
empirical approach briefly, following our extensive discussion in Chapter 4, and then 
analyse our baseline results in subsection 5.2.1. We draw attention to countries with 
significant and positive effects of real intervention on changes in real base money. 
Next, we study the role of different country characteristics in influencing the 
intervention effects in subsection 5.2.2 by using mean and median equality tests, and 
bivariate regressions. We also discuss regression diagnostics for the baseline 
specification of each country and robustness checks in subsections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4 
respectively. In Section 5.3, we conclude.  
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5.2 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 As first presented in Chapter 4, the following is the standard model 
specification estimated with OLS for each country. Our sample consists of 30 
countries58. Individual country estimations are based on quarterly observations over 
the sample period 1990q1 to 2010q2. This is the maximum sample size, and sample 
sizes are smaller for some countries due to the lack of availability of long time series 
data for certain variables.  
  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ?  ? Ⱦ  ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ  ? ? ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ?
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ɂ ? ? 
                            
                   (5.1) 
  
A discussion on the choice of control variables is provided in Chapter 4, section 
4.2.2. In section 4.3.2 of the same chapter, we provide descriptions of the variables 
used in our baseline regression specification and indicate the expected signs on the 
coefficients. The main coefficients of interest are the short-run and long-run effects 
of the change in real foreign exchange reserves (intervention) on the change in real 
base money. The short-run effect is the coefficient Ⱦ ? ?  while the long-run coefficient 
is derived as follows: 
Ⱦ ?ǡ  ?  ? Ⱦ  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
                   
                 (5.2) 
                                                          
58
  The countries are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Egypt, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey.  
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 If the coefficients are zero, this indicates that there has been full sterilisation 
of the intervention operations through market-based instruments. Nevertheless, as 
noted in previous chapters, there can be incomplete sterilisation, which is different 
from the inability to carry out sterilisation, when a short-term interest rate is the 
operating target. This is because intervention is treated like any other factor affecting 
domestic money market liquidity. The degree of sterilisation is then the outcome of 
the demand for base money balances (currency, required reserves and excess 
reserves) by the private sector and banks. This demand is directly linked to the new 
liquidity associated with the intervention and is not necessarily fully captured by the 
control variables. 
 If, on the other hand, the coefficients are closer to one than zero, then this 
does not necessarily imply that there has been very little sterilisation. Rather, it could 
be that the domestic liquidity generated through intervention has been absorbed 
through required reserves. Several of the recent empirical studies are silent on how 
reserve requirements affect conclusions on the degree of sterilisation (namely 
Aizenman and Glick (2009), Cardarelli et al. (2009) and Ouyang et al. (2010)). 
However, there are also studies that acknowledge the impact of reserve requirements 
on the size of base money (for example Ho and McCauley (2008), which briefly 
discusses the case of China in a study on the domestic consequences of reserve 
accumulation in Asia; and IMF (2011) which contains a short analysis on 
sterilisation for a group of Asian economies)59. A significant positive relationship is 
possible if reserve requirement ratios are high and used actively in conjunction with 
increased intervention operations. Frequent movements in the ratios, however, may 
not be practically desirable among policymakers.  
 Positive coefficients that are both statistically and economically significant 
can also occur when the monetary policy framework in operation is a currency board 
or involves deliberate and continuous monetary expansion. With the former, in the 
strictest sense, foreign exchange intervention must be allowed to determine the 
monetary base and interest rate movements, as domestic monetary policy is 
                                                          
59
  Since required reserves constitute a form of sterilisation, one could argue that it should be excluded 
from the change in base money measure. We do not exclude required reserves for two reasons: (i) the breakdown 
between required and excess reserves is only available for a few countries whilst any estimation of required 
reserves requires information on the required reserves ratio(s) and the associated eligible liabilities; and (ii) it 
provides information on passive sterilisation where the required reserve ratio may be high but is not actively used, 
and this reflects the endogeneity of base money to broad money.  
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subjugated to that of the anchor currency country. In the latter case, there is an 
intentional policy of expanding the monetary base with short-term interest rates 
falling, perhaps to a level close to zero. Monetary base expansion is a feature of 
quantitative easing (see for instance Borio and Disyatat (2009) for various 
characterisations of this policy approach). In both instances, therefore, intervention 
may lead to corresponding changes in base money. In our sample, we note that Hong 
Kong has a currency board system60, whilst Japan undertook prolonged expansionary 
monetary policy. Japan experienced a marked expansion in base money coupled with 
falling interest rates in the 1990s and adopted quantitative easing over the period 
2001-2006, with its operating target switched from the overnight call rate to current 
account balances with the central bank.  
 The unique cases of Hong Kong and Japan aside, among the remaining 
countries in our sample, 19 countries implemented inflation-targeting during the 
sample period under investigation and therefore have adopted short-term interest 
rates as their operating targets. With the other nine countries, Malaysia operates an 
interest rate-targeting framework and this has been the practice for the greater part of 
the sample period while Egypt switched to the overnight interest rate as the 
operational target in 2005 from a monetary-targeting framework previously. The 
frameworks in Argentina61, China, India and Taiwan continue to have elements of 
monetary-targeting with no one interest rate as the main operational target. 
Meanwhile, Denmark, which has a de facto peg to the Euro, operates monetary 
policy through several key interest rates. Singapore, which has an explicit exchange 
rate-targeting framework, conducts its money market operations to ensure sufficient 
OLTXLGLW\WRPHHWEDQNV¶GHPDQGIRUUHVHUYHDQGVHWWOHPHQWEDODQFHV± much like an 
interest rate-targeting framework, but without the interest rate target. Brief 
FKURQRORJLFDO GHWDLOV RI HDFK FRXQWU\¶V PRQHWDU\ SROLF\ DQG H[FKDQJH UDWH
frameworks are provided in Appendix 3: Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate 
Frameworks (1990-2010).  
                                                          
60
  In our study, we have excluded Exchange Fund Bills and Notes (EFBNs), securities issued by the 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA)IURP+RQJ.RQJ¶VPHDVXUHRIEDVHPRQH\$OWKRXJKQRWVWULFWO\
functioning as sterilisation of intervention, these issuances do provide an avenue for banks to invest their surplus 
funds (see ADB (2009)). Under the currency board, these liabilities of the HKMA must be fully backed by 
foreign assets. The data indicates that changes in outstanding EFBNs tend to mimic changes in foreign reserves. 
61
  It is commonly accepted that Argentina operated a currency board system over the period 1991-2002, 
although this is disputed by Hanke (2008).  
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 In summary, the effects of intervention on base money is implicitly about 
how these effects reflect the deliberate policy of the central bank and/or the outcome 
RIWKHSULYDWHVHFWRU¶VDFWLRQV,QWHUYHQWLRQWKDWWUDQVODWHVLQWRGHPDQGIRUFXUUHQF\
and thus has significant effects on base money need not connote a looser monetary 
policy than if there were no effect on currency demand, particularly if the increased 
demand reflects a preference for cash over bank deposits.  Meanwhile, sterilisation 
through required reserves can be either passive or active - the former making base 
money endogenous to broad money and the way in which liquidity has made its way 
through the economy. Overall, if the coefficients on intervention effects are small, 
this need not mean that the liquidity associated with intervention has not had an 
impact on the economy. At the same time, large positive coefficients do not imply 
that there is a deliberate policy of non-sterilisation, particularly if reserve 
requirements are in fact actively used and which to some extent limit increases in the 
money multiplier and broad money expansion.  
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5.2.1 Baseline Regression Results for the Real Intervention Effects on Real 
 Base Money Change 
The results for each country in Table 5.1 are based on the final parsimonious 
version of the initial general unrestricted model as presented in equation (5.1). 
Contemporaneous and lagged values of regressors which were found to be 
statistically insignificant at the 10% level were removed. The exclusion of variables 
was done one at a time, in a unidirectional backwards manner, starting with the 
variable with the highest p-value (or lowest t-statistic) and then proceeding to the 
next variable with the highest p-value, upon re-estimation of the model. This applies 
to all regressors except the contemporaneous effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  
which is not removed in the general to specific modelling process. 
As a general rule, in instances where serial correlation and/or 
heteroscedasticity had been detected either in the unrestricted model or in the final 
parsimonious model, robust standard errors were used from the beginning of 
estimation. The robust standard errors were derived according to either the Newey 
West HAC or White Consistent Covariances method. Serial correlation was tested 
for at lags two, four and eight using the Breusch-Godfrey LM test statistic and the F-
statistic for the joint significance of lagged residuals. The sample sizes for many of 
the countries are relatively small, with the smallest sample comprising 46 
observations. Finite samples can adversely affect the performance of the LM test and 
that of the robust standard errors. As such, we use the robust standard errors only 
when there is consistency between the F-test and the LM test in providing evidence 
of serial correlation. 
The effects of outliers, primarily in the context of non-normality in the 
residuals, and also in regard to other diagnostic test results, have been removed for 
some countries with the use of impulse dummy variables. Individual-country 
regression outcomes along with diagnostic test results are detailed in Appendix 2, 
Section A: Detailed Baseline Regression Results. In subsection 5.2.3 we discuss the 
results of regression diagnostic tests. In subsection 5.2.4 we elaborate on robustness 
checks. 
For each country, there are two columns of results in Table 5.1. Column (i) 
consists of the short-run coefficient on  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  while column 
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(ii) lists the corresponding long-run coefficient. For the short-run coefficients, t-
statistics are reported while for the long-run coefficients, F-statistics are reported ± 
both statistics are in brackets.  
 In Table 5.2, group averages and the average for all countries in the sample 
are reported. The groups comprise Asia, Latin America, other emerging market 
economies and developed economies. The results are those of simple averages of the 
coefficients and their associated average t- and F-statistics.   
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Table 5.1: Real Intervention Effects 
on Real Base Money Change - Individual Country Results 
 
Country 
The effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   
on  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  
 (i)  (ii) 
Contemporaneous Ⱦ ? ? Long-run multiplier Ⱦ ?ǡ ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
Asia  
China 0.158** 
[2.638] 
0.043 
[0.306] 
 
1991q2-2010q2 
Hong Kong  0.270*** 
(4.866) 
0.155** 
(4.514) 
 
1999q1-2010q2 
India 0.157*** 
(2.860) 
0.216*** 
(22.625) 
1997q1-2010q2 
Indonesia -0.100 
(-1.316) 
-0.124 
(1.712) 
1995q1-2010q2 
Korea -0.086** 
(-2.510) 
-0.051** 
(6.119) 
1991q1-2010q2 
Malaysia 0.041** 
(2.153) 
0.084*** 
(7.713) 
1990q2-2010q2 
Philippines -0.076* 
[-1.983] 
-0.076* 
[3.932] 
1990q2-2010q2 
Singapore 0.008 
(0.780) 
0.039*** 
(14.376) 
1990q3-2010q2 
Taiwan 0.074* 
(1.191) 
0.057* 
(3.678) 
1990q3-2010q2 
Thailand 0.030 
[0.855] 
-0.017 
[0.321] 
 
1991q2-2010q2 
 
x Column (i) reports the contemporaneous effect and the corresponding t-statistic. 
x Column (ii) reports the long-run multiplier and the corresponding F-statistic. 
The F-statistic is for the test,  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? = 0. x For both the t- and F-statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;  
     *: significant at 10%, using (Default), [Newey West], {White} standard errors.   
x The results are based on restricted regressions, which include only statistically significant 
variables at the minimum 10% significance level. Regressors are removed one at a time in a 
unidirectional backwards manner based on the lowest t-statistic each time. This applies to 
all regressors except the contemporaneous effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? which is 
not removed in the general to specific modelling process. 
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Table 5.1: Continued 
 
Country 
The effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   
on ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  
 (i)  (ii) 
Contemporaneous Ⱦ ? ? Long-run multiplier Ⱦ ?ǡ ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
Latin America  
Argentina 0.116** 
(2.170) 
0.152 
(0.889) 
 
1994q4-2010q2 
Brazil -0.030 
(-0.331) 
-0.043 
(0.108) 
 
1997q2-2010q2 
Chile 0.026 
(0.943) 
0.054* 
(3.936) 
1990q4-2010q2 
Colombia 0.144* 
[1.982] 
0.362*** 
[24.377] 
1995q2-2010q2 
Mexico -0.062*** 
(-3.231) 
-0.046*** 
(10.667) 
1991q2-2010q2 
Peru 0.030*** 
(3.120) 
0.120*** 
(86.527) 
1995q2-2010q2 
 
x Column (i) reports the contemporaneous effect and the corresponding t-statistic. 
x Column (ii) reports the long-run multiplier and the corresponding F-statistic. 
The F-statistic is for the test,  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? = 0. x For both the t-and F-statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;  
     *: significant at 10%, using (Default), [Newey West], {White} standard errors.   
x The results are based on restricted regressions, which include only statistically 
significant variables at the minimum 10% significance level. Regressors are removed 
one at a time in a unidirectional backwards manner based on the lowest t-statistic each 
time. This applies to all regressors except the contemporaneous effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? which is not removed in the general to specific modelling 
process. 
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Table 5.1: Continued 
 
Country 
The effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   
on  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  
 (i)  (ii) 
Contemporaneous Ⱦ ? ? Long-run multiplier Ⱦ ?ǡ ? ? ?  ?Ⱦ  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
Other Emerging Market Economies(EMEs)-Europe, Middle East and 
Africa 
Czech Republic 0.069* 
(1.760) 
0.048* 
(3.105) 
 
1997q2-2010q2 
Egypt 3.537*** 
(7.867) 
1.934** 
(6.221) 
 
2003q1-2010q2 
Hungary 0.035 
(1.243) 
0.090*** 
(8.381) 
1996q1-2010q2 
Israel 0.563*** 
{5.714} 
0.688*** 
{26.408} 
1990q4-2010q2 
Poland -0.011 
[-0.142] 
0.113 
 [1.166] 
1997q3-2010q2 
Russia 0.264*** 
[3.041] 
0.253*** 
[10.548] 
1996q3-2010q2 
South Africa 0.057 
(1.085) 
0.084** 
(5.144) 
1991q2-2010q2 
Turkey -0.012 
(-0.309) 
-0.012 
(0.096) 
1995q2-2010q2 
 
x Column (i) reports the contemporaneous effect and the corresponding t-statistic. 
x Column (ii) reports the long-run multiplier and the corresponding F-statistic. 
The F-statistic is for the test,  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? = 0. x For both the t-and F-statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;  
     *: significant at 10%, using (Default), [Newey West], {White} standard errors.   
x The results are based on restricted regressions, which include only statistically 
significant variables at the minimum 10% significance level. Regressors are removed 
one at a time in a unidirectional backwards manner based on the lowest t-statistic each 
time. This applies to all regressors except the contemporaneous effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? which is not removed in the general to specific modelling 
process. 
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Table 5.1: Continued 
 
Country 
The effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   
on  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  
 (i)  (ii) 
Contemporaneous Ⱦ ? ? Long-run multiplier Ⱦ ?ǡ ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ?Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
Developed Economies 
Australia -0.011 
(-0.062) 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
 
1991q2-2010q2 
Canada 0.027 
(0.781) 
0.055** 
(4.811) 
 
1990q4-2010q2 
Denmark -0.015 
(-0.736) 
-0.008 
(0.536) 
1991q1-2010q2 
Japan 0.425** 
[2.092] 
0.636** 
[4.612] 
1990q2-2010q2 
New Zealand 0.046 
(1.497) 
0.278*** 
(18.260) 
1991q1-2010q2 
Norway 0.034 
(0.779) 
0.024 
(0.605) 
1991q1-2010q2 
 
x Column (i) reports the contemporaneous effect and the corresponding t-statistic. 
x Column (ii) reports the long-run multiplier and the corresponding F-statistic. 
The F-statistic is for the test,  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? = 0. x For both the t- and F-statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;  
     *: significant at 10%, using (Default), [Newey West], {White} standard errors.   
x The results are based on restricted regressions, which include only statistically 
significant variables at the minimum 10% significance level. Regressors are removed 
one at a time in a unidirectional backwards manner based on the lowest t-statistic each 
time. This applies to all regressors except the contemporaneous effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? which is not removed in the general to specific 
modelling process. 
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Table 5.2: Real Intervention Effects  
on Real Base Money Change - Group Averages 
 
Group  
The group average effect of   ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  on  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  
 (i)  (ii) 
Contemporaneous Ⱦ ? ? Long-run multiplier Ⱦ ?ǡ ? ? ?  ?Ⱦ  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
Asia 
 
Excluding Taiwan 
 
0.048* 
(1.845) 
0.045* 
(1.917) 
0.033** 
(6.530) 
0.030*** 
(6.846) 
 
Latin America 
 
0.037* 
(1.868) 
0.101*** 
(21.084) 
 
Other EMEs 
 
Excluding Egypt 
0.563*** 
(2.610) 
0.138* 
(1.858) 
 
0.400*** 
(7.634) 
0.181*** 
(7.835) 
Developed Economies 0.084 
(0.991) 
0.163** 
(4.805) 
 
TOTAL 
 
Excluding 
Taiwan and Egypt 
0.190* 
(1.882) 
 
0.075* 
(1.693) 
0.170*** 
(9.390) 
 
0.111*** 
(9.707)  
 
Sample standard deviation 
(excluding Taiwan and 
Egypt) 
0.151 0.191 
 
x Column (i) reports the simple average of the contemporaneous effect and the corresponding 
average t-statistic. 
x Column (ii) reports the simple average of the long-run multiplier and the corresponding 
average F-statistic. 
The F-statistic is for the test,  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? = 0. x For both the t-and F-statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;  
     *: significant at 10%. 
x The results are based on restricted regressions, which include only statistically significant 
variables at the minimum 10% significance level. Regressors are removed one at a time in a 
unidirectional backwards manner based on the lowest t-statistic each time. This applies to all 
regressors except the contemporaneous effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? which is not 
removed in the general to specific modelling process. 
x Results are reported for average values which exclude Egypt and Taiwan. The former is an 
outlier in the analysis of intervention effects on real base money growth and the latter, and 
outlier in the analysis of intervention effects on real broad money growth. 
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 With reference to Tables 5.1 and 5.2, the results indicate that the effect of real 
intervention on the change in real base money is on average, low. Excluding Taiwan 
and Egypt62, the average coefficients for the remaining sample of 28 countries are 
0.075 in the short-run and 0.111 in the long-run respectively. In effect, a one unit 
increase in real intervention only leads to a 0.075 unit increase in the change in real 
base money in the short run and a 0.111 unit increase in the long run. However, the 
corresponding standard deviations across the sample group are 0.151 and 0.191 
respectively, which suggests substantial dispersion. On closer inspection, the short-
run and long-run coefficients are in the range of 0.000 ± 0.200 for about half of the 
countries (15 and 13 respectively), and negative in value for nine countries. 
Nevertheless, the negative coefficients tend to be of small economic significance 
even if statistically significant. Israel and Japan are outliers on the other end of the 
spectrum with statistically significant positive short-run and long-run coefficients of 
0.563 and 0.688, and 0.425 and 0.636 respectively. The dispersions in the short-run 
and long-run coefficients across countries are summarised in the following boxplots 
(Graph 5.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
62
  We exclude Egypt as the short-run and long-run coefficients are exceptionally large and based upon 
regressions covering a short sample period. The sample period differs considerably from that which is used in the 
real broad money growth regression in Chapter 6. In the case of Taiwan, while the coefficients in this chapter do 
not represent outliers, the long-run coefficient from the real broad money regression is exceptionally large and 
statistically insignificant in Chapter 6 DQG7DLZDQLVH[FOXGHGLQWKDWFKDSWHU¶VDQDO\VLV,QRUGHUWRKDYHWKHVDPH
sample of countries when we compare the coefficients from the real base money growth regression against those 
from the real broad money growth regression later, we thus exclude both these countries in our analysis here as 
well as in the next chapter. 
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Graph 5.1: Boxplots for the Short-run and Long-run  
Real Intervention Effects on Real Base Money Change  
 
 
 
  
 It is difficult to make one-to-one comparisons with the results of previous 
empirical work owing to differences in country coverage, methodology and sample 
period. Nevertheless, if we take a subset of the countries in our sample which is 
comparable to the set of countries in other studies and if there are substantial 
differences in results, then this highlights the importance of the choice of 
methodology, variations in the effects of intervention over time and also, possibly, 
differences in data definitions. 
 
 In particular, we compare the average of the long-run coefficient for the 
subset of the countries63 in our sample which is consistent with the sample in 
Aizenman and Glick (2009) against their results which are based on static 
multivariate regressions using quarterly overlapping annual observations. At a 
statistically significant 0.042, our result is reasonably consistent with the high 
                                                          
63
  The countries are Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Singapore and Thailand. 
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statistically significant sterilisation coefficients Aizenman and Glick (2009) report 
which we average to arrive at -0.825 and -0.996 (pre- and post-break respectively).  
 
 Our results are much less consistent with those of Lavigne (2008) and 
Cardarelli et al. (2009) since these are based on ratios of cumulative amounts and 
annual sterilisation coefficients drawn from bivariate regressions of pooled monthly 
data respectively. The sterilisation coefficients from these studies tend to be lower 
than what would be suggested by our intervention effects partly on account of the 
simplicity of methodology employed in these studies.   
 
 In Graph 5.2 we plot the long-run coefficients against the short-run 
coefficients and in Table 5.3 we provide the results of regressions between these two 
variables. A unit increase in the short-run coefficient implies roughly a unit increase 
in the long-run coefficient. With reference to Diagram 4.4 of Chapter 4, this suggests 
that countries are generally in the bottom left or top right quadrants of the diagram ± 
that is they belong to either the category of countries with low reserve requirement 
ratios and/or market based sterilisation of intervention; or the category of countries 
with active use of reserve requirements to sterilise intervention or which operate 
frameworks with limited sterilisation of intervention.   
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Graph 5.2: The Relationship between Short-run and Long-run Effects  
of Real Intervention on Real Base Money Change  
 
 
Table 5.3:  Regression Analysis between Short-run and Long-run Effects  
of Real Intervention on Real Base Money Change  
Regressor: Short-run 
Coefficient 
Dependent variable: Long-run Coefficient 
Coefficient t-statistic Adjusted  
R2 
All countries  
 
1.148 10.797*** 0.81 
Excluding Israel and 
Japan 
0.903 5.406*** 0.53 
1RWH7KHPD[LPXPQXPEHURIREVHUYDWLRQV LV7KHJURXS³DOOFRXQWULHV´DOUHDG\H[FOXGHV
Egypt and Taiwan. In the second regression, we exclude the additional outliers, Israel and Japan, 
their relative positions in the sample presented in Graphs 5.1 and 5.2. Both regressions include 
constants which are not shown for brevity. 
***significant at the 1% level.  
 
 We observe that countries with comparatively large positive short-run and 
long-run coefficients are mostly emerging market economies. The exceptions to this 
are Japan and New Zealand. We focus a little more in depth on the ten countries with 
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the largest positive coefficients64 and support our discussion by also considering the 
effects of intervention on the individual components of base money ± currency, and 
required reserves/deposit accounts with the central bank, for these countries. The 
associated regression results65 are presented in Table 5.4.  
 In the case of Japan, the statistically and economically significant short-run 
and long-run coefficients (for deposit accounts with the Bank of Japan) would appear 
to be consistent with its policy of base money expansion. Nevertheless, clarifications 
on the interpretation of these coefficients are required.  
 In Japan, it is the Ministry of Finance that determines intervention policy and 
issues securities known as Financing Bills to raise funds prior to intervention 
operations which are conducted by the Bank of Japan. Thus, in one sense 
intervention is automatically sterilised. However, the Bank of Japan may still 
respond to the new liquidity created (Fatum and Hutchison, 2005). Using daily data 
on current account balances with the Bank of Japan and intervention operations for 
the period 2003-2004, during which the Bank of Japan had intervened heavily, the 
authors find that intervention does not explain changes in the current account 
balances. Defining complete sterilisation as being consistent with a lack of response 
of current account balances to intervention, it would seem that was a high degree of 
sterilisation at least on a daily frequency. They nevertheless note that these two 
variables may be highly correlated at lower frequencies, namely at monthly and 
quarterly intervals.  
 As such, the results that we observe in our analysis of Japan may not reflect 
an active non-sterilisation policy but rather the independent pursuit of base money 
expansion in order to stimulate the Japanese economy. It should also be noted that 
our results are based on a regression which includes an impulse dummy variable for 
2004q1, when the sharpest increase in intervention was observed and which 
represents an outlier in the data. Excluding this dummy variable the short-run and 
long-run coefficients are lower at 0.247 and 0.360 respectively, and statistically 
insignificant. However, as presented later in the section on robustness analysis, the 
                                                          
64
  The countries are Argentina, China, Colombia, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Peru and 
Russia.  
65
  The specifications follow equation 5.1 but instead of growth in base money as the dependent variable, 
we use the change in currency and required reserves/deposit accounts respectively, both of which are scaled by 
the level of base money lagged one period.  
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effects were nevertheless economically and statistically significant for the sample 
period 1990q2 - 2000q4.  
 New Zealand also presents a unique case as it had introduced a new liquidity 
management framework in July 2006. The new framework involved increasing the 
level of settlement cash balances in the money market in stages with injections of 
cash made primarily through foreign exchange swaps (Reserve Bank of New 
=HDODQG  7KLV HQWDLOHG LQFUHDVHV LQ WKH FHQWUDO EDQN¶V IRUHLJQ UHVHUYHV DQG
FRUUHVSRQGLQJO\LQEDQNV¶FDVKEDODQFHVZKLFKFDQDFFRXQWIRUWKHSRVLWLYHORQJ-run 
effect on deposit accounts with the central bank that we observe.66  
 For Hong Kong, as expected the short-run and long-run effects on deposit 
accounts with the monetary authority are positive and significant given its currency 
board regime67. With regard to Israel, which has the largest positive short-run and 
long-run coefficients in our sample, this reflects that when large intervention 
operations take place the main sterilisation method is for commercial banks to place 
deposits in interest earning accounts with the central bank, through monetary deposit 
auctions. Sokoler (2005) makes note of this method of sterilisation of intervention 
operations by the Bank of Israel during a period of substantial intervention in the 
second half of the 1990s.  The same method of sterilisation was also employed when 
the Bank of Israel embarked on another round of steadily increasing intervention 
beginning March 2008 (Bank of Israel, 2009).68  
 Among the three Latin American countries, Argentina, Colombia and Peru, 
there are different underlying factors that account for the effects of intervention on 
base money. All three have actively used reserve requirements although not 
necessarily always in the context of intervention (see Gray (2011), and Montoro and 
Moreno (2011) for a snapshot of reserve requirement ratios across countries).  
However, as presented in Table 5.4, the effect of intervention is mainly seen on 
currency in the case of Argentina and Peru. For Argentina, the effect on currency is 
                                                          
66
  Strictly speaking, we would expect this to be also reflected as a contemporaneous effect and the data 
suggests that the increases in foreign reserves and base money occurred in the same period at least for two 
quarters. However, the short-run coefficient is economically and statistically insignificant.  
67
  It should be noted that the coefficients are not as high as some of the other countries despite the unique 
monetary policy framework because we have excluded the outstanding amount of EFBNs from the base money 
measure. See footnote 57 for further details. 
68
 Intervention operations were carried out to build foreign exchange reserves and therefore, financial 
resilience. Amidst the global slowdown, it also served to avoid excessive exchange rate appreciation which could 
KDYHKDGDGYHUVHHIIHFWVRQ,VUDHO¶VH[Sorts.  
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consistent with increased demand for cash holdings after the collapse of the currency 
board system in 2002. On the other hand, with regard to Colombia, the effect of 
intervention on required reserves/deposit accounts is statistically significant.69 
 With regard to Russia, the effect of intervention is statistically significant on 
currency rather than required reserves/deposit accounts but the latter is of a non- 
trivial economic size and fairly close to being statistically significant. The two large 
Asian economies, China and India provide contrasting information. With respect to 
India, the change in base money associated with intervention is mainly emanating 
from required reserves. The results for China are rather peculiar. It should be 
highlighted that the coefficients for the effect of intervention on base money (as 
reported in Table 5.1) are statistically insignificant if based on default standard 
errors70. If we take the results as such, then there appears to be consistency with the 
results of intervention effects on currency and required reserves/deposit accounts, 
which are negative and statistically insignificant respectively. It is interesting to note 
that despite accumulating the largest absolute amount of reserves among all the 
countries in our sample, and with obvious growth in reserves and base money, once 
control factors are taken into account, intervention does not appear to have an effect 
on base money in China.71 
 
 Our results thus far are broadly consistent with those of other studies in that 
the coefficients for the effects of intervention on changes in base money average a 
low value. This is comparable to the results of high sterilisation coefficients of the 
other VWXGLHV ZKLFK XVH ǻ1'$ DV WKH GHSHQGHQW YDULDEOH +RZHYHU WKH LVVXHV RI
differences between countries, and variations over time for individual countries and 
across regions are to some extent misrepresented by Aizenman and Glick (2009) and 
Cardarelli et al. (2009) given that the effects of different monetary policy 
frameworks and the use of reserve requirements are not considered as possible 
factors for these variations. This is something we have sought to highlight in our 
                                                          
69
  In the late 2000s, the Central Bank of Colombia begin using interest bearing deposits as a monetary 
contraction tool,  in line with offsetting intervention to keep short-term interest rates at levels consistent with its 
inflation target. Source: www.banrep.gov.co/press _release/press.htm. 
70 
 The t-statistics corresponding to the default standard errors are 1.491 and 0.099 respectively for the 
short-run and long-run coefficients.  
71
  The lack of effect is consistent with other studies which report a high degree of sterilisation (see 
Appendix 1). We also note that while reserve requirement ratios were on an increasing trend over 2006q4-2008q3, 
these actions may not have been in a direct one-to-one response to increases in intervention. At the same time, 
WKHUHZHUHDFWLYHLVVXDQFHVRIFHQWUDOEDQNVHFXULWLHVZKLFKPDGHWKHRIIVHWWLQJHOHPHQWVZLWKLQǻ1'$
particularly sizable. The net effect of these: base money expanded much less than foreign exchange reserves. 
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analysis. We have drawn attention to the relative effects of intervention on changes 
in currency and changes in required reserves/deposit accounts for a subset of 
countries. Even if the effects are higher for some countries than others, particularly if 
seen in terms of currency in circulation or the non-active use of required 
reserves/deposit accounts, these cannot be viewed in isolation from the money 
multiplier and importantly, broad money expansion.  
 
 For our subset of countries, we find that money multipliers are lower or on a 
downward trend in the 2000s for Argentina, Peru and Colombia, as well as for Japan. 
As expected there are volatile movements for Hong Kong, Israel and New Zealand, 
given similar volatile movements in base money due to the special factors that we 
highlighted earlier.  China, India and Russia exhibit slight upward trends, with minor 
troughs for China and India, and a visible increase for Russia, in the late 2000s 
owing to changes in reserve requirement ratios. Graphs of money multipliers for all 
countries in our sample are provided in Appendix 4: Broad Money Multipliers. The 
various average values, trends and degrees of volatility observed are indicative of 
disconnect between changes in base money and broad money developments.72 
 
 In the next section, we test for differences among the countries in our sample 
by categorising them into groups based on regions, income levels, balance of 
payments positions, intervention indicators, exchange rate flexibility, and monetary 
policy frameworks.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
72
  Disyatat (2011) argues that the money multiplier is not a meaningful concept in the context of an 
interest rate-targeting framework. This is because the target for the interest rate can be met without changes to 
bank reserves. As such there is no direct link between bank reserves with monetary policy and bank lending.  
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Table 5.4: Real Intervention Effects on Changes in Real Currency in 
&LUFXODWLRQǻ5HDO&,&DQG5HDO5HTXLUHG5HVHUYHV'HSRVLW$FFRXQWV 
ǻ5HDO55± Selected Country Results 
 
Country 
The effect of  ? ?       ?   ?    ǡ ?      ? ?      ǡ   ? ?   
on ? ?       ? ? ?   ?      ? ?      ǡ   ? ??  The effect of  ? ?       ?   ?    ǡ ?      ? ?      ǡ   ? ?   on ? ?      ? ?   ?      ? ?      ǡ   ? ?  
Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run 
Argentina 0.163*** 
{8.700} 
0.141*** 
{66.146} 
-0.017 
(-0.470) 
-0.018 
(0.224) 
1995q2-2010q2 1994q4-2010q2 
China -0.005 
(-0.157) 
-0.113*** 
(13.210) 
0.014 
(0.126) 
0.066 
(0.071) 
1991q2-2010q2 1991q2-2010q2 
Colombia -0.012 
[-0.430] 
0.100 
[0.846] 
0.008 
[0.129] 
0.096*** 
[15.277] 
1995q1-2010q2 1995q1-2010q2 
Hong Kong 0.039*** 
(2.818) 
0.012 
(0.045) 
0.285*** 
(5.577) 
0.395*** 
(23.545) 
1999q4-2010q2 1994q4-2010q2 
India -0.013 
(-0.570) 
-0.897 
(0.044) 
0.140** 
(2.346) 
0.209*** 
(17.469) 
1997q3-2010q2 1996q4-2010q2 
Israel 0.025* 
{1.842} 
0.025* 
{3.392} 
0.578*** 
{5.677} 
0.593*** 
{18.008} 
1990q3-2010q2 1990q4-2010q2 
Japan -0.027 
[-0.612] 
-0.067 
[0.389] 
0.237** 
[2.232] 
0.355** 
[5.193] 
1991q2-2010q2 1990q2-2010q2 
New Zealand 0.001 
(0.181) 
-0.006* 
(3.255) 
0.051 
[1.375] 
0.285** 
[4.349] 
1991q1-2010q2 1991q2-2010q2 
Peru  0.027*** 
(2.972) 
0.062*** 
(13.896) 
0.009 
[1.421] 
0.015*** 
[14.335] 
1996q3-2010q2 1996q3-2010q2 
Russia 0.178*** 
(8.252) 
0.074* 
(3.204) 
0.071 
[1.199] 
0.098 
[2.676] 
1996q3-2010q2 1996q3-2010q2 
 
x The respective specifications used follow equation 5.1 with  ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  and  ? ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  as the dependent variables.  
x For the short-run coefficients, t-statistics are reported in brackets. For the long-run coefficients F-statistics 
are reported in brackets. 
x For both the t-and F-statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%, using 
(Default), [Newey West], {White} standard errors.   
x The results are based on restricted regressions, which include only statistically significant variables at the 
minimum 10% significance level. Regressors are removed one at a time in a unidirectional backwards 
manner based on the lowest t-statistic each time. This applies to all regressors except the contemporaneous 
effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? which is not removed in the general to specific modelling process. 
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5.2.2 Tests for the Relevance of Differences in Country Characteristics  
 
 As presented in Chapter 4 and at the start of this chapter, our hypothesis is 
that there would only be significant differences in the coefficients for the effects of 
real intervention on changes in real base money if reserve requirements are an 
important policy tool used in response to intervention operations; or if the monetary 
policy framework in operation is that of a currency board or involves the deliberate 
and continuous expansion of the monetary base. The use of reserve requirements 
may be more apparent when countries experience sustained balance of payments 
inflows, that is the effects of surpluses and deficits may be distinct from the effects 
of trade and capital account openness.  
  
 While income levels are related to financial development and influence the 
demand for currency holdings, it may be incorrect to deduce that lower income 
countries would experience higher effects of intervention on currency especially 
once control factors have been taken into account. Higher income countries, with 
greater current account and capital account openness may in fact experience higher 
intervention effects on base money, since these could reflect the stronger influence of 
financial factors compared to real sector factors.  
 
 
5.2.2.1  Equality Tests for Differences in Coefficients on Real Intervention 
  Effects between Groups of Countries 
 
 
  In Table 5.5, we categorise the countries in our sample according to regions, 
current account and capital account balances (surpluses versus deficits), income 
levels (high income versus middle income) and monetary policy frameworks 
(inflation-targeting versus non-inflation-targeting) and present the results of mean 
and median equality tests for differences in the coefficients on real intervention 
effects73. We find that the only significant difference between groups arises when we 
compare inflation-targeting countries against non-inflation-targeting countries. The 
statistically significant difference applies to both the short-run and long-run 
coefficients, more so in the former case, with non-inflation-targeting countries 
                                                          
73
  In pre-testing for normality and homogenous variances across the subgroups, the respective 
distributions for the short-run and long-run coefficients were found to exhibit non-normality. As such while we 
report both, the ANOVA F-test statistic for mean equality and the Mann-Whitney/Kruskal-Wallis test statistic for 
median equality, more emphasis should be placed on the latter since these are robust to outliers.  
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displaying higher average and median coefficients. While we have not reported the 
results in Table 5.5, we find that once we exclude Hong Kong and Japan from the 
non-inflation-targeting group, the statistical significance of the difference between 
the two groups is reduced74. Thus, the difference between the inflation-targeting and 
non-inflation-targeting countries has to be assessed with recognition of the unique 
monetary policy frameworks in these two countries. Furthermore, as analysed earlier 
on, with regard to Argentina and India, exceptional factors may also be at play ± 
remonetisation in the former, and the use of required reserves in the latter.  IMF 
(2011), in their analysis of sterilisation in Asian countries, conclude based on panel 
data analysis that large and persistent capital inflows pose a challenge particularly for 
non-inflation-targeting countries, which exhibit lower sterilisation. However, in their 
group of five non-inflation-targeting countries, they do not make note of the 
uniqueness that pertains to Hong Kong, which by nature of its framework will indeed 
sterilise less.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
74
  The Mann-Whitney test statistics are 1.792 (significant at the 10% level) and 1.185 (not statistically 
significant) for the short-run and long-run coefficients respectively.  
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Table 5.5: Equality Tests for Real Intervention Effects  
on Real Base Money Change 
Groups 
The effect of  ? ?       ?   ?    ǡ ?      ? ?      ǡ   ? ?   
on  ? ?      ? ?     ǡ   ?      ? ?      ǡ   ? ? ?  
Short-run Coefficient Long-run Coefficient 
Group Mean 
[Median] 
Equality 
Test 
Statistic ± 
Mean 
[Median] 
Group Mean 
[Median] 
Equality 
Test 
Statistic ± 
Mean 
[Median] 
1. Region     
 Asia 0.045*   [0.030] 0.633 0.030*** [0.039] 1.001 
 Latin America 0.037*   [0.028] [1.493] 0.101*** [0.091] [3.063] 
 Other EMEs 0.138*   [0.057]  0.181*** [0.090]  
 Developed Economies 0.084     [0.031]  0.163**   [0.022]  
      
2. Current Account (CA) 
Balance 
    
 CA surplus 0.090*   [0.034] 0.242 0.095**  [0.039] 0.193 
 CA deficit 0.062*   [0.030] [0.484] 0.125***[0.084] [0.622] 
      
3. Capital Account (KA) 
Balance 
    
 KA surplus 0.059*   [0.030] 0.823 0.103***[0.062] 0.147 
 KA deficit 0.116     [0.040] [0.534] 0.132**  [0.051] [0.254] 
      
4. Income Level     
 High income 0.104     [0.034] 0.912 0.158**  [0.048] 1.392 
 Middle income 0.050*   [0.030] [0.369] 0.070***[0.054] [0.783] 
      
5. Monetary Policy 
Framework 
    
 Inflation-targeting 0.035     [0.027] 4.597** 0.081***[0.024] 1.522 
 Non-inflation-targeting 0.158** [0.157] [2.361]** 0.174***[0.152] [1.746]* 
      
 
     
The mean equality test is the single factor ANOVA F-test and the median equality test is either the Mann-Whitney 
test (two subgroups) or the Kruskal-Wallis test (more than two subgroups). 
 CA and KA surpluses are measured based on the number of surplus years as a proportion of the total number of 
years corresponding to the regression sample period for each country. A country is recorded as a surplus country if 
the proportion exceeds 0.5. 
 Income level is measured by the average of GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity over the regression 
sample period for each country. Countries are classified as either high or middle income based on the World Bank 
income classification scheme.  
 Inflation-targeting countries are countries that have adopted the inflation-targeting framework at some point during 
our sample period.  
All groups exclude Egypt and Taiwan. 
The statistical significances of the subgroup averages of short-run and long-UXQ FRHIILFLHQWV LQ WKH ³*URXS0HDQ
>0HGLDQ@´FROXPQVDUHEDVHGRQWKHFRUUHVSRQGLQJDYHUDJHVRILQGLYLGXDOFRXQWU\W-and F-statistics. These do not 
indicate statistically significant differences across the subgroups. 
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
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5.2.2.2  Equality Tests for Differences in Country Characteristics based on 
  Differences in Real Intervention Effects   
 
  
 In Tables 5.6(a) and 5.6(b), we carry out further analysis by way of mean and 
median75 equality tests across characteristics of countries grouped by the boxplot 
quartiles for the short-run and long-run real intervention effects on changes in real 
base money as seen in Graph 5.176. As in Table 5.5 in the previous subsection, the 
characteristics include the surplus years on current account and capital account 
balances, and income levels. We also include additional characteristics, namely 
current account and capital account openness; the balance positions for 
subcomponents of the capital account ± the sum of net direct investment and 
portfolio investment, and net other investment balances respectively; intervention 
indicators ± volatility, reserve accumulation, and the number of surplus periods77; 
and exchange rate flexibility. For the current account and capital account balances 
(including for the subcomponents), aside from the number of surplus years, we also 
consider the average balance over the regression sample period of each country, 
scaled by the average annual nominal GDP. We do this to provide an element of 
scale for the surpluses (or deficits) and in relation to economy size. The net other 
investment balances excludes official flows. We draw attention to this subcomponent 
of the capital account to assess if there is a link between flows related to bank loans 
and deposits, and the effects of real intervention on changes in real base money. 
Details of the measurement of each characteristic are provided in the notes to the 
tables.  
 Essentially, we focus on three elements not explored in Table 5.5: (i) the 
nature of intervention ± the amount of intervention as captured by its volatility, and 
the tendency for sustained one-way intervention as reflected by surplus quarters and 
reserve accumulation; (ii) the role of balance of payments surpluses and deficits 
reflected in net balances versus the size of gross external flows as captured by the 
                                                          
75
  The ANOVA F-test is used when the characteristic under investigation exhibits normality and 
homogenous variances, the Welch F-test if it exhibits normality but heterogeneous variances, and the Kruskal-
Wallis test for median equality if there is non-normality.  
76
  The number of countries in each quartile, beginning with the upper quartile is as follows: 7, 15, and 6 
respectively for the short-run coefficients; and 8, 13 and 7 respectively for the long-run coefficients. 
77
  Surplus periods refer to the number of quarters over the regression sample period, during which 
intervention was of a positive value, leading to reserves accumulation (exchange rate appreciation pressure) as 
opposed to reserves depletion (exchange rate depreciation pressure). 
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openness variables; and (iii) exchange rate flexibility which reflects the confluence 
of a country¶V H[FKDQJH UDWH IUDPHZRUN EDODQFH RI SD\PHQWV VKRFNV DQG
intervention activity.  
 
 For the different quartile groups of both, short-run and long-run coefficients, 
we observe statistically significant differences in capital account openness. It 
tentatively suggests that countries with higher capital account openness tend to have 
higher coefficients on real intervention effects. However, the median values are not 
monotonic in that it is the inter-quartile group rather than the upper quartile group 
that has the highest median value for capital account openness. A more thorough 
analysis indicates that the difference in medians is between the inter-quartile and 
lower quartile groups rather than between the upper quartile and lower quartile 
groups. The significance of capital account openness over net balances in the balance 
of payments subaccounts somewhat contradicts our initial hypothesis about the 
importance of the accumulation of flows but nevertheless points to the importance of 
the size and volatility in gross capital flows.  
  
 We also find some evidence of statistically significant differences in a few 
other characteristics ± surplus quarters of intervention in the case of the short-run 
coefficients; and surplus years of net direct investment and portfolio balance, 
intervention volatility and income levels in the case of the long-run coefficients. 
Only in the second case is there a monotonic ordering of the medians of the 
characteristic. We view these results with caution. One possible criticism of our 
approach in Tables 5.6(a) and 5.6(b) is the lack of clear delineation between the 
groups of coefficients, even though it is based on the sample dispersion, since the 
absolute values of the coefficients are quite small. As a test of the sensitivity of the 
results to changes in groupings, we also grouped the coefficients as follows: >0.100, 
>0 but <0.100, and <078, which shifts a few countries at the margins of the boxplot 
quartiles into different subgroups. The results of analysis with these groupings 
indicate that whilst the statistical significance of differences in capital account 
openness remains, the statistical significances of the other differences disappear (see 
Tables 5(c) and 5(d)). The differences in terms of current account openness also turn 
                                                          
78
  The number of countries in each subgroup is as follows: 8, 11 and 9 respectively for the short-run 
coefficients; and 10, 9 and 9 respectively for the long-run coefficients.  
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statistically significant when we utilise the groupings based on the size and sign of 
the coefficients. Mirroring capital account openness, the median values among the 
subgroups are not monotonically ordered. There is also a statistically significant 
difference in intervention volatility for the short-run coefficients, with the lowest 
median of volatility associated with the smallest coefficients.  
 
 While variations between groups may not be particularly apparent, our 
analysis here does not provide information on possible linear relationships. Next, in 
subsection 5.2.2.3 we discuss the results of simple bivariate regressions between the 
coefficients on real intervention effects on changes in real base money and specific 
country characteristics.  
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Table 5.6(a): Equality Tests of Country Characteristics Grouped by  
Boxplot Quartiles of Short-run Intervention Effects on Base Money Change 
Country Characteristic 
Subgroup Average/[Median]  
of Characteristic Equality  Test 
Statistic Upper quartile 
Inter-
quartile  
Lower 
quartile 
1. Openness 
 
Current account [0.586] [0.807] [0.718] 1.729 
 
Capital account [0.121] [0.168] [0.094] 4.912* 
2. Current Account Balance 
 Surplus years 0.675 0.367 0.542 1.930 
 Average balance [2.851] [-1.831] [0.657] 3.550 
3. Capital Account Balance 
 Surplus years 0.569 0.723 0.646 0.623 
 Average balance [1.388] [3.540] [1.371] 2.135 
4. Net Direct Investment and Portfolio Investment Balance 
 Surplus years 0.605 0.757 0.798 0.940 
 Average balance [0.183] [2.562] [1.841] 2.756 
5. Net Other Investment Balance 
 Surplus years 0.523 0.497 0.435 0.265 
 Average balance [-0.044] [0.353] [0.018] 0.486 
6. Intervention Indicators     
 Volatility 0.907 0.839 0.549 2.074 
 Reserve accumulation [0.444] [0.187] [0.245] 2.731 
 Surplus quarters 0.719 0.605 0.655 2.981* 
7. Income Level 14.986 17.153 11.967 0.480 
8. Exchange Rate Flexibility 8.030 9.965 9.413 0.307 
Note: 
Corresponding subgroup average of 
short-run real intervention effects 0.283*** 0.032 -0.062*  
 
For each subgroup of countries, either the average or median (in square brackets) of the characteristic is shown.  
The countries are divided into the subgroups based on the boxplot quartiles of real intervention effects in Graph 5.1. 
The mean equality test is either the single-factor ANOVA F-test or the Welch F-test for unequal variances.  
The median equality test is the Kruskal-Wallis test, which is used when non-normality is detected in the series. 
Differences in mean/median: ***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level.   
 
Explanatory notes on country characteristics (unless otherwise indicated, all variables are measured in US dollars): 
1. Openness is measured as the average of the sum of the absolute value of annual inflows and outflows for each  
        account respectively, taken as a ratio to average annual GDP. 
2. The total surplus years is measured by the number of years with net inflows into the account as a proportion of the  
        total number of years that corresponds to the regression sample period. The values are between 0 and 1. 
       The average balance is the average of the annual net position in the account scaled by the average annual nominal  
       GDP for the years that corresponds to the regression sample period, multiplied by 100. 
3. The capital account includes net errors and omissions. Surplus years and average balance are defined as in 2. 
4. Net direct investment and portfolio investment are subaccounts of the capital account. Surplus years and average 
balance are defined as in 2 and are for the sum of the two accounts. 
5. Net other investment is a subaccount of the capital account. It excludes official other investment which involves the 
government or monetary authorities. Surplus years and average balance are defined as in 2. 
6. Intervention volatility is measured by the standard deviation of the monthly changes in foreign exchange reserves 
scaled by the average annual nominal GDP. Reserve accumulation is the sum of change in foreign exchange reserves 
over the regression sample period, scaled by the average annual nominal GDP. The total surplus quarters refers to the 
number of quarters with a positive increase in reserves as a proportion of the total number of quarters that 
corresponds to the regression sample period. The values are between 0 and 1. 
7. GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (millions of current international dollar), taken as an annual 
average over the regression sample period. 
8. Exchange rate flexibility is identified based on the historical de facto fine classification provided by Ilzetzki et al. 
(2011) which updates the analysis by Reinhart and Rogoff (2002). Essentiall\HDFK\HDU¶VUHJLPHLVDVVLJQHGD
number between 1 and 14, with larger numbers reflecting increased flexibility. We use the average over the years 
FRUUHVSRQGLQJWRWKHUHJUHVVLRQVDPSOHSHULRGDVDQLQGLFDWRURIHDFKFRXQWU\¶VH[FKDQJHUDWHUHJLPHIOH[LEility. 
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Table 5.6(b): Equality Tests of Country Characteristics Grouped by  
Boxplot Quartiles of Long-run Intervention Effects on Base Money Change 
Country Characteristic 
Subgroup Average/[Median]  
of Characteristic Equality  Test 
Statistic Upper quartile 
Inter-
quartile  
Lower 
quartile 
1. Openness 
 
Current account [0.544] [0.828] [0.642] 3.366 
 
Capital account [0.142] [0.201] [0.094] 8.266** 
2. Current Account Balance 
 Surplus years 0.538 0.473 0.432 0.153 
 Average balance [-0.257] [-0.078] [0.116] 0.101 
3. Capital Account Balance 
 Surplus years 0.604 0.679 0.722 0.325 
 Average balance [0.764] [2.067] [2.496] 0.440 
4. Net Direct Investment and Portfolio Investment Balance 
 Surplus years# 0.616 0.712 0.883 3.629* 
 Average balance [1.018] [2.562] [2.421] 1.690 
5. Net Other Investment Balance 
 Surplus years 0.499 0.496 0.469 0.043 
 Average balance [0.133] [0.353] [-0.428] 0.701 
6. Intervention Indicators     
 Volatility# 0.834 0.911 0.532 2.806* 
 Reserve accumulation [0.270] [0.250] [0.192] 0.026 
 Surplus quarters 0.646 0.625 0.677 0.496 
7. Income Level# 16.600 18.670 8.357 4.226** 
8. Exchange Rate Flexibility 8.513 9.381 10.302 1.108 
Note: 
Corresponding subgroup average of 
long-run real intervention effects 0.343*** 0.057*** -0.053*  
 
For each subgroup of countries, either the average or median (in square brackets) of the characteristic is shown.  
The countries are divided into the subgroups based on the boxplot quartiles of real intervention effects in Graph 5.1. 
The mean equality test is either the single-factor ANOVA F-test or the Welch F-test for unequal variances.  
(#The mean equality test statistic is from the Welch F-test. The ANOVA F-test statistic is not statistically significant.)  
The median equality test is the Kruskal-Wallis test, which is used when non-normality is detected in the series. 
Differences in mean/median: ***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level.   
 
Explanatory notes on country characteristics (unless otherwise indicated, all variables are measured in US dollars): 
1. Openness is measured as the average of the sum of the absolute value of annual inflows and outflows for each  
        account respectively, taken as a ratio to average annual GDP. 
2. The total surplus years is measured by the number of years with net inflows into the account as a proportion of the  
        total number of years that corresponds to the regression sample period. The values are between 0 and 1. 
       The average balance is the average of the annual net position in the account scaled by the average annual nominal  
       GDP for the years that corresponds to the regression sample period, multiplied by 100. 
3. The capital account includes net errors and omissions. Surplus years and average balance are defined as in 2. 
4. Net direct investment and portfolio investment are subaccounts of the capital account. Surplus years and average 
balance are defined as in 2 and are for the sum of the two accounts. 
5. Net other investment is a subaccount of the capital account. It excludes official other investment which involves the 
government or monetary authorities. Surplus years and average balance are defined as in 2. 
6. Intervention volatility is measured by the standard deviation of the monthly changes in foreign exchange reserves 
scaled by the average annual nominal GDP. Reserve accumulation is the sum of change in foreign exchange reserves 
over the regression sample period, scaled by the average annual nominal GDP. The total surplus quarters refers to the 
number of quarters with a positive increase in reserves as a proportion of the total number of quarters that 
corresponds to the regression sample period. The values are between 0 and 1. 
7. GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (millions of current international dollar), taken as an annual 
average over the regression sample period. 
8. Exchange rate flexibility is identified based on the historical de facto fine classification provided by Ilzetzki et al. 
(2011) ZKLFKXSGDWHVWKHDQDO\VLVE\5HLQKDUWDQG5RJRII(VVHQWLDOO\HDFK\HDU¶VUHJLPHLVDVVLJQHGD
number between 1 and 14, with larger numbers reflecting increased flexibility. We use the average over the years 
corresponding to the regression sample SHULRGDVDQLQGLFDWRURIHDFKFRXQWU\¶VH[FKDQJHUDWHUHJLPHIOH[LELOLW\ 
 
                  
158 
 
Table 5.6(c): Equality Tests of Country Characteristics Grouped by  
Coefficient Sizes of Short-run Intervention Effects on Base Money Change 
Country Characteristic 
Subgroup Average/[Median]  
of Characteristic Equality  
Test 
Statistic For Intervention Effects: 
>0.100 <0.100, >0  <0 
1. Openness 
 
Current account [0.518] [0.885] [0.642] 5.751* 
 
Capital account [0.117] [0.169] [0.113] 5.368* 
2. Current Account Balance 
 Surplus years 0.657 0.441 0.375 1.419 
 Average balance [1.400] [-0.078] [-1.294] 2.094 
3. Capital Account Balance 
 Surplus years 0.579 0.666 0.750 0.670 
 Average balance [0.764] [2.496] [2.640] 1.773 
4. Net Direct Investment and Portfolio Investment Balance 
 Surplus years 0.623 0.715 0.837 1.281 
 Average balance [1.018] [2.562] [2.421] 2.299 
5. Net Other Investment Balance 
 Surplus years 0.473 0.474 0.526 0.171 
 Average balance [-0.081] [0.353] [0.464] 0.375 
6. Intervention Indicators     
 Volatility# 0.861 0.953 0.540 3.038* 
 Reserve accumulation [0.386] [0.250] [0.187] [1.847 
 Surplus quarters 0.648 0.656 0.625 0.188 
7. Income Level 14.425 17.773 13.678 0.388 
8. Exchange Rate Flexibility 7.769 9.707 10.360 0.124 
Note: 
Corresponding subgroup average of 
short-run real intervention effects 0.262*** 0.037 -0.045  
 
For each subgroup of countries, either the average or median (in square brackets) of the characteristic is shown.  
The countries are divided into the subgroups based on the relative sizes of real intervention effects on real base money 
change (>0.100, <0.100 but >0, and <0). 
The mean equality test is either the single-factor ANOVA F-test or the Welch F-test for unequal variances.  
(#The mean equality test statistic is from the Welch F-test. The ANOVA F-test statistic is not statistically significant.) 
The median equality test is the Kruskal-Wallis test, which is used when non-normality is detected in the series. 
Differences in mean/median: ***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level.   
 
Explanatory notes on country characteristics (unless otherwise indicated, all variables are measured in US dollars): 
1. Openness is measured as the average of the sum of the absolute value of annual inflows and outflows for each  
        account respectively, taken as a ratio to average annual GDP. 
2. The total surplus years is measured by the number of years with net inflows into the account as a proportion of the  
        total number of years that corresponds to the regression sample period. The values are between 0 and 1. 
       The average balance is the average of the annual net position in the account scaled by the average annual nominal  
       GDP for the years that corresponds to the regression sample period, multiplied by 100. 
3. The capital account includes net errors and omissions. Surplus years and average balance are defined as in 2. 
4. Net direct investment and portfolio investment are subaccounts of the capital account. Surplus years and average 
balance are defined as in 2 and are for the sum of the two accounts. 
5. Net other investment is a subaccount of the capital account. It excludes official other investment which involves the 
government or monetary authorities. Surplus years and average balance are defined as in 2. 
6. Intervention volatility is measured by the standard deviation of the monthly changes in foreign exchange reserves 
scaled by the average annual nominal GDP. Reserve accumulation is the sum of change in foreign exchange reserves 
over the regression sample period, scaled by the average annual nominal GDP. The total surplus quarters refers to the 
number of quarters with a positive increase in reserves as a proportion of the total number of quarters that 
corresponds to the regression sample period. The values are between 0 and 1. 
7. GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (millions of current international dollar), taken as an annual 
average over the regression sample period. 
8. Exchange rate flexibility is identified based on the historical de facto fine classification provided by Ilzetzki et al. 
(2011) which updates the analysis by Reinhart and Rogoff (2002). EssentialO\HDFK\HDU¶VUHJLPHLVDVVLJQHGD
number between 1 and 14, with larger numbers reflecting increased flexibility. We use the average over the years 
FRUUHVSRQGLQJWRWKHUHJUHVVLRQVDPSOHSHULRGDVDQLQGLFDWRURIHDFKFRXQWU\¶VH[FKDQJHUDWHUHJLPHIOH[Lbility. 
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Table 5.6(d): Equality Tests of Country Characteristics Grouped by  
Coefficient Sizes of Long-run Intervention Effects on Base Money Change 
Country Characteristic 
Subgroup Average/[Median]  
of Characteristic Equality  
Test 
Statistic For Intervention Effects: 
>0.100 <0.100, >0 <0 
1. Openness 
 
Current account [0.570] [0.885] [0.642] 4.838* 
 
Capital account [0.127] [0.201] [0.113] 5.318* 
2. Current Account Balance 
 Surplus years 0.462 0.544 0.442 0.188 
 Average balance [-0.681] [-0.064] [0.116] 0.592 
3. Capital Account Balance 
 Surplus years 0.683 0.602 0.717 0.329 
 Average balance [2.345] [1.315] [2.496] 0.517 
4. Net Direct Investment and Portfolio Investment Balance 
 Surplus years# 0.686 0.663 0.839 1.493 
 Average balance [2.108] [0.656] [2.421] 0.530 
5. Net Other Investment Balance 
 Surplus years 0.531 0.442 0.493 0.384 
 Average balance [0.557] [-0.031] [0.158] 0.833 
6. Intervention Indicators     
 Volatility# 0.818 0.995 0.567 2.254 
 Reserve accumulation [0.268] [0.250] [0.192] 0.664 
 Surplus quarters 0.646 0.652 0.634 0.058 
7. Income Level 15.240 18.456 12.833 0.589 
8. Exchange Rate Flexibility 8.761 9.360 10.034 0.503 
Note: 
Corresponding subgroup average of 
long-run real intervention effects 0.297*** 0.058** -0.043  
 
For each subgroup of countries, either the average or median (in square brackets) of the characteristic is shown.  
The countries are divided into the subgroups based on the relative sizes of real intervention effects on real base money 
change (>0.100, <0.100 but >0, and <0). 
The mean equality test is either the single-factor ANOVA F-test or the Welch F-test for unequal variances.  
(#The mean equality test statistic is from the Welch F-test. The ANOVA F-test statistic is not statistically significant.) 
The median equality test is the Kruskal-Wallis test, which is used when non-normality is detected in the series. 
Differences in mean/median: ***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level.   
 
Explanatory notes on country characteristics (unless otherwise indicated, all variables are measured in US dollars): 
1. Openness is measured as the average of the sum of the absolute value of annual inflows and outflows for each  
        account respectively, taken as a ratio to average annual GDP. 
2. The total surplus years is measured by the number of years with net inflows into the account as a proportion of the  
        total number of years that corresponds to the regression sample period. The values are between 0 and 1. 
       The average balance is the average of the annual net position in the account scaled by the average annual nominal  
       GDP for the years that corresponds to the regression sample period, multiplied by 100. 
3. The capital account includes net errors and omissions. Surplus years and average balance are defined as in 2. 
4. Net direct investment and portfolio investment are subaccounts of the capital account. Surplus years and average 
balance are defined as in 2 and are for the sum of the two accounts. 
5. Net other investment is a subaccount of the capital account. It excludes official other investment which involves the 
government or monetary authorities. Surplus years and average balance are defined as in 2. 
6. Intervention volatility is measured by the standard deviation of the monthly changes in foreign exchange reserves 
scaled by the average annual nominal GDP. Reserve accumulation is the sum of change in foreign exchange reserves 
over the regression sample period, scaled by the average annual nominal GDP. The total surplus quarters refers to the 
number of quarters with a positive increase in reserves as a proportion of the total number of quarters that 
corresponds to the regression sample period. The values are between 0 and 1. 
7. GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (millions of current international dollar), taken as an annual 
average over the regression sample period. 
8. Exchange rate flexibility is identified based on the historical de facto fine classification provided by Ilzetzki et al. 
ZKLFKXSGDWHVWKHDQDO\VLVE\5HLQKDUWDQG5RJRII(VVHQWLDOO\HDFK\HDU¶VUHJLPHLVDVVLJQHGD
number between 1 and 14, with larger numbers reflecting increased flexibility. We use the average over the years 
FRUUHVSRQGLQJWRWKHUHJUHVVLRQVDPSOHSHULRGDVDQLQGLFDWRURIHDFKFRXQWU\¶VH[FKDQJHUDWHUHJLPHIOH[LELOLW\ 
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5.2.2.3  Regression Analysis between Coefficients on Real Intervention Effects 
  and Country Characteristics   
 
  
 In this subsection, we assess if there exist linear relationships between real 
intervention effects on changes in real base money and country characteristics. We 
treat the estimated coefficients for real intervention effects in the real base money 
equation for each country as the dependent variable and investigate if these 
coefficients vary systematically with income levels; the nature of intervention 
(volatility, the number of surplus periods, and reserve accumulation); exchange rate 
flexibility; and the nature of the current and capital accounts in terms of openness 
and net balances. The bivariate regression specification is as follows: 
 
     ? ? Į  ?ȕ ?                    
                   (5.3) 
 where  
i =country 
y= short-run/long- run coefficient on real intervention effect 
x= country characteristic 
  
 The characteristics are the same as those that were used in the equality tests 
in subsection 5.2.2.2. The choice of characteristics reflects our interest in 
investigating if the coefficients on real intervention effects are positively related to 
the amount of intervention and size of gross external flows; and whether there is a 
distinction between prolonged surpluses and deficits. Large and volatile capital 
inflows and persistent one-way intervention may induce higher coefficients by way 
of the increased use of reserve requirements. Meanwhile, we expect that there might 
be a negative relationship between the coefficients with exchange rate flexibility to 
the extent that it is closely tied with intervention and captures the operating 
procedure of non-sterilisation that may be associated with hard peg regimes.   
  
 Before we discuss the results of the regression analysis, in Table 5.7, we 
present unconditional correlation coefficients between the coefficients on real 
intervention effects and the majority of the country characteristics, as well as 
between the characteristics themselves. The description of the measurement of each 
characteristic is provided in the notes to the table.  
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 Among the characteristics of the countries in our sample, current account and 
capital account openness are strongly positively correlated with one another and with 
intervention volatility and reserve accumulation (but not with intervention surplus 
periods, which does not capture scale effects, neither of intervention nor of the 
economy). However, it is the current account balance, rather than the capital account 
balance, that is positively correlated with openness, intervention volatility, surplus 
periods and reserve accumulation. The current account balance is also marginally 
positively correlated with per capita income.  Exchange rate flexibility meanwhile, is 
to some extent, negatively correlated with intervention volatility and reserve 
accumulation.  
 
 Turning to the correlations between the coefficients on real intervention 
effects and the various characteristics as listed in Table 5.7, we find no statistically 
significant relationships.79 The highest correlations and associated t-statistics, 
relatively, are the positive correlation between the short-run coefficient and surplus 
periods, and the negative correlation between the short-run coefficient and exchange 
rate flexibility.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
79
  Upon consideration of the surplus years for the current account, capital account, net direct and portfolio 
investment balances and other investment balances; as well as the average balances for the latter two variables, 
we find statistically significant negative correlations between the number of surplus years in the net direct and 
portfolio investment balances with the coefficients on real intervention effects (-0.457 and -0.331 for the short-
run and long-run coefficients respectively). 
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Table 5.7: Correlation Coefficients (with t-statistics) for Real Intervention Effects  
on Real Base Money Change and Selected Country Characteristics 
 
 
Short-run 
coefficient 
(SR) LR Y/c FXIV 
 
 
FXIS RA ERF CAO KAO CAB 
Long-run coefficient (LR) 0.904***          
 (10.788)          
GDP per capita (Y/c)  0.189 0.148         
 (0.984) (0.765)         
Intervention volatility (FXIV)  0.128 -0.030 0.294        
 (0.659) (-0.155) (1.569)        
Proportion of time with positive 0.207 0.093 -0.128 0.229       
Intervention (FXIS) (1.079) (0.477) (-0.657) (1.200)       
Reserve accumulation (RA)  0.160 -0.043 0.073 0.702*** 0.706***      
 (0.828) (-0.218) (0.374) (5.019) (5.086)      
Exchange rate flexibility (ERF)  -0.224 0.004 0.013 -0.445** -0.084 -0.396**     
 (-1.169) (0.018) (0.068) (-2.535) (-0.432) (-2.199)     
Current account openness (CAO) 0.048 -0.100 0.476*** 0.742*** 0.252 0.680*** -0.418**    
 (0.247) (-0.514) (2.758) (5.637) (1.330) (4.729) (-2.348)    
Capital account openness (KAO) 0.163 -0.012 0.617*** 0.680*** 0.077 0.462*** -0.421** 0.874***   
 (0.843) (-0.060) (3.997) (4.730) (0.394) (2.656) (-2.370) (9.153)   
Current account balance (CAB) 0.152 -0.039 0.402** 0.685*** 0.436** 0.704*** -0.253 0.619*** 0.512***  
 (0.783) (-0.201) (2.239) (4.795) (2.473) (5.055) (-1.336) (4.016) (3.038)  
Capital account balance (KAB) -0.169 -0.022 -0.442** -0.445** -0.119 -0.256 0.138 -0.264 -0.287 -0.838*** 
 (-0.877) (-0.114) (-2.514) (-2.531) (-0.612) (-1.348) (0.712) (-1.394) (-1.529) (-7.833) 
  
 x Y/c is the measure of the annual average of GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (millions of current international dollar) over the regression sample period. 
x FXIV is measured by the standard deviation of the monthly changes in foreign exchange reserves (in US dollar), scaled by the average annual nominal GDP (in US dollar). 
 x FXIS is measured by the number of quarters with a positive increase in reserves as a proportion of the total number of quarters in the regression sample period. The values are between 0 and 1. 
 x RA is the sum of change in foreign exchange reserves (in US dollar) scaled by the average annual nominal GDP (in US dollar). 
 x ERF is identified based on the historical de facto fine classification provided by Ilzetzki et alZKLFKXSGDWHVWKHDQDO\VLVE\5HLQKDUWDQG5RJRII(VVHQWLDOO\HDFK\HDU¶VUHJLPHLV
assigned a number between 1 and 14, with larger numbers reflecting increased flexibility. We use the average over the years corresponding to the regression sample period as an indicator of each 
FRXQWU\¶VH[FKDQJHUDWHUHJLPHIOH[LELOLW\ 
 x CAO and KAO are measured as the average of the sum of the absolute value of annual inflows and outflows for each account respectively, taken as a ratio to average annual GDP. CA, KA and GDP are 
in nominal US dollars. The KA also includes net errors and omissions. 
 x CAB and KAB are measured as the average of the annual net position in each account scaled by the average annual GDP for the years that correspond to the regression sample period. 
 x ***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
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 In Tables 5.8 and 5.9, we present the results of bivariate regressions between 
the short-run and long-run coefficients on real intervention effects and country 
characteristics. Plots of the coefficients against these characteristics are presented in 
Graphs 5.3 and 5.4.  
 We find that both, the short-run and long-run real intervention effects only 
have statistically significant relationships with the number of surplus years recorded 
for net direct and portfolio investment balances (DIPIS). The negative relationship 
is surprising, but on closer inspection of the plot of the two variables in question, 
we note that Israel and Japan, whose respective unique developments we have 
explored, have likely influenced the result. On the basis of the values of the t-
statistics among other characteristics, we note that the short-run coefficient has 
relatively stronger links to the net direct and investment portfolio balance (DIPIB), 
current account surplus, exchange rate flexibility and surplus periods of 
intervention ± negative relationships in the first and third instances, and positive 
relationship in the second and fourth cases. The t-statistics for links between the 
long-run coefficient and other characteristics are much weaker.  
 The analysis in this subsection highlights that while we see relationships 
between balance of payments flows with intervention volatility and reserve 
accumulation, the translation of these characteristics into particular effects of real 
intervention on changes in real base money is not so straight forward. Overall, we 
hardly see any connection between the characteristics and the coefficients for 
intervention effects. This is not unexpected given our discussion in earlier sections.  
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Table 5.8: Bivariate Regressions between Short-run Real Intervention Effects 
on Real Base Money Change and Country Characteristics  
Country Characteristic 
(Regressor in bivariate 
regression) 
Dependent Variable:  
Short-run Effect of  ? ?       ?   ?    ǡ ?      ? ?      ǡ   ? ?   
on  ? ?      ? ?     ǡ   ?      ? ?      ǡ   ? ? ?  
Coefficient t-statistic Adjusted 
R2 
Diagnostics 
1. GDP per capita (Y/c) 2.628 0.984 -0.00 Non-normality*** 
2. Intervention volatility 
(FXIV) 
0.037 0.659 -0.02 Non-normality*** 
3. Surplus periods (FXIS) 0.282 1.079 0.01 Non-normality*** 
4. Reserve accumulation (RA) 0.062 0.828 -0.01 Non-normality*** 
5. Exchange rate flexibility 
(ERF) 
-0.012 -1.169 0.01 Non-normality*** 
6. Current account openness 
(CAO) 
0.007 0.247 -0.04 Non-normality*** 
7. Capital account openness 
(KAO) 
0.091 0.843 -0.01 Non-normality*** 
8. Current account balance 
(CAB) 
0.411 0.783 -0.01 Non-normality*** 
9. Current account surplus 
years (CAS) 
0.108 1.385 0.03 Non-normality*** 
10. Capital account balance 
(KAB) 
-0.665 -0.877 -0.01 Non-normality*** 
11. Capital account surplus 
years (KAS) 
-0.123 -1.290 0.02 Non-normality*** 
12. Net direct and portfolio 
investment balance (DIPIB) 
-1.046 -1.429 0.04 Non-normality*** 
13. Net direct and portfolio 
investment balance surplus 
years (DIPIS) 
-0.246 -2.623** 0.18 Non-normality** 
14. Net other investment 
balance (OIB) 
0.338 0.476 -0.03 Non-normality*** 
15. Net other investment 
balance surplus years (OIS) 
0.036 0.266 -0.04 Non-normality*** 
 
All regressions include a constant which is not shown for brevity.  
For the t-statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%. 
See the notes to Tables 5.6(a)-(b) and Table 5.7 for descriptions of the respective regressors.  
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Table 5.9: Bivariate Regressions between Long-run Real Intervention Effects 
on Real Base Money Change and Country Characteristics  
Country Characteristic 
(Regressor in bivariate 
regression) 
Dependent Variable:  
Long-run Effect of  ? ?       ?   ?    ǡ ?      ? ?      ǡ   ? ?   
on  ? ?      ? ?     ǡ   ?      ? ?      ǡ   ? ? ?  
Coefficient t-statistic Adjusted 
R2 
Diagnostics 
1. GDP per capita (Y/c) 2.620 0.765 -0.02 Non-normality*** 
2. Intervention volatility 
(FXIV) 
-0.011 -0.155 -0.04 Non-normality*** 
3. Surplus periods (FXIS) 0.149 0.440 -0.03 Non-normality*** 
4. Reserve accumulation (RA) -0.021 -0.218 -0.04 Non-normality*** 
5. Exchange rate flexibility 
(ERF) 
0.000 0.018 -0.04 Non-normality*** 
6. Current account openness 
(CAO) 
-0.019 -0.514 -0.03 Non-normality*** 
7. Capital account openness 
(KAO) 
-0.008 -0.060 -0.04 Non-normality*** 
8. Current account balance 
(CAB) 
-0.136 -0.201 -0.04 Non-normality*** 
9. Current account surplus 
years (CAS) 
0.024 0.236 -0.04 Non-normality*** 
10. Capital account balance 
(KAB) 
-0.112 -0.114 -0.04 Non-normality*** 
11. Capital account surplus 
years (KAS) 
-0.053 -0.427 -0.03 Non-normality*** 
12. Net direct and portfolio 
investment balance (DIPIB) 
-0.464 -0.481 -0.03 Non-normality*** 
13. Net direct and portfolio 
investment balance surplus 
years (DIPIS) 
-0.226 -1.787* 0.08 Non-normality** 
14. Net other investment 
balance (OIB) 
0.397 0.439 -0.03 Non-normality*** 
15. Net other investment 
balance surplus years (OIS) 
0.091 0.523 -0.03 Non-normality*** 
 
All regressions include a constant which is not shown for brevity.  
For the t-statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%. 
See the notes to Tables 5.6(a)-(b) and Table 5.7 for descriptions of the respective regressors.  
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Graph 5.3: Short-run Real Intervention Effects on Real Base Money Change
 
and Country Characteristics 
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Graph 5.3: Continued 
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Graph 5.3: Continued 
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Graph 5.4: Long-run Real Intervention Effects on Real Base Money Change
 
and Country Characteristics 
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Graph 5.4: Continued 
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Graph 5.4: Continued 
 
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
-0.12 -0.08 -0.04 0.00 0.04 0.08
Net direct and portfolio investment balance
Lo
n
g-
ru
n
 
co
ef
fic
ien
t
IL
JP
HK
NO
RU
SG
DK
KR
ID
P H
MX
BRTR
CL
CA
MY
TH
ZA
P E
HU
NZ
CZ
P L
AU
AR
IN
CN
CO
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Net direct and portfolio investment balance, proportion of surplus years
IL
JP
HK
RU
NO
CASG
DK
AR
CZ
MY
ID
CO
CN
IN
ZA
HU
NZ
TH
P E
CL
AU
P L
TR BR
MX
P H
KR
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
-0.25 -0.20 -0.15 -0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.05
Net other investment balance
Lo
n
g-
ru
n
 
co
ef
fic
ien
t
SG
IL
JP
RU
HK
IN
CN
CO
AR
MY CZ
ZA
TH
CA
P E
CL
NO
NZ
HU
BR
MX
ID
AU
DK
TR
P L
P H
KR
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Net other investment balance, proportion of surplus years
IL
JP
RU
HKAR
CN
CO
SG
MY
BR
ID
ZA
MX
CA
TH
CL
AU
NZ
P H
KR
P E
HU
NO
DK
P L
CZ
IN
TR
                  
172 
 
5.2.3  Regression Diagnostics 
In this section, we provide a summary assessment of individual country 
baseline regressions drawing on the results of diagnostic tests. The diagnostic tests 
mainly consist of those for serial correlation, heteroskedasticity and normality in the 
UHJUHVVLRQUHVLGXDOVDQGUHJUHVVLRQPLVVSHFLILFDWLRQ5DPVH\¶V5(6(77KHLVVXH 
of parameter stability is tackled in section 5.2.4. 
 
The presence of lagged dependent variables as regressors in most of the 
parsimonious regressions means that the coefficients are biased but consistent if we 
appeal to large sample theory and if there is no serial correlation. To correct for the 
effects of serial correlation on the standard errors of coefficient estimates and allow 
for better statistical inferences, we have used Newey-West HAC standard errors for 
regressions where serial correlation has been detected in the unrestricted regression 
and/or in the final parsimonious regression based on both the Breusch-Godfrey LM 
statistic and the F-statistic for joint significance of lagged residuals. Where there are 
lagged dependent variables as regressors and serial correlation is still present in the 
final parsimonious regression, then it could be the case that our coefficient estimates 
are both biased and inconsistent.  
 
In Table 5.10, we indicate with a tick if the final parsimonious change in real 
base money regression for each country has lagged dependent variables as 
regressors. We also indicate in the corresponding diagnostic tests columns if there 
was a rejection of the null hypothesis for specific tests and the associated level of 
statistical significance. If serial correlation, heteroskedasticity or non-normality was 
only detected in the unrestricted regression but not in the final parsimonious 
regression, we indicate as such.  
 
 There are seven countries that have lagged dependent variables as regressors 
in the presence of serial correlation in the final parsimonious specification ± China, 
Colombia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Australia and Japan. In most of 
these instances, statistical significance tests point to relatively weak serial 
correlation. In the case of Australia and New Zealand, strong non-normality remains 
despite the used of impulse dummy variables for several outliers. In the latter case, it 
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is partly because of the introduction of the new liquidity framework, discussed earlier 
on, the effects of which we have chosen to keep intact.  Meanwhile, the RESET 
suggests the omission of non-linear terms for Brazil, India and Malaysia. It is not 
clear what correction should be made to the functional form but we can deduce that 
the non-linearity is likely related to large changes in the required reserves component 
of base money for all three countries.  
  
 Overall, we are comfortable enough with the diagnostics of our individual 
country baseline regressions to use the results as we have done to draw conclusions 
for the group as a whole.  
 
Table 5.10: Summary of Results for Diagnostic Tests  
 of Individual Country Real Base Money Growth Baseline Regressions  
 
Country AR 
variables 
Diagnostic Tests Country AR 
variables 
Diagnostic Tests 
China 9 Serial 
correlation*^ 
Peru 9 Serial correlation#^ 
Hong Kong   Serial correlation#^ Czech 
Republic 
9 Non-normality* 
Serial correlation*^ 
India 9 Serial correlation#^ 
RESET failure** 
Egypt 9  
Indonesia 9  Hungary 9 Serial correlation*^ 
Korea 9 Serial correlation#^ Israel 9 Heteroskedasticity* 
Malaysia 9 RESET failure*** Poland 9 Serial correlation** 
Philippines  Serial 
correlation** 
Russia  Serial correlation** 
Singapore 9 Serial correlation#^ South Africa 9  
Taiwan 9 Serial correlation#^ Turkey 9  
Thailand 9 Serial correlation*# Australia 9 Non normality*** 
Serial correlation* 
Argentina 9 Serial correlation#^ Canada 9  
Brazil 9 Serial correlation#^ 
RESET failure** 
Denmark 9  
Chile 9  Japan 9 Serial correlation** 
Colombia 9 Serial correlation* New Zealand  Non normality*** 
Serial correlation#^ 
Mexico 9 Non-normality*; 
Serial correlation 
**
#
 
 
Norway 9  
 
9 Indicates presence of lagged values of the dependent variable as regressors.  
***significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.  
# Serial correlation or heteroscedasticity detected in the unrestricted regression only. No evidence of serial correlation  
   or heteroscedasticity in the final parsimonious regression. 
^ Of the serial correlation tests, the Breusch-Godfrey LM statistic (NR2) is significant but not the F-statistic for the  
   joint significance of all lagged residuals. 
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5.2.4 Robustness Analysis 
 In order to assess the robustness of the baseline coefficients we presented in 
Table 5.1, we undertake three tasks in this section. First we assess if using robust 
standard errors for those countries that displayed mixed results in the tests for serial 
correlation would substantially change the outcomes on the intervention effects. 
Next, we compare the results from the baseline regressions against the results from 
unrestricted regressions. Thirdly, we also consider the stability of the coefficients 
from the baseline regressions over time.   
5.2.4.1  Robust Standard Errors for Selected Individual Country Regressions 
 For some of our individual country baseline regressions, we used robust 
standard errors, in particular, based on the Newey-West HAC covariance matrix 
method since serial correlation appeared to be more prevalent than 
heteroscedasticity. We used these only when there was consistency in the results of 
the F-test and LM test for serial correlation as we wanted to balance the need for 
more accurate statistical inference against the possible adverse effects of small 
sample sizes on the performance of the LM test and the robust standard errors.  
 In this subsection, we apply robust standard errors to the baseline regressions 
that display serial correlation, either in the unrestricted form or in the final 
parsimonious specification, as indicated by the LM test, even if the F-test does not 
provide similar evidence. The robust standard errors are used from the beginning of 
the estimation in our general to specific modelling approach. Consequently, since the 
standard errors are now different, the remaining variables in the final parsimonious 
specifications and the coefficients for real intervention effects may differ from the 
baseline versions. The results for the coefficients on real intervention effects for the 
countries in question are reported in Table 5.11. The results differ noticeably from 
the baseline coefficients for Argentina, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Australia.  
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Table 5.11: Robustness Analysis of Real Intervention Effects 
 on Real Base Money Change ±  
Use of Robust Standard Errors for Selected Countries 
 
Country 
The effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   
on  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  
 (i)  (ii) 
Contemporaneous Ⱦ ? ? Long-run multiplier Ⱦ ?ǡ ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
Hong Kong  0.272*** 
[3.963] 
0.130 
[1.701] 
 
1999q4-2010q2 
India 0.157*** 
[2.870] 
0.225*** 
[26.891] 
1997q1-2010q2 
Korea -0.102*** 
[-3.012] 
-0.042 
[1.376] 
1991q1-2010q2 
Singapore 0.010 
[0.816] 
0.035*** 
[22.274] 
1990q3-2010q2 
Argentina 0.079 
[1.476] 
0.089 
[1.256] 
 
1994q4-2010q2 
Brazil -0.100 
[-0.798] 
-0.086 
[0.086] 
 
1997q2-2010q2 
 
x Column (i) reports the contemporaneous effect and the corresponding t-statistic. 
x Column (ii) reports the long-run multiplier and the corresponding F-statistic. 
The F-statistic is for the test,  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? = 0. x For both the t- and F-statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;  
     *: significant at 10%, using (Default), [Newey West], {White} standard errors.   
x The results are based on restricted regressions, which include only statistically significant 
variables at the minimum 10% significance level. Regressors are removed one at a time in 
a unidirectional backwards manner based on the lowest t-statistic each time. This applies to 
all regressors except the contemporaneous effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? which is 
not removed in the general to specific modelling process. 
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Table 5.11: Continued 
 
Country 
The effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   
on  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  
 (i)  (ii) 
Contemporaneous Ⱦ ? ? Long-run multiplier Ⱦ ?ǡ ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ?Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
Peru  0.021** 
[2.079] 
0.112*** 
[233.39] 
 
1995q2-2010q2 
Czech Republic 0.097*** 
[3.906] 
0.180*** 
[10.517] 
1997q2-2010q2 
Hungary 0.072*** 
[4.422] 
0.145*** 
[67.918] 
1995q4-2010q2 
Australia 0.054 
[0.357] 
-0.122 
[1.273] 
1991q2-2010q2 
Denmark -0.016 
[-0.761] 
0.016 
[0.388] 
 
1991q1-2010q2 
 
x Column (i) reports the contemporaneous effect and the corresponding t-statistic. 
x Column (ii) reports the long-run multiplier and the corresponding F-statistic. 
The F-statistic is for the test,  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? = 0. x For both the t- and F-statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;  
     *: significant at 10%, using (Default), [Newey West], {White} standard errors.   
x The results are based on restricted regressions, which include only statistically significant 
variables at the minimum 10% significance level. Regressors are removed one at a time in 
a unidirectional backwards manner based on the lowest t-statistic each time. This applies to 
all regressors except the contemporaneous effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? which is 
not removed in the general to specific modelling process. 
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 The effects of the changes to the selected coefficients based on the use of the 
robust standard errors are assessed by re-evaluating the equality tests and bivariate 
regressions that were carried out in subsection 5.2.2. The statistical significances 
(and signs on coefficients) of the regressors in the bivariate regressions appear not to 
be affected by the revised intervention coefficients. In Table 5.12 we highlight the 
results for equality tests of intervention coefficients based on the country groups 
from Table 5.5, and equality tests of characteristics based on the new boxplot 
quartiles80 (baseline scenario: Tables 5(a) and 5(b)) and the subgroups of coefficient 
sizes (baseline scenario: Tables 5(c) and 5(d)), for which there are changes to 
statistical significance. With regard to the first and second sets of tests, there are only 
two instances of changes to statistical significance (Table 5.12, sections (a) and (b)).  
 For the third set, we only report the results relating to long-run intervention 
effects81 (Table 5.12, section (c)), since with regard to the short-run coefficients, the 
subgroups are the same as the new boxplot quartiles. Here, we find relatively more 
changes to statistical significance, indicating, in particular, differences in capital 
account characteristics. We, nevertheless, observe that the capital account average 
balance (KAB) and surplus years (KAS), and the net direct investment and portfolio 
balance (DIPIB) do not follow a clear monotonic pattern in line with the averages of 
the subgroups of intervention coefficients. For these characteristics, there are no 
differences between the >0.100 and <0 subgroups of intervention coefficients. 
Generally, it is the middle group of coefficients (<0.100, >0) that registers the lowest 
average/median value among the characteristics. However, we observe that the 
lowest average intervention volatility (FXIV) is associated with the <0 subgroup of 
intervention coefficients and registers a statistically significant difference against the 
other two subgroups. The highest average other investment balance surplus years 
(OIS) is associated with the >0.100 subgroup of intervention coefficients and 
registers a statistically significant difference against the other two subgroups. In 
contrast, the highest average net direct investment and portfolio balance surplus 
years (DIPIS) is associated with the <0 subgroup of intervention coefficients and 
registers a statistically significant difference against the other two subgroups. 
                                                          
80
  The number of countries in each quartile is 7, 13, and 8 respectively for the short-run coefficients and 6, 
16, and 6 respectively for the long-run coefficients. 
81
  The number of countries in each of the subgroups of long-run coefficients is 11, 9, and 8 respectively.
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Table 5.12: Sensitivity Analysis of Equality Tests  
with the use of Robust Standard Errors for Selected Countries  
(a) Differences in Long-run Intervention Effects between Groups of Countries 
 Monetary Policy Framework Group Median of Intervention Effect 
Equality 
Test 
Statistic 
 
Inflation-targeting 0.035 
1.427 
 
Non-inflation-targeting 0.089 
Baseline scenario reference: Tables 5.5 
(b) Differences in Country Characteristics Grouped by Boxplot Quartiles of 
Long-run Intervention Effects 
Country Characteristic 
Subgroup Average  
of Characteristic  Equality  Test 
Statistic Upper quartile 
Inter-
quartile  
Lower 
quartile 
 Income level 15.229 18.500 10.863 1.330 
Baseline scenario reference: Tables 5.6(b) 
(c) Differences in Country Characteristics Grouped by Coefficient Sizes of 
Long-run Intervention Effects 
Country Characteristic 
Subgroup Average/[Median]  
of Characteristic for  
Intervention Effects: 
Equality  
Test 
Statistic 
>0.100 <0.100, >0 <0 
1. Current account openness  [0.711] [0.807] [0.614] 1.292 
2. Capital account average balance  [3.562] [0.140] [2.568] 6.260** 
3. Capital account surplus years 0.744 0.496 0.756 3.216* 
4. Net direct and portfolio 
investment average balance 
[2.680] [0.430] [2.727] 5.119* 
5. Net direct and portfolio 
investment balance surplus years  0.702 0.614 0.891 4.513** 
6. Net other investment balance 
surplus years  
0.602 0.372 0.470 3.397** 
7. Intervention volatility  0.874 0.941 0.519 3.332* 
Baseline scenario reference: Tables 5.6(d) 
 
The results presented are only those for which there have been changes to the statistical significance of the 
equality test statistics in comparison to the baseline scenario. 
Differences in mean/median: ***significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at 
the 10% level.  
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5.2.4.2  Real Intervention Effects from Unrestricted Regressions 
 Next, in Tables 5.13 and 5.14 we present the results for the short-run and 
long-run coefficients that are derived from unrestricted regressions. By unrestricted, 
we mean that all the lags of all the explanatory variables as per equation (5.1) have 
been kept intact, regardless of statistical significance. We still include the impulse 
dummy variables that also appear in the restricted regressions for some of the 
countries. While statistical significance declines across the board, which is not 
unexpected given the increase in the number of explanatory variables, the variation 
in terms of economic significance is minimal as observed from the group averages. 
Furthermore, the sample correlations between the unrestricted regression results and 
the baseline restricted regression results are quite high at 0.97 and 0.89 for the short-
run and long-run coefficients respectively (0.94 and 0.83 respectively if Israel and 
Japan are excluded).  
 We re-evaluate the equality tests and bivariate regressions using the 
coefficients from the unrestricted regressions. In Table 5.15, we highlight the results 
for equality tests of intervention coefficients based on the country groups from Table 
5.5, and equality tests of characteristics based on the new boxplot quartiles82 
(baseline scenario: Tables 5(a) and 5(b)) and the subgroups of coefficient sizes83 
(baseline scenario: Tables 5(c) and 5(d)), for which there are changes to statistical 
significance. For the first set of tests, the only variation against the baseline scenario 
is that the difference in long-run intervention coefficients between inflation-targeting 
and non-inflation-targeting countries is no longer statistically significant (Table 5.15, 
section (a)). For the second set of tests, we observe that with regard to the short-run 
real intervention effects, the changes are mostly to statistical significance in 
differences of country characteristics, but for the long-run real intervention effects, 
the changes are to statistical insignificance. Crucially, however, we find that the 
relative sizes or ordering (monotonic or otherwise) of the characteristics in question 
are generally unchanged when compared against the baseline scenario (Table 5.15, 
sections (b) and (c)). With regard to the third set of tests, we note that changes occur 
particularly in relation to the characteristics corresponding to the subgroups for long-
                                                          
82
  The number of countries in each quartile is 7, 14, and 7 respectively, for both the short-run and long-
run coefficients. 
83
  The number of countries in each subgroup is as follows: 6, 13 and 9 respectively for the short-run 
coefficients, and 12, 9 and 7 respectively for the long-run coefficients.  
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run real intervention effects. In contrast to the baseline scenario, differences in 
current account and capital account openness are no longer statistically significant. 
On the other hand, differences in current account and capital account balances are 
now statistically significant. However, similar to the baseline scenario and our first 
section on robustness analysis, the differences in characteristics do not follow a 
monotonic ordering in line with the averages of the subgroups of coefficients.  
 In Table 5.16, we highlight the results from bivariate regressions which have 
been carried out using the revised intervention coefficients. Only two changes to 
statistical significance are noted, and even so, the coefficients on the regressors do 
not vary much from the baseline scenario.   
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Table 5.13: Robustness Analysis of Real Intervention Effects  
on Real Base Money Change -  
Individual Country Results from Unrestricted Regressions 
 
Country 
The effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   
on  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  
 (i)  (ii) 
Contemporaneous Ⱦ ? ? Long-run multiplier Ⱦ ?ǡ ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
Asia  
China 0.045 
[0.780] 
0.014 
[0.012] 
 
1991q2-2010q2 
Hong Kong  0.319* 
(2.149) 
0.138 
(0.170) 
 
1999q1-2010q2 
India 0.185* 
(1.914) 
0.190** 
(5.514) 
1997q3-2010q2 
Indonesia -0.049 
(-0.414) 
0.020 
(0.009) 
1995q2-2010q2 
Korea -0.083 
(-1.645) 
-0.056 
(0.984) 
1991q2-2010q2 
Malaysia 0.035 
(1.353) 
0.022 
(0.165) 
1990q2-2010q2 
Philippines -0.035 
(-0.451) 
-0.066 
(0.139) 
1990q2-2010q2 
Singapore 0.008 
(0.604) 
0.040*** 
(8.261) 
1991q2-2010q2 
Thailand 0.029 
[0.683] 
-0.017 
[0.097] 
 
1991q2-2010q2 
 
x Column (i) reports the contemporaneous effect and the corresponding t-statistic. 
x Column (ii) reports the long-run multiplier and the corresponding F-statistic. 
The F-statistic is for the test,  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? = 0. x For both the t-and F-statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;  
     *: significant at 10%, using (Default), [Newey West], {White} standard errors.   
x The results are based on unrestricted regressions, which include all regressors regardless 
of statistical significance. 
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Table 5.13: Continued 
 
Country 
The effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   
on ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  
 (i)  (ii) 
Contemporaneous Ⱦ ? ? Long-run multiplier Ⱦ ?ǡ ? ? ?  ?Ⱦ  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
Latin America  
Argentina 0.092 
(1.266) 
0.091 
(0.287) 
 
1995q2-2010q2 
Brazil -0.061 
(-0.330) 
0.012 
(0.001) 
 
1997q4-2010q2 
Chile 0.041 
(1.032) 
0.048 
(0.659) 
1991q2-2010q2 
Colombia 0.165 
[1.267] 
0.504*** 
[14.618] 
1995q2-2010q2 
Mexico -0.057** 
[-2.397] 
-0.030 
[0.391] 
1991q2-2010q2 
Peru 0.022* 
(1.773) 
0.117*** 
(16.025) 
1995q2-2010q2 
 
x Column (i) reports the contemporaneous effect and the corresponding t-statistic. 
x Column (ii) reports the long-run multiplier and the corresponding F-statistic. 
The F-statistic is for the test,  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? = 0. x For both the t-and F-statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;  
     *: significant at 10%, using (Default), [Newey West], {White} standard errors.   
x The results are based on unrestricted regressions, which include all regressors regardless 
of statistical significance. 
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Table 5.13: Continued 
 
Country 
The effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   
on  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  
 (i)  (ii) 
Contemporaneous Ⱦ ? ? Long-run multiplier Ⱦ ?ǡ ? ? ?  ? Ⱦ  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
Other Emerging Market Economies(EMEs)-Europe, Middle East and 
Africa 
Czech Republic 0.075 
(1.494) 
0.165** 
(4.762) 
 
1997q2-2010q2 
Hungary 0.064 
(1.090) 
0.107 
(1.646) 
1996q2-2010q2 
Israel 0.554*** 
{4.788} 
0.546** 
{5.533} 
1991q2-2010q2 
Poland -0.010 
[-0.422] 
0.147 
[0.363] 
1998q1-2010q2 
Russia 0.231** 
[2.490] 
0.162 
[1.081] 
1996q3-2010q2 
South Africa 0.074 
(1.102) 
0.118* 
(3.482) 
1991q2-2010q2 
Turkey -0.014 
(-0.235) 
-0.250 
(1.416) 
1995q2-2010q2 
 
x Column (i) reports the contemporaneous effect and the corresponding t-statistic. 
x Column (ii) reports the long-run multiplier and the corresponding F-statistic. 
The F-statistic is for the test,  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? = 0. x For both the t-and F-statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;  
     *: significant at 10%, using (Default), [Newey West], {White} standard errors.   
x The results are based on unrestricted regressions, which include all regressors regardless 
of statistical significance. 
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Table 5.13: Continued 
 
Country 
The effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   
on  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  
 (i)  (ii) 
Contemporaneous Ⱦ ? ? Long-run multiplier Ⱦ ?ǡ ? ? ?  ?Ⱦ  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ?Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
Developed Economies 
Australia -0.005 
(-0.242) 
-0.215 
(0.629) 
 
1991q2-2010q2 
Canada 0.033 
{0.886} 
0.019 
{0.174} 
 
1991q2-2010q2 
Denmark -0.008 
(-0.287) 
-0.043 
(0.979) 
1991q1-2010q2 
Japan 0.301 
[1.014] 
0.501 
[0.699] 
1991q2-2010q2 
New Zealand 0.043 
[1.198] 
0.368** 
[6.165] 
1991q2-2010q2 
Norway 0.061 
(1.029) 
0.058 
(0.193) 
1991q2-2010q2 
 
x Column (i) reports the contemporaneous effect and the corresponding t-statistic. 
x Column (ii) reports the long-run multiplier and the corresponding F-statistic. 
The F-statistic is for the test,  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? = 0. x For both the t-and F-statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;  
     *: significant at 10%, using (Default), [Newey West], {White} standard errors.   
x The results are based on unrestricted regressions, which include all regressors 
regardless of statistical significance. 
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Table 5.14: Robustness Analysis of Real Intervention Effects 
on Real Base Money Change -  
Group Averages based on Unrestricted Regressions 
 
Group  
The group average effect of   ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  on  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  
 (i)  (ii) 
Contemporaneous Ⱦ ? ? Long-run multiplier Ⱦ ?ǡ ? ? ?  ?Ⱦ  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
Asia 
 
 
0.050 
(1.110) 
 
0.032 
(1.706) 
Latin America 
 
0.034 
(1.344) 
0.124** 
(5.330) 
 
Other EMEs 
 
 
0.139* 
(1.660) 
 
0.142 
(2.612) 
 
Developed Economies 0.071 
(0.775) 
0.115 
(1.473) 
 
TOTAL 
 
 
0.073 
(1.226) 
 
0.097 
(2.659) 
 
Sample standard deviation 
 
0.138 0.191 
Correlation with restricted 
regression results: Correlation (t-statistic) 
Full sample 0.97*** 
(19.382) 
0.89*** 
(9.798) 
Excluding Israel and Japan 0.94*** 
(13.835) 
0.83*** 
(7.202) 
 
x Column (i) reports the simple average of the contemporaneous effect and the corresponding 
average t statistic. 
x Column (ii) reports the simple average of the long-run multiplier and the corresponding 
average F-statistic. 
The F-statistic is for the test,  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? = 0. x For both the t and F statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;  
     *: significant at 10%. 
x The results are based on unrestricted regressions, which include all regressors regardless of 
statistical significance. 
x Data excludes Egypt and Taiwan. 
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Table 5.15: Sensitivity Analysis of Equality Tests  
with the use of Results from Unrestricted Regressions 
(a) Differences in Long-run Intervention Effects between Groups of Countries 
 Monetary Policy Framework Group Mean of Intervention Effect 
Equality 
Test 
Statistic 
 
Inflation-targeting 0.084 0.261 
 
Non-inflation-targeting 0.124 
Baseline scenario reference: Tables 5.5 
(b) Differences in Country Characteristics Grouped by Boxplot Quartiles of 
Short-run Intervention Effects 
Country Characteristic 
Subgroup Average/[Median] 
of Characteristic  Equality  Test 
Statistic Upper quartile 
Inter-
quartile  
Lower 
quartile 
1. Net direct and portfolio 
investment balance surplus years 0.577 0.723 0.881 3.742* 
2. Intervention volatility 0.843 0.918 0.497 4.429** 
3. Surplus quarters 0.655 0.627 0.666 0.319 
4. Income level 16.029 18.264 9.443 2.923* 
Baseline scenario reference: Tables 5.6(a) 
(c) Differences in Country Characteristics Grouped by Boxplot Quartiles of 
Long-run Intervention Effects 
1. Capital account openness [0.163] [0.150] [0.119] 0.762 
2. Net direct and portfolio 
investment balance surplus years 0.678 0.701 0.831 0.632 
3. Net other investment balance 
surplus years 0.589 0.400 0.573 2.821* 
4. Intervention volatility 0.702 0.938 0.598 1.538 
5. Income level 15.229 15.957 14.857 0.023 
Baseline scenario reference: Tables 5.6(b) 
 
The results presented are only those for which there have been changes to the statistical significance of the 
equality test statistics in comparison to the baseline scenario. 
Differences in mean/median: ***significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at 
the 10% level.  
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Table 5.15: Continued 
(d) Differences in Country Characteristics Grouped by Coefficient Sizes of 
Short-run Intervention Effects 
Country Characteristic 
Subgroup Average/[Median]  
of Characteristic for  
Intervention Effects: 
Equality  
Test 
Statistic 
>0.100 <0.100, >0 <0 
 Current account openness  [0.544] [0.807] [0.642] 2.278 
Baseline scenario reference: Tables 5.6(c) 
(e) Differences in Country Characteristics Grouped by Coefficient Sizes of 
Long-run Intervention Effects 
1. Current account openness [0.675] [0.798] [0.794] 0.046 
2. Capital account openness [0.148] [0.166] [0.119] 0.271 
3. Current account average balance [-2.025] [3.436] [0.116] 5.674* 
4. Capital account average balance [3.551] [0.140] [2.496] 6.826** 
5. Net other investment balance 
surplus years 
0.583 0.303 0.573 7.412*** 
6. Net other investment average 
balance 
[0.579] [-0.660] [0.464] 6.390** 
Baseline scenario reference: Tables 5.6(d) 
 
The results presented are only those for which there have been changes to the statistical significance of the 
equality test statistics in comparison to the baseline scenario. 
Differences in mean/median: ***significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at 
the 10% level.  
 
 
 
Table 5.16: Sensitivity Analysis of Bivariate Regressions  
with the use of Results from Unrestricted Regressions 
Country Characteristic 
(Regressor in bivariate regression) 
Dependent Variable:  
Short-run Real Intervention Effect 
Coefficient t-statistic 
 Net direct and portfolio investment 
balance (DIPIB) -1.194 -1.815* 
Baseline scenario reference: Table 5.8 
  Dependent Variable:  
Long-run Real Intervention Effect 
 Net direct and portfolio investment 
balance surplus years (DIPIS) -0.172 -1.332 
Baseline scenario reference: Table 5.9 
 
The results presented are only those for which there have been changes to the statistical 
significance of the regressors in comparison to the baseline scenario. 
***significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.  
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5.2.4.3  Stability Analysis of Baseline Real Intervention Effects 
 We now turn to analysing the stability of the baseline coefficients over time. 
8VLQJHDFKFRXQWU\¶VILQDOSDUVLPRQLRXVVSHFLILFDWLRQZHUXQUHJUHVVLRQVIURPWKH
beginning of the sample period specific to each country, up to 2000q4 and 2005q4 
respectively. In Table 5.17, we compare the coefficients on real intervention effects 
on changes in real base money from these regressions against the coefficients from 
the baseline regressions. Some instability is not unexpected particularly given 
changes in monetary policy frameworks, and the use of reserve requirements and 
monetary deposit auctions which can be volatile over time.  
 The averages for the coefficients across the full set of countries appear to be 
fairly stable over time. To be able to make inferences about the statistical 
significance of the variations in coefficients that we observe in Table 5.17, we 
formally test for breakpoints. We test for changes in the constant and seasonal 
factors, the contemporaneous and lagged coefficients on real intervention, and the 
lagged coefficients on the change in real base money. The latter are included in the 
group of parameters to be tested for stability since they matter for the long-run 
effects of intervention. On the basis of a single unknown breakpoint, in Table 5.18, 
we report the Quandt-Andrews supremum or maximum Wald statistic (sup-W), 
which is the maximum of a sequence of Chow type test statistics calculated for 
different potential breakpoints and thus allows for the identification of the most 
likely location for a breakpoint. We also report the Andrews-Ploberger average of 
exponential Wald statistics (exp-W), which is the average of the exponential of the 
same sequence of test statistics. The asymptotic distributions for these statistics are 
non-standard84. Conducting the traditional Chow test by drawing on features of the 
data to ascertain a breakpoint would too often lead to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of no structural change based on the limiting chi-square distribution 
                                                          
84
 For the identification of the most likely breakpoint date, Andrews (1993) considers the maximum Wald, 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) and Likelihood Ratio (LR) test statistics and determines the associated non-standard 
asymptotic null distributions and critical values. E-Views reports the maximum Wald statistic and the Quandt 
Likelihood Ratio (QLR) test statistic, derived in Quandt (1960). The QLR is the maximum of the sequence of F-
statistics based on the comparison of restricted and unrestricted sums of squared residuals. There is no difference 
in the reported p-values of these two statistics which are based on Hansen (1997). Andrews and Ploberger (1994) 
derive Wald, LM and LR average statistics, computed by taking the simple average of the sequence of test 
statistics and the average of the exponential of the sequence of test statistics respectively. Andrews and Ploberger 
show that the exponential form of the test statistic may have higher power, and that the LR versions of both, the 
simple average and average of the exponential values, are less than optimal. As such, we report the average of the 
exponential Wald statistics (exp-W). We note that the p-value differs from that for the average of the exponential 
F-statistics used to calculate the QLR, and is more likely to reject the null hypothesis.  
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(Hansen, 2001). We, nevertheless, also present results of the traditional Chow F-test 
for known breakpoint, using the mid-point of the regression sample period for each 
country as the breakpoint to be tested. We note that such an approach may limit the 
power of the Chow test in establishing a true breakpoint (see, for instance, Hansen 
(2001) and Greene (2003)). 
 The results indicate that the coefficients on the real intervention effects have 
been relatively stable over time for most countries. The countries exhibiting evidence 
of instability based on the statistical significance of the Quandt-Andrews/Andrews-
Ploberger and Chow test statistics are Mexico, Peru, and Japan. For Colombia, the 
Czech Republic and to a lesser extent, South Africa, there are indications of 
instability based on the Quandt-Andrews/Andrews-Ploberger set of test statistics but 
not the Chow test.  
 The statistically significant breakpoints for Mexico, Peru and Colombia 
roughly coincide with changes in the monetary policy frameworks in these countries 
and the gradual move to inflation-targeting. For the Czech Republic and South 
Africa, the breakpoints do not coincide with the move to inflation targeting but may 
be connected to particular changes that occurred in the respective countries. In the 
Czech Republic, a gradual reduction in the reserve requirement ratio took place in 
the late 1990s and a special account with the Czech National Bank for the 
government¶VIRUHLJQH[FKDQJHUHYHQXHVIURPSULYDWLVDWLRQZDVHVWDEOLVKHGLQHDUO\
2000. For South Africa, the dual exchange rate system was abolished in March 1995. 
In the case of Japan, the breakpoint appears to coincide with the interim lifting of the 
zero interest rate policy in August 2000 before the subsequent implementation of 
EDQNV¶FXUUHQWDFFRXQWEDODQFHVDVWKHRSHUDWLRQDOWDUJHW 
 In Appendix 5, we present the results of Chow tests for selected countries, 
carried out for the specific dates where known changes to monetary policy 
frameworks have taken place. These changes encompass shifts to inflation-targeting, 
changes to the monetary policy instrument and for a few countries, significant 
changes in reserve requirement ratios. We recognise that the Quandt-Andrews test 
may exhibit low power in the presence of multiple breaks and that the Chow test can 
be used to test for the significance of more than one known breakpoint.  Some of the 
dates for the changes to monetary policy frameworks coincide with or are close to 
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the most likely break date identified through the Quandt-Andrews test and which 
were reported in Table 5.18.  
 The Chow test results indicate that, for some countries, the dates 
corresponding to changes to monetary policy frameworks appear to entail 
statistically significant changes to real intervention effects. There is consistency with 
the Quandt-Andrews test in the case of Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Japan. The 
Chow test suggests strong statistical significance of a break for New Zealand, where 
none was picked up by the Quandt-Andrews test because of large trimmings that 
excluded the break date from analysis. The Chow test results also indicate weak 
statistical significance of breaks for Malaysia, Brazil, Israel and Turkey. Comparing 
and contrasting the results across countries does not yield a clear pattern on the 
implications of changes to monetary policy frameworks for real intervention effects. 
In particular, the move to inflation-targeting is associated with statistically significant 
breaks for some countries but not for others, even if changes to the monetary policy 
instrument (namely from base money to interest rates) occur for both groups at the 
time of the shift. On the other hand, a clear cut and rather extreme case of the 
relevance of the monetary policy instrument for breaks is Japan which exhibits 
multiple breaks associated with changes in the role of its base money.  
 As an indication of the overall stability of the regression specifications we 
have used in our baseline analysis, we present the results of tests for stability across 
all parameters, in Appendix 6. The results do not indicate a noticeably greater amount 
of instability compared to the tests that focus on the subset of real intervention 
effects85. Compared to the results in Table 5.18, there are additionally, indications of 
instability for India, Malaysia, Argentina, New Zealand, and to a lesser extent, 
Korea. It is likely that the break for the Czech Republic is not picked up despite 
consideration of the full set of parameters because of large trimmings.  
 
                                                          
85
  We also carried out the Bai-Perron test for (see Bai and Perron (1998)) multiple breaks across the full 
set of parameters. There are some differences when compared against the results of the Quandt-Andrews test as 
follows: (i) the Bai-Perron test identifies one break for Hong Kong, two breaks for  the Philippines, one for 
Canada, and three for Norway in contrast to none being statistically significant under the Quandt-Andrews test; 
(ii) three breaks are identified for Mexico, and two breaks are identified for Japan and New Zealand respectively; 
and (iii) for Argentina, Colombia, Malaysia and South Africa, the Bai-Perron test does not identify any breaks, in 
contrast to indications of some statistically significant instability based on the Quandt-Andrews test. The Bai-
Perron test is subject to distortions in power and size (see Antoshin et al. (2008)), but nevertheless provides a 
check for the robustness of our stability analysis.  
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Table 5.17:  Results from Recursive Regressions for  
Real Intervention Effects on Real Base Money Change  
Country 
The effect of  ? ?       ?   ?    ǡ ?      ? ?      ǡ   ? ?   
on  ? ?      ? ?     ǡ   ?      ? ?      ǡ   ? ? ?  
Short-run Coefficient 
(for sample ending) 
Long-run Coefficient 
(for sample ending) 
2000q4 2005q4 2010q2 2000q4 2005q4 2010q2 
Asia 
China 0.275** 0.192** 0.158** 0.125 -0.056 0.043 
Hong Kong n.a. 0.225** 0.270** n.a. 0.114 0.155** 
India n.a. 0.047 0.157** n.a. 0.210*** 0.216*** 
Indonesia -0.157 -0.107 -0.100 -0.161 -0.140 -0.124 
Korea 0.001 -0.080* -0.086* 0.001 -0.056* -0.051** 
Malaysia 0.057 0.033 0.041** 0.205** 0.090** 0.084*** 
Philippines -0.115*** -0.075* -0.076* -0.115*** -0.075* -0.076* 
Singapore 0.017 0.009 0.008 0.033* 0.034*** 0.039*** 
Thailand -0.020 0.008 0.030 -0.050 -0.026 -0.017 
Latin America 
Argentina 0.108 0.150** 0.116** 0.086 0.329 0.152 
Brazil n.a. 0.004 -0.030 n.a. 0.006 -0.043 
Chile 0.013 0.009 0.026 0.032 0.025 0.054* 
Colombia 0.012 0.078 0.144* 0.354* 0.401*** 0.362*** 
Mexico -0.074*** -0.071*** -0.062*** -0.052*** -0.054*** -0.046*** 
Peru n.a. 0.046*** 0.030*** n.a. 0.112*** 0.128*** 
 
Regressions are estimated recursively using HDFKFRXQWU\¶V full sample baseline estimating equation. 
Coefficient estimates are reported based on the regressions run from the beginning of the sample to 2000q4, 
2005q4 and 2010q2 respectively, depending on the available sample size. The 2010q2 results correspond to 
those in Table 5.1 and are reported here for comparison purposes. 
***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.  
n.a. Not available or not reported, on account of short sample period.  
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Table 5.17:  Continued 
Country 
The effect of  ? ?       ?   ?    ǡ ?      ? ?      ǡ   ? ?   
on  ? ?      ? ?     ǡ   ?      ? ?      ǡ   ? ? ?  
Short-run Coefficient  
(for sample ending) 
Long-run Coefficient  
(for sample ending) 
2000q4 2005q4 2010q2 2000q4 2005q4 2010q2 
Other Emerging Market Economies 
Czech 
Republic 
n.a. 0.062 0.069* n.a. 0.040 0.048* 
Hungary 0.109 0.010 0.035 0.082 0.057 0.090*** 
Israel 0.554*** 0.556*** 0.563*** 0.765*** 0.778*** 0.688*** 
Poland n.a. -0.035 -0.011 n.a. 0.082 0.113 
Russia 0.238** 0.447*** 0.264*** 0.240 0.453*** 0.253*** 
South Africa 0.052 0.033 0.057 0.064 0.071* 0.084** 
Turkey 0.081 0.035 -0.012 0.067 0.047 -0.012 
Developed Economies 
Australia -0.156 -0.160 -0.011 -0.120 -0.117 -0.007 
Canada 0.058 0.020 0.027 0.080** 0.058** 0.055** 
Denmark -0.028 -0.018 -0.015 -0.014 -0.010 -0.008 
Japan 0.561*** 0.443*** 0.425** 0.609** 0.576*** 0.636** 
New 
Zealand 
0.005 0.017 0.046 0.048 0.064** 0.278*** 
Norway 0.018 0.049 0.034 0.012 0.035 0.024 
Average 
 for all 
countries  ^
0.073 0.069 0.075 0.104 0.109 0.111 
 
Regressions are estimated recursively using HDFKFRXQWU\¶V full sample baseline estimating equation. 
Coefficient estimates are reported based on the regressions run from the beginning of the sample to 2000q4, 
2005q4 and 2010q2 respectively, depending on the available sample size. The 2010q2 results correspond to 
those in Table 5.1 and are reported here for comparison purposes. 
***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.  
n.a. Not available or not reported, on account of short sample period.  
^Average excludes Hong Kong, India, Brazil, Peru, the Czech Republic and Poland for the sample period 
ending 2000. 
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Table 5.18:  Structural Break Tests for  
Real Intervention Effects on Real Base Money Change  
Country 
Quandt-Andrews/ 
Andrews-Ploberger Tests# Chow Test
#
 
Unknown 
Breakpoint 
[Trimming] 
Sup-W  
Statistic 
(p-value) 
Exp-W  
Statistic 
(p-value) 
Regression 
Sample 
Midpoint 
F-statistic 
(p-value) 
Asia 
China 2007q2 
[15%] 
8.354 
(0.941) 
1.822 
(0.991) 
2001q1 0.209 
(0.982) 
Hong Kong 2008q2 
[15%] 
11.993 
(0.339) 
3.724 
(0.304) 
2005q1 1.006 
(0.436) 
India 2006q1 
[15%] 
13.170 
(0.378) 
4.208 
(0.349) 
2004q1 0.821 
(0.561) 
Indonesia 2007q4 
[15%] 
11.342 
(0.707) 
3.890 
(0.577) 
2003q1 0.842 
(0.559) 
Korea 2004q2 
[15%] 
11.208 
(0.574) 
3.844 
(0.833) 
2001q1 0.957 
(0.462) 
Malaysia 1997q4 
[15%] 
13.326 
(0.364) 
4.257 
(0.339) 
2000q3 1.391 
(0.233) 
Philippines 2000q3 
[49%] 
2.670 
(0.352) 
1.290 
(0.278) 
2000q3 1.335 
(0.270) 
Singapore 2000q3 
[49%] 
7.468 
(0.692) 
3.733 
(0.603) 
2000q4 1.410 
(0.207) 
Thailand 1997q3 
[15%] 
8.015 
(0.957) 
2.645 
(0.886) 
2001q1 0.628 
(0.730) 
Latin America 
Argentina 2000q4 
[15%] 
14.225 
(0.557) 
5.689 
(0.325) 
2002q4 1.755 
(0.118) 
Brazil 1999q2 
[15%] 
8.558 
(0.338) 
2.438 
(0.264) 
2004q1 0.535 
(0.661) 
Chile 1993q4 
[15%] 
4.877 
(0.940) 
1.285 
(0.879) 
2000q4 0.401 
(0.807) 
Colombia 1999q1 
[15%] 
24.583** 
(0.036) 
9.745** 
(0.021) 
2003q1 1.562 
(0.167) 
Mexico 2000q4 
[49%] 
33.867*** 
(0.000) 
16.416*** 
(0.000) 
2001q1 4.367*** 
(0.000) 
Peru 2002q2 
[20%] 
24.922** 
(0.048) 
9.781** 
(0.035) 
2003q1 2.272** 
(0.048) 
 
#
 The coefficients that are allowed to vary under the alternative hypothesis are the constant term 
and seasonal factors, the contemporaneous and lagged coefficients on real intervention, and the 
lagged coefficients on the change in real base money. 
Sup-W: Maximum of Wald statistics; Exp-W: average of exponential Wald statistics. 
The Quandt-Andrews Sup-W test statistic corresponds to the maximum of the sequence of Wald 
test statistics for different potential breakpoints. The unknown breakpoint is the date where the 
maximum statistic is recorded and therefore, the most likely breakpoint location. The Andrews-
Ploberger Exp-W test statistic corresponds to the average of the exponential of the same sequence 
of Wald test statistics.  
The distribution of these test statistics is non-standard and the p-values follow Hansen (1997). A 
portion of the sample is excluded from the test. This trimming percentage, equally split between 
the beginning and the end of the sample for each country, is the lowest percentage that allows for 
enough observations to identify subsample parameters. The standard 15% is used as minimum 
trimming where possible.   
***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.  
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Table 5.18:  Continued 
Country 
Quandt-Andrews/ 
Andrews-Ploberger Tests# Chow Test
#
 
Unknown 
Breakpoint 
[Trimming] 
Sup-W  
Statistic 
(p-value) 
Exp-W  
Statistic 
(p-value) 
Regression 
Sample 
Midpoint 
F-statistic 
(p-value) 
Other Emerging Market Economies 
Czech 
Republic 
2000q2 
[15%] 
17.825** 
(0.027) 
5.646** 
(0.032) 
2004q1 0.547 
(0.702) 
Hungary 1999q4 
[15%] 
13.416 
(0.499) 
4.390 
(0.453) 
2003q3 0.657 
(0.706) 
Israel 1995q4 
[15%] 
15.905 
(0.403) 
5.415 
(0.376) 
2000q4 0.433 
(0.896) 
Poland 2008q3 
[15%] 
9.702 
(0.576) 
1.965 
(0.814) 
2004q2 0.467 
(0.798) 
Russia 2007q3 
[15%] 
12.509 
(0.439) 
4.376 
(0.315) 
2003q4 1.337 
(0.267) 
South Africa 1995q3 
[15%] 
18.447* 
(0.084) 
6.422* 
(0.075) 
2001q1 0.692 
(0.657) 
Turkey 1998q1 
[15%] 
10.278 
(0.350) 
4.018 
(0.135) 
2003q1 1.521 
(0.212) 
Developed Economies 
Australia 1997q3 
[20%] 
14.966 
(0.312) 
5.620 
(0.209) 
2001q1 1.813 
(0.105) 
Canada  2000q3 
[40%] 
16.062 
(0.230) 
6.794 
(0.178) 
2000q4 1.438 
(0.194) 
Denmark 2004q1 
[15%] 
10.218 
(0.518) 
2.560 
(0.620) 
2001q1 0.395 
(0.850) 
Japan 2000q2 
[49%] 
17.385** 
(0.026) 
8.692** 
(0.015) 
2000q3 2.484** 
(0.026) 
New 
Zealand 
2000q4 
[49%] 
6.598 
(0.581) 
3.191 
(0.507) 
2001q1 0.877 
(0.531) 
Norway 2000q1 
[45%] 
4.319 
(0.765) 
1.623 
(0.710) 
2001q1 0.374 
(0.864) 
 
#
 The coefficients that are allowed to vary under the alternative hypothesis are the constant term 
and seasonal factors, the contemporaneous and lagged coefficients on real intervention, and the 
lagged coefficients on the change in real base money. 
Sup-W: Maximum of Wald statistics; Exp-W: average of exponential Wald statistics. 
The Quandt-Andrews Sup-W test statistic corresponds to the maximum of the sequence of Wald 
test statistics for different potential breakpoints. The unknown breakpoint is the date where the 
maximum statistic is recorded and therefore, the most likely breakpoint location. The Andrews-
Ploberger Exp-W test statistic corresponds to the average of the exponential of the same sequence 
of Wald test statistics.  
The distribution of these test statistics is non-standard and the p-values follow Hansen (1997). A 
portion of the sample is excluded from the test. This trimming percentage, equally split between 
the beginning and the end of the sample for each country, is the lowest percentage that allows for 
enough observations to identify subsample parameters. The standard 15% is used as minimum 
trimming where possible.   
***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.  
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5.3 CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter, we set out to investigate the effects of real intervention on 
changes in real base money over the period 1990q1-2010q2. Because of the nature of 
the components of base money, our hypothesis was that strong effects were unlikely 
unless under specific circumstances. We proposed that these circumstances had to do 
with exceptional monetary policy frameworks, such as a currency board or a policy 
of monetary base expansion/quantitative easing; and the nature of instruments, noting 
that the use of required reserves would lead to base money expansion.  
 Our first stage of empirical analysis was carried out using individual country 
multivariate dynamic regressions for a sample of 30 countries. This allowed us to 
consider short-run and long-run effects separately and also to bring attention to 
individual country peculiarities. We find that on average, the intervention effect on 
base money is low - the baseline group average short-run and long-run coefficients 
are 0.075 and 0.111 respectively, excluding outliers, Egypt and Taiwan. However, 
there is substantial dispersion among countries, especially where the positive signed 
coefficients are concerned. For a subset of countries with economically significant 
coefficients, we analysed the effects of intervention on the components of base 
money: currency in circulation and required reserves/deposit accounts with the 
central bank. We discussed how the empirical evidence of positive coefficients tied 
in with the monetary policy frameworks and the nature of instruments used, namely 
required reserves and monetary deposit auctions, among these countries. For 
instance, the highest coefficients on intervention effects were observed for Japan, 
which had a policy of base money expansion and Israel, which actively used 
monetary deposit auctions as a sterilisation instrument.  
 In the second stage, to better understand the individual country results 
revealed by the empirical analysis, we also performed mean and median equality 
tests and bivariate regressions to investigate the relevance of country characteristics 
in terms of region; the nature of intervention (volatility, the proportion of surplus 
periods and reserve accumulation); income levels; current account and capital 
account openness and net positions; exchange rate flexibility; and monetary policy 
frameworks - whether the countries are inflation-targeting or non-inflation-targeting. 
Correlation analyses between the country characteristics reveal that intervention 
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volatility and reserve accumulation are positively and strongly correlated with the 
average current account balance and negatively correlated (either with statistical 
significance or without statistical significance) with the average capital account 
balance and the average balances on its subaccounts.  
 Generally, we find that there are only a few instances of statistical 
significance for the relevance of country characteristics to intervention effects on 
changes in base money. In terms of monetary policy frameworks, median equality 
tests point towards a difference between inflation-targeting and non-inflation-
targeting countries particularly in the context of short-run intervention effects. 
However, the statistical significance of this difference owes much to the uniqueness 
of the monetary policy frameworks of Hong Kong and Japan in the non-inflation-
targeting group and does not point to the inability to carry out sterilisation. 
Differences in exchange rate flexibility, on the other hand, are not statistically 
significant although the lowest intervention effects generally appear to be associated 
with the highest exchange rate flexibility.  
 Of the intervention indicators, there is mixed evidence of statistical 
significance for differences in intervention volatility based on the equality tests from 
the baseline scenario and the robustness analysis. The lowest intervention effects 
appear to be associated with the lowest intervention volatility. There is no similar 
indication of statistical significance for the differences in reserve accumulation.  
Meanwhile, in terms of the relevance of balance of payment flows, the 
equality tests for the characteristics of countries based on the boxplot and alternative 
groupings of coefficients indicate the fairly robust statistical significance of 
differences in capital account openness. Crucially however, these differences do not 
occur between the upper and lower quartile groups ± essentially, one cannot infer a 
difference in capital account openness between the countries with the largest real 
intervention effects and those with the smallest real intervention effects on changes 
in base money. This may reflect differences in monetary policy frameworks and 
sterilisation instruments. Nevertheless, the result is a tentative indication of the 
relevance of the gross size of capital flows rather than net balances.  
The baseline set of equality tests suggest a few other statistically significant 
differences but these are sensitive to changes in the groupings of the coefficients, 
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becoming statistically insignificant with the switch. In our robustness analysis, we 
find indications of statistically significant differences across a wider number of 
capital account related characteristics. However, like the baseline results, it is a 
common occurrence that the characteristics do not display a monotonic ordering 
consistent with the ordering of the groupings of intervention coefficients. Taking 
together the results of the baseline analysis and robustness checks for the equality 
tests and bivariate regressions, there is tentative evidence that higher coefficients on 
intervention effects are associated with a lower number of surplus years for the net 
direct and portfolio investment balance. This may relate to the negative correlation 
between intervention volatility and capital account surpluses ± which points to a 
situation of low intervention rather than high sterilisation.  
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CHAPTER 6 
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF  
FOREIGN EXCHANGE INTERVENTION ON BROAD MONEY 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 In this chapter, we investigate the effects of real intervention on changes in 
real broad money. A detailed conceptual framework was presented in Chapter 4. Our 
hypothesis is that there are elements of disconnect between the effects of real 
intervention on changes in real base money and the effects of real intervention on 
changes in real broad money. Given this disconnect, it is important to draw attention 
to the effects of intervention on changes in broad money. As we saw in Chapter 5, 
the analysis of intervention effects on changes in base money takes on a distinctive 
technical slant, in that it primarily concerns liquidity management in the interbank 
PRQH\ PDUNHW DORQJVLGH WKH SULYDWH VHFWRU¶V GHPDQG IRU FXUUHQF\ KROGLQJV ,Q
contrast, the analysis of intervention effects on changes in broad money provides 
relatively more important information on how intervention related to trade and 
capital flows affects private sector liquidity and permeates the economy. The effects 
of intervention on changes in broad money depend on the type of balance of 
payments flows and the sectors involved; the nature of sterilisation methods; as well 
as the monetary policy stance. These are issues that have not been addressed in the 
existing literature.  
 While there is quite extensive empirical literature on the effects of 
intervention on changes in base money, there is a dearth of econometric analysis on 
the effects of intervention on changes in broad money, in terms of both individual 
country examination as well as cross-sectional studies. The reasons for this are 
unclear, but we can speculate that it arises from the tendency to focus on the narrow 
definition of sterilisation and to invoke the theoretical simplification of a constant 
money multiplier. Frankel (1994) and Frankel and Okongwu (1995) provide succinct 
clarification on the definitions of sterilisation. Narrowly defined sterilisation involves 
offsetting reserve inflows, mainly through open market operations, so as to leave 
base money unaffected. Sterilisation more broadly defined is the offsetting of inflows 
                 
199 
 
so as to leave the overall money supply unaffected, even if base money changes, for 
example through reserve requirements.  
 Without a strong supporting conceptual framework, the few studies that 
provide econometric analysis of the effects of intervention on broad money leave 
room for improvement. Takagi (1999), acknowledging the use of various measures to 
sterilise capital inflows in Asia, carries out multivariate regression analysis of the 
effect of a change in central bank foreign assets on the monetary aggregates, M1 and 
M2 respectively. This is done for five Asian economies. Contemporaneous values of 
control variables are used, but importantly, only the first-order lagged value of the 
change in foreign assets is considered as an explanatory variable in order to capture 
intervention effects on the monetary aggregates. This is justified by the author on the 
conceptual assumption that intervention affects the monetary aggregates over time 
through the banking system, and from an econometric viewpoint, to avoid 
simultaneity bias.  
 Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) estimate the effects of intervention on narrow 
money (M1) on a yearly basis over 2000-2006 using bivariate regressions of data 
from a cross-section of 30 developing countries. It is not made known why the 
authors choose M1 as the dependent variable rather than base money or a broader 
monetary aggregate to gauge sterilised intervention. The choice may have to do with 
M1 traditionally representing transaction balances.  
 Cardarelli et al. (2009) estimate narrow and broad sterilisation indices by 
region using pooled bivariate regressions of monthly country data to arrive at annual 
sterilisation coefficients. The relatively simple approach to the broad sterilisation 
measure involves the static regression of the change in the monetary aggregate, M2 
DJDLQVWWKHFKDQJHLQQHWIRUHLJQDVVHWVǻ1)$7KH\QRWHSDJHWKDWWKHEURDG
VWHULOLVDWLRQ LQGH[ ³UHIOHFWV WKH FHQWUDO EDQN¶V HIIRUW WR SUHYHQW WKH LQFUHDVH LQ
monetary base from causing an expansion of money supply. This has generally 
RFFXUUHG WKURXJK DQ LQFUHDVH LQ WKH UHVHUYH UHTXLUHPHQWV IRU WKH EDQNLQJ VHFWRU´
However, the authors choose to utilise only the results for the narrow sterilisation 
index in their analysis, stating that the results are consistent with those of the broad 
sterilisation index.  
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 Our contribution is to fill an evident gap in the empirical literature on the 
effects of intervention on changes in broad money. As in Chapter 5, we carry out 
multivariate dynamic regression analysis on an individual-country basis. We focus 
RQWKHEURDGPRQH\DJJUHJDWHWKDW LV W\SLFDOO\FRQVLVWHQWZLWKDFRXQWU\¶VEURDGHVW
QDWLRQDOGHILQLWLRQRIPRQH\UDWKHU WKDQ WKHFRXQWU\¶VQDUURZHUDJJUHJDWHVQDPHO\
M1 and in some instances, M2. We do this because the narrower aggregates may not 
capture all the relevant financial assets classified as money and, crucially, those 
financial assets into which balance of payments flows are channelled. If the narrower 
aggregates were used, the effects of intervention on broad money could be 
understated.  
 The layout of this chapter is similar to that in Chapter 5, and the analysis 
concerns the same group of countries and time period. In Section 6.2 we describe our 
empirical approach briefly, following the detailed discussion in Chapter 4, and then 
analyse our baseline results in subsection 6.2.1. We compare our results to the 
findings on real intervention effects on changes in real base money which were 
discussed in Chapter 5. Next, we evaluate the role of different country characteristics 
in influencing the intervention effects in subsection 6.2.2 by using mean and median 
equality tests and bivariate regressions. We also discuss regression diagnostics for 
the baseline specification of each country and robustness checks in subsections 6.2.3 
and 6.2.4 respectively. In Section 6.3, we conclude.  
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6.2 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 We estimate the real intervention effects on real broad money growth for 
each country using the following model specification. This estimating equation is 
similar to equation (5.1) but replaces the dependent variable with real broad money 
growth and includes the interest rate on bonds as an additional explanatory variable. 
  ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  ? Į ? ?  ? Į ? ? ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? Į ? ? ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?  ? Į ? ? ? ?
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? Į ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? Į ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?   ? Į ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? Į ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?İ ? ? 
           
                   (6.1) 
The main coefficients of interest are the short-run and long-run effects of the change 
in real foreign exchange reserves (real intervention) on the change in real broad 
money. The short-run effect is the coefficient Ƚ ? ? while the long-run coefficient is 
derived as follows: 
Į ?ǡ  ?  ? Į ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ?Į ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
                   (6.2) 
 If the short-run coefficient is zero, this indicates that real intervention does 
not have any unique contemporaneous effect on changes in real broad money in the 
presence of control variables. As discussed in Chapter 4, any of the following factors 
could explain the lack of impact, even before consideration of the control variables:  
intervention operations are mainly related to balance of payments flows that are 
associated with banking institutions or the government and therefore do not translate 
immediately into changes in broad money liabilities (deposits); there is sterilisation 
at the point of the private sector (resident or non-resident); or there is active use of 
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foreign exchange swaps with banking institutions which may have broken the 
connection between intervention and the external flows to which they relate86. If the 
long-run coefficient is close to zero, then there are limited indirect effects of real 
intervention on changes in real broad money. This means that intervention-driven 
credit expansion and public sector spending do not occur and therefore do not 
influence changes in broad money over the long run above and beyond what is 
accounted for by the control variables.   
 We propose that real intervention can have statistically and economically 
significant effects on changes in real broad money whilst having no discernible 
effects on changes in real base money. The reverse is also a possibility. These 
dichotomous outcomes and variations in the broad money multiplier lend support to 
the importance of analysing the effects of real intervention on changes in real broad 
money. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
86
  For example, if the central bank intervenes in the full amount of a current account surplus but does not 
sterilise broad money, we would expect broad money to change in line with intervention and the current account 
surplus. However, if the increase in foreign exchange reserves (our proxy for intervention) is swapped out to 
banks, the link between intervention and broad money change is broken.  
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6.2.1 Baseline Regression Results for the Real Intervention Effects on Real 
 Broad Money Change 
In Table 6.1, we present the results for each country based on the final 
parsimonious versions of the initial general unrestricted model (equation (6.1)). For 
each country, there are two columns of results in Table 6.1. Column (i) consists of 
the short-run coefficient on  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  while column (ii) lists the 
corresponding long-run coefficient. For the short-run coefficients, t-statistics are 
reported while for the long-run coefficients, F-statistics are reported ± both statistics 
are in brackets. We carry out the same general-to-specific approach as in Chapter 5, 
which we discussed in detail in section 5.2.1. In Table 6.2, subgroup averages and 
the average for all countries in the sample are reported. The results are those of 
simple averages of the coefficients and their associated average t- and F-statistics.   
 The results indicate that the effect of real intervention on changes in real 
broad money is on average, relatively low in the short run but noticeably higher in 
the long run, indicating the comparatively more prominent role of indirect effects. 
Excluding Taiwan and Egypt,87 the average coefficients for the remaining sample of 
28 countries are 0.122 in the short run and 0.469 in the long run respectively. In 
effect, a one unit increase in real intervention only leads to a 0.122 unit increase in 
the change in real broad money in the short run but a 0.469 unit increase in the long 
run. Of interest, these coefficients are respectively 1.6 and 4.2 times higher than the 
coefficients for the short-run and long-run effects of real intervention on changes in 
real base money as seen in Chapter 5.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
87
  We exclude Egypt as the short-run and long-run coefficients for the effects of real intervention on 
changes in real base money are exceptionally large and based upon regressions covering a short sample period 
(see Chapter 5). The sample period differs considerably from that which is used in the real broad money growth 
regression in this chapter. In the case of Taiwan, the long-run coefficient of the effect of real intervention on 
changes in real broad money is exceptionally large and statistically insignificant. In order to have the same 
sample of countries when we compare the coefficients from the real base money growth regression against those 
from the real broad money growth regression, we thus exclude both these countries in our analysis. 
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Table 6.1: Real Intervention Effects on  
Real Broad Money Change - Individual Country Results 
 
Country 
The effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?   
on  ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
 (i)  (ii) 
Contemporaneous Ƚ ? ? Long-run multiplier Į ?ǡ ? ? ?  ? Į ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ?Į ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
Asia  
China -0.103 
[-0.647] 
0.743*** 
[9.289] 
 
1991q2-2010q2 
Hong Kong  0.331 
(1.145) 
1.316** 
(6.349) 
 
1998q1-2010q2 
India 0.288* 
(1.960) 
0.297 
(1.092) 
1997q3-2010q2 
Indonesia 0.440** 
[2.334] 
0.357** 
[5.840] 
1995q2-2010q2 
Korea 0.048 
[0.290] 
-0.752** 
[5.479] 
1990q2-2010q2 
Malaysia 0.201*** 
(3.935) 
0.042 
(0.187) 
1990q4-2010q2 
Philippines 0.042 
(0.246) 
1.396** 
(4.171) 
1991q1-2010q2 
Singapore 0.169*** 
(2.656) 
0.374** 
(5.404) 
1990q2-2010q2 
Taiwan 0.464*** 
(4.012) 
6.272 
(0.107) 
1991q2-2010q2 
Thailand 0.191* 
(1.825) 
1.792*** 
(9.944) 
 
1991q2-2010q2 
 
x Column (i) reports the contemporaneous effect and the corresponding t-statistic. 
x Column (ii) reports the long-run multiplier and the corresponding F-statistic. 
The F-statistic is for the test,  ? Ƚ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? Ƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? = 0. x For both the t-and F-statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;  
     *: significant at 10%, using (Default), [Newey West], {White} standard errors.   
x The results are based on restricted regressions, which include only statistically significant 
variables at the minimum 10% significance level. Regressors are removed one at a time in a 
unidirectional backwards manner based on the lowest t-statistic each time. This applies to all 
regressors except the contemporaneous effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ? which is not 
removed in the general to specific modelling process. 
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Table 6.1: Continued 
 
Country 
The effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?   
on  ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
 (i)  (ii) 
Contemporaneous Ƚ ? ? Long-run multiplier Į ?ǡ ? ? ?  ? Į ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ?Į ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
Latin America  
Argentina 0.512*** 
[2.857] 
0.379** 
[6.513] 
 
1994q4-2010q2 
Brazil 0.199*** 
[2.792] 
0.041 
[0.025] 
 
1997q4-2010q2 
Chile 0.052 
(0.504) 
0.052 
(0.254) 
1990q3-2010q2 
Colombia 0.346** 
[2.157] 
0.614** 
[4.577] 
1995q2-2010q2 
Mexico -0.225** 
(-2.092) 
-0.164 
(0.876) 
1991q2-2010q2 
Peru 0.226*** 
(3.883) 
0.569*** 
(51.928) 
1995q2-2010q2 
 
x Column (i) reports the contemporaneous effect and the corresponding t-statistic. 
x Column (ii) reports the long-run multiplier and the corresponding F-statistic. 
The F-statistic is for the test,  ? Ƚ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? Ƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? = 0. x For both the t- and F-statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;  
     *: significant at 10%, using (Default), [Newey West], {White} standard errors.   
x The results are based on restricted regressions, which include only statistically 
significant variables at the minimum 10% significance level. Regressors are removed 
one at a time in a unidirectional backwards manner based on the lowest t-statistic each 
time. This applies to all regressors except the contemporaneous effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ? which is not removed in the general to specific modelling 
process. 
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Table 6.1: Continued 
 
Country 
The effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?   
on  ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
 (i)  (ii) 
Contemporaneous Ƚ ? ? Long-run multiplier Į ?ǡ ? ? ?  ? Į ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ?Į ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
Other Emerging Market Economies(EMEs)-Europe, Middle East and 
Africa 
Czech Republic 0.052 
(0.261) 
0.226 
(1.529) 
 
1997q2-2010q2 
Egypt 0.524*** 
[4.481] 
0.013 
[0.000] 
 
1990q2-2010q2 
Hungary 0.015 
(0.239) 
0.095 
(0.890) 
1996q2-2010q2 
Israel 0.091 
[0.704] 
-0.164 
[0.994] 
1991q2-2010q2 
Poland 0.007 
(0.070) 
1.211* 
(3.216) 
1998q1-2010q2 
Russia 0.292*** 
(5.938) 
0.515*** 
(59.747) 
1996q2-2010q2 
South Africa -0.020 
(-0.076) 
0.882** 
(6.060) 
1990q2-2010q2 
Turkey -0.300*** 
[-3.093] 
-0.214 
[1.501] 
1995q1-2010q2 
 
x Column (i) reports the contemporaneous effect and the corresponding t-statistic. 
x Column (ii) reports the long-run multiplier and the corresponding F-statistic. 
The F-statistic is for the test,  ? Ƚ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? Ƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? = 0. x For both the t-and F-statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;  
     *: significant at 10%, using (Default), [Newey West], {White} standard errors.   
x The results are based on restricted regressions, which include only statistically 
significant variables at the minimum 10% significance level. Regressors are removed 
one at a time in a unidirectional backwards manner based on the lowest t-statistic each 
time. This applies to all regressors except the contemporaneous effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ? which is not removed in the general to specific modelling 
process. 
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Table 6.1: Continued 
 
Country 
The effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?   
on  ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
 (i)  (ii) 
Contemporaneous Ƚ ? ? Long-run multiplier Į ?ǡ ? ? ?  ? Į ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ?Į ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
Developed Economies 
Australia 0.081 
(0.110) 
0.172 
(0.004) 
 
1991q2-2010q2 
Canada 0.371 
(1.245) 
1.883* 
(3.066) 
 
1991q2-2010q2 
Denmark 0.048 
(0.491) 
0.336** 
 (5.334) 
1990q2-2010q2 
Japan -0.455 
[-1.239] 
-0.409 
[1.529] 
1991q2-2010q2 
New Zealand 0.233 
(1.537) 
0.496*** 
(12.851) 
1991q2-2010q2 
Norway 0.296*** 
{4.451} 
1.039*** 
{40.475} 
1990q2-2010q2 
 
x Column (i) reports the contemporaneous effect and the corresponding t-statistic. 
x Column (ii) reports the long-run multiplier and the corresponding F-statistic. 
The F-statistic is for the test,  ? Ƚ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? Ƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? = 0. x For both the t-and F-statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;  
     *: significant at 10%, using (Default), [Newey West], {White} standard errors.   
x The results are based on restricted regressions, which include only statistically 
significant variables at the minimum 10% significance level. Regressors are removed 
one at a time in a unidirectional backwards manner based on the lowest t-statistic each 
time. This applies to all regressors except the contemporaneous effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ? which is not removed in the general to specific 
modelling process. 
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Table 6.2: Real Intervention Effects  
on Real Broad Money Change - Group Averages 
 
Group  
The group average effect of   ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  on  ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
 (i)  (ii) 
Contemporaneous Ƚ ? ? Long-run multiplier Į ?ǡ ? ? ?  ? Į ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ?Į ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
Asia 
 
 
Excluding Taiwan 
 
0.207* 
(1.907) 
 
0.179* 
(1.673) 
1.184** 
(4.786) 
 
0.618** 
(5.306) 
 
Latin America 
 
0.185** 
(2.381) 
0.249*** 
(10.696) 
 
Other EMEs 
 
 
Excluding Egypt 
0.083* 
(1.883) 
 
0.020 
(1.512) 
 
0.321*** 
(9.188) 
 
0.364*** 
(10.501) 
Developed Economies 0.096 
(1.512) 
 
0.586*** 
(10.543) 
TOTAL 
 
 
Excluding 
Taiwan and Egypt 
0.147* 
(1.834) 
 
0.122* 
(1.662) 
0.647*** 
(8.293) 
 
0.469*** 
(8.882) 
 
Sample standard deviation 
(excluding Taiwan and 
Egypt) 
0.219 0.636 
 
x Column (i) reports the simple average of the contemporaneous effect and the corresponding 
average t-statistic. 
x Column (ii) reports the simple average of the long-run multiplier and the corresponding 
average F-statistic. 
The F-statistic is for the test,  ? Ƚ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? Ƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? = 0. x For both the t-and F- statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;  
     *: significant at 10%. 
x The results are based on restricted regressions, which include only statistically significant 
variables at the minimum 10% significance level. Regressors are removed one at a time in a 
unidirectional backwards manner based on the lowest t-statistic each time. This applies to all 
regressors except the contemporaneous effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ? which is not 
removed in the general to specific modelling process. 
x Results are reported for average values which exclude Egypt and Taiwan. The former is an 
outlier in the analysis of intervention effects on real base money growth and the latter, and 
outlier in the analysis of intervention effects on real broad money growth. 
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 The standard deviations across the sample group of 28 countries are 0.219 
and 0.636 respectively for the short-run and long-run coefficients. We observe that 
the short-run coefficients are in the range of 0.000 ± 0.300 for 16 countries and 
negative in value for five countries. With regard to the long-run coefficients, 18 
countries fall in the range 0.000-0.800, whilst five countries display negative values. 
Nevertheless, the negative coefficients tend to be of smaller economic significance 
compared to the positive coefficients and most also lack statistical significance. A 
possible explanation for the negative coefficients is that sterilisation has taken place 
at the non-bank private sector level (rather than at the banks level) to an extent that 
exceeds the money supply shock associated with intervention. This may be part of a 
policy of monetary control that leads to interest rate increases, contraction in the real 
sector and a further reduction in broad money. The dispersions in the short-run and 
long-run coefficients across countries are summarised in the following boxplots 
(Graph 6.1). The long-run coefficients are noticeably more dispersed than the short-
run coefficients, but both groups appear to be more evenly distributed compared to 
the results for the effects of real intervention on changes in base money (Graph 5.1 in 
Chapter 5). 
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Graph 6.1: Boxplots for the Short-run and Long-run  
Real Intervention Effects on Real Broad Money Change 
 
 A comparison with the results of previous empirical work is hindered by the 
limited amount of existing research that has quantified the effects of intervention on 
changes in broad money. Thus, we are only able to make a quantitative evaluation of 
our results against those of Takagi (1999).  In particular, we compare the average of 
the long-run coefficients for the subset of the countries88 in our sample which is 
consistent with the sample used by Takagi DJDLQVW WKH DYHUDJH RI WKH DXWKRU¶V
estimated coefficients on the first-order lagged real inWHUYHQWLRQYDULDEOHV7DNDJL¶V
estimated coefficients are based on static multivariate regressions using quarterly 
data over the period 1987q1-1997q2. At 0.886, our result is strikingly in contrast to 
WKDWRI7DNDJL¶VDW-0.009. Furthermore, on an individual-FRXQWU\EDVLV LQ7DNDJL¶V
case, there is hardly any statistical significance of the coefficients, except in the case 
RI WKH 3KLOLSSLQHV 2QH REYLRXV GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ RXU VWXG\ DQG 7DNDJL¶V LV WKH
sample period under consideration, suggesting the importance of variations in the 
coefficients over time. However, it would appear that the methodology and data used 
also matter. With regard to the former, our dynamic model specification allows for 
                                                          
88
 The countries are Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. 
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both the contemporaneous and indirect effects of intervention to be taken into 
account. Meanwhile, where data are concerned, we have generally used the broadest 
national monetary aggregate for each country rather than M1 and in some instances, 
M2. 
 
 While Cardarelli et al. (2009) do not report the results for the effects of a 
change in foreign assets on changes in broad money we can nevertheless conclude 
that our results are not similar to theirs. This is because they state that their results for 
the broad sterilisation measure are consistent with the narrow sterilisation measure, 
while in our study, there is evidence that the effects of real intervention on changes 
in real broad money differ from its effects on changes in real base money.  
 
 In Graph 6.2 we plot the long-run coefficients against the short-run 
coefficients for our sample of 28 countries and in Table 6.3 we provide the results of 
a regression between these two variables. Most countries are in the top right quadrant 
of the graph, implying positive short-run and long-run effects. A unit increase in the 
short-run coefficient leads to a 1.2 unit increase in the long-run coefficient. This 
effect is of similar economic significance compared to the relationship between the 
short-run and long-run effects of real intervention on changes in real base money as 
seen in Chapter 5, where a unit increase in the short-run coefficient leads to a 1.1 unit 
increase in the long-run coefficient (0.9, if excluding Israel and Japan). However, in 
contrast, the statistical significance and in particular, the explanatory power of the 
short-run coefficient as a regressor is lower compared to the relationship between the 
short-run and long-run effects of real intervention on changes in real base money. In 
Graph 6.2, we find that the data points tend to fall above the line of equality between 
the short-run and long-run coefficients, with long-run coefficients exceeding short-
run coefficients. With reference to Diagram 4.5 in Chapter 4, this suggests that 
countries are generally in the top left quadrant of the diagram, exhibiting relatively 
strong credit creation driven intervention effects over time, notwithstanding small 
contemporaneous effects. As we discussed in Chapter 4, the unique 
contemporaneous effects may be small once control variables are taken into account, 
and may also be non-existent in the first instance if intervention is related to bank or 
government flows. However, the excess liquidity available to banks has increased 
regardless, and can lead to higher intervention effects in the long run. In contrast, 
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with regard to the intervention effects on base money growth, the average short-run 
and long-run coefficients have been observed to be similar, with individual country 
coefficients generally falling in the bottom left and top right quadrants of Diagram 
4.4. This is not surprising as, unless there is a marked shift in policy (in terms of 
interest rate-targeting or the use of reserve requirements) or in private sector 
behaviour (the demand for currency and excess reserves), the coefficients are not 
expected to differ significantly over time.  
Graph 6.2: The Relationship between Short-run and Long-run Effects  
of Real Intervention on Real Broad Money Change  
 
 
Table 6.3:  Regression Analysis between Short-run and Long-run Effects   
of Real Intervention on Real Broad Money Change 
Regressor: Short-run 
Coefficient 
Dependent variable: Long-run Coefficient 
Coefficient t-statistic Adjusted  
R2 
All countries  
 
1.202 2.318** 0.14 
1RWH7KHPD[LPXPQXPEHURIREVHUYDWLRQVLV7KHJURXS³DOOFRXQWULHV´ excludes Egypt and 
Taiwan. The regression includes a constant term which is not shown for brevity. 
***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level.  
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 In Table 6.4, we compare the short-run effect of real intervention on changes 
in real broad money against the short-run effect on changes in real base money. We 
do the same for the long-run effects. For both comparisons, we split the countries 
into two groups based on the real intervention effect on changes in real broad money 
± countries with positive coefficients larger than the median value for the sample of 
28 countries, and countries with coefficients smaller than the median value, which 
includes negative coefficients. The averages and medians for these two subgroups 
are then reported alongside the associated averages and medians for the coefficients 
on the real intervention effects on changes in real base money. We test for 
differences using the ANOVA F-test for mean equality and also the Mann-Whitney 
test for median (distribution) equality. We use the latter test since non-normality and 
non-homogenous variances in the distribution for the coefficients on the real 
intervention effects on changes in real base money render the use of the ANOVA F-
test contentious.  
 We observe that countries with short-run and long-run coefficients above the 
full sample median value for the real intervention effect on changes in real broad 
money do not display a significant difference in terms of the effects on changes in 
real base money, compared to countries with coefficients below the median value. 
This is consistent with our hypothesis of disconnect between the effects of real 
intervention on changes in real broad money and changes in real base money 
respectively, and reinforces the importance of analysing the effects on changes in 
real broad money. For our sample of countries, low intervention effects on base 
money growth do not imply a similar result for broad money growth. At the same 
time, higher intervention effects on base money growth, partly on account of the use 
of required reserves, are also not associated with lower intervention effects on broad 
money growth. With the model in Chapter 3, we showed that base money can be 
relatively steady regardless of the sector from which liquidity is absorbed using 
market-based sterilisation instruments. This, however, does not imply that broad 
money is similarly stable. Our finding that long-run intervention effects on broad 
money growth are economically significant and noticeably different from that on 
base money growth provides an empirical counterpart to the policy concerns that 
surround broad money sterilisation in the theoretical model.  
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Table 6.4: Real Intervention Effects:  
A Comparison between Real Broad Money Change 
and Real Base Money Change 
 
Country 
Subgroups 
Short-run Effect  
of Real Intervention ±  
Average [Median] 
Long-run Effect  
of Real Intervention ± 
Average [Median] 
Real Broad 
Money  
Real Base 
Money  
Real Broad 
Money  
Real Base 
Money  
Real intervention 
effect on changes 
in real broad 
money > median 
value 
 
0.293*** 
[0.290] 
 
 
0.074* 
[0.038] 
 
 
0.944*** 
[0.813] 
 
 
0.114*** 
[0.099] 
 
Observations 14 14 
Real intervention 
effect on changes 
in real broad 
money < median 
value 
 
-0.048 
[0.029] 
 
 
0.076* 
[0.008] 
 
 
-0.006* 
[0.047] 
 
0.109*** 
[0.021] 
Observations 14 14 
Mean Equality: 
ANOVA F-test 
statistic 
 0.001  0.004 
Median Equality: 
Mann-Whitney test 
statistic 
 0.850  1.103 
Correlation coefficient (t-statistic) 
Short-run effects 
Long-run effects 
-0.088 (-0.450) 
-0.218 (-1.144) 
 
 
The first and third rows report the average short-run and long-run coefficients, and the median coefficient  
in brackets, for each subgroup. The statistical significance of the average values is based on the associated 
average t-and F-statistics. Countries are split into two subgroups based on the coefficients on the real 
intervention effect on changes in real broad money. 
Test statistics are only reported for the test of group differences in terms of the real intervention effects on 
changes in real base money. The group differences in terms of the average and median coefficients for the 
real intervention effects on changes in real broad money are statistically significant by construction.  
***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level.  
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6.2.2 Tests for the Relevance of Differences in Country Characteristics  
 
 In the previous section, we observed that the effects of real intervention on 
changes in broad money are relatively higher than and, as subgroup tests of equality 
indicate, disconnected from the effects of real intervention on changes in real base 
money. Nevertheless, the effects of real intervention on changes in real broad money 
are, on their own, considerably low as well, averaging 0.122 and 0.469 in the short 
run and long run respectively. This is notwithstanding several exceptions on an 
individual country basis of long-run coefficients exceeding 1.000. 
  
 In Chapter 4, we discussed various factors that can influence the nature of 
real intervention effects on changes in real broad money. As in section 5.2.2 of 
Chapter 5, in this section we evaluate the relevance of differences in country 
characteristics. The empirical methods and country characteristics considered are the 
same as those used in Chapter 5. In subsection 6.2.2.1 (Table 6.5), we test for 
differences in the coefficients for real intervention effects among the countries in our 
sample by splitting them into clearly delineated groups based on regions, current 
account and capital account balances (surpluses versus deficits), income levels (high 
income versus middle income) and monetary policy frameworks (inflation-targeting 
versus non-inflation-targeting). In subsection 6.2.2.2 (Tables 6.6(a) and 6.6(b)), we 
test for differences in some of these characteristics as well as other characteristics 
with less clear delineations, for subgroups of coefficients that fall into the boxplot 
quartile divisions as seen in Graph 6.1. In subsection 6.2.2.3, we carry out bivariate 
regressions with the coefficients on real intervention effects as the dependent 
variable, and each country characteristic, in turn, as the regressor.  
 
 We hypothesise that if there is a high degree of intervention and reserve 
accumulation, scaled by the size of the economy, the more likely it is that we will 
observe prominent effects on changes in real broad money. In particular, sustained 
current account and capital account surpluses, more so if occurring simultaneously, 
may be associated with relatively significant positive indirect effects of real 
intervention on changes in real broad money, since the banking system is flush with 
liquidity. Thus, it could be that the net balances on these accounts that matter more 
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WKDQWUDGHDQGILQDQFLDORSHQQHVVHYHQLIWKHODWWHUUHIOHFWVDQHFRQRP\¶VUHOLDQFHRQ
the external sector. 
  
 These effects, however, may be complicated by several factors. Not all 
balance of payments flows involve intervention ± the effects of balance of payments 
flows can be viewed as a distinct phenomenon from the effects of intervention. When 
intervention does occur, it matters how the central bank chooses to sterilise its 
operations, whether at the level of the private sector or at the level of the banking 
system. Furthermore, the use of foreign exchange swaps subsequent to intervention 
breaks the link between the timing of intervention and its effects on changes in broad 
money. Meanwhile, the effect of reserve requirement adjustments is unclear, 
particularly if these changes merely represent an alternative to open market 
operations in an interest rate-targeting framework. Naturally, indirect effects of 
external sector surpluses may be limited by policy tightening, but we propose that the 
distinction between inflation-targeting and non-inflation-targeting countries does not 
matter, unless there is no independent monetary policy in the latter case. Similarly, it 
is not necessarily the case that countries with less flexible exchange rates will exhibit 
higher intervention effects on changes in broad money.  
  
 The level of economic and financial development also matters: a high level of 
development may render the indirect effects of intervention limited on an already 
large money stock but at the same time may facilitate the intermediation process and 
potentially lead to greater intervention effects on changes in broad money. Higher 
income countries may also exhibit higher coefficients since these could reflect the 
stronger influence of financial factors relative to real sector factors, and the 
complexity of which may not be fully captured by the control variables.  
 
 The end result is that the immediate effects and the dynamics of the indirect 
effects of real intervention on changes in real broad money may be very much 
country-specific. This seems to be the scenario suggested by the results in the 
following three subsections. 
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6.2.2.1  Equality Tests for Differences in Coefficients on Real Intervention  
  Effects between Groups of Countries 
 
 Observing column 2 of Table 6.5, we note differences in economic size and 
variations in statistical significance for the average short-run coefficients across the 
subgroups of all the categories except the monetary policy framework category. 
There are less obvious differences for the average long-run coefficients (column 4 of 
Table 6.5) across the subgroups of the categories. Based on the results of ANOVA F-
tests,89 however, we find no statistical significance for the differences observed 
across the means of the subgroups under consideration, indicating the strong 
dispersion of values within subgroups. The difference in coefficients between groups 
that comes closest to statistical significance is that between current account surpluses 
and deficits, and in terms of the short-run coefficient only (row 2 of Table 6.5). 
Furthermore, whilst there was some indication of difference between inflation-
targeting and non-inflation-targeting countries in terms of the real intervention 
effects on changes in real base money, as seen in Chapter 5, we find no similar 
difference in the context of the real intervention effects on changes in real broad 
money (row 5 of Table 6.5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
89
  The distributions for the short-run and long-run coefficients were pre-tested for non-normality and 
homogenous variances across subgroups based on the subgroup classifications. We did not find any evidence of 
non-normality or heterogeneous variances. 
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Table 6.5: Mean Equality Tests for Real Intervention Effects  
on Real Broad Money Change 
Groups 
The effect of  ? ?       ?   ?    ǡ ?      ?    ǡ  ? ?   
on  ? ?      ?    ǡ  ?      ?    ǡ  ? ? ?  
Short-run Coefficient Long-run Coefficient 
Group 
Mean 
ANOVA  
F-statistic 
Group 
Mean 
ANOVA  
F-statistic 
1. Region 
    
 Asia 0.179* 0.895 0.618** 0.508 
 Latin America 0.185**  0.249***  
 Other EMEs 0.020  0.364***  
 Developed Economies 0.096  0.586***  
      
2. Current Account (CA) 
Balance 
 
 
   
 CA surplus 0.180** 1.721 0.586*** 0.817 
 CA deficit 0.072  0.367**  
      
3. Capital Account (KA) 
Balance 
    
 KA surplus 0.105 0.415  0.478** 0.013 
 KA deficit 0.165***  0.446***  
      
4. Income Level     
 High income 0.099 0.272 0.448*** 0.025 
 Middle income 0.143**  0.487***  
      
5. Monetary Policy 
Framework 
    
 Inflation targeting 0.113 0.107 0.502*** 0.153 
 Non-inflation-targeting 0.142  0.390***  
      
 
     
 CA and KA surpluses are measured based on the number of surplus years as a proportion of the total number of 
years corresponding to the regression sample period for each country. A country is recorded as a surplus country if 
the proportion exceeds 0.5. 
 Income level is measured by the average of GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity over the regression 
sample period for each country. Countries are classified as either high or middle income based on the World Bank 
income classification scheme.  
 Inflation-targeting countries are countries that have adopted the inflation-targeting framework at some point during 
our sample period.  
All groups exclude Egypt and Taiwan. 
Short-run and long-run average statistical significance of the coefficients for suEJURXSV LQ WKH ³*URXS 0HDQ´
columns are based on the corresponding simple average of t- and F-statistics. These do not indicate statistically 
significant differences across the subgroups. 
The mean equality test is the single-factor ANOVA F-test.  
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
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6.2.1.2  Equality Tests for Differences in Country Characteristics based on 
  Differences in Real Intervention Effects 
 
 In Tables 6.6(a) and 6.6(b) we perform equality tests of characteristics of 
countries grouped by the boxplot quartiles for the short-run and long-run effects of 
real intervention on changes in broad money as seen in Graph 6.1.90 As in Table 6.5, 
the characteristics include the number of surplus years on the current account and 
capital account, and income levels. Additionally, we also consider the current 
account and capital account average balances, scaled by GDP; the balance positions 
and surplus years for subcomponents of the capital account ± the sum of net direct 
investment and portfolio investment, and net other investment balances respectively; 
current account and capital account openness; intervention indicators ± volatility, 
reserve accumulation, and the number of surplus periods; and exchange rate 
flexibility.  
 The ANOVA F-test for mean equality is carried out when the distribution of 
the characteristic exhibits normality,91 while the Kruskal-Wallis test for median 
equality is used when there is evidence of non-normality. For the different quartile 
groups of short-run real intervention effects on changes in real broad money (Table 
6.6(a)), we observe statistically significant differences in the capital account balance 
and its subcomponent, net direct investment and portfolio investment balance. The 
values are observed to monotonically decrease with higher averages of the 
intervention coefficients. There is also some mixed indication of statistically 
significant differences in the current account balance,92 which are monotonically 
consistent with the differences in the capital account balance. This is not surprising 
given the balance of payments identity. The results suggest that higher short-run 
coefficients appear to be associated with capital account deficits, and lower balances 
                                                          
90
  The number of countries in each quartile beginning with the upper quartile is as follows: 7, 14, and 7 
respectively, for both the short-run and long-run coefficients. 
91
  There is some indication of heterogeneous variances across subgroups in the income levels category in 
Tables 6.6(a) and 6.6(b) and in the category of surplus years for net direct investment and portfolio investment 
balance in Table 6.6(b). The results of the Welch F-test, which allows for unequal variances, do not, however, 
suggest different conclusions from the ANOVA F-test. 
92
  Note from Table 6.6(a), item 2, there are only statistically significant differences in terms of the 
average balance but not the surplus years. We also tested for differences in cumulative balances ± the sum of the 
annual net position in the account, scaled by the average annual nominal GDP, for the years that correspond to 
the regressioQVDPSOHSHULRG:HGRWKLVIRUWKHFXUUHQWDFFRXQWWKHFDSLWDODFFRXQWDQGWKHODWWHU¶V
subcomponents. The results for the equality tests differed from those for the average balances only in the case of 
the current account balance, with no statistically significant differences found in terms of the cumulative 
balances.  
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in the subcomponent, net direct investment and portfolio investment; as well as, 
correspondingly, current account surpluses.  
 Meanwhile, for the different quartile groups of long-run real intervention 
effects on changes in real broad money (Table 6.6(b)), based on the equality tests, 
there are no statistically significant differences in any of the corresponding 
characteristics. In particular, statistically significant differences are neither apparent 
in the balance of payment surpluses, nor in the intervention indicators. 
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Table 6.6(a): Equality Tests of Country Characteristics Grouped by  
Boxplot Quartiles of Short-run Intervention Effects on Broad Money Change 
Country Characteristic 
Subgroup Average/[Median]  
of Characteristic 
Equality  
Test 
Statistic Upper 
quartile 
Inter-
quartile  
Lower 
quartile 
1. Openness 
 
Current account [0.642] [0.846] [0.587] 1.471 
 
Capital account [0.166] [0.166] [0.113] 1.428 
2. Current Account Balance 
 Surplus years 0.707 0.427 0.363 2.017 
 Average balance [3.436] [-0.062] [-2.397] 4.747* 
3. Capital Account Balance 
 Surplus years 0.434 0.733 0.776 3.503** 
 Average balance [-0.313] [2.130] [3.380] 7.230** 
4. Net Direct Investment and Portfolio Investment Balance 
 Surplus years 0.537 0.794 0.804 2.728* 
 Average balance [0.172] [2.155] [2.731] 5.152* 
5. Net Other Investment Balance 
 Surplus years 0.381 0.507 0.548 1.178 
 Average balance [-0.291] [0.351] [0.340] 1.808 
6. Intervention Indicators     
 Volatility [0.538] [0.684] [0.416] 1.808 
 Reserve accumulation [0.144] [0.328] [0.203] 3.001 
 Surplus quarters [0.583] [0.621] [0.673] 1.907 
7. Income Level 19.146 15.317 12.186 0.709 
8. Exchange Rate Flexibility 8.485 9.048 10.887 1.644 
Note: 
Corresponding subgroup average of 
short-run real intervention effects 0.370*** 0.137 -0.154  
 
For each subgroup of countries, either the average or median (in square brackets) of the characteristic is shown.  
The countries are divided into the subgroups based on the boxplot quartiles of intervention effects in Graph 6.1. 
The mean equality test is the single-factor ANOVA F-test. 
The median equality test is the Kruskal-Wallis test, which is used when non-normality is detected in the series. 
Differences in mean/median: ***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level.   
 
Explanatory notes on country characteristics (unless otherwise indicated, all variables are measured in US dollars): 
1. Openness is measured as the average of the sum of the absolute value of annual inflows and outflows for each  
        account respectively, taken as a ratio to average annual GDP. 
2. The total surplus years is measured by the number of years with net inflows into the account as a proportion of the  
        total number of years that corresponds to the regression sample period. The values are between 0 and 1. 
       The average balance is the average of the annual net position in the account scaled by the average annual nominal  
       GDP for the years that corresponds to the regression sample period, multiplied by 100. 
3. The capital account includes net errors and omissions. Surplus years and average balance are defined as in 2. 
4. Net direct investment and portfolio investment are subaccounts of the capital account. Surplus years and average 
balance are defined as in 2 and are for the sum of the two accounts. 
5. Net other investment is a subaccount of the capital account. It excludes official other investment which involves the 
government or monetary authorities. Surplus years and average balance are defined as in 2. 
6. Intervention volatility is measured by the standard deviation of the monthly changes in foreign exchange reserves 
scaled by the average annual nominal GDP. Reserve accumulation is the sum of change in foreign exchange reserves 
over the regression sample period, scaled by the average annual nominal GDP. The total surplus quarters refers to the 
number of quarters with a positive increase in reserves as a proportion of the total number of quarters that 
corresponds to the regression sample period. The values are between 0 and 1. 
7. GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (millions of current international dollar), taken as an annual 
average over the regression sample period. 
8. Exchange rate flexibility is identified based on the historical de facto fine classification provided by Ilzetzki et al. 
(2011) which updates the analysis E\5HLQKDUWDQG5RJRII(VVHQWLDOO\HDFK\HDU¶VUHJLPHLVDVVLJQHGD
number between 1 and 14, with larger numbers reflecting increased flexibility. We use the average over the years 
corresponding to the regression sample period as an indicator of eDFKFRXQWU\¶VH[FKDQJHUDWHUHJLPHIOH[LELOLW\ 
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Table 6.6(b): Equality Tests of Country Characteristics Grouped by  
Boxplot Quartiles of Long-run Intervention Effects on Broad Money Change 
Country Characteristic 
Subgroup Average/[Median]  
of Characteristic 
Equality  
Test 
Statistic Upper 
quartile 
Inter-
quartile  
Lower 
quartile 
1. Openness 
 
Current account [0.885] [0.640] [0.587] 3.553 
 
Capital account [0.147] [0.169] [0.117] 2.087 
2. Current Account Balance 
 Surplus years 0.562 0.455 0.453 0.217 
 Average balance [0.279] [-0.681] [-0.060] 0.626 
3. Capital Account Balance 
 Surplus years 0.566 0.720 0.670 0.607 
 Average balance [1.764] [2.685] [1.400] 1.023 
4. Net Direct Investment and Portfolio Investment Balance 
 Surplus years 0.630 0.799 0.701 0.954 
 Average balance [2.456] [2.522] [0.752] 1.543 
5. Net Other Investment Balance 
 Surplus years 0.509 0.476 0.482 0.053 
 Average balance [0.435] [0.064] [-0.134] 1.628 
6. Intervention Indicators     
 Volatility [0.712] [0.721] [0.490] 1.791 
 Reserve accumulation [0.203] [0.274] [0.211] 0.057 
 Surplus quarters [0.636] [0.594] [0.680] 3.446 
7. Income Level 18.908 14.119 14.820 0.452 
8. Exchange Rate Flexibility 9.324 8.989 10.167 0.424 
Note: 
Corresponding subgroup average of 
long-run real intervention effects 1.360*** 0.373*** -0.231  
 
For each subgroup of countries, either the average or median (in square brackets) of the characteristic is shown.  
The countries are divided into the subgroups based on the boxplot quartiles of intervention effects in Graph 6.1. 
The mean equality test is the single-factor ANOVA F-test. 
The median equality test is the Kruskal-Wallis test, which is used when non-normality is detected in the series. 
Differences in mean/median: ***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level.   
 
Explanatory notes on country characteristics (unless otherwise indicated, all variables are measured in US dollars): 
1. Openness is measured as the average of the sum of the absolute value of annual inflows and outflows for each  
        account respectively, taken as a ratio to average annual GDP. 
2. The total surplus years is measured by the number of years with net inflows into the account as a proportion of the  
        total number of years that corresponds to the regression sample period. The values are between 0 and 1. 
       The average balance is the average of the annual net position in the account scaled by the average annual nominal  
       GDP for the years that corresponds to the regression sample period, multiplied by 100. 
3. The capital account includes net errors and omissions. Surplus years and average balance are defined as in 2. 
4. Net direct investment and portfolio investment are subaccounts of the capital account. Surplus years and average 
balance are defined as in 2 and are for the sum of the two accounts. 
5. Net other investment is a subaccount of the capital account. It excludes official other investment which involves the 
government or monetary authorities. Surplus years and average balance are defined as in 2. 
6. Intervention volatility is measured by the standard deviation of the monthly changes in foreign exchange reserves 
scaled by the average annual nominal GDP. Reserve accumulation is the sum of change in foreign exchange reserves 
over the regression sample period, scaled by the average annual nominal GDP. The total surplus quarters refers to the 
number of quarters with a positive increase in reserves as a proportion of the total number of quarters that 
corresponds to the regression sample period. The values are between 0 and 1. 
7. GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (millions of current international dollar), taken as an annual 
average over the regression sample period. 
8. Exchange rate flexibility is identified based on the historical de facto fine classification provided by Ilzetzki et al. 
ZKLFKXSGDWHVWKHDQDO\VLVE\5HLQKDUWDQG5RJRII(VVHQWLDOO\HDFK\HDU¶VUHJLPHLVDVVLJQHGD
number between 1 and 14, with larger numbers reflecting increased flexibility. We use the average over the years 
FRUUHVSRQGLQJWRWKHUHJUHVVLRQVDPSOHSHULRGDVDQLQGLFDWRURIHDFKFRXQWU\¶VH[FKDQJHUDWHUHJLPHIOH[LELOLW\ 
 
 
  
                 
223 
 
6.2.2.3  Regression Analysis between Coefficients on Real Intervention Effects 
  and Country Characteristics   
 
 In this subsection, we assess if there exist linear relationships between real 
intervention effects on changes in real broad money and specific country 
characteristics. We treat the estimated coefficients for real intervention effects in the 
real broad money equation for each country as the dependent variable and investigate 
whether these coefficients vary systematically with income levels; the nature of 
intervention (volatility, the number of surplus periods, and reserve accumulation); 
exchange rate flexibility; and the nature of the current and capital accounts in terms 
of openness and net balances. The bivariate regression specification is as follows: 
               ? ? Į  ?ȕ ?                          (6.3)   
 where  
i =country 
y= short-run/long-run coefficient on real intervention effect 
x= country characteristic 
 Our hypotheses about the relationships between the country characteristics 
and real intervention effects were discussed at the beginning of Section 6.2.2. Here 
we summarise our reasons for choosing these variables. Amongst the intervention 
indicators, volatility points to the size of intervention activity and we expect that this 
may have a positive relationship with real intervention effects on changes in broad 
money, particularly in the short run, although the nature of balance of payments 
flows and sterilisation may weaken such a link. Surplus periods and reserve 
accumulation, the latter including scale effect, are meant to assess if the distinction 
between surpluses and deficits matter, particularly for long-run indirect effects. In 
terms of the balance of payments subcomponents, we make a distinction between net 
balance and openness to separately evaluate the significance of the type of balance of 
payments surplus or deficit; and the importance of the size and volatility of external 
flows for each economy. Exchange rate flexibility is a unique characteristic in that it 
reflects the confluence of exchange rate regime/monetary policy framework, balance 
of payments shocks and intervention. We would expect that it has a negative 
relationship with intervention effects on changes in broad money to the extent that it 
is closely linked with intervention and captures the potentially looser control over 
intervention effects that may be associated with hard peg regimes. Meanwhile, as 
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mentioned earlier on, our expectation of the relationship between income levels and 
intervention effects could be positive or negative. 
 Before we discuss the results of the regression analysis, in Table 6.7, we 
present unconditional correlation coefficients between the coefficients on 
intervention effects and selected country characteristics, as well as between the 
characteristics themselves. The description of the measurement of each characteristic 
is provided in the notes to the table.93 We find that the short-run coefficient for real 
intervention effects on changes in real broad money only has statistically significant 
but economically small negative correlations with surplus periods and exchange rate 
flexibility. While the latter result is not surprising, the former seems counterintuitive, 
especially since surplus periods appear to be related to current account surpluses, 
which we expect, ceteris paribus, would translate into broad money increases. 
However, it could be that given we have, to some extent, controlled for income 
effects on broad money changes, the unique effect of intervention related to current 
account surpluses is less apparent. Furthermore, as mentioned, the measure of 
surplus periods lacks a size element, and also captures capital account surpluses. It is 
worth noting that the results in both instances, surplus periods and exchange rate 
flexibility, are likely influenced by outlier countries ± China and Japan94, and Hong 
Kong and Japan95, respectively. On the basis of the t-statistics for the correlations 
between the short-run coefficient and other characteristics, the next strongest links 
are the positive correlations with intervention volatility and the current account 
balance, the latter matched by a corresponding negative correlation with the capital 
account balance.  
  
 
 
 
                                                          
93
  A similar table, Table 5.6, was presented in Chapter 5. Some of the correlation coefficients between the 
same characteristics may show minor differences in size (but not in direction and statistical significance) on 
account of small differences in sample sizes. A brief discussion on the correlations between the characteristics is 
contained in Section 5.2.2.3 of Chapter 5. 
94
  Both countries have high proportions of surplus periods but negative short-run coefficients.  
95
  Hong Kong has very low exchange rate flexibility and a positive short-run coefficient. Japan has high 
exchange rate flexibility and a large negative short-run coefficient.  
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 Meanwhile, the long-run coefficient does not appear to have statistically 
significant correlations with any of the characteristics. The relatively strongest links, 
based on the t-statistics, are the negative correlation with exchange rate flexibility 
and the positive correlations with both, current account and capital account 
openness.96 
                                                          
96
  Upon consideration of the surplus years for the current account, capital account, net direct and portfolio 
investment balances and other investment balances; as well as the average balances for the latter two variables, 
we find a weakly statistically significant (at the 10% level) negative correlation between the number of surplus 
years in the net other investment balances with the short-run coefficient on real intervention effect (-0.316). 
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Table 6.7: Correlation Coefficients (with t-statistics) for Real Intervention Effects  
on Real Broad Money Change and Selected Country Characteristics 
 
Short-run 
coefficient 
(SR) LR Y/c FXIV 
 
 
FXIS RA ERF CAO KAO CAB 
Long-run coefficient (LR) 0.414**          
 (2.318)          
GDP per capita (Y/c)  0.014 0.049         
 (0.073) (0.249)         
Intervention volatility (FXIV)  0.264 0.182 0.358*        
 (1.398) (0.943) (1.957)        
Proportion of time with positive -0.347* -0.031 -0.117 0.198       
intervention (FXIS) (-1.889) (-0.160) (-0.599) (1.029)       
Reserve accumulation (RA)  0.007 0.136 0.096 0.691*** 0.686***      
 (0.038) (0.701) (0.492) (4.877) (4.804)      
Exchange rate flexibility (ERF)  -0.357* -0.206 0.013 -0.546*** -0.064 -0.427**     
 (-1.947) (-1.075) (0.068) (-3.323) (-0.329) (-2.409)     
Current account openness (CAO) 0.157 0.197 0.474*** 0.816*** 0.236 0.713*** -0.413**    
 (0.813) (1.025) (2.744) (7.206) (1.237) (5.191) (-2.315)    
Capital account openness (KAO) 0.181 0.220 0.610*** 0.836*** 0.065 0.508*** -0.427** 0.866***   
 (0.940) (1.147) (3.930) (7.754) (0.334) (3.007) (-2.410) (8.813)   
Current account balance (CAB) 0.207 0.115 0.394** 0.641*** 0.434** 0.708*** -0.247 0.612*** 0.492***  
 (1.077) (0.592) (2.186) (4.258) (2.460) (5.117) (-1.298) (3.949) (2.885)  
Capital account balance (KAB) -0.239 -0.087 -0.443** -0.419** -0.125 -0.266 0.147 -0.273 -0.295 -0.841*** 
 (-1.255) (-0.446) (-2.519) (-2.356) (-0.640) (-1.405) (0.760) (-1.448) (-1.572) (-7.923) 
  
x Y/c is the measure of the annual average of GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (millions of current international dollar) over the regression sample period.  
x FXIV is measured by the standard deviation of the monthly changes in foreign exchange reserves (in US dollar), scaled by the average annual nominal GDP (in US dollar). 
x FXIS is measured by the number of quarters with a positive increase in reserves as a proportion of the total number of quarters in the regression sample period. The values are between 0 and 1. 
x RA is the sum of change in foreign exchange reserves (in US dollar) scaled by the average annual nominal GDP (in US dollar). 
x ERF is identified based on the historical de facto fine classification provided by Ilzetzki et al. (2011) whiFKXSGDWHVWKHDQDO\VLVE\5HLQKDUWDQG5RJRII(VVHQWLDOO\HDFK\HDU¶VUHJLPHLV
assigned a number between 1 and 14, with larger numbers reflecting increased flexibility. We use the average over the years corresponding to the regression sample period as an indicator of each 
FRXQWU\¶VH[FKDQJHUDWHUHJLPHIOH[LELOLW\ 
x CAO and KAO are measured as the average of the sum of the absolute value of annual inflows and outflows for each account respectively, taken as a ratio to average annual GDP. CA, KA and 
GDP are in nominal US dollars. The KA also includes net errors and omissions. 
x CAB and KAB are measured as the average of the annual net position in each account scaled by the average annual GDP for the years that correspond to the regression sample period.  
x ***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
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 In Tables 6.8 and 6.9, we present the results of bivariate regressions between 
the short-run and long-run coefficients on intervention effects, with the selected 
country characteristics as listed in Table 6.7, and with the balances and surplus years 
for the capital account subcomponents. Consistent with the correlation coefficients 
presented in Table 6.7, we find statistically significant negative relationships 
between the short-run coefficient with surplus periods (FXIS) and exchange rate 
flexibility (ERF) respectively. Additionally, the short-run coefficient is negatively 
related to the proportion of surplus years recorded for net other investment balances 
(OIS). There are no other statistically significant linear relationships between the 
short-run and long-run coefficients with the country characteristics. However, similar 
to our correlation analysis in Table 6.7, we note on the basis of the t-statistics for the 
rest of the country characteristics, that the short-UXQFRHIILFLHQW¶VQH[WVWURQJHVWOLQNV
are with the current account and capital account balances; while in the case of the 
long-run coefficient, the strongest links are with exchange rate flexibility, and current 
account and capital account openness. We also observe that the signs on the 
coefficients of the regressors are consistent between the respective bivariate 
regressions for the short-run and long-run intervention coefficients, with the 
exception of the net other investment balance (OIB) which has a positive, albeit 
statistically insignificant, relationship with the long-run intervention effect. Plots of 
the coefficients against the various country characteristics are presented in Graphs 
6.3 and 6.4. From most of the plots, we note that there is very little indication of 
linear or discernible non-linear relationships between the coefficients and the 
characteristics. There appears be a quadratic relationship between per capita income 
and the long-run coefficient (Graph 6.4) which is also reflected in the RESET failure 
of the linear bivariate regression (Table 6.9).  
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Table 6.8: Bivariate Regressions between Short-run Real Intervention Effects 
on Real Broad Money Change and Country Characteristics  
Country Characteristic 
(Regressor in bivariate 
regression) 
Dependent Variable:  
Short-run Effect of  ? ?       ?   ?    ǡ ?      ?    ǡ  ? ?   
on  ? ?      ?    ǡ  ?      ?    ǡ  ? ? ?  
Coefficient t-statistic Adjusted 
R2 
Diagnostics 
1. GDP per capita (Y/c) 0.290 0.073 -0.04  
2. Intervention volatility 
(FXIV) 
0.090 1.398 0.03 Heteroscedasticity** 
3. Surplus periods (FXIS) -0.696 -1.890* 0.09  
4. Reserve accumulation (RA) 0.004 0.038 -0.04  
5. Exchange rate flexibility 
(ERF) 
-0.029 -1.947* 0.09  
6. Current account openness 
(CAO) 
0.035 0.813 -0.01 Heteroscedasticity* 
7. Capital account openness 
(KAO) 
0.143 0.940 -0.00  
8. Current account balance 
(CAB) 
0.820 1.077 0.01  
9. Current account surplus 
years (CAS) 
0.088 0.750 -0.02  
10. Capital account balance 
(KAB) 
-1.371 -1.255 0.02 Non-normality* 
11. Capital account surplus 
years (KAS) 
-0.114 -0.802 -0.01 Non-normality* 
12. Net direct and portfolio 
investment balance (DIPIB) 
-1.079 -0.933 -0.00  
13. Net direct and portfolio 
investment balance surplus 
years (DIPIS) 
-0.053 -0.338 -0.03  
14. Net other investment 
balance (OIB) 
-0.657 -0.629 -0.02  
15. Net other investment 
balance surplus years (OIS) 
-0.318 -1.697* 0.07  
 
All regressions include a constant which is not shown for brevity.  
For the t-statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%. 
See the notes to Tables 6.6(a) and (b), and Table 6.7 for descriptions of the respective regressors.  
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Table 6.9: Bivariate Regressions between Long-run Real Intervention Effects 
on Real Broad Money Change and Country Characteristics  
Country Characteristic 
(Regressor in bivariate 
regression) 
Dependent Variable:  
Long-run Effect of  ? ?       ?   ?    ǡ ?      ?    ǡ  ? ?   
on  ? ?      ?    ǡ  ?      ?    ǡ  ? ? ?  
Coefficient t-statistic Adjusted 
R2 
Diagnostics 
1. GDP per capita (Y/c) 2.852 0.249 -0.04 RESET failure** 
2. Intervention volatility 
(FXIV) 
0.180 0.943 -0.00  
3. Surplus periods (FXIS) -0.182 -0.160 -0.04  
4. Reserve accumulation (RA) 0.218 0.701 -0.02  
5. Exchange rate flexibility 
(ERF) 
-0.048 -1.075 0.01  
6. Current account openness 
(CAO) 
0.128 1.025 0.00  
7. Capital account openness 
(KAO) 
0.503 1.148 0.01  
8. Current account balance 
(CAB) 
1.325 0.590 -0.02  
9. Current account surplus 
years (CAS) 
0.239 0.704 -0.02  
10. Capital account balance 
(KAB) 
-1.442 -0.443 -0.03  
11. Capital account surplus 
years (KAS) 
-0.283 -0.683 -0.02  
12. Net direct and portfolio 
investment balance (DIPIB) 
-2.993 -0.889 -0.01  
13. Net direct and portfolio 
investment balance surplus 
years (DIPIS) 
-0.170 -0.373 -0.03  
14. Net other investment 
balance (OIB) 
0.742 0.243 -0.04  
15. Net other investment 
balance surplus years (OIS) 
-0.281 -0.491 -0.03  
 
All regressions include a constant which is not shown for brevity.  
For the t-statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%. 
See the notes to Tables 6.6(a) and (b), and Table 6.7 for descriptions of the respective regressors.  
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Graph 6.3: Short-run Real Intervention Effects on Real Broad Money Change
 
and Country Characteristics 
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Graph 6.3: Continued 
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Graph 6.3: Continued 
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Graph 6.4: Long-run Real Intervention Effects on Real Broad Money Change
 
and Country Characteristics 
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Graph 6.4: Continued 
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Graph 6.4: Continued 
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6.2.3  Regression Diagnostics 
 In this section, we provide a summary assessment of individual country 
baseline regressions drawing on the results of diagnostic tests. The diagnostic tests 
mainly consist of those for serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and normality in the 
regression UHVLGXDOVDQGUHJUHVVLRQPLVVSHFLILFDWLRQ5DPVH\¶V5(6(77KHLVVXH
of parameter stability is addressed in section 6.2.4. 
 
In Table 6.10, we indicate with a tick if the final parsimonious change in real 
broad money regression for each country has lagged dependent variables as 
regressors. Their presence may lead to inconsistent coefficient estimates if serial 
correlation is detected. We also indicate in the corresponding diagnostic tests 
columns if there was a rejection of the null hypothesis for specific tests and the 
associated level of statistical significance. If serial correlation, heteroscedasticity or 
non-normality was only detected in the unrestricted regression but not in the final 
parsimonious regression, we indicate as such.  
 
Small amounts of serial correlation are widely present across our individual 
country regressions. For 11 out of the total 22 cases, serial correlation is detected 
only in the unrestricted regressions. In almost all other instances, there are 
inconsistencies between the results from the F-test and the LM test. Robust standard 
errors are used in the baseline regressions for China, Indonesia, Korea, Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, Israel, Turkey, Japan and Norway.97 There are only three 
countries where lagged dependent variables are regressors in the presence of 
relatively strong serial correlation in the final parsimonious regression ± Korea, 
Israel and Japan.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
97
  Robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity are not used in the case of the Philippines 
because they worsen regression diagnostics, leading to serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in the 
parsimonious specification.  
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Table 6.10: Summary of Results for Diagnostic Tests  
 of Individual Country Real Broad Money Growth Baseline Regressions 
 
Country AR 
variables 
Diagnostic Tests Country AR 
variables 
Diagnostic Tests 
China 9 Serial correlation**^ 
RESET failure* 
Peru  Serial correlation **#^ 
Hong Kong   Serial correlation#^ Czech 
Republic 
9 Serial correlation*^ 
India 9 Serial correlation#^ Egypt 9 Serial correlation*^ 
Indonesia 9 Serial correlation*^ Hungary  Serial correlation#^ 
Korea 9 Serial correlation** Israel 9 Serial correlation** 
Malaysia 9 Serial correlation#^ Poland 9 Serial correlation*^ 
Philippines 9 Serial correlation#^ 
Heteroscedasticity** 
Russia 9 Serial correlation**^ 
Singapore 9 Serial correlation#^ South Africa 9  
Taiwan 9  Turkey  Serial correlation #^ 
Thailand 9  Australia 9  
Argentina  Serial correlation # 
RESET failure* 
Canada 9  
Brazil 9 Serial correlation*^ Denmark   
Chile   Japan 9 Serial correlation*** 
Non-normality** 
RESET failure* 
Colombia 9 Serial correlation **# 
 
New 
Zealand 
9 Serial correlation#^ 
Mexico 9 Serial correlation #^ Norway  Heteroscedasticity* 
 
9 Indicates presence of lagged values of the dependent variable as regressors.  
***significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.  
# Serial correlation or heteroscedasticity detected in the unrestricted regression only. No evidence of serial correlation  
   or heteroscedasticity in the final parsimonious regression. 
^ Of the serial correlation tests, the Breusch-Godfrey LM statistic (NR2) is significant but not the F-statistic for the  
   joint significance of all lagged residuals.  
 
 
 Given complex dynamics and indications of both positive and negative serial 
correlation in the baseline regressions, we abstain from attempting to draw 
generalised conclusions on the direction of possible bias in the coefficients for real 
intervention. We do not, however, expect this bias to be particularly strong since the 
diagnostic tests point to relatively weak serial correlation. Furthermore, our baseline 
regressions and the subsequent analysis presented have been geared towards 
comparing relative effects across countries rather than focussing on the absolute 
values of coefficients for specific countries.  
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6.2.4 Robustness Analysis 
 In this section, we evaluate the robustness of the baseline coefficients we 
presented in Table 6.1. First, we assess if using robust standard errors for those 
countries that displayed mixed results in the tests for serial correlation would 
substantially change the outcomes on the intervention effects.  Next, we compare the 
results from the baseline regressions against the results from unrestricted regressions. 
Thirdly, we also consider the stability of the coefficients from the baseline 
regressions over time.    
6.2.4.1  Robust Standard Errors for Selected Individual Country Regressions 
 For some of our baseline regressions, we used robust standard errors, in 
particular, based on the Newey-West HAC covariance matrix method since serial 
correlation appeared to be more prevalent than heteroscedasticity. We used these 
only when there was consistency in the results of the F-test and LM test for serial 
correlation. 
 In this subsection, we apply robust standard errors to the baseline regressions 
that display serial correlation, either in the unrestricted form or in the final 
parsimonious specification, as indicated by the LM test, even if the F-test does not 
provide similar evidence. The robust standard errors are used from the beginning of 
the estimation in our general to specific modelling approach. This leads to some 
differences in the variables that are retained in the final parsimonious specifications 
when compared to the baseline scenarios. The results for the coefficients on real 
intervention effects for the countries in question are reported in Table 6.11. We note 
that there are three countries for which the results differ quite substantially from the 
baseline coefficients ± Hong Kong, the Philippines and the Czech Republic. The 
results for diagnostic tests for all the countries are either similar or slightly worse. 
The effects of the changes to the coefficients are assessed by re-evaluating the 
equality tests and bivariate regressions that were carried out in subsection 6.2.2 using 
the coefficients from Table 6.11.  
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Table 6.11: Robustness Analysis of Real Intervention Effects  
on Real Broad Money Change ±  
Use of Robust Standard Errors for Selected Countries 
 
Country 
The effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?   
on  ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
 (i)  (ii) 
Contemporaneous Ƚ ? ? Long-run multiplier Į ?ǡ ? ? ?  ? Į ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ?Į ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
Hong Kong  0.719*** 
[3.182] 
2.092*** 
[23.914] 
 
1998q1-2010q2 
India 0.240* 
[1.827] 
0.320 
[1.671] 
1997q3-2010q2 
Malaysia 0.212*** 
[3.318] 
0.102 
[1.357] 
1991q2-2010q2 
Philippines -0.188 
[-0.919] 
-0.471 
[-0.779] 
1991q1-2010q2 
Singapore 0.173*** 
[3.414] 
0.355** 
[6.131] 
 
1990q2-2010q2 
Mexico -0.188** 
[-2.612] 
-0.103 
[1.088] 
 
1991q1-2010q2 
 
x Column (i) reports the contemporaneous effect and the corresponding t-statistic. 
x Column (ii) reports the long-run multiplier and the corresponding F-statistic. 
The F-statistic is for the test,  ? Ƚ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? Ƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? = 0. x For both the t-and F-statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;  
     *: significant at 10%, using (Default), [Newey West], {White} standard errors.   
x The results are based on restricted regressions, which include only statistically significant 
variables at the minimum 10% significance level. Regressors are removed one at a time in 
a unidirectional backwards manner based on the lowest t-statistic each time. This applies to 
all regressors except the contemporaneous effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  which is 
not removed in the general to specific modelling process. 
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Table 6.11: Continued 
Country 
The effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?   
on  ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
 (i)  (ii) 
Contemporaneous Ƚ ? ? Long-run multiplier Į ?ǡ ? ? ?  ? Į ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ?Į ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
Peru 
 
0.192*** 
[3.137] 
0.501*** 
[57.277] 
 
1995q2-2010q2 
Czech Republic -0.273** 
[-2.185] 
0.069 
[0.655] 
1997q2-2010q2 
Hungary 0.037 
[0.626] 
0.125 
[1.799] 
1996q2-2012q2 
Poland  -0.019 
[-0.328] 
1.042** 
[6.052] 
1998q1-2010q2 
Russia 
 
0.268** 
[7.395] 
0.649** 
[55.365] 
1996q2-2010q2 
New Zealand 0.211 
[1.274] 
0.410** 
[6.607] 
 
1991q2-2010q2 
 
x Column (i) reports the contemporaneous effect and the corresponding t-statistic. 
x Column (ii) reports the long-run multiplier and the corresponding F-statistic. 
The F-statistic is for the test,  ? Ƚ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? Ƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? = 0. x For both the t-and F-statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;  
     *: significant at 10%, using (Default), [Newey West], {White} standard errors.   
x The results are based on restricted regressions, which include only statistically significant 
variables at the minimum 10% significance level. Regressors are removed one at a time in 
a unidirectional backwards manner based on the lowest t-statistic each time. This applies to 
all regressors except the contemporaneous effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ? which is 
not removed in the general to specific modelling process. 
 
 
 In the following tables, Table 6.12 and Table 6.13, we highlight selected 
results from the subgroup equality tests98 and bivariate regressions respectively for 
which there are changes to statistical significance arising from the use of the 
coefficients which were presented in Table 6.11. In our assessment, caution needs to 
be exercised in reading these results as it would appear that the exceptionally large 
short-run and long-run coefficients on real intervention effects for Hong Kong exert 
substantial influence on the changes we observe in regard to the bivariate 
regressions. Even so, the changes themselves are not major, in that there are only a 
                                                          
98
  The number of countries in each quartile beginning with the upper quartile is as follows: 7, 14, and 7 
respectively, for both the short-run and long-run coefficients. 
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few differences to statistical significance. Otherwise, the signs on the regression 
coefficients and the ordering of means and medians (in particular, the largest or 
smallest value) of subgroups generally remain the same even if the absolute values 
have changed.  
Table 6.12: Sensitivity Analysis of Equality Tests  
with the use of Robust Standard Errors for Selected Countries 
(a) Differences in Short-run Intervention Effects between Groups of Countries 
 Current Account (CA) Balance  Group Mean of Intervention Effect 
Equality 
Test 
Statistic 
 
CA surplus 0.209 3.659* 
 
CA deficit 0.124 
Baseline scenario reference: Tables 6.5 
(b) Differences in Long-run Intervention Effects between Groups of Countries 
 
CA surplus 0.659 2.861* 
 
CA deficit 0.218 
Baseline scenario reference: Tables 6.5 
(c) Differences in Country Characteristics Grouped by Boxplot Quartiles of 
Short-run Intervention Effects 
Country Characteristic 
Subgroup Average/[Median] 
of Characteristic  Equality  Test 
Statistic Upper quartile 
Inter-
quartile  
Lower 
quartile 
1. Current account average balance [3.436] [-0.482] [-1.988] 3.363 
2. Intervention volatility [0.538] [0.743] [0.416] 5.017* 
Baseline scenario reference: Tables 6.6(a) 
(d) Differences in Country Characteristics Grouped by Boxplot Quartiles of 
Long-run Intervention Effects 
 Surplus quarters [0.673] [0.594] [0.680] 4.903* 
Baseline scenario reference: Tables 6.6(b) 
 
The results presented are only those for which there have been changes to the statistical significance of the 
equality test statistics in comparison to the baseline scenario. 
Differences in mean/median: ***significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at 
the 10% level.  
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Table 6.13: Sensitivity Analysis of Bivariate Regressions 
with the use of Robust Standard Errors for Selected Countries 
Country Characteristic 
(Regressor in bivariate regression) 
Dependent Variable:  
Short-run Real Intervention Effect 
Coefficient t-statistic 
1. Intervention volatility (FXIV) 0.179 2.546** 
2. Surplus periods (FXIS) -0.578 -1.287 
3. Capital account openness (KAO) 0.395 2.395** 
4. Net direct and portfolio investment 
balance (DIPIB) -2.644 -2.059** 
5. Net other investment balance surplus 
years (OIS) -0.334 -1.496 
Baseline scenario reference: Table 6.8 
  Dependent Variable:  
Long-run Real Intervention Effect 
1. Intervention volatility (FXIV) -0.172 -1.332 
2. Current account openness (CAO) 0.217 1.675* 
3. Capital account openness (KAO) 1.055 2.427** 
4. Net direct and portfolio investment 
balance (DIPIB) -6.374 -1.852* 
Baseline scenario reference: Table 6.9 
 
The results presented are only those for which there have been changes to the statistical 
significance of the regressors in comparison to the baseline scenario. 
***significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.  
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6.2.4.2  Real Intervention Effects from Unrestricted Regressions 
 In Tables 6.14 and 6.15 we present the results for the short-run and long-run 
coefficients on real intervention effects derived from unrestricted regressions (all the 
lags of all the explanatory variables as per equation (6.1) have been kept intact, 
regardless of statistical significance). We still include the impulse dummy variables 
that appear in the baseline restricted regressions. When compared to the baseline 
results, the coefficients for both the short-run and long-run effects tend to exhibit 
lower statistical significance in most instances. This is not unexpected given the 
increase in the number of explanatory variables and likely multicollinearity across 
these variables. The differences in terms of economic significance vary across 
country groups as can be seen from the group averages, with the least difference 
observed for the Asian countries. Nevertheless, sample correlations between the 
unrestricted regression results and the baseline restricted regression results are quite 
high at 0.91 and 0.81 for the short-run and long-run coefficients respectively.  
 Using the coefficients on short-run and long-run real intervention effects 
from the unrestricted regressions, in Table 6.16, we highlight the results for equality 
tests based on the country groups from Table 6.5 and the new boxplot quartiles99 
(baseline scenario: Tables 6.6(a) and (b)) for which there are changes to statistical 
significance. We do the same for the bivariate regressions in Table 6.17 (baseline 
scenario: Tables 6.8 and 6.9). We observe that for the equality tests, the changes are 
mostly to statistical insignificance of the relevance of several country characteristics 
for the short-run intervention effects. Meanwhile for the bivariate regressions, we 
note that several regressors are now statistically significant in the regressions with 
long-run intervention effects as the dependent variable.  The results for the bivariate 
regressions, however, appear to be influenced by the large coefficients for Hong 
Kong and Australia. Nevertheless, it is worth highlighting that the relative sizes or 
ordering (monotonic or otherwise) of the characteristics in question and the signs on 
                                                          
99
  The number of countries in each quartile beginning with the upper quartile is as follows: 7, 14, and 7 
for the short-run coefficients; and 6, 15, and 7 for the long-run coefficients. 
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coefficients in the bivariate regressions are generally unchanged.100 Thus, in our 
assessment, these results do not contradict the baseline scenario.  
Table 6.14: Robustness Analysis of Real Intervention Effects  
on Real Broad Money Change -  
Individual Country Results from Unrestricted Regressions 
 
Country 
The effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?   
on  ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
 (i)  (ii) 
Contemporaneous Ƚ ? ? Long-run multiplier Į ?ǡ ? ? ?  ? Į ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ?Į ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
Asia  
China 0.021 
[0.120] 
0.692* 
[3.274] 
 
1991q2-2010q2 
Hong Kong  0.510 
(1.167) 
2.485** 
(6.687) 
 
1998q1-2010q2 
India 0.198 
(0.819) 
0.163 
(0.162) 
1997q3-2010q2 
Indonesia 0.445** 
[2.157] 
0.388 
[1.923] 
1995q2-2010q2 
Korea 0.058 
[0.270] 
-0.890 
[1.389] 
1991q2-2010q2 
Malaysia 0.212*** 
(2.939) 
-0.390 
(2.026) 
1991q2-2010q2 
Philippines 0.039 
(0.169) 
0.443 
(0.296) 
1991q2-2010q2 
Singapore 0.144 
(1.612) 
0.637 
(1.160) 
1991q2-2010q2 
Thailand 0.167 
(1.236) 
1.181 
(1.730) 
 
1991q2-2010q2 
 
x Column (i) reports the contemporaneous effect and the corresponding t-statistic. 
x Column (ii) reports the long-run multiplier and the corresponding F-statistic. 
The F-statistic is for the test, ? Ƚ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? Ƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? = 0. x For both the t-and F-statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;  
     *: significant at 10%, using (Default), [Newey West], {White} standard errors.   
x The results are based on unrestricted regressions, which include all regressors regardless 
of statistical significance. 
 
  
                                                          
100
  The exceptions are the sign for surplus periods, which turns positive, and for net other investment 
balance, which turns negative, in the respective bivariate regressions with long-run intervention effects as the 
dependent variable. Nevertheless, both regressors remain statistically insignificant.  
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Table 6.14: Continued 
 
Country 
The effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?   
on  ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
 (i)  (ii) 
Contemporaneous Ƚ ? ? Long-run multiplier Į ?ǡ ? ? ?  ? Į ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ?Į ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
Latin America  
Argentina 0.391** 
[2.267] 
0.432 
[0.917] 
 
1995q2-2010q2 
Brazil 0.236** 
[2.136] 
-0.022 
[0.004] 
 
1997q4-2010q2 
Chile -0.040 
(-0.258) 
-0.225 
(0.373) 
1991q2-2010q2 
Colombia 0.197 
[0.725] 
0.178 
[0.135] 
1995q2-2010q2 
Mexico -0.195 
(-1.459) 
-0.118 
(0.168) 
1991q2-2010q2 
Peru 0.140* 
(1.750) 
0.378* 
(3.330) 
1995q2-2010q2 
 
x Column (i) reports the contemporaneous effect and the corresponding t-statistic. 
x Column (ii) reports the long-run multiplier and the corresponding F-statistic. 
The F-statistic is for the test,  ? Ƚ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? Ƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? = 0. x For both the t and F statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;  
     *: significant at 10%, using (Default), [Newey West], {White} standard errors.   
x The results are based on unrestricted regressions, which include all regressors regardless 
of statistical significance. 
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Table 6.14: Continued 
 
Country 
The effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?   
on  ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
 (i)  (ii) 
Contemporaneous Ƚ ? ? Long-run multiplier Į ?ǡ ? ? ?  ? Į ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ?Į ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
Other Emerging Market Economies(EMEs)-Europe, Middle East and 
Africa 
Czech Republic 0.015 
(0.052) 
0.360 
(1.246) 
 
1997q2-2010q2 
Hungary 0.019 
(0.155) 
0.144 
(0.408) 
1996q2-2010q2 
Israel 0.054 
[0.376] 
-0.326* 
[3.190] 
1991q2-2010q2 
Poland -0.096 
(-0.646) 
0.965 
(0.254) 
1998q1-2010q2 
Russia 0.291*** 
(3.725) 
0.691** 
(5.337) 
1996q3-2010q2 
South Africa -0.238 
(-0.718) 
1.170** 
(4.063) 
1991q2-2010q2 
Turkey -0.292 
[-1.649] 
-0.303 
[0.197] 
1995q2-2010q2 
 
x Column (i) reports the contemporaneous effect and the corresponding t-statistic. 
x Column (ii) reports the long-run multiplier and the corresponding F-statistic. 
The F-statistic is for the test,  ? Ƚ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? Ƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? = 0. x For both the t-and F-statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;  
     *: significant at 10%, using (Default), [Newey West], {White} standard errors.   
x The results are based on unrestricted regressions, which include all regressors regardless 
of statistical significance. 
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Table 6.14: Continued 
 
Country 
The effect of  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?   
on  ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
 (i)  (ii) 
Contemporaneous Ƚ ? ? Long-run multiplier Į ?ǡ ? ? ?  ? Į ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ?Į ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
Developed Economies 
Australia 0.251 
 (0.277) 
-1.760 
(0.094) 
 
1991q2-2010q2 
Canada 0.238 
(0.526) 
2.197 
(0.552) 
 
1991q2-2010q2 
Denmark^ -0.146 
(-0.803) 
-0.114 
(0.076) 
1991q1-2010q2 
Japan -0.567 
[-1.216] 
-0.940 
[1.838] 
1991q2-2010q2 
New Zealand 0.283 
(1.325) 
0.531 
(1.966) 
1991q2-2010q2 
Norway 0.346*** 
(3.663) 
0.908*** 
(19.102) 
1991q2-2010q2 
 
x Column (i) reports the contemporaneous effect and the corresponding t-statistic. 
x Column (ii) reports the long-run multiplier and the corresponding F-statistic. 
The F-statistic is for the test,  ? Ƚ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? Ƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? = 0. x For both the t-and F-statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;  
     *: significant at 10%, using (Default), [Newey West], {White} standard errors.   
x The results are based on unrestricted regressions, which include all regressors 
regardless of statistical significance. 
x ^Excludes impulse dummy variables which appear in the baseline restricted 
regression. Regressors may be perfectly collinear with the inclusion of the impulse 
dummy variables. 
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Table 6.15: Robustness Analysis of Real Intervention Effects  
on Real Broad Money Change -  
Group Averages based on Unrestricted Regressions 
 
Group  
The group average effect of   ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?   
on  ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
 (i)  (ii) 
Contemporaneous Ƚ ? ? Long-run multiplier Į ?ǡ ? ? ?  ? Į ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?  ?Į ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
Asia 
 
 
0.199 
(1.165) 
 
0.523 
(2.072) 
Latin America 
 
0.122 
(0.860) 
0.104 
(0.821) 
 
Other EMEs 
 
 
-0.035 
(1.046) 
 
0.386 
(2.099) 
 
Developed Economies 0.068 
(1.302) 
0.132* 
(3.938) 
 
TOTAL 
 
 
0.096 
(1.222) 
 
0.315 
(2.211) 
 
Sample standard deviation 
 
0.239 0.871 
Correlation with baseline 
restricted regression results: Correlation (t-statistic) 
Full sample 0.91*** 
(11.506) 
0.81*** 
(7.031) 
 
x Column (i) reports the simple average of the contemporaneous effect and the corresponding 
average t statistic. 
x Column (ii) reports the simple average of the long-run multiplier and the corresponding 
average F-statistic. 
The F-statistic is for the test,  ? Ƚ ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ? Ƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? = 0. x For both the t-and F-statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;  
     *: significant at 10%. 
x The results are based on unrestricted regressions, which include all regressors regardless of 
statistical significance. 
x Data excludes Egypt and Taiwan. 
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Table 6.16: Sensitivity Analysis of Equality Tests  
with the use of Results from Unrestricted Regressions 
Differences in Country Characteristics Grouped by Boxplot Quartiles of 
Short-run Intervention Effects 
Country Characteristic 
Subgroup Average/[Median] 
of Characteristic  Equality  Test 
Statistic Upper quartile 
Inter-
quartile  
Lower 
quartile 
1. Current account average balance [3.436] [-0.010] [-1.988] 1.682 
2. Capital account surplus years 0.500 0.743 0.689 1.658 
3. Capital account average balance [-0.313] [2.282] [2.647] 1.454 
4. Net direct and portfolio 
investment balance surplus years 0.614 0.799 0.718 1.099 
5. Net direct and portfolio 
investment average balance [1.261] [2.568] [1.814] 1.107 
6. Reserve accumulation [0.144] [0.386] [0.203] 4.874* 
Baseline scenario reference: Tables 6.6(a) 
 
The results presented are only those for which there have been changes to the statistical significance of the 
equality test statistics in comparison to the baseline scenario. 
Differences in mean/median: ***significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at 
the 10% level.  
 
 
Table 6.17: Sensitivity Analysis of Bivariate Regressions  
with the use of Results from Unrestricted Regressions 
Country Characteristic 
(Regressor in bivariate regression) 
Dependent Variable:  
Short-run Real Intervention Effect 
Coefficient t-statistic 
1. Intervention volatility (FXIV) 0.160 2.432** 
2. Surplus periods (FXIS) -0.536 -1.286 
3. Capital account openness (KAO) 0.275 1.719* 
Baseline scenario reference: Table 6.8 
  Dependent Variable:  
Long-run Real Intervention Effect 
1. Intervention volatility (FXIV) 0.517 2.106** 
2. Exchange rate flexibility (ERF) -0.112 -1.900* 
3. Current account openness (CAO) 0.352 2.211** 
4. Capital account openness (KAO) 1.378 2.497** 
5. Net direct and portfolio investment 
balance (DIPIB) -8.478 -1.941* 
Baseline scenario reference: Table 6.9 
 
The results presented are only those for which there have been changes to the statistical 
significance of the regressors in comparison to the baseline scenario. 
***significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.  
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6.2.4.3  Stability Analysis of Baseline Real Intervention Effects  
 8VLQJ HDFK FRXQWU\¶V ILQDO SDUVLPRQLRXV VSHFLILFDWLRQ ZH UXQ UHJUHVVLRQV
from the beginning of the sample period available for each country, up to 2000q4 and 
2005q4 respectively. In Table 6.18, we compare the short-run and long-run 
coefficients for real intervention effects from these regressions against those of the 
baseline regressions. 
 The averages for the coefficients across the full set of countries appear to be 
fairly stable over time. On an individual-country basis, however, there is some 
degree of instability, which is not unexpected since changes in economic and 
institutional factors over time are likely to influence the dynamics of real 
intervention effects on changes in real broad money. The coefficients appear to be 
particularly stable for Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Peru, Russia 
and Norway. For countries with coefficients that are statistically insignificant and/or 
closer to zero in value, there seem to be changes in the signs of the coefficients over 
time.   
 To make inferences about the statistical significance of the variations in 
intervention effects over time that we observe in Table 6.19, we formally test for 
changes in the constant term and seasonal factors, the contemporaneous and lagged 
coefficients on real intervention, and the lagged coefficients on the change in real 
broad money. On the basis of a single unknown breakpoint, in Table 6.19, we report 
the Quandt-Andrews supremum or maximum Wald statistic (sup-W), which allows 
for the identification of the most likely location for a breakpoint, as well as the 
Andrews-Ploberger average of the sequence of exponential Wald statistics (exp-W) 
which correspond to the tested breakpoints.  Additionally, we present results of the 
traditional Chow test for known breakpoint, using the mid-point of the regression 
sample period for each country as the breakpoint to be tested.101  
 The results suggest that the coefficients under investigation have been stable 
over time for most countries. The countries exhibiting evidence of instability based 
on the Quandt-Andrews/Andrews-Ploberger tests are Argentina, Israel, New 
Zealand, and to a lesser degree, the Philippines and Indonesia. There is also 
relatively weak statistical significance of instability observed either in the Quandt-
                                                          
101
  These are the same tests that were utilised and discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Andrews/Andrews-Ploberger test results or in the Chow test statistic for Colombia, 
Malaysia and Singapore. The breakpoints for Argentina and Israel seem to coincide 
ZLWK FKDQJHV LQ HDFKFRXQWU\¶VPRQHWDU\Solicy framework - $UJHQWLQD¶V FXUUHQF\
board collapsed in 2002q1; and in Israel, the short-term interest rates were adopted as 
the policy instrument in 1995 following the gradual implementation of inflation-
targeting in the prior few years. The breakpoint for the Philippines appears to 
precede the looser observance of intermediate money targets over 1995-1996; for 
Indonesia, the breakpoint occurs during the Asian financial crisis; while for New 
Zealand, the breakpoint occurs in advance of the changes to foreign exchange 
intervention policy in 2004 and changes to the liquidity management framework in 
2006.  
 In Appendix 7, we present the results of Chow tests for selected countries, 
carried out for the specific dates where known changes to monetary policy 
frameworks have taken place. Most of the dates corresponding to changes to 
monetary policy frameworks do not appear to entail statistically significant changes 
to real intervention effects. However, the Chow test does indicate instability not 
picked up by the Quandt-Andrews test for Malaysia, Korea and to a lesser extent, 
Mexico. Statistical significance of instability is consistent with the Quandt-Andrews 
test with regard to the Philippines, Israel and New Zealand though the breakpoint 
dates differ in particular for New Zealand.  
 Taken together and in comparison to the results in Chapter 5, we can make 
several observations. Similar to the results for the real intervention effects on 
changes in real base money, the results here suggest that for many countries, the 
move to an inflation-targeting framework during the sample period did not signal a 
break in the real intervention effects on changes in real broad money. For Korea, the 
Philippines and Israel, there is tentative evidence that the breakpoints coincide with 
changes to monetary policy operating and intermediate targets, that is, from base 
money and monetary aggregates, to interest rates. With regard to Korea, Malaysia 
and Indonesia, the statistically significant breakpoints occur during the Asian 
financial crisis or just after, possibly as an indication of the structural change in these 
FRXQWULHV¶UHVSHFWLYHEDODQFHRISD\PHQWV ,W LVDOVRWKHFDVHWKDWZKLOHEUHDNGDWHV
appear statistically significant for real intervention effects on changes in broad 
money, they do not for real intervention effects on changes in base money (and vice-
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versa), with exceptions being Malaysia and New Zealand (See Table 6.14 and 
Appendix 7 versus Table 5.15 and Appendix 5). With regard to New Zealand, while 
the statistically significant break date 2006q3 is common in both the base money and 
broad money regressions, it is interesting to note that real intervention effect changes 
in different directions ± larger with regard to changes in real base money but smaller 
with regard to changes in real broad money (see the results of recursive regressions 
in Table 6.17 versus Table 5.14).  
 As an indication of the overall stability of the regression specifications we 
have used in our baseline analysis, we present the results of tests for stability across 
all parameters, in Appendix 8. The results indicate a greater amount of instability 
compared to the tests that focus on the subset of real intervention effects. This 
implies that there is instability in the relationship between changes in real broad 
money and the traditional money demand determinants.102 The countries recording 
statistically significant breaks are Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, the Czech Republic, Israel, Poland, Turkey, Japan and 
Norway. The test does not pick up instability in the case of Indonesia, possibly due to 
the large trimmings, and also, rather more oddly, in the case of New Zealand.  
 As a concluding comment for this subsection, we note that our results have to 
be viewed in the context of the sample sizes and results of diagnostic tests for our 
baseline regressions. In particular, though largely of minor degree, the presence of 
serial correlation or heteroscedasticity for some of our baseline regressions, and 
small sizes elsewhere despite a lack of diagnostic issues, affects the finite and 
asymptotic distributions of the test statistics under the null hypothesis.  
 
 
 
                                                          
102
  We also carried out the Bai-Perron test for multiple breaks across the full set of parameters. There are 
some differences when compared against the results of the Quandt-Andrews test as follows: (i) the Bai-Perron 
test identifies two breaks for  Argentina; (ii) in contrast to the absence of statistically significant single 
breakpoints under the Quandt-Andrews test for Peru and Canada, the Bai-Perron test identifies three breaks 
respectively for each country; and (iii) for Colombia, Mexico, Hong Kong, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland and Israel, the Bai-Perron test does not identify any breaks, in contrast to indications of some statistical 
significance based on the Quandt-Andrews test. The Bai-Perron test is subject to distortions in power and size 
(see Antoshin et al. (2008)), but nevertheless provides a check for the robustness of our stability analysis.  
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Table 6.18:  Results from Recursive Regressions for  
Real Intervention Effects on Real Broad Money Change  
Country 
The effect of  ? ?       ?   ?    ǡ ?      ?    ǡ  ? ?   
on  ? ?      ?    ǡ  ?      ?    ǡ  ? ? ?  
Short-run Coefficient 
(for sample ending) 
Long-run Coefficient 
(for sample ending) 
2000q4 2005q4 2010q2 2000q4 2005q4 2010q2 
Asia 
China 0.213 0.100 -0.103 1.103* 0.789 0.743*** 
Hong Kong n.a. 0.533 0.330 n.a. 1.825** 1.316** 
India n.a. 0.238 0.288* n.a. -0.015 0.297 
Indonesia n.a. 0.055 0.440** n.a. 0.510* 0.357** 
Korea 0.223 -0.030 0.048 -1.602** -1.246 -0.752** 
Malaysia 0.202** 0.218*** 0.201*** 0.073 0.114 0.042 
Philippines 0.122 0.141 0.042 1.915 2.201** 1.396** 
Singapore 0.198** 0.172*** 0.169*** 0.402* 0.319** 0.374** 
Thailand 0.334 0.240 0.191* 2.088* 1.869** 1.792*** 
Latin America 
Argentina 0.488** 0.793*** 0.512*** 0.307 0.636*** 0.379** 
Brazil n.a. 0.104 0.199*** n.a. -0.364 0.041 
Chile 0.076 0.134 0.052 0.076 0.134 0.052 
Colombia 0.052 0.158 0.346*** 0.158 0.309 0.614** 
Mexico -0.316*** -0.150* -0.225** -0.082 0.033 -0.164 
Peru 0.245 0.268*** 0.226*** 0.595** 0.587*** 0.569*** 
 
Regressions are estimated recursively using HDFKFRXQWU\¶V full sample baseline estimating equation. 
Coefficient estimates are reported based on the regressions run from the beginning of the sample to 2000q4, 
2005q4 and 2010q2 respectively, depending on the available sample size. The 2010q2 results correspond to 
those in Table 6.1 and are reported here for comparison purposes. 
***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.  
n.a. Not available or not reported, on account of short sample period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  
254 
 
Table 6.18:  Continued 
Country 
The effect of  ? ?       ?   ?    ǡ ?      ?    ǡ  ? ?   
on  ? ?      ?    ǡ  ?      ?    ǡ  ? ? ?  
Short-run Coefficient  
(for sample ending) 
Long-run Coefficient  
(for sample ending) 
2000q4 2005q4 2010q2 2000q4 2005q4 2010q2 
Other Emerging Market Economies 
Czech 
Republic 
n.a. 0.056 0.052 n.a. 0.312 0.226 
Hungary -0.086 -0.047 0.015 -0.072 0.125 0.095 
Israel -0.010 0.097 0.091 -0.233 -0.095 -0.164 
Poland n.a. -0.130 0.007 n.a. 0.918 1.211* 
Russia 0.301* 0.292*** 0.292*** 0.682** 0.522*** 0.515*** 
South Africa -0.406 -0.252 -0.020 0.848 0.694* 0.882** 
Turkey 0.074 -0.310** -0.300*** 0.954 -0.168 -0.214 
Developed Economies 
Australia 0.561 -0.087 0.081 1.078 -0.487 0.172 
Canada -0.396 0.230 0.371 -0.053 0.786 1.883* 
Denmark 0.024 0.020 0.048 0.341 0.393** 0.336** 
Japan 0.836 -0.411 -0.455 0.761 -0.364 -0.409 
New 
Zealand 
0.629** 0.340* 0.233 0.619** 0.343** 0.496*** 
Norway 0.373*** 0.316*** 0.296*** 1.383*** 1.107*** 1.039*** 
Average  
for all 
countries  ^
 
0.170 
 
0.110 
 
0.122 
 
0.516 
 
0.421 
 
0.469 
 
Regressions are estimated recursively using HDFKFRXQWU\¶V full sample baseline estimating equation. 
Coefficient estimates are reported based on the regressions run from the beginning of the sample to 2000q4, 
2005q4 and 2010q2 respectively, depending on the available sample size. The 2010q2 results correspond to 
those in Table 6.1 and are reported here for comparison purposes. 
***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.  
n.a. Not available or not reported, on account of short sample period.  
^ Average excludes Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Czech Republic, and Poland for the sample period 
ending 2000. 
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Table 6.19:  Structural Break Tests for  
Real Intervention Effects on Real Broad Money Change 
Country 
Quandt-Andrews/ 
Andrews-Ploberger Tests# Chow Test
#
 
Unknown 
Breakpoint 
[Trimming] 
Sup-W  
Statistic 
(p-value) 
Exp-W  
Statistic 
(p-value) 
Regression 
Sample 
Midpoint 
F-statistic 
(p-value) 
Asia 
China 2006q1 
[15%] 
17.501 
(0.389) 
6.108 
(0.369) 
2000q4 0.874 
(0.555) 
Hong Kong 2000q3 
[15%] 
7.121 
(0.862) 
2.286 
(0.710) 
2004q2 0.334 
(0.888) 
India 2005q3 
[15%] 
11.973 
(0.644) 
4.223 
(0.493) 
2004q1 1.014 
(0.440) 
Indonesia 1998q1 
[15%] 
20.320* 
(0.083) 
7.784** 
(0.048) 
2002q4 0.913 
(0.510) 
Korea 1999q2 
[15%] 
14.315 
(0.284) 
4.564 
(0.280) 
2000q2 1.107 
(0.368) 
Malaysia 1997q3 
[15%] 
14.407 
(0.171) 
5.220* 
(0.099) 
2000q4 0.798 
(0.556) 
Philippines 1994q1 
[15%] 
20.166** 
(0.048) 
7.453** 
(0.033) 
2000q4 1.028 
(0.416) 
Singapore 2005q3 
[15%] 
12.530 
(0.438) 
4.473 
(0.297) 
2000q2 2.071* 
(0.068) 
Thailand 1995q1 
[15%] 
8.423 
(0.553) 
2.184 
(0.546) 
2000q4 0.303 
(0.875) 
Latin America 
Argentina 2002q1 
[15%] 
21.763** 
(0.013) 
8.273*** 
(0.007) 
2002q4 3.330** 
(0.013) 
Brazil 2001q3 
[20%] 
17.951 
(0.410) 
6.814 
(0.333) 
2004q2 1.550 
(0.205) 
Chile 2007q1 
[15%] 
9.010 
(0.140) 
1.489 
(0.313) 
2000q4 0.264 
(0.769) 
Colombia 2003q1 
[15%] 
14.912 
(0.146) 
5.235* 
(0.098) 
2003q1 2.982** 
(0.021) 
Mexico 1994q4 
[15%] 
16.316 
(0.163) 
5.696 
(0.129) 
2001q1 1.651 
(0.152) 
Peru 2007q3 
[15%] 
11.465 
(0.547) 
3.891 
(0.422) 
2003q1 0.547 
(0.769) 
  
#
 The coefficients that are allowed to vary under the alternative hypothesis are the constant term 
and seasonal factors, the contemporaneous and lagged coefficients on real intervention, and the 
lagged coefficients on the change in real base money. 
Sup-W: Maximum of Wald statistics; Exp-W: average of exponential Wald statistics. 
The Quandt-Andrews Sup-W test statistic corresponds to the maximum of the sequence of Wald 
test statistics for different potential breakpoints. The unknown breakpoint is the date where the 
maximum statistic is recorded and therefore, the most likely breakpoint location. The Andrews-
Ploberger Exp-W test statistic corresponds to the average of the exponential of the same sequence 
of Wald test statistics.  
The distribution of these test statistics is non-standard and the p-values follow Hansen (1997). A 
portion of the sample is excluded from the test. This trimming percentage, equally split between 
the beginning and the end of the sample for each country, is the lowest percentage that allows for 
enough observations to identify subsample parameters. The standard 15% is used as minimum 
trimming where possible.   
***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.  
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Table 6.19:  Continued 
Country 
Quandt-Andrews/ 
Andrews-Ploberger Tests# Chow Test
#
 
Unknown 
Breakpoint 
[Trimming] 
Sup-W  
Statistic 
(p-value) 
Exp-W  
Statistic 
(p-value) 
Regression 
Sample 
Midpoint 
F-statistic 
(p-value) 
Other Emerging Market Economies 
Czech 
Republic 
2003q2 
[40%] 
3.983 
(0.991) 
1.617 
(0.967) 
2004q1 0.439 
(0.889) 
Hungary 2008q1 
[15%] 
11.811 
(0.660) 
3.898 
(0.575) 
2003q3 0.806 
(0.588) 
Israel 1994q4 
[15%] 
36.867*** 
(0.001) 
14.674*** 
(0.001) 
2001q1 0.834 
(0.589) 
Poland 2006q4 
[25%] 
16.414 
(0.478) 
6.261 
(0.400) 
2004q3 0.629 
(0.773) 
Russia 2000q1 
[15%] 
18.572 
(0.140) 
6.936* 
(0.091) 
2003q2 0.724 
(0.653) 
South Africa 1994q3 
[15%] 
13.179 
(0.377) 
4.754 
(0.247) 
2000q3 1.242 
(0.298) 
Turkey 1997q3 
[15%] 
16.018 
(0.103) 
4.464 
(0.178) 
2003q1 0.390 
(0.853) 
Developed Economies 
Australia 2006q4 
[15%] 
20.934 
(0.174) 
7.276 
(0.195) 
2000q4 0.899 
(0.533) 
Canada  2006q3 
[15%] 
15.873 
(0.650) 
5.666 
(0.580) 
2001q1 0.358 
(0.959) 
Denmark 2002q2 
[30%] 
7.177 
(0.520) 
2.268 
(0.442) 
2000q3 0.310 
(0.870) 
Japan 2000q4 
[30%] 
10.447 
(0.326) 
4.143 
(0.192) 
2001q1 1.442 
(0.222) 
New 
Zealand 
2003q2 
[15%] 
25.862*** 
(0.006) 
9.743*** 
(0.005) 
2001q1 2.081* 
(0.069) 
Norway 1998q3 
[40%] 
15.017 
(0.215) 
5.558 
(0.247) 
2000q3 0.687 
(0.701) 
 
#
 The coefficients that are allowed to vary under the alternative hypothesis are the constant term 
and seasonal factors, the contemporaneous and lagged coefficients on real intervention, and the 
lagged coefficients on the change in real base money. 
Sup-W: Maximum of Wald statistics; Exp-W: average of exponential Wald statistics. 
The Quandt-Andrews Sup-W test statistic corresponds to the maximum of the sequence of Wald 
test statistics for different potential breakpoints. The unknown breakpoint is the date where the 
maximum statistic is recorded and therefore, the most likely breakpoint location. The Andrews-
Ploberger Exp-W test statistic corresponds to the average of the exponential of the same sequence 
of Wald test statistics.  
The distribution of these test statistics is non-standard and the p-values follow Hansen (1997). A 
portion of the sample is excluded from the test. This trimming percentage, equally split between 
the beginning and the end of the sample for each country, is the lowest percentage that allows for 
enough observations to identify subsample parameters. The standard 15% is used as minimum 
trimming where possible.   
***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.  
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6.3 CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter, we set out to investigate the effects of real intervention on 
changes in real broad money over the period 1990q1-2010q2. Empirical work in this 
regard has been relatively scarce, with emphasis mainly on base money sterilisation.  
 Our first stage of empirical analysis was carried out using individual country 
multivariate dynamic regressions for a sample of 30 countries. This allowed us to 
consider the short-run and long-run effects of intervention on broad money changes 
separately and also to recognise heterogeneity across countries. We proposed that 
intervention influences changes in broad money differently than how it affects 
changes in base money. Such disconnect lends support for the focus on changes in 
broad money in understanding how intervention permeates the economy. Our 
findings support the disconnect hypothesis. Real intervention effects on changes in 
real broad money are on average higher than the effects on changes in real base 
money, both in the short run and long run. The average coefficients are 0.122 and 
0.469 respectively compared with 0.075 and 0.111 respectively (excluding outliers, 
Egypt and Taiwan, in both instances). Crucially, however, for our sample of 
countries, equality tests and correlation analysis indicate that there is no relationship 
between the effects of intervention on changes in base money with its effects on 
changes in broad money.  
 Our results suggest that real intervention effects on changes in real broad 
money are generally higher in the long run compared to the short run, pointing to 
indirect effects that are relatively strong notwithstanding small contemporaneous 
effects. This is an interesting finding especially when set against previous studies 
which did not undertake dynamic analysis. The contemporaneous and indirect effects 
appear to be very much country-specific with various factors at play. The average 
coefficients may seem low, notwithstanding several individual countries with long-
run coefficients greater than 1.000, as they are meant to capture the unique influence 
of intervention over and above the control variables, such as GDP which reflects 
income and wealth effects. Furthermore, not all balance of payments flows involve 
intervention ± those that do may not translate into immediate effects, for example 
government or bank-related flows; and may not play a prominent role in subsequent 
credit creatioQ7KHFHQWUDOEDQN¶VFKRLFHRIVWHULOLVDWLRQPHWKRGVDQGXVHRIIRUHLJQ
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exchange swaps also affect the degree to which intervention has an impact on 
changes in broad money.  
 In our second stage of analysis, we used mean and median equality tests, and 
bivariate regressions to investigate the relevance of country characteristics for the 
real intervention effects on changes in real broad money. Similar to the results in the 
previous chapter, there are only a few instances of statistical significance of the 
differences in country characteristics in our baseline analysis.  
 With regard to the intervention indicators (intervention volatility, reserve 
accumulation and surplus periods), we do not find an unambiguous scenario of 
positive and statistically significant relationships with the short-run and long-run real 
intervention effects. Instead, baseline equality tests do not indicate statistically 
significant differences in the nature of intervention associated with the differences 
across the short-run and long-run intervention effects. Bivariate regressions of 
estimated real intervention effects against intervention volatility and reserve 
accumulation respectively also do not yield statistically significant results although 
the signs on the coefficients are positive. Robustness analysis, however, suggest a 
positive link between intervention volatility and intervention effects. Nevertheless, 
the results from the bivariate regressions have to be viewed with some caution as two 
countries, Hong Kong and Australia, appear to exert significant influence on the 
changes we observe when compared to the baseline scenario. Surplus periods have a 
rather surprising statistically significant negative relationship with short-run real 
intervention effects in the bivariate regression analysis, but we view this result with 
caution since it is heavily influenced by two data points. Furthermore, the robustness 
analysis does not reinforce this result.  
In terms of monetary policy frameworks, there does not seem to be a 
difference in intervention effects between inflation-targeting and non-inflation-
targeting countries. This is in contrast to the results for real intervention effects on 
changes in real base money, which suggested that non-inflation ±targeting countries 
exhibited higher real intervention effects. Meanwhile, lower exchange rate flexibility 
is a statistically significant characteristic associated with higher short-run real 
intervention effects in the baseline bivariate regression analysis. Though not 
statistically significant, a similar negative relationship is observed with long-run 
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intervention effects. The robustness analysis lends support to the negative 
relationship between exchange rate flexibility with both, short-run and long-run 
intervention effects. 
 Concerning the characteristics of the balance of payments flows, generally, 
while statistical significance is hard to come by, the monotonic orderings of the 
means/medians of subgroups in equality tests, and the signs on coefficients from the 
bivariate regressions provide interesting information about our sample of countries. 
Current account surpluses are associated with higher short-run real intervention 
effects ± this is statistically significant in the baseline equality test, with a monotonic 
ordering of the characteristic that is consistent with the ordering of the subgroups for 
intervention effects; and is also captured as a positive (albeit statistically 
insignificant) relationship in the bivariate regression analysis. At the same time, the 
short-run real intervention effect appears to increase as the capital account balance 
declines monotonically ± this is statistically significant in the median equality tests 
for the capital account balance and its subcomponent, net direct investment and 
portfolio balance. The statistical significances of the capital account balances are 
supported in the robustness analysis using robust standard errors for a wider number 
of countries. While no similar statistical significances are observed with the results 
on intervention effects from the unrestricted regressions, the monotonic orderings of 
the current and capital account balances are generally consistent with the baseline 
scenario. These results indicate that the net balances on the current and capital 
accounts matter for the short-run real intervention effects on changes in broad 
money. This is in contrast to the case of real intervention effects on changes in base 
money, where it was only capital account openness that mattered in the baseline 
scenario, and when capital account balances seemed to matter with robustness 
analysis, monotonic orderings of the characteristics were not observed.  
 The baseline bivariate regression analysis also reveals that the short-run real 
intervention effect on changes in real broad money has a statistically significant 
negative relationship with surplus years on net other investment balance. The results 
from the robustness analysis provide mixed support for the baseline scenario. Aside 
from the lack of correlation between the surplus years on the subaccount with 
intervention volatility, the tentative negative link may indicate that bank-related 
inflows do not immediately affect broad money and are therefore, associated with 
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lower short-run intervention effects, or that bank-related outflows are indirectly 
related to current account surpluses, and therefore higher intervention effects.  
 In contrast, the long-run real intervention effects on changes in real broad 
money do not appear to be linked to any particular balance of payments characteristic 
in a statistically significant manner in the baseline scenario. Based on the relative 
closeness of the test statistics to statistical significance, it appears that the most likely 
important characteristics are current account and capital account openness, rather 
than net balances. There are also indications that the relationships between the capital 
account subcomponents with short-run and long-run intervention effects differ, in 
that short-run effects appear to be associated with deficits, but this is less clear in the 
case of long-run effects, particularly where other investment balances are concerned. 
Though not statistically significant, the monotonic ordering of the medians for other 
investment balances switches in the long run, and increases with higher intervention 
effects, whilst in the bivariate regression a positive, albeit statistically insignificant, 
relationship is observed. Tentatively, this may indicate the relevance of other 
investment balances, and in particular, bank-related flows for the long-run 
intervention effects on changes in broad money. In the robustness analysis section, 
although the use of the results from unrestricted regressions does not yield instances 
of statistical significance of the capital account balances in the equality tests, the 
orderings of the medians of these characteristics are generally consistent with the 
baseline scenario. Meanwhile, the results from the bivariate regressions of the 
robustness analysis point to the statistical significance of current account openness, 
capital account openness, and the net direct and investment portfolio balance for the 
long-run intervention effects. However, while consistent with the signs on the 
coefficients in the baseline scenario, we view these results with caution, given the 
influence of large coefficients for Hong Kong and Australia. 
 As final remarks in this chapter, it is useful to return to the open economy 
trilemma ± the challenge of simultaneously pursuing monetary independence and 
exchange rate stability, amidst a high level of financial integration. Aizenman et al. 
(2010) suggest that a higher level of reserves allows for the pursuit of a higher 
weighted average of monetary independence and financial openness, given exchange 
rate stability. We have seen from our results that higher reserve accumulation per se 
is not associated with stronger real intervention effects on real broad money growth. 
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Nevertheless, there are indications that exchange rate stability and de facto capital 
account openness are positively linked to higher real intervention effects on real 
broad money growth. Using the measure of monetary independence provided by 
Aizenman et al. (2010), we investigate the link to real intervention effects on real 
broad money growth through equality tests. These results, along with tests for the 
other trilemma measures provided by Aizenman et al. (exchange rate stability and de 
jure financial openness), are presented in Appendix 9: Equality Tests of the 
Aizenman-Chinn-Ito Trilemma Measures  Grouped by the Boxplot Quartiles of Real 
Intervention Effects on Real Broad Money Change. Although there are no 
statistically significant results, it is interesting to note that higher long-run real 
intervention effects are associated with lower average values of monetary 
independence, with the monotonic ordering and closeness to statistical significance 
generally much more apparent than for the short-run real intervention effects. This is 
observed across the baseline scenario and robustness analyses.103  
In contrast, the association between real intervention effects on real base 
money growth and monetary independence is harder to discern (Appendix 10: 
Equality Tests of the Aizenman-Chinn-Ito Trilemma Measures Grouped by the 
Boxplot Quartiles of Real Intervention Effects on Real Base Money Change). There 
are no instances of statistical significance, and test statistics are relatively small 
across the board. Furthermore, the average values of monetary independence do not 
follow a monotonic ordering. Given our discussion in previous chapters, this is not 
surprising. High real intervention effects on real base money growth may indicate the 
use of reserve requirements, which in turn lends support to monetary independence.  
Overall, whilst tentative and requiring further investigation, it is a fair assessment 
that these results pertaining to monetary independence are in line with the thrust of 
our thesis ± that it is broad money sterilisation that matters.   
 
                                                          
103
  For our sample of countries, we note that the Aizenman et al. (2010) de jure financial openness 
measure and our de facto capital account openness measure have a correlation of 0.463. The Aizenman et al. de 
jure financial openness and monetary independence measures have a statistically significant correlation of -0.489. 
However, the monetary independence measure has weaker (non-statistically significant) correlations with 
exchange rate stability (-0.274) and our de facto capital account openness measure (-0.165), both of which are 
more strongly correlated with intervention volatility and the long-run real intervention effects than the de jure 
financial openness measure.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 With the three main chapters of this thesis, we provided a new simple 
theoretical model for the analysis of the conduct of monetary policy with sterilised 
intervention, and carried out empirical analysis of the effects of foreign exchange 
intervention on base money and broad money growth respectively. Within these 
chapters we sought to answer the following key questions:  
 
1.  How do base money sterilisation and broad money sterilisation differ 
 under an interest rate-targeting framework? 
2.  What are the implications of varying degrees of sterilisation for the 
 policy interest rate?  
3.  Do countries exhibit differences in the effects of intervention on 
 base money and broad money growth, and are there common country 
 characteristics that can explain these differences? 
 
In this concluding chapter we summarise our main findings and contribution (Section 
7.2), discuss policy implications (Section 7.3), highlight the limitations of our study, 
and suggest areas for future research (Sections 7.4 and 7.5 respectively).  
 
7.2 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTION 
  
 A primary motivation for our research undertaking is the lack of conceptual 
understanding underlying recent empirical literature on the degree of sterilisation; of 
how balance of payments flows and intervention affect base money and broad 
money, and permeate the economy. Most of these studies tend to focus on base 
money sterilisation and rather unrealistically assume that the change in the central 
EDQN¶V QHW GRPHVWLF DVVHWV LV WKH SROLF\ LQVWUXPHQW &RQVHTXHQWO\ WKH
meaningfulness of base money sterilisation in the context of an interest rate-targeting 
framework is not investigated, nor the wider macroeconomic implications of varying 
degrees of base money and broad money sterilisation.  
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 In Chapter 3, using a portfolio balance model consisting of three assets 
(money, bonds and equity) and simple balance sheet constraints, we showed that 
base money sterilisation does not imply broad money sterilisation. Depending on the 
instruments used, and, crucially, the sectors from which liquidity is absorbed (banks 
versus non-EDQNV WKH FHQWUDO EDQN¶V PRQHWDU\ RSHUDWLRQV ZLOO KDYH VLJQLILFDQtly 
different effects on broad money growth, even as base money growth is completely 
sterilised. Incomplete broad money sterilisation, when intervention is a positive 
money supply shock, leads to looser monetary and financial conditions.  
 
 Then, based on simple structural equations of a stylised emerging market 
economy, we derived an optimal monetary policy reaction function which shows 
how the policy interest rate responds to various exogenous factors given varying 
degrees of broad money sterilisation. To justify the inclusion of broad money growth 
in the aggregate demand equation, we drew on the literature that advocates a role for 
money as a proxy for returns on other financial and real assets which are important 
for economic activity. The short-term policy interest rate is not a sufficient summary 
of these wider monetary and financial conditions.  
  
 Under the assumption of foreign exchange intervention as the only source of 
broad money growth, positive unsterilised money supply shocks result in lower bond 
and equity returns and higher excess liquidity in the banking system (Within an 
interest rate-targeting framework, money demand shocks are accommodated. Thus, 
with external inflows and intervention, asset returns either remain steady or decline, 
ceteris paribus). While these reflect cheaper financing conditions, from the 
perspective of savers, the money supply shocks also contain real balance effects. The 
implication for the policy interest rate is that it needs to respond more strongly to the 
exogenous factors affecting the output gap and inflation compared to the complete 
sterilisation scenario. However, an increase in the policy interest rate may trigger 
further capital inflows as the interest rate differential against the foreign interest rate 
widens. Thus, incomplete sterilisation reduces monetary policy independence and 
effectiveness.  
 Our model suggests that it is broad money sterilisation which matters in an 
interest rate-targeting framework rather than base money sterilisation. However, 
most countries do not actively sterilise the effects of intervention on broad money, 
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particularly with respect to current account flows. Furthermore, unless sterilisation 
instruments (namely bonds) fulfil a specific demand, the effect of broad money 
sterilisation on monetary and financial variables can be unpredictable.  
 
 For the empirical analysis part of our thesis, the sample used consisted of 24 
emerging market economies and six developed economies. Based on holdings of 
foreign exchange reserves scaled by GDP, the countries in our sample are fairly 
evenly distributed among the world rankings of countries. Simple correlation 
analyses of country characteristics indicate that for our sample of countries, current 
account openness and capital account openness are both strongly positively 
correlated with intervention volatility and reserve accumulation. However, it is the 
current account balance, rather than the capital account balance, that is positively 
correlated with openness, intervention volatility and reserve accumulation. 
Meanwhile, exchange rate flexibility is negatively correlated with openness, 
intervention volatility and reserve accumulation.  
 
 In Chapters 5 and 6, we carried out individual country regressions to estimate 
the effects of real intervention on real base money growth and real broad money 
growth respectively over the period 1990q1-2010q2. The regression analysis was 
carried out using the ARDL approach which allowed us to isolate contemporaneous 
and long-run effects of real intervention on the two money variables. Control 
variables were chosen based on behavioural money demand literature. We then 
compared the results for the real intervention effects against country characteristics 
through mean and median equality tests and bivariate regressions.  
 
 Our hypothesis with regard to real intervention effects on real base money 
growth was that there were unlikely to be economically significant effects unless a 
currency board was in operation, base money expansion was deliberate, or if reserve 
requirements were actively used in response to intervention. In contrast, the real 
intervention effects on real broad money growth were expected to be statistically and 
economically significant as well as showing greater dispersion depending on the 
types of balance of payments flows and the sectors involved; the nature of 
sterilisation methods; and the monetary policy stance. Thus, the effect of real 
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intervention on real base money growth is disconnected from its effect on real broad 
money growth.   
 
 We found that on average, the real intervention effect on real broad money 
growth is higher than the effect on real base money growth. The baseline group 
average short-run and long-run coefficients are 0.122 and 0.496 respectively for real 
broad money growth and 0.075 and 0.111 respectively for real base money growth 
(excluding outliers, Egypt and Taiwan, in both instances). Equality tests and 
correlation analysis indicate there is no relationship between the real intervention 
effect on real broad money growth and its effect on real base money growth.  
 
 In testing for subgroup differences and the linear relevance of country 
characteristics in explaining the real intervention effects, we observed a general lack 
of statistical significance across the equality tests and bivariate regressions. This 
suggests that real intervention effects are very much country-specific and that 
heterogeneity cannot be ignored.  Reserve accumulation does not appear to have a 
statistically significant link to the real intervention effects, neither on real base 
money growth nor on real broad money growth. In terms of monetary policy 
frameworks, based on equality tests, there is no evidence of a difference in real 
intervention effects on real broad money growth between inflation-targeting and non-
inflation-targeting countries. This is in contrast to the results for real intervention 
effects on real base money growth, which suggest that non-inflation±targeting 
countries exhibit higher real intervention effects. This latter result, however, is 
influenced by the uniqueness of the monetary policy frameworks in Hong Kong and 
Japan ± a currency board and prolonged base money expansion respectively. On the 
other hand, bivariate regressions indicate that lower exchange rate flexibility is a 
statistically significant characteristic associated with higher real intervention effects 
on real broad money growth. There is no similar statistically significant evidence of 
the relevance of exchange rate flexibility for the real intervention effects on real base 
money growth.  
  
 Concerning the characteristics of balance of payments flows, based on 
equality tests, we found that there are robust differences in capital account openness 
associated with the short-run and long-run real intervention effects on real base 
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money growth. However these differences are non-monotonic ± essentially we 
cannot infer a difference in capital account openness between the countries with the 
largest real intervention effects and those with the smallest real intervention effects. 
This may reflect differences in monetary policy frameworks and the choice of 
sterilisation instruments ± open market operations versus required reserves. 
Nevertheless, the result is a tentative indication of the relevance of the gross size of 
capital flows rather than net balances.  There is also tentative evidence from equality 
tests and bivariate regressions that real intervention effects on real base money 
growth are negatively associated with the number of surplus years on net direct and 
portfolio investment balances. This may reflect the lower volatility of the flows 
(negative correlation with capital account openness) and lower associated 
intervention (negative correlation with intervention volatility). 
  
 With regard to short-run real intervention effects on real broad money 
growth, as expected, equality tests suggest a positive (monotonic) association with 
current account balances and correspondingly a negative (monotonic) association 
with capital account balances. This is not surprising as the wealth effect associated 
with current account surpluses are much more likely to have a straightforward 
immediate link to broad money deposits, and as our simple model suggests, less 
likely to be sterilised. Furthermore, as we have noted, current account surpluses are 
positively related to intervention volatility for our sample of countries. In contrast, 
the long-run real intervention effects on real broad money growth do not appear to be 
robustly linked to any particular country characteristic in a statistically significant 
manner. Based on the relative closeness of the test statistics to statistical significance, 
it appears that the most likely important characteristics are current account and 
capital account openness rather than net balances. Furthermore, there are weak 
indications that the associations between capital account subcomponents with real 
intervention effects on real broad money growth tend to switch directions in the long 
run. For instance, though not statistically significant, higher long-run intervention 
effects are associated with monotonically rising medians for other investment 
balances, while in the bivariate regression, a positive, albeit statistically insignificant, 
relationship is observed. Tentatively, this may indicate the relevance of other 
investment balances, and in particular, bank-related flows for the long-run real 
intervention effects on real broad money growth.  
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 Meanwhile, preliminary mean equality tests of average values of monetary 
independence do not point to statistically significant differences across the variations 
in real intervention effects on real broad money growth and real base money growth. 
Nevertheless, for the long-run real intervention effects on real broad money growth, 
the differences in monetary independence values are close to statistical significance 
and generally follow a monotonic ordering, with lower values associated with higher 
real intervention effects.  These results can be viewed from two angles. On one hand, 
the negative association seems to support the premise that incomplete broad money 
sterilisation complicates monetary independence. On the other hand, the lack of 
statistical significance may suggest that the intervention effects are not high enough 
to warrant a problem; are perhaps not dominated by flows driven by interest rate 
differentials; and may not fully represent the money supply shocks that compromise 
monetary policy, as described in our simple model.  
  
 With our thesis, we have provided a new simple theoretical framework for 
understanding the differences between base money sterilisation and broad money 
sterilisation and their respective implications for a monetary policy framework where 
the policy instrument is a short-term interest rate. We show how policy dilemmas can 
arise under certain scenarios with incomplete broad money sterilisation. 
Economically and statistically significant real intervention effects on real broad 
money growth are a reflection of how balance of payments flows and intervention 
permeate the economy and affect monetary and financial conditions. In a departure 
from existing empirical literature which focuses on base money sterilisation, we have 
estimated the extent of real intervention effects on both, real base money growth and 
real broad money growth, and shown these to be different. With individual country 
multivariate dynamic regressions, we have been able to carefully take into account 
differences in monetary policy frameworks and capture both immediate and indirect 
real intervention effects. A similar attention to detail is missing from the current 
empirical literature which is culpable of inadequate and inaccurate conceptual 
foundations. 
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7.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
  
 The findings of this thesis have several implications for academics 
undertaking related research and for policymakers. For academics, the primary 
implication is that a reorientation away from the exclusive focus on base money 
sterilisation is required. As ZHKDYHKLJKOLJKWHG³IXOO´EDVHPRQH\VWHULOLVDWLRQGRHV
not imply that liquidity associated with balance of payments flows does not pose a 
policy challenge, or vice-YHUVDWKDW³LQFRPSOHWH´EDVHPRQH\VWHULOLVDWLRQUHIOHFWVDQ
inability to manage the impact of flows. Instead, academics need to devote more 
attention to the link between intervention and broad money growth. For example, 
even if required reserves are used, balance of payments flows and intervention can 
still have an immediate impact on broad money growth, unless sterilisation occurs at 
the private sector level. A sound understanding of the underlying mechanics, as we 
have provided, is required for any further research of sterilisation effectiveness and 
policy recommendations. Our findings cast doubts on the validity of conclusions 
from previous work, such as that the degree of broad money sterilisation is similar to 
that of base money sterilisation, that non-inflation-targeting countries tend to sterilise 
less than inflation-targeting countries, and that the sterilisation of FDI flows is less 
than the sterilisation of current account and non-FDI flows.  
  
 For policymakers, the simple model presented is a useful reference 
framework that illustrates how central banks in emerging markets are caught between 
a rock and a hard place, either with tight exchange rate management or relatively 
loosely managed exchange rates. On one hand, the adjustment mechanism of the 
exchange rate is muted, with possible build-up of imbalances; on the other, the 
economy may still be subject to the volatility associated with capital flows, and 
excessive movements in the exchange rate. Broad money growth driven by balance 
of payments flows and intervention can be symbolic of changing monetary and 
financial conditions elsewhere in the economy. In our model, broad money growth 
enters the output gap equation, the basis for which can be questioned. However, the 
channel through which broad money growth may affect the output gap is relatively 
more tangible, and this is through the prices on financial and real assets, and 
financing conditions.  
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 Our model suggests that broad money sterilisation is a substitute for changes 
in the policy interest rate, in that higher broad money sterilisation reduces the need 
for increases in the policy interest rate. We are, however, cautious in assigning such a 
substitute role to broad money sterilisation in the achievement of inflation and output 
goals. Like the policy interest rate, broad money sterilisation can be viewed as a 
blunt instrument. The ambiguity over money demand and money supply shocks and 
mismatches in asset demand and supply leads to uncertainty about the effects of 
broad money sterilisation on the returns on assets and wider monetary conditions. 
There is the issue of the appropriate type of sterilisation instruments and the 
implications for other markets, namely the Government bond market. Furthermore, 
in the case where there is non-resident demand for the assets supplied, while excess 
liquidity and movements in asset prices and returns are reduced, this may in turn 
prolong inflows (not unlike a rise in the policy interest rate widening the differential 
against foreign interest rates). Additionally, the impact of the policy interest rate 
through the expectations channel as an established indicator of the monetary policy 
stance should perhaps not be underestimated.  
 
 We are thus, more inclined to view broad money sterilisation as a 
complementary policy. In fact, our model illustrates instances where there appears to 
still be a need to resort to additional policy instruments, such as prudential measures 
and restrictions on capital flows, particularly in addressing the risk of financial 
imbalances.  
 
7.4 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
 
 We note that there are several limitations in our research, relating to the 
model we have developed; and with regard to the empirical analysis, in terms of 
sample, data and estimation techniques. Our simple model is a partial equilibrium 
framework without micro-foundations. Naturally, a micro-founded dynamic general 
equilibrium model will allow for more rigorous analysis, derived from first principles 
with well defined economy-wide behavioural relationships and constraints. A 
possible exploration within such a model is the welfare implications of different 
policy manoeuvres.  
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 In our empirical analysis, an obvious aspect that can be improved upon and 
which may arguably affect the statistical significance of the equality tests and 
bivariate regressions is the number of countries in our sample. A notable gap in our 
sample is the lack of inclusion of major oil-exporting countries. Meanwhile, our 
measure of foreign exchange intervention is only an approximate, based on reserves 
data, and is thus subject to inaccuracies. The series can be adjusted to exclude 
approximations of interest income and used in the robustness analysis. Where 
available for a limited number of countries, the actual intervention data can also be 
compared against the proxy series.  
 
 Our ARDL approach to estimation, applied in a standard fashion for all 
countries, is not completely free of possible bias in coefficient estimates and 
misspecification. Not unexpectedly, the diagnostics are better for some individual 
country regressions than others. While we have highlighted the limitation of fixed 
and random-effects panel data models when there is slope heterogeneity, it may still 
be useful to compare our results against those from a panel data approach, 
particularly if we employed a random coefficients model. Panel data estimations 
would allow us to reduce the risk of endogeneity and use annual data with fewer 
lags, whilst being able to take into account differences across groups of countries. In 
particular, dummy variables can be used to capture the relationship between net 
domestic asset-driven money growth and different stages of financial development 
relative to a baseline category.  
 
 Another limitation of our empirical analysis is that we have done a 
comparison of averages ± the coefficients on real intervention effects from 
regressions, regardless of statistical significance, against averages of country 
characteristics. A useful addition to the analysis is to incorporate interaction 
variables into our individual country regressions to capture the effects of 
³DERYHEHORZ DYHUDJH´ WLPH SHULRGV RI LQWHUYHQWLRQ DQG EDODQFH RI SD\PHQWV
characteristics. A likely limitation in this regard is the lack of availability of balance 
of payments data on a quarterly frequency. The use of annual data within a panel 
data framework may be an alternative around this problem. 
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7.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 Our simple theoretical model suggests that unsterilised positive money supply 
shocks emanating from balance of payments flows are linked to fluctuations in asset 
prices, and that with incomplete broad money sterilisation, there is reduced monetary 
policy effectiveness and independence ± the foreign interest rate enters the monetary 
policy reaction function. Empirical analysis in this regard would consist of 
investigating the impact of intervention on asset prices, and exploring monetary 
independence and the trilemma configuration more carefully, conditional on the 
methods of sterilisation. Our empirical analysis has only dealt with estimating the 
real intervention effects on real base money growth and real broad money growth 
respectively, and investigating the possible factors for these results. A natural follow-
on from this is the in-depth exploration of the implications of the results ± the effects 
on wider monetary and financial conditions, and the link to different sterilisation 
instruments. Cross-country data on sterilisation instruments including the amounts of 
securities issued and the holders of these securities are generally not publicly 
available. This, however, does not preclude a detailed analysis of specific individual 
country experiences where data can be obtained. 
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APPENDIX 1: SELECTED RECENT STUDIES ON STERILISATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES104 
 Source Coverage Methodology and Specification Results 
1. Aizenman and Glick 
(2009) 
Argentina (1992q1-2007q2),  
Brazil (1995q2 ± 2007q2),  
China (1986q2-2007q2), 
India, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Thailand, Singapore 
(1985q1-2007q2). 
  
Individual country OLS estimation:  ? ? ? ? 嘋? ? ? ? ? Ƚ  ? Ⱦ ? ? ? ? ? 嘋? ? ? ? ? Ɂ ? + u 
The net domestic credit (ǻDC) and net foreign assets (ǻNFA) 
variables are four quarter changes relative to the stock of base money 
(RM), lagged four quarters. ǻDC = ǻRM -ǻNFA 
ǻNFA = change in foreign exchange reserves in USD converted into 
national currency less change in foreign liabilities.  ? are the 
following control variables:  
(i)  ? ?
 ? 
(ii)  ? ?
 ?Ǣ  ? ? ? ?  
A third type of regression consists of regressing ǻDC on different 
types of balance of payments flows along with  ? ?
 ?Ǥ 
Regressions include interaction dummy variables to capture breaks. 
 
Selected sterilisation coefficients, 
for pre- and post- break periods 
(latter coefficient presented if 
break is statistically significant): 
Argentina = -0.783 and -1.065 
Brazil = - 0.569 to -1.108 
China = - 0.827  and -1.083 
Korea = -0.744 and -0.937 
India = -0.770  and -0.939 
Malaysia = -0.874  
Mexico = -0.934 and  -1.037 
Thailand = -0.929  
Singapore = -0.993 
(Note: Taken from Table 1, pages 
785-787 of the paper.) 
2. Cardarelli et al. 
(2009) 
52 countries: 8 advanced 
economies and 44 developing 
countries.  
1991-2007. 
Narrow sterilisation index105 derived with values for each year 
estimated using 12 monthly observations for each country. Pooled 
OLS estimation as follows:   ? ? ? = ? ?+Ⱦ ? ? ?	 ? ? ?  ? ? 
ȕ ? ? is  ? ? ? ? if there is full sterilisation. ȕ ? ? ? ? ? ?. 
NFA = foreign assets converted into USD less foreign liabilities 
converted into USD. NDA = Base Money ± NFA. Base Money is 
also converted into USD.  
Values for the index for each 
country grouping (Latin America, 
Central and Eastern Europe, East 
Asia, and other emerging markets) 
are generally between 0.4 and 
1.0.There is relatively more 
variation for the East Asia 
grouping in the 1990s, with 
negative values in the index in 
1994 and 1998-1999. 
                                                          
104
 Some of these studies do not specifically or solely focus on the nature of sterilisation but rather address the issues arising from and implications of capital inflows. In the analyses, however, brief estimations and 
discussions of sterilisation are presented. We focus on studies that have some overlap with our analysis in terms of the sample period. 
105
 A broad sterilisation index was also computed based on the specification ? ? ? ? = ? ?+į ? ? ?	 ? ? ?  ? ?. The results for this are not shown but the authors claim the results are consistent with the narrow sterilisation 
index. M2 is the sum of lines 34 and 35 in the IMF IFS. 
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APPENDIX 1: CONTINUED 
 Source Coverage Methodology and Specification Results 
3. IMF (2011) 
Box 1.4: Sterilization of 
Reserve Accumulation in 
Times of Large Capital 
Inflows 
China, Hong Kong SAR, 
India, Malaysia, Singapore 
(1990q1-2011q1); Indonesia, 
Korea, Philippines, Thailand 
(2002q1-2011q1). 
Panel data analysis with fixed country and period effects106:  ? ? ? ? ? ? Į  ?ȕ ? ?	 ? ? ? ? ?ȕ ? ?	 ? ? ? ? ? 	  ?ȕ ? ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?ȕ ? ?	 ? ? ? ? ? 	  ?  ? ? ? ? ? Ɂ ?  ?  
where: 
ǻ1'$DQGǻ1)$DUHIRXU-quarter changes. 
ǻ1'$LQFOXGHVUHTXLUHGUHVHUYHV 
FER = fixed exchange rate indicator.  ? ? ? ? = capital inflow size 
indicator.  ? = 
 ? ? ?,  ? ? ? and Ɂ the associated coefficients. 
 
The stronger and more persistent 
are capital inflows the lower is the 
degree of sterilisation in non-
inflation targeting economies. 
4. Lavigne (2008) 35 countries emerging 
market economies in Asia, 
Latin America, Europe, and 
the middle east, along with 
oil producing countries. 
1990-1996 and 2000-2006. 
Narrow sterilisation ratio for each country:  ?	  ?  ? ?	  
Ratio = 1 indicates full sterilisation 
NFA = net foreign assets; CC = currency in circulation. Both are 
cumulative annual amounts.  
NFA adjusted for exchange rate revaluation effects by deflating 
central bank foreign asset levels by an index of the nominal 
exchange rate in USD (the base year is 2000 for all countries) 
 
Country specific experiences vary. 
There however, appears to be 
greater sterilisation over 2000-
2006 compared with 1990-1996. 
The ratio over 2000-2006 averaged 
0.82 for the 11 countries that have 
had  ?	 > USD20 billion since 
2000 (0.74 over the period 1990-
1996 (excluding Russia).  
 
 
                                                          
106
 The specification as described here is based on correspondence with the author of the box article, as details are not provided in the published document.  
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APPENDIX 1: CONTINUED 
 Source Coverage Methodology and Specification Results 
5. Ouyang et al. (2008) India, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines, 
Taiwan, Thailand and 
Singapore.  
1990q1-2005q3 
2SLS panel data random effects estimation of the following 
simultaneous equations derived from a loss minimisation 
theoretical model:  ? ? = ?+Ƚ ? ?	 ? ?  ? ?Ƚ ? ? ? ?   ?	 ? =ȕ ?+ȕ ? ?	 ? ?  ?ƍ ȕ ? ? ? ?   ?	 ? = Quarterly annual change in foreign reserves converted 
into national currency minus foreign liabilities in national 
currency. Excludes exchange rate revaluation effects. Scaled by 
GDP.  ? ? ? Quarterly annual change, inclusive of exchange rate 
revaluation effects, and scaled by GDP.  
Exchange rate revaluation effect =  ?	 ? ? ?x  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  ?= Annual change in log of M2 multiplier, quarterly annual 
change in log of CPI, cyclical income (deviation of log of real 
GDP from HP trend), quarterly annual change in log REER, 
quarterly annual change in government fiscal deficit scaled by 
GDP, quarterly annual change in exchange rate adjusted foreign 
interest rate (perfect foresight and static expectation), and interest 
rate volatility, and AR terms.  ? = As above, except exchange rate 
volatility in place of interest rate volatility.  ? ?are either 
contemporaneous values or lagged one period.  
 
Sterilisation coefficient estimated 
to be close to -1 in both sub-
samples, suggesting full 
sterilization of reserve 
accumulation. 
1990q1-1997q1 (perfect foresight: 
-1.046; static expectation: -0.966); 
1998q3-2005q3 (perfect foresight: 
-1.265; static expectation: -0.846)  
 
Offset coefficient:  
1990q1-1997q1 (perfect foresight: 
-0.796; static expectation: -0.838); 
1998q3-2005q3 (perfect foresight: 
-0.601; static expectation: -0.514) 
6. Ouyang and Rajan (2011) 
 
Singapore and Taiwan. 
1990q1-2008q4 
 
 
Single equation 2SLS and 3SLS estimation of simultaneous 
equations as in 5. Only the perfect foresight assumption is used 
for exchange rate expectation.   
Singapore:  
Sterilisation coefficient 
(2SLS/3SLS)  = -1.049/-1.090 
Offset coefficient =  -0.868/-0.922 
Taiwan: Sterilisation coefficient =  
-1.052/-1.088 
Offset coefficient = -0.861/-0.915 
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APPENDIX 1: CONTINUED 
 Source Coverage Methodology and Specification Results 
7. Ouyang et al. (2010) China 
2000m6- 2008m9 
  
Methodology and specification similar to 6 above but applied to 
monthly data. Additionally, three different assumptions for 
exchange rate expectations are used ± perfect foresight, forward 
exchange rate, and static expectation. 
Monthly GDP measured by distributing quarterly GDP data into 
the corresponding three months weighted by the industrial 
production index. 
 
 
Sterilisation coefficient = -1.001  
to -1.234 
Offset coefficient = -0.517 to  
- 0.721 
  
8. Reinhart and Reinhart 
(2008) 
30 developing countries. 
2000-2006 
Cross-section OLS estimation for each year as follows:  ? ? =Ƚ+Ⱦ ?	 ? ?  ?   ?  ? , which consists of 
currency in circulation and transferable deposits in national 
currency. Note, this is a component of broad money and not a 
definition of base money.  ?	A = percent change in total reserves less gold in USD (IMF 
IFS line 1L.D). 
No discussion of regression diagnostics. 
 
The elasticity of narrow money 
with respect to reserves has been 
close to zero ( 0.2) over 2000-
2005 but rose to about 0.4 in 2006. 
 
9. Takagi (1999) Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines and 
Thailand.1987q1-1997q2 
Individual country OLS estimation:  ?  ? ? ? ?  ?   ?  ?  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ?   ?  
M =M1, M2; FA = Foreign assets in national currency (IMF IFS 
line 11), no adjustment for exchange rate revaluation effects.  
v comprises  ? ? ,  ? and seasonal dummies.  
 
Regardless of whether M1 or M2 
is used, the coefficient h is not 
significantly different from zero. 
The only exception is in the case of 
the M2 regression for the 
Philippines (with  ? included), 
where h= - 0.108. 
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APPENDIX 2: 
FACTORS AFFECTING REAL BROAD MONEY GROWTH AND REAL BASE 
MONEY GROWTH - DETAILED COUNTRY ESTIMATION RESULTS 
This appendix contains three sections. The following are explanatory notes for each section. 
Section A: Detailed Baseline Regression Results 
We report for each country the detailed baseline regression results for real base money growth and 
real broad money growth respectively. The t-statistics corresponding to the coefficients are either 
default standard errors or robust standard errors as follows: 
^: Newey-West HAC consistent covariances (Kernel options: Bartlett, Newey-West Automatic). 
#: White heteroscedasticity consistent covariances. 
For the diagnostic tests, the values shown are the associated p-values of test statistics. The test 
statistics are the Breusch-Godfrey LM chi-square statistic, and the F-statistic for joint significance of 
lagged residuals respectively, in the case of serial correlation diagnosis; the Breusch-Pagan chi-square 
statistic for heteroscedasticity; the chi-square statistic for the Jarque-Bera Normality test; and the t-
statistic for RESET. For serial correlation diagnosis, the two tests are run with two, four and eight lags 
of residuals respectively. The results reported are generally the lowest p-values for both tests among 
the three sets.  
For all coefficients and test statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%;  
*: significant at 10%. 
 
Section B: Unit Root and Stationarity Tests for Variables in Levels and First Differences 
ADF: Augmented Dickey Fuller, PP: Phillips-Perron, KPSS: Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and 
Shin. 
ADF and PP have the presence of a unit root (I(1)) as the null hypothesis (H0). KPSS has trend or 
level stationarity (I(0)) as the null hypothesis.  
The Zivot-Andrews (ZA) test has the presence of a unit root as the null hypothesis. The alternative 
hypothesis is trend or level stationarity with a single structural break. The ZA test is compared against 
the Clemente-Montanes-Reyes Additive Outlier (CMO-AO) test for two structural breaks (two mean 
shifts) for variables in levels where the presence of a trend is not clear, and for all variables in first 
differences. The shaded cells in the tables indicate instances where the ZA test result contrasts with 
the CMO-AO test result when the latter identifies two breaks at the 1% significance level. 
Values shown are test statistics. For all test statistics, ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: 
significant at 10%. 
The content of the two parentheses indicate the inclusion of constant and/or trend (c = constant, 
t=trend) and the number of AR lags/bandwidth respectively. ADF lag length: sequential t-statistic 
significance (maximum lag=12). PP and KPSS bandwidth: Newey-West automatic, using Bartlett 
kernel. The inclusion of the deterministic regressors is based on statistical significance.  Where 
statistically significant, these regressors are always included. Where these regressors are not 
statistically significant, they may still be kept based on graphical analysis of the likely alternative 
hypothesis, particularly for the tests with H0= I(1). The lag selection for the ZA test is based on the 
Akaike Information Criterion. 
For each variable, the span of data tested corresponds to the series length indicated in the individual 
country data notes (Section C). The maximum span is 1989q1-2010q2. 
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Section C: Country Data Notes 
We provide details on the sources and definitions of data used in the individual country baseline 
regressions. The main source is the IMF IFS, with various editions downloaded via ESDS 
International, University of Manchester. http://www.esds.ac.uk/international/doipages/imfifs.asp. We 
provide the corresponding IFS code where relevant. Codes ending with ZF reflect pre-Standardised 
Report Forms (SRF) and codes ending with ZK reflect post-SRF. SRF was introduced in 2004 and is 
based on the methodology in the IMF Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual.  
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Section A: Detailed Baseline Regression Results 
Argentina 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic^  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.116 2.170**  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.512 2.857***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  -0.156 -2.574**  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  -0.133 -2.573**  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.145 2.160** ȟ ?
 ? ? 0.449 9.556*** ȟ ?
 ? ? -0.009 -5.318*** ȟ ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.398 3.141***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.003 2.354*** ȟ ?
 ? ? ? ? -0.319 -3.145***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.005 4.111*  ? ? -0.006 -11.123***  ? ? 1.449 5.913***  ? ? ? ? -0.002 -3.757***  ? ? ? ? -0.741 -2.872**  ? ? ? ? 0.001 1.876*  ? ? ? ? -0.445 -1.977*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.180 5.783*** ȟ ? ? ? -0.755 -10.650*** ȟ ? ? ? ? 0.692 2.941*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.319 2.813*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.607 -3.871*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.496 -3.104*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.401 2.707*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.641 -2.285** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.241 -2.215** 
AR(1) -0.242 -2.473** S3 (seasonal dummy, q3) -0.071 -3.702*** 
AR(2) 0.373 3.056*** S4 (seasonal dummy, q4) 0.033 2.484** 
AR(3) 0.175 2.060** Constant 0.025 4.365*** 
S2 (seasonal dummy, q2) 
-0.372 -6.272***  
  
Constant 0.096 6.131*** 
   
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.152 (0.889) 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.379 (6.513)*** 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.87 Adjusted R2 0.86 
Serial Correlation (2 lags)  Serial Correlation (2 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.807     LM Test (chi-square) 0.377 
    F-Test 0.863     F-Test 0.493 
Heteroscedasticity  0.353 Heteroscedasticity  0.898 
Normality  0.809 Normality  0.745 
Ramsey RESET 0.210 Ramsey RESET 0.075* 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1994q4-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1994q4-2010q2 
Observations 63 Observations 63 
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Australia 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  -0.011 -0.062  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.081 0.110 ȟ ?
 ? ? 1.862 2.386**  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  -1.252 -1.716*  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -1.516 -2.218**  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  1.253 1.776*  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 2.314 2.980*** ȟ ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.409 1.663* ȟ ? ? ? -0.314 -2.060** ȟ ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.464 1.910* ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.269 1.912*  ? ? ? ? -0.011 -2.343** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.250 2.145**  ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.009 -1.951* ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -1.781 -3.096***  ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.008 1.963* ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -1.469 -2.576**  ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.012 3.232*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 1.477 2.608** ȟ ? ? ? 0.118 2.381** 
AR(1) -0.342 -4.749*** ȟ ? ? ? ? -0.841 -3.539*** 
AR(2) -0.136 -1.936* ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.864 4.680*** 
AR(3) -0.190 -2.710*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.617 -2.797*** 
S3 (seasonal dummy, q3) 0.044 3.268*** AR(1) 0.302 2.831*** 
S4 (seasonal dummy, q4) 0.092 7.496*** AR(3) 0.220 2.063** 
D1 (1997q4) -0.216 -4.871*** S2 (seasonal dummy, q2) 0.019 4.286*** 
D2 (1999q3) -0.198 -5.137*** S3 (seasonal dummy, q3) 0.017 3.810*** 
D3 (2008q4) 0.355 6.799*** S4 (seasonal dummy, q4) 0.026 6.462*** 
Constant -0.037 -2.890*** Constant -0.015 -3.042*** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
-0.007 (0.004) 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.172 (0.004) 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.81 Adjusted R2 0.51 
Serial Correlation (2 lags)  Serial Correlation (4 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.043**     LM Test (chi-square) 0.288 
    F-Test 0.093*     F-Test 0.450 
Heteroscedasticity  0.243 Heteroscedasticity  0.477 
Normality  0.000*** Normality  0.112 
Ramsey RESET 0.620 Ramsey RESET 0.457 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1991q2-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1991q2-2010q2 
Observations 77 Observations 77 
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Brazil 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic^  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  -0.030 -0.331  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.199 2.792*** ȟ ?
 ? ? 3.775 5.044***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  -0.128 -2.544**  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -0.974 -2.232**  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  -0.272 -4.759***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -3.278 -4.512***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.233 3.137*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.338 2.283** ȟ ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.200 2.110** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.320 2.079** ȟ ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.281 5.661*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.381 2.246** ȟ ?
 ? ? ? ? -0.246 -3.167*** ȟ ? ? ? ? 2.345 1.757*  ? ? -0.002 -4.924*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 3.038 1.862*  ? ? ? ? -0.001 -3.235*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -2.440 -2.035**  ? ? ? ? 0.002 5.272*** 
AR(4) 0.297 2.187** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.049 3.727*** 
Constant 0.028 1.917* ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.046 -4.508*** 
 
  ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.083 2.490** 
 
  ȟ ? ? ? ? -0.973 -4.894*** 
 
  ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.551 2.262** 
 
  ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.156 -1.804* 
 
  ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.678 9.535*** 
 
  ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.860 -6.474*** 
 
  AR(1) 0.389 4.751*** 
 
  AR(2) -0.168 -4.445*** 
 
  S2 (seasonal dummy, q2) 0.050 4.910*** 
 
  S3 (seasonal dummy, q3) 0.052 6.731*** 
 
  S4 (seasonal dummy, q4) 0.033 10.562*** 
 
  Constant -0.019 -3.901*** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
-0.030 (-0.331) 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.041 (0.025) 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.48 Adjusted R2 0.71 
Serial Correlation (8 lags)  Serial Correlation (8 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.707     LM Test (chi-square) 0.062* 
    F-Test 0.865     F-Test 0.483 
Heteroscedasticity  0.230 Heteroscedasticity  0.795 
Normality  0.498 Normality  0.391 
Ramsey RESET 0.023** Ramsey RESET 0.188 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1997q2-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1997q4-2010q2 
Observations 53 Observations 51 
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Canada 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.027 0.781  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.371 1.245  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.093 2.823***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.501 1.691*  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -0.679 -2.029** ȟ ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.510 2.807*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.243 -3.104***  ? ? ? ? 0.005 2.245** ȟ ? ? ? ? -0.809 -2.739*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.085 2.161** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.712 -2.370** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.094 2.187** 
AR(1) -0.516 -6.544*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.077 1.838* 
AR(2) -0.384 -4.552*** ȟ ? ? ? ? -1.233 -6.465*** 
AR(3) -0.306 -3.729*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.314 -1.902* 
S2 (seasonal dummy, q2) 0.057 3.999*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.710 -3.956*** 
S3 (seasonal dummy, q3) 0.039 4.320*** AR(1) -0.250 -2.197** 
S4 (seasonal dummy, q4) 0.077 5.399*** AR(2) 0.203 2.023** 
D1 (1999q4) 0.201 9.426*** AR(3) 0.342 3.530*** 
Constant -0.025 -2.753*** AR(4) 0.242 2.124** 
 
  S2 (seasonal dummy, q2) 0.009 1.675* 
 
  S3 (seasonal dummy, q3) 0.014 2.969*** 
 
  S4 (seasonal dummy, q4) 0.027 4.948*** 
 
  Constant -0.011 -2.728* 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.055 (4.811)** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
1.883 (3.066)* 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.91 Adjusted R2 0.70 
Serial Correlation (2 lags)   Serial Correlation (4 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.348     LM Test (chi-square) 0.222 
    F-Test 0.426     F-Test 0.365 
Heteroscedasticity  0.369 Heteroscedasticity  0.381 
Normality  0.830 Normality  0.789 
Ramsey RESET 0.131 Ramsey RESET 0.530 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1990q4-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1991q2-2010q2 
Observations 79 Observations 77 
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Chile 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.026 0.943  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.052 0.504  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.055 2.027** ȟ ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.314 5.248***  ? ?
 ? ? 0.921 3.593***  ? ? ? ? -0.001 -2.303**  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -1.262 -4.714***  ? ? ? ? -0.001 -2.633***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -0.730 -3.385***  ? ? ? ? -0.001 -2.689***  ? ? ? ? -0.005 -3.118***  ? ? ? ? -0.002 -4.360*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -1.147 -1.991* ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.094 1.865* ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 1.188 1.865* ȟ ? ? ? ? -0.410 -2.471** 
AR(1) -0.484 -10.203*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.510 2.860*** 
D1(1992q1) 1.112 14.746*** Constant 0.017 8.429*** 
Constant 0.040 4.194***    
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.054 (3.936)* 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.052 (0.254) 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.87 Adjusted R2 0.43 
Serial Correlation (2 lags)  Serial Correlation (2 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.121     LM Test (chi-square) 0.451 
    F-Test 0.163     F-Test 0.504 
Heteroscedasticity  0.910 Heteroscedasticity  0.266 
Normality  0.780 Normality  0.236 
Ramsey RESET 0.833 Ramsey RESET 0.585 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1990q4-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1990q3-2010q2 
Observations 79 Observations 80 
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China 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic^ Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic^  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.158 2.638**  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  -0.103 -0.647  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  -0.316 -6.820***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.504 2.893***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.191 2.787*** ȟ ?
 ? ? 0.381 6.432***  ? ?
 ? ? 0.541 3.499*** ȟ ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.264 6.497***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.584 4.002*** ȟ ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.149 2.872***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.781 5.133***  ? ? -0.010 -5.987***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.648 3.686***  ? ? ? ? -0.011 -5.041***  ? ? ? ? -0.016 -2.819*** ȟ ? ? ? -0.036 -2.123**  ? ? ? ? 0.013 1.882*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.045 -2.231** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.186 2.725*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.039 -1.834* ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.156 3.548*** ȟ ? ? ? ? -0.797 -8.792*** ȟ ? ? ? ? -0.810 -4.868*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.248 -2.520** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.295 2.396** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.231 2.529** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.571 4.325*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.209 -3.798*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.604 -2.499** AR(1) 0.206 6.067*** 
AR(3) 0.238 2.579** AR(2) -0.094 -2.135** 
S3 (seasonal dummy, q3) 0.103 2.609** AR(3) 0.348 9.821*** 
S4 (seasonal dummy, q4) 0.161 3.028*** S2 (seasonal dummy, q2) -0.101 -2.902*** 
Constant -0.094 -4.312*** S3 (seasonal dummy, q3) -0.071 -2.243** 
 
  S4 (seasonal dummy, q4) -0.205 -5.932*** 
 
  D1(1993q1) 0.204 17.829*** 
 
  Constant 0.094 4.295*** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.043 (0.306) 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.743 (9.289)*** 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.77 Adjusted R2 0.84 
Serial Correlation (4 lags)  Serial Correlation (4 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.068*     LM Test (chi-square) 0.049** 
    F-Test 0.157     F-Test 0.143 
Heteroscedasticity  0.959 Heteroscedasticity  0.130 
Normality  0.684 Normality  0.148 
Ramsey RESET 0.953 Ramsey RESET 0.080* 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1991q2-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1991q2-2010q2 
Observations 77 Observations 77 
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Colombia 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic^ Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic^  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.144 1.982*  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.346 2.157**  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.182 2.572** ȟ ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.486 2.687***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.347 4.715*** ȟ ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.879 5.975***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  -0.123 -1.806*  ? ? -0.003 -2.724***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 2.455 4.933***  ? ? ? ? -0.002 -1.842*  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -1.471 -2.911*** ȟ ? ? ? -0.117 -1.994* ȟ ? ? ? -0.224 -2.094** AR(2) 0.436 5.427*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.366 -2.744*** S3 (seasonal dummy, q3) 0.047 6.008*** 
AR(1) -0.521 -13.439*** S4 (seasonal dummy, q4) 0.095 12.189*** 
S3 (seasonal dummy, q3) 0.028 1.748* Constant -0.042 -6.114*** 
S4 (seasonal dummy, q4) 0.232 12.041***    
Constant -0.049 -3.824***    
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.362 (24.377)*** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.614 (4.577)** 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.89 Adjusted R2 0.85 
Serial Correlation (2 lags)  Serial Correlation (4 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.040**     LM Test (chi-square) 0.306 
    F-Test 0.073*     F-Test 0.413 
Heteroscedasticity  0.243 Heteroscedasticity  0.354 
Normality  0.633 Normality  0.698 
Ramsey RESET 0.217 Ramsey RESET 0.596 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1995q2-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1995q2-2010q2 
Observations 61 Observations 61 
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Czech Republic 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.069 1.760*  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.052 0.261  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 1.651 3.621***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.178 1.895*  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.990 4.183*** ȟ ?
 ? ? -0.526 -2.026* ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.454 -2.099** ȟ ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.709 3.444*** ȟ ? ? ? ? -1.354 -2.413** ȟ ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.682 4.560*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.975 -1.868* ȟ ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.694 2.486** 
AR(1) -0.430 -4.175***  ? ? -0.016 -2.788*** 
S3 (seasonal dummy, q3) -0.109 -2.807***  ? ? ? ? 0.018 2.867*** 
D1(2004q3) 0.152 3.540*** ȟ ? ? ? -0.228 -2.433** 
D2(2008q4) 0.155 3.559*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.182 1.828* 
Constant 0.008 0.894 ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.220 -2.235** 
   ȟ ? ? ? ? -0.572 -2.205** 
   ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.792 -3.088*** 
   AR(1) -0.316 -2.916*** 
   AR(2) 0.171 2.185* 
   AR(3) 0.126 1.689* 
 
  S2 (seasonal dummy, q2) 0.079 1.842* 
 
  S4 (seasonal dummy, q4) 0.108 4.691*** 
 
  D1(2002q1) -0.165 -10.524*** 
 
  D2(2002q2) -0.076 -1.700* 
 
  Constant -0.042 -2.524** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.048 (3.105)* 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.226 (1.529) 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.55 Adjusted R2 0.86 
Serial Correlation (4 lags)  Serial Correlation (8 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.051*     LM Test (chi-square) 0.026** 
    F-Test 0.105     F-Test 0.218 
Heteroscedasticity  0.622 Heteroscedasticity  0.446 
Normality  0.068* Normality  0.522 
Ramsey RESET 0.242 Ramsey RESET 0.403 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1997q2-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1997q2-2010q2 
Observations 53 Observations 53 
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Denmark 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  -0.015 -0.736  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.048 0.491  ? ? -0.017 -2.582**  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.288 2.793*** ȟ ? ? ? ? 3.709 2.141**  ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.007 2.326** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 5.786 3.090***  ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.017 -2.663*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 4.723 2.598**  ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.003 -0.480 
AR(1) -0.623 -5.882*** ȟ ? ? ? 0.638 3.071*** 
AR(2) -0.226 -2.175** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.537 -2.510** 
S4(seasonal dummy, q4) 0.036 2.482** S4(seasonal dummy, q4) -0.017 -2.866*** 
Constant 0.017 2.160** D1(1991q1) -0.163 -6.887*** 
 
  D2(2004q1) 0.079 3.354*** 
 
  D3(2004q2) -0.094 -4.138*** 
   D4(2005q2) 0.077 3.426*** 
   Constant 0.014 4.465*** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
-0.008 (0.536) 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.336 (5.334)** 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.44 Adjusted R2 0.65 
Serial Correlation (8 lags)  Serial Correlation (4 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.506     LM Test (chi-square) 0.166 
    F-Test 0.617     F-Test 0.247 
Heteroscedasticity  0.755 Heteroscedasticity  0.235 
Normality  0.294 Normality  0.697 
Ramsey RESET 0.721 Ramsey RESET 0.903 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1991q1-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1990q2-2010q2 
Observations 78 Observations 81 
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Egypt 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic^  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  3.537 7.867***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.524 4.481  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  -1.423 -3.702***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  -0.395 -3.581  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  -2.182 -6.143***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.300 2.687  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  1.178 3.253***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  -0.428 -3.122  ? ? -0.168 -5.659***  ? ? ? ? -0.019 -2.349  ? ? ? ? 0.130 2.660** ȟ ?Ȁ ? ? 0.110 7.630  ? ? ? ? 0.147 3.357*** ȟ ?Ȁ ? ? ? ? -0.114 -5.549  ? ? ? ? -0.150 -4.721*** ȟ ? ? ? ? -0.742 -9.116 ȟ ?Ȁ ? ? 0.636 2.318** AR(1) 0.358 4.967 ȟ ?Ȁ ? ? ? ? 0.634 2.595** AR(2) -0.173 -3.091 ȟ ?Ȁ ? ? ? ? -1.301 -5.402*** AR(3) 0.315 4.988 ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -2.804 -4.303*** AR(4) 0.371 4.972 
AR(4) 0.426 2.758** S2(seasonal dummy, q2) 0.012 2.313 
S4(seasonal dummy, q4) -0.038 -2.137** S4(seasonal dummy, q4) 0.009 2.033 
Constant 0.018 1.534 D1(2002q3) -0.062 -15.458 
   D2(2002q4) 0.074 12.252 
   Constant -0.006 -2.541 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
1.934 (6.221)** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.013 (0.000) 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.84 Adjusted R2 0.72 
Serial Correlation (8 lags)  Serial Correlation (2 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.005***     LM Test (chi-square) 0.064* 
    F-Test 0.135     F-Test 0.113 
Heteroscedasticity  0.811 Heteroscedasticity  0.167 
Normality  0.438 Normality  0.864 
Ramsey RESET 0.353 Ramsey RESET 0.653 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 2003q1-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1990q2-2010q2 
Observations 30 Observations 81 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
296 
 
Hong Kong 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.270 4.866***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.331 1.145  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  -0.115 -2.220**  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.449 1.741*  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -1.094 -3.073***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.536 1.858*  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -1.430 -3.499***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.450 4.186***  ? ? ? ? -0.040 -2.892***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.285 2.380***  ? ? ? ? 0.029 2.428**  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.658 4.267*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.838 -2.106**  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.368 3.084*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 1.487 2.937***  ? ? -0.009 -3.062*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -1.194 -2.640**  ? ? ? ? 0.008 2.654** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.788 -2.275** ȟ ? ? ? -0.232 -2.505** ȟ ? ? ? ? 5.214 5.041*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.175 -1.847* ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -3.575 -4.192*** ȟ ? ? ? ? -1.654 -5.944*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 2.021 2.511** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.940 -3.487*** 
S3(seasonal dummy, q3) 0.200 3.496*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.698 -2.590** 
S4(seasonal dummy, q4) 0.259 4.182*** S4(seasonal dummy, q4) 0.028 2.021* 
D1(2008q4) 0.627 8.265*** Constant -0.014 -1.943* 
Constant -0.101 -3.719***    
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.155 (4.514)** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
1.316 (6.349)** 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.87 Adjusted R2 0.63 
Serial Correlation (4 lags)  Serial Correlation (2 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.234     LM Test (chi-square) 0.150 
    F-Test 0.501     F-Test 0.283 
Heteroscedasticity  0.212 Heteroscedasticity  0.928 
Normality  0.749 Normality  0.508 
Ramsey RESET 0.230 Ramsey RESET 0.777 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1999q1-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1998q1-2010q2 
Observations 46 Observations 50 
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Hungary 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.035 1.243  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.015 0.239  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.077 2.720***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.195 3.225***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.641 1.980*  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  -0.115 -1.946*  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.806 2.417**  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.365 2.224**  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.855 2.363**  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 1.090 6.798***  ? ? 0.008 1.732*  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -0.680 -3.858*** ȟ ? ? ? -0.570 -3.697***  ? ? -0.004 -1.782* ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.740 4.474*** ȟ ? ? ? -0.215 -2.908*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.462 3.218*** S2(seasonal dummy, q2) 0.234 5.632*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.842 -1.962* S3(seasonal dummy, q3) 0.284 6.440*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.742 1.904* S4(seasonal dummy, q4) 0.411 7.911*** 
AR(1) -0.248 -2.490** Constant -0.224 -7.272*** 
S2(seasonal dummy, q2) 0.189 3.164***    
S3(seasonal dummy, q3) 0.187 3.028***    
S4(seasonal dummy, q4) 0.260 3.234***    
D1(2001q1) -0.170 -5.489***    
Constant -0.169 -5.436***    
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.090 (8.381)*** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.095 (0.890) 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.86 Adjusted R2 0.81 
Serial Correlation (8 lags)   Serial Correlation (2 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.098*     LM Test (chi-square) 0.248 
    F-Test 0.306     F-Test 0.340 
Heteroscedasticity  0.157 Heteroscedasticity  0.449 
Normality  0.989 Normality  0.339 
Ramsey RESET 0.958 Ramsey RESET 0.512 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1996q1-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1996q2-2010q2 
Observations 58 Observations 57 
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India 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.157 2.860***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.288 1.960*  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.155 2.870***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  -0.499 -3.017***  ? ?
 ? ? 0.737 5.260***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.463 2.963***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.368 6.822***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  -0.425 -2.505**  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.328 2.322**  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.377 2.449** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.257 1.770*  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.118 3.640*** ȟ ? ? ? ? -0.506 -2.785***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.199 3.942*** 
AR(1) -0.438 -4.366***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.161 3.729*** 
S2(seasonal dummy, q2) 0.052 1.787* ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.144 -1.796* 
S4(seasonal dummy, q4) -0.076 -2.701*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.214 2.710*** 
Constant 0.000 0.023 ȟ ? ? ? ? -0.610 -5.354*** 
   AR(4) 0.315 2.687** 
   Constant 0.008 2.482** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.216 (22.625)*** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.297 (1.092) 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.80 Adjusted R2 0.76 
Serial Correlation (2 lags)  Serial Correlation (8 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.828     LM Test (chi-square) 0.217 
    F-Test 0.866     F-Test 0.450 
Heteroscedasticity  0.549 Heteroscedasticity  0.172 
Normality  0.279 Normality  0.915 
Ramsey RESET 0.030** Ramsey RESET 0.543 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1997q1-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1997q3-2010q2 
Observations 54 Observations 52 
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Indonesia 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic^  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  -0.100 -1.316  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.440 2.334**  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 1.272 4.903***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  -0.441 -2.044*  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -0.570 -1.807*  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.748 4.080***  ? ? -0.017 -3.866***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.851 7.704*** ȟ ? ? ? -0.176 -2.398**  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.275 1.976* ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.148 -1.960*  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.573 4.484*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.626 2.193**  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.483 4.412*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.545 -2.819***  ? ? ? ? 0.005 3.130*** 
AR(1) -0.290 -4.384***  ? ? ? ? 0.009 4.455*** 
AR(3) 0.183 2.094**  ? ? ? ? 0.006 4.401*** 
AR(4) 0.307 3.876*** ȟ ? ? ? -0.232 -9.214*** 
S3(seasonal dummy, q3) 0.117 5.009*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.092 -2.330** 
S4(seasonal dummy, q4) 0.144 6.426*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.167 -5.076*** 
D1(1996q1) 0.203 3.966*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.220 -4.496*** 
D2(2008q4) -0.279 -5.162*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.071 -1.803* 
Constant -0.049 -3.632*** ȟ ? ? ? ? -0.617 -4.385*** 
 
  ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.249 -2.110* 
 
  ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.389 -3.142*** 
 
  ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.516 -4.201*** 
 
  AR(1) -0.586 -12.270*** 
 
  AR(3) -0.360 -8.615*** 
 
  AR(4) -0.146 -3.443*** 
 
  D1(1996q1) 0.414 30.592*** 
 
  Constant 0.003 0.668 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
-0.124 (1.712) 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.357 (5.840)*** 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.78 Adjusted R2 0.93 
Serial Correlation (4 lags)  Serial Correlation (4 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.191     LM Test (chi-square) 0.086* 
    F-Test 0.348     F-Test 0.299 
Heteroscedasticity  0.786 Heteroscedasticity  0.661 
Normality  0.537 Normality  0.729 
Ramsey RESET 0.292 Ramsey RESET 0.146 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1995q1-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1995q2-2010q2 
Observations 62 Observations 61 
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Israel 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic# Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic^  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.563 5.714***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.091 0.704  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.116 1.936*  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  -0.229 -2.357**  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  -0.122 -2.287**  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.199 1.720*  ? ? ? ? -0.018 -2.821***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.183 1.714*  ? ? ? ? -0.015 -2.995***  ? ? ? ? -0.004 -2.344** ȟ ? ? ? 0.571 1.838* ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.216 2.389** ȟ ? ? ? ? -1.173 -1.874* ȟ ? ? ? ? -0.783 -5.491*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.933 -1.687* ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.353 2.318** 
AR(2) 0.191 3.810*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.485 -2.737*** 
S2(seasonal dummy, q2) 0.068 2.732*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.410 2.529** 
S3(seasonal dummy, q3) 0.076 3.412*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.610 -3.046*** 
S4(seasonal dummy, q4) 0.087 3.905*** AR(1) 0.378 6.700*** 
D1(2008q4) 0.467 11.729*** AR(2) -0.258 -3.832*** 
Constant -0.078 -4.041*** AR(3) 0.223 3.343*** 
   AR(4) -0.181 -3.039*** 
   S2(seasonal dummy, q2) -0.031 -7.037*** 
   S4(seasonal dummy, q4) -0.017 -4.092*** 
   D1(1991q4) 0.201 20.169*** 
 
  Constant 0.023 4.920*** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.688 (26.408)*** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
-0.164 (0.994) 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.76 Adjusted R2 0.75 
Serial Correlation (8 lags)  Serial Correlation (2 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.201     LM Test (chi-square) 0.028** 
    F-Test 0.342     F-Test 0.065* 
Heteroscedasticity  0.099* Heteroscedasticity  0.900 
Normality  0.438 Normality  0.928 
Ramsey RESET 0.213 Ramsey RESET 0.387 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1990q4-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1991q2-2010q2 
Observations 79 Observations 77 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
301 
 
Japan 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic^ Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic^  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.425 2.092**  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  -0.455 -1.239  ? ?
 ? ? -1.281 -2.735***  ? ? ? ? -0.008 -2.656*** ȟ ? ? ? -0.221 -2.653***  ? ? ? ? -0.004 -1.982* 
AR(1) -0.216 -4.166*** ȟ ? ? ? ? -0.697 -4.291*** 
AR(2) 0.263 4.681*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.315 -2.152** 
AR(3) 0.286 4.468*** AR(2) -0.112 -2.657*** 
S2(seasonal dummy, q2) -0.042 -3.527*** S2(seasonal dummy, q2) 0.006 3.049*** 
S4(seasonal dummy, q4) 0.085 5.273*** S4(seasonal dummy, q4) 0.019 11.498*** 
D1(1999q4) 0.424 30.416*** D1(1998q2) -0.086 -26.743*** 
D2(2000q2) -0.318 -13.169*** D2(2004q1) 0.009 1.832* 
D3(2002q1) 0.160 16.729*** Constant -0.002 -1.303 
D4(2002q2) -0.113 -8.779***    
D5(2004q1) -0.063 -2.668***    
Constant -0.005 -1.071    
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.636 (4.612)*** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
-0.409 (1.529) 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.88 Adjusted R2 0.83 
Serial Correlation (2 lags)  Serial Correlation (4 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.015**     LM Test (chi-square) 0.010*** 
    F-Test 0.028**     F-Test 0.014** 
Heteroscedasticity  0.852 Heteroscedasticity  0.804 
Normality  0.101 Normality  0.046** 
Ramsey RESET 0.415 Ramsey RESET 0.057* 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1990q2-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1991q2-2010q2 
Observations 81 Observations 77 
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Korea 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic^  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  -0.086 -2.510  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.048 0.290  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -0.582 -2.061  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  -0.319 -1.953*  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.469 3.953  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.414 2.224**  ? ? ? ? -0.039 -3.897  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  -0.694 -3.628***  ? ? ? ? -0.016 -1.815  ? ?
 ? ? 0.048 2.154** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.289 -2.069  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.045 2.601** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -1.309 -1.677  ? ? 0.005 3.407*** 
AR(1) -0.444 -4.203  ? ? ? ? -0.006 -4.969*** 
AR(2) -0.227 -2.123 ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.056 -1.945* 
S2(seasonal dummy, q2) -0.097 -4.147 ȟ ? ? ? ? -0.676 -4.715*** 
S3(seasonal dummy, q3) -0.132 -2.173 AR(4) 0.267 2.913*** 
Constant 0.087 4.139 Constant 0.013 4.844*** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
-0.051 (6.119)** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
-0.752 (5.479)*** 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.45 Adjusted R2 0.47 
Serial Correlation (8 lags)  Serial Correlation (8 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.279     LM Test (chi-square) 0.010*** 
    F-Test 0.416     F-Test 0.019** 
Heteroscedasticity  0.631 Heteroscedasticity  0.467 
Normality  0.684 Normality  0.812 
Ramsey RESET 0.249 Ramsey RESET 0.442 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1991q1-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1990q2-2010q2 
Observations 78 Observations 81 
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Malaysia 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.041 2.153**  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.201 3.935***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.044 2.120**  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  -0.167 -2.748***  ? ?
 ? ? 1.005 5.111***  ? ?
 ? ? 0.299 4.688***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 1.375 4.651***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.230 3.048***  ? ? 0.032 2.346**  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.339 6.331***  ? ? ? ? -0.043 -3.343***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.170 3.300***  ? ? ? ? 0.039 2.809***  ? ? ? ? 0.011 3.333***  ? ? ? ? -0.033 -2.654*** ȟ ? ? ? ? -0.676 -4.020*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.363 1.789* ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.438 -2.435** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 1.112 5.196*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.379 2.084** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.530 -2.436** AR(4) 0.191 2.141** 
AR(1) -0.176 -2.056** S2(seasonal dummy, q2) -0.013 -1.745* 
AR(4) 0.173 2.265** Constant 0.006 1.743* 
S3(seasonal dummy, q3) 0.058 2.521**    
Constant -0.042 -3.548***    
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.084 (7.713)*** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.042 (0.187) 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.65 Adjusted R2 0.61 
Serial Correlation (4 lags)  Serial Correlation (8 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.622     LM Test (chi-square) 0.250 
    F-Test 0.722     F-Test 0.143 
Heteroscedasticity  0.650 Heteroscedasticity  0.131 
Normality  0.135 Normality  0.969 
Ramsey RESET 0.003*** Ramsey RESET 0.621 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1990q2-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1990q4-2010q2 
Observations 81 Observations 79 
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Mexico 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  -0.062 -3.231***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  -0.225 -2.092**  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -0.700 -3.694***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.293 2.182**  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.586 3.039***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  -0.299 -1.996*  ? ? -0.005 -5.112***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -0.283 -3.202***  ? ? ? ? -0.005 -5.084***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.383 5.948***  ? ? ? ? -0.004 -3.893***  ? ? -0.004 -4.782***  ? ? ? ? 0.005 3.567***  ? ? ? ? 0.002 2.662*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.321 3.548***  ? ? ? ? 0.002 3.316*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.404 -2.427**  ? ? ? ? 0.002 2.530** 
AR(1) -0.535 -7.711*** ȟ ? ? ? -0.189 -4.854*** 
AR(2) -0.160 -2.189** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.097 2.051** 
AR(4) 0.361 6.684*** ȟ ? ? ? ? -0.422 -2.965*** 
S2(seasonal dummy, q2) -0.152 -5.674*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.414 -2.467** 
S3(seasonal dummy, q3) -0.108 -5.247*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.349 -4.548*** 
D1(1999q4) 0.208 6.844*** AR(1) -0.418 -5.023*** 
Constant 0.095 7.919*** S2(seasonal dummy, q2) -0.042 -8.290*** 
 
  D1(1992q1) -0.050 -3.665*** 
 
  D2(1992q2) -0.059 -4.188*** 
 
  D3(2000q4) -0.044 -3.376*** 
 
  Constant 0.034 11.907*** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
-0.046 (10.667)*** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
-0.164 (0.876) 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.97 Adjusted R2 0.83 
Serial Correlation (8 lags)  Serial Correlation (2 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.007***     LM Test (chi-square) 0.351 
    F-Test 0.023**     F-Test 0.468 
Heteroscedasticity  0.830 Heteroscedasticity  0.833 
Normality  0.054* Normality  0.163 
Ramsey RESET 0.493 Ramsey RESET 0.945 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1991q2-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1991q2-2010q2 
Observations 77 Observations 77 
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New Zealand 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.046 1.497  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.233 1.537  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.069 2.376**  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.518 3.598***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.072 2.431**  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -0.374 -1.798*  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.091 3.487*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.145 2.675***  ? ? 0.067 2.741*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.121 2.152** ȟ ? ? ? -0.867 -2.390** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.805 -2.481** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -1.291 -3.944*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.634 2.176** ȟ ? ? ? ? -6.492 -2.657** AR(1) -0.263 -2.630** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 3.937 2.524** AR(4) -0.252 -2.423** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -3.431 -1.972* S4(seasonal dummy, q4) 0.010 2.206** 
S3(seasonal dummy, q3) 0.123 4.732*** Constant 0.019 6.298*** 
S4(seasonal dummy, q4) 0.273 10.154***    
D1(1999q4) 0.566 5.978***    
D2(2000q1) -0.381 -4.111***    
D3(2008q4) -0.191 -1.819*    
Constant -0.068 -4.619***    
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.278 (18.260)*** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.496 (12.851)*** 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.74 Adjusted R2 0.27 
Serial Correlation (4 lags)  Serial Correlation (2 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.242     LM Test (chi-square) 0.240 
    F-Test 0.370     F-Test 0.298 
Heteroscedasticity  0.351 Heteroscedasticity  0.114 
Normality  0.000*** Normality  0.571 
Ramsey RESET 0.139 Ramsey RESET 0.721 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1991q2-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1991q2-2010q2 
Observations 77 Observations 77 
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Norway 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic#  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.034 0.779  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.296 4.451***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 1.978 2.611**  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.232 3.241***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 2.779 3.354***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.164 3.236***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 1.831 4.808***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.225 4.170***  ? ? ? ? -0.058 -2.508**  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.122 2.225** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -1.065 -1.781*  ? ?
 ? ? -0.155 -2.204** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 1.919 3.254***  ? ? ? ? 0.010 3.654*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -7.623 -4.195***  ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.012 4.510*** 
AR(1) -0.381 -5.908***  ? ? ? ? 0.015 4.489*** 
S2(seasonal dummy, q2) -0.177 -2.284** ȟ ? ? ? ? -1.034 -4.756*** 
S3(seasonal dummy, q3) -0.182 -2.404** S3(seasonal dummy, q3) -0.022 -6.440*** 
D1(1994q4) -0.257 -2.303*** S4(seasonal dummy, q4) 0.019 2.406** 
D2(1999q4) 0.492 4.490*** D1(1991q3) 0.072 23.864*** 
D3(2002q1) 0.384 3.561*** D2(1992q4) 0.054 11.649*** 
D4(2005q3) 0.538 4.894*** D3(2000q4) -0.046 -9.626*** 
D5(2007q4) 0.352 3.131*** Constant 0.013 4.420*** 
D6(2008q4) 0.885 7.410***    
Constant 0.046 1.628    
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.024 (0.065) 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
1.039 (40.475)*** 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.75 Adjusted R2 0.68 
Serial Correlation (8 lags)  Serial Correlation (8 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.302     LM Test (chi-square) 0.594 
    F-Test 0.522     F-Test 0.758 
Heteroscedasticity  0.679 Heteroscedasticity  0.079* 
Normality  0.103 Normality  0.437 
Ramsey RESET 0.546 Ramsey RESET 0.330 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1991q1-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1990q2-2010q2 
Observations 78 Observations 81 
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Peru 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.030 3.120***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.226 3.883***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.057 4.391***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.191 3.028***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.050 4.934***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.152 3.124***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.046 4.036***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.351 2.766***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.518 2.970***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -0.451 -4.805***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -0.513 -4.095***  ? ? ? ? 0.007 1.732*  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -0.376 -2.211** ȟ ? ? ? -0.547 -3.739***  ? ? 0.012 1.814* ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.297 2.021*  ? ? ? ? -0.027 -4.015*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.229 1.970*  ? ? ? ? 0.031 5.259*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.378 -2.928***  ? ? ? ? -0.019 -3.802*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -1.043 -3.298*** ȟ ? ? ? -0.842 -5.822*** S2(seasonal dummy, q2) -0.074 -6.120*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.829 4.853*** S3(seasonal dummy, q3) -0.070 -3.688*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.581 -3.848*** Constant 0.049 6.733*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.797 -5.559***    ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -1.644 -4.013***    ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.702 -1.881*    ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 1.010 3.018***    
AR(2) -0.229 -2.714***    
AR(3) -0.288 -3.791***    
S2(seasonal dummy, q2) 0.091 2.747***    
S4(seasonal dummy, q4) 0.204 7.754***    
D1(1996q4) -0.161 -5.980***    
D2(1997q2) -0.102 -4.379***    
Constant -0.038 -2.531**    
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.120 (86.527)*** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.569 (51.928)*** 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.96 Adjusted R2 0.60 
Serial Correlation (2 lags)  Serial Correlation (2 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.107     LM Test (chi-square) 0.188 
    F-Test 0.275     F-Test 0.281 
Heteroscedasticity  0.385 Heteroscedasticity  0.670 
Normality  0.550 Normality  0.260 
Ramsey RESET 0.972 Ramsey RESET 0.032** 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1995q2-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1995q2-2010q2 
Observations 61 Observations 61 
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Philippines 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic^ Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  -0.076 -1.983*  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.042 0.246  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.304 3.255***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.283 1.814*  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -0.423 -6.908***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.375 2.297** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.433 2.281** ȟ ? ? ? -0.220 -1.847* 
S4(seasonal dummy, q4) 0.201 9.665*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.190 1.656 
D1(1999q4) 0.248 13.325*** ȟ ? ? ? ? -0.634 -2.564** 
D2(2006q4) 0.334 26.615*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.833 3.418*** 
Constant -0.033 -4.733*** AR(4) 0.498 6.727*** 
 
  S4(seasonal dummy, q4) 0.038 2.856*** 
 
  Constant -0.004 -0.777 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
-0.076 (3.932)* 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
1.396 (4.171)** 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.85 Adjusted R2 0.73 
Serial Correlation (2 lags)  Serial Correlation (4 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.027**     LM Test (chi-square) 0.107 
    F-Test 0.037**     F-Test 0.154 
Heteroscedasticity  0.611 Heteroscedasticity  0.043** 
Normality  0.520 Normality  0.201 
Ramsey RESET 0.935 Ramsey RESET 0.476 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1990q2-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1991q1-2010q2 
Observations 81 Observations 78 
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Poland 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic^ Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  -0.011 -0.142  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.007 0.070  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.149 1.710*  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  -0.280 -2.268**  ? ?
 ? ? 0.910 4.765***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.275 2.746***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -0.684 -3.332***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.365 3.806***  ? ? ? ? -0.039 -5.320***  ? ?
 ? ? 0.750 5.764***  ? ? ? ? 0.048 5.371***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.343 4.289*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 2.578 3.114***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -0.720 -8.157*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -2.208 -2.189**  ? ? -0.018 -5.424*** 
AR(1) -0.221 -2.160**  ? ? ? ? 0.018 6.537*** 
S2(seasonal dummy, q2) 0.028 2.032**  ? ? ? ? -0.006 -2.882*** 
D1(2001q4) 0.175 5.625*** ȟ ? ? ? -0.068 -1.745* 
D2(2008q4) 0.124 4.494*** ȟ ? ? ? ? -0.641 -3.041*** 
Constant 0.000 0.005 ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.864 3.577*** 
   AR(2) 0.385 4.848*** 
   AR(3) 0.312 3.843*** 
   S2(seasonal dummy, q2) 0.082 4.240*** 
   S3(seasonal dummy, q3) 0.041 3.619*** 
   S4(seasonal dummy, q4) 0.055 2.840*** 
   Constant -0.048 -3.773*** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.113 (1.166) 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
1.211 (3.216)* 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.67 Adjusted R2 0.84 
Serial Correlation (2 lags)  Serial Correlation (2 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.008***     LM Test (chi-square) 0.078* 
    F-Test 0.024**     F-Test 0.210 
Heteroscedasticity  0.893 Heteroscedasticity  0.616 
Normality  0.633 Normality  0.916 
Ramsey RESET 0.357 Ramsey RESET 0.897 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1997q3-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1998q1-2010q2 
Observations 52 Observations 50 
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Russia 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic^ Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.264 3.041***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.292 5.938***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.083 1.720*  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.199 3.406***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  -0.094 -2.093**  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -0.077 -1.855*  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -0.740 -5.622***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -0.177 -1.844*  ? ? 0.007 4.172***  ? ? ? ? 0.002 3.381***  ? ? ? ? -0.008 -6.440*** ȟ ? ? ? 0.128 2.226**  ? ? ? ? 0.005 4.194*** ȟ ? ? ? ? -0.316 -5.769***  ? ? ? ? -0.003 -3.364*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.155 -2.158**  ? ? ? ? 0.004 5.957*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.113 1.816* ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.234 -6.014*** AR(2) -0.315 -2.896*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.323 3.649*** AR(3) 0.361 4.124*** ȟ ? ? ? ? -0.623 -8.506*** S2(seasonal dummy, q2) 0.088 5.870*** 
S2(seasonal dummy, q2) 0.220 6.248*** S4(seasonal dummy, q4) 0.086 4.453*** 
S4(seasonal dummy, q4) 0.098 3.511*** Constant -0.021 -3.152*** 
Constant -0.052 -7.424***    
      
      
      
      
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.253 (10.548)*** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.515 (59.747)*** 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.80 Adjusted R2 0.87 
Serial Correlation (2 lags)  Serial Correlation (8 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.003***     LM Test (chi-square) 0.035** 
    F-Test 0.011**     F-Test 0.112 
Heteroscedasticity  0.869 Heteroscedasticity  0.534 
Normality  0.957 Normality  0.739 
Ramsey RESET 0.519 Ramsey RESET 0.259 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1996q3-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1996q2-2010q2 
Observations 56 Observations 57 
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South Africa 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.057 1.085  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  -0.020 -0.076  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.088 1.939*  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.875 3.198***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 1.493 2.194**  ? ?
 ? ? 1.532 4.071***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 1.811 2.809***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -1.117 -2.387** ȟ ? ? ? -0.275 -3.588***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 1.731 5.041*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.265 -3.459***  ? ? ? ? 0.005 2.303** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.182 -2.333** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.092 -2.529** ȟ ? ? ? ? -1.869 -4.618*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.101 -2.923*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -1.181 -3.411*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.097 2.640*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -1.332 -3.456*** ȟ ? ? ? ? -0.549 -3.111*** 
AR(1) -0.401 -5.953*** AR(3) -0.186 -2.051** 
AR(2) -0.317 -4.741*** AR(4) 0.217 2.176** 
S4(seasonal dummy, q4) 0.096 10.193*** S2(seasonal dummy, q2) -0.014 -3.312*** 
D1(1993q4) -0.188 -5.165*** Constant 0.002 0.519 
D2(1997q2) -0.081 -2.041**    
Constant -0.029 -4.313***    
      
      
      
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.084 (5.144)** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.882 (6.060)** 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.72 Adjusted R2 0.59 
Serial Correlation (4 lags)  Serial Correlation (4 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.347     LM Test (chi-square) 0.336 
    F-Test 0.484     F-Test 0.448 
Heteroscedasticity  0.909 Heteroscedasticity  0.934 
Normality  0.624 Normality  0.296 
Ramsey RESET 0.369 Ramsey RESET 0.573 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1991q2-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1990q2-2010q2 
Observations 77 Observations 81 
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Singapore 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.008 0.780  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.169 2.656***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.030 2.594**  ? ? ? ? -0.005 -2.318**  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.041 3.460*** ȟ ? ? ? ? -0.977 -4.515***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -0.255 -2.036** AR(1) 0.254 2.826***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -0.472 -3.293*** AR(4) 0.293 3.007***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -0.275 -2.202** S2(seasonal dummy, q2) -0.009 -2.262**  ? ? ? ? -0.016 -2.174** S3(seasonal dummy, q3) -0.011 -2.738*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 1.154 4.548*** Constant 0.009 2.646*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -1.071 -2.514**    
AR(1) -0.576 -10.274***    
AR(2) -0.293 -4.690***    
AR(3) -0.183 -2.861***    
S2(seasonal dummy, q2) -0.031 -3.362***    
S3(seasonal dummy, q3) -0.031 -3.286***    
D1(1998q3) -0.236 -10.057***    
D2(1999q4) 0.231 10.665***    
Constant 0.044 6.870***    
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.039 (14.376)*** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.374 (5.404)** 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.84 Adjusted R2 0.43 
Serial Correlation (4 lags)  Serial Correlation (2 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.166     LM Test (chi-square) 0.351 
    F-Test 0.246     F-Test 0.395 
Heteroscedasticity  0.677 Heteroscedasticity  0.680 
Normality  0.856 Normality  0.961 
Ramsey RESET 0.335 Ramsey RESET 0.805 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1990q3-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1990q2-2010q2 
Observations 80 Observations 81 
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Taiwan 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.074 1.911*  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.464 4.012***  ? ?
 ? ? -0.430 -2.383**  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  -0.224 -1.950*  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? -0.351 -2.191**  ? ?
 ? ? -0.183 -5.581***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.334 1.843*  ? ? ? ? 0.008 2.148**  ? ? ? ? 0.034 2.299** ȟ ?Ȁ ? ? ? ? -0.096 -2.618**  ? ? ? ? 0.049 3.105*** ȟ ? ? ? ? -0.975 -8.195***  ? ? ? ? -0.061 -4.024*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.252 2.503** ȟ ?Ȁ ? ? -0.290 -1.948* ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.216 2.040** ȟ ?Ȁ ? ? ? ? -0.418 -2.666*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.507 -4.303*** ȟ ?Ȁ ? ? ? ? -0.368 -2.404** AR(1) 0.157 2.355** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -0.757 -1.960* AR(2) 0.416 4.993*** 
AR(1) -0.295 -3.114*** AR(3) 0.125 2.013** 
S3(seasonal dummy, q3) -0.046 -2.247** AR(4) 0.264 2.895*** 
Constant 0.026 2.965*** S4(seasonal dummy, q4) 0.029 6.456*** 
 
  Constant -0.006 -2.395** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
0.057 (3.678)* 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
6.272 (0.107) 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.38 Adjusted R2 0.80 
Serial Correlation (8 lags)  Serial Correlation (8 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.231     LM Test (chi-square) 0.433 
    F-Test 0.378     F-Test 0.619 
Heteroscedasticity  0.308 Heteroscedasticity  0.796 
Normality  0.823 Normality  0.295 
Ramsey RESET 0.443 Ramsey RESET 0.562 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1990q3-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1991q2-2010q2 
Observations 80 Observations 77 
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Thailand 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic^ Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.030 0.855  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  0.191 1.825*  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  -0.062 -2.049**  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.388 3.650***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.461 3.163***  ? ?
 ? ? 0.117 2.764***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.877 4.426***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.106 2.819***  ? ? -0.016 -2.422** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.126 -3.710***  ? ? ? ? 0.014 1.701* ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.185 -4.510***  ? ? ? ? -0.025 -3.659*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.097 -2.669*** ȟ ? ? ? 0.420 3.295*** ȟ ? ? ? ? -0.913 -7.066*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.214 -2.184** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.504 3.991*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.545 4.088*** AR(4) 0.677 8.767*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? -0.203 -2.332** Constant -0.002 -1.263 ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.211 1.905*    ȟ ? ? ? ? -0.897 -1.907*    ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -1.969 -4.512***    ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.953 3.154***    ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? -1.390 -3.366***    
AR(1) -0.393 -5.484***    
AR(2) -0.402 -4.760***    
S2(seasonal dummy, q2) 0.049 2.085**    
S4(seasonal dummy, q4) 0.052 3.623***    
Constant -0.009 -1.267    
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
-0.017 (0.321) 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
1.792 (9.944)*** 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.84 Adjusted R2 0.74 
Serial Correlation (2 lags)  Serial Correlation (2 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.124     LM Test (chi-square) 0.232 
    F-Test 0.221     F-Test 0.290 
Heteroscedasticity  0.482 Heteroscedasticity  0.823 
Normality  0.179 Normality  0.565 
Ramsey RESET 0.307 Ramsey RESET 0.950 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1991q2-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1991q2-2010q2 
Observations 77 Observations 77 
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Turkey 
Dependent variable (Real Base Money Growth) Dependent variable (Real Broad Money Growth)  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?   ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ? ?  
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic^  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  -0.012 -0.309  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  -0.300 -3.093***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.367 2.678***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  0.433 3.502***  ? ?
 ? ? ? ? 0.511 3.821***  ?	 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  -0.347 -3.440***  ? ? ? ? 0.002 1.675*  ? ?
 ? ? 0.170 5.199*** ȟ ? ? ? -0.532 -5.483***  ? ? 0.001 1.805* ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.272 2.747***  ? ? ? ? 0.002 1.955* ȟ ? ? ? ? -0.513 -3.275***  ? ? ? ? 0.002 3.895*** 
AR(1) -0.346 -3.928*** ȟ ? ? ? -0.310 -6.273*** 
AR(2) 0.352 3.066*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.137 2.101** 
D1(1999q4) 0.153 3.150*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.103 2.198** 
D2(2005q4) 0.165 3.273*** ȟ ? ? ? ? ? 0.163 2.283** 
Constant 0.004 0.537 ȟ ? ? ? ? -0.218 -2.181** 
 
  ȟ ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.200 1.883* 
 
  S2(seasonal dummy, q2) -0.030 -2.970*** 
 
  D1(2005q4) 0.124 14.336*** 
 
  Constant 0.032 5.570*** 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
-0.012 (0.096) 
Long-run multiplier for  ?	 ? ? ? ? ?  
(F-statistic) 
-0.214 (1.501) 
Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.63 Adjusted R2 0.74 
Serial Correlation (8 lags)  Serial Correlation (2 lags)  
    LM Test (chi-square) 0.554     LM Test (chi-square) 0.179 
    F-Test 0.733     F-Test 0.285 
Heteroscedasticity  0.550 Heteroscedasticity  0.343 
Normality  0.391 Normality  0.875 
Ramsey RESET 0.862 Ramsey RESET 0.538 
Sample Information 
Sample size (adjusted) 1995q2-2010q2 Sample size (adjusted) 1995q1-2010q2 
Observations 61 Observations 62 
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Section B: Unit Root and Stationarity Tests for Variables in Levels and First Differences 
Variable 
Argentina Australia Brazil 
ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS 
H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) 
Level 
Real BM -1.434 (c, t) (2) 
-1.234 
(c, t) (5) 
0.139* 
(c, t) (6) 
1.469 
 (c, t) (11) 
0.019 
(c, t) (4) 
0.261*** 
(c, t) (7) 
-0.740 
(c, t) (7) 
0.039 
(c, t) (4) 
0.223*** 
(c, t) (6) 
Real RM -1.538 (c, t) (7) 
-1.567 
(c, t) (6) 
0.265*** 
(c, t)(6) 
-2.727 
(c, t) (8) 
-5.262*** 
(c, t) (2) 
0.094 
(c, t) (5) 
-1.755 
(c, t) (5) 
-1.791 
(c, t) (0) 
0.151** 
(c, t) (4) 
Real FXRcb 
-3.276* 
(c, t) (12) 
-1.699 
(c, t) (5) 
0.156** 
(c, t) (6) 
-3.678** 
(c, t) (12) 
-1.887 
(c, t) (3) 
0.138* 
(c, t) (6) 
-1.078 
(c, t) (6) 
-1.014 
(c, t) (3) 
0.228*** 
(c, t) (6) 
ln(Real GDP) -1.463 (c, t) (8) 
-2.862 
(c, t) (11) 
0.199** 
(c, t) (6) 
-3.698** 
(c, t) (5) 
-2.062 
 (c, t) (3) 
0.130* 
(c, t) (6) 
-1.394 
(c, t) (5) 
-5.059*** 
(c, t) (2) 
0.264*** 
(c, t) (4) 
ln(REER) -2.894 (c, t) (1) 
-2.436 
(c, t) (2) 
0.116 
(c, t) (5) 
-1.922 
(c, t) (7) 
-2.115 
(c, t) (2) 
0.259*** 
(c, t) (6) 
-1.314 
(c) (0) 
-1.281 
(c) (4) 
0.249 
(c) (6) 
Inflation  -3.273* (c) (5) 
-2.640* 
(c) (1) 
0.087 
(c, t) (5) 
-3.857*** 
(c) (9) 
-3.805** 
(c) (4) 
0.079 
(c) (6) 
-1.826 
 (c) (9) 
-2.950** 
(c) (2) 
0.110 
(c, t) (5) 
IntRate(M) -3.503** (c) (3) 
-3.880*** 
(c) (2) 
0.095 
(c) (5) 
-3.318* 
(c, t) (8) 
-2.532 
(c) (3) 
0.228** 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.300 
 (c, t) (8) 
-5.464*** 
(c, t) (6) 
0.072 
(c, t) (3) 
IntRate(B) - - - -3.416* (c, t) (10) 
-2.919** 
(c) (1) 
0.215*** 
(c, t) (6) - - - 
First Difference  ? ? ? ? ? ?  -3.916*** (c) (1) -6.911*** (c) (4) 0.162 (c) (5) -3.077** (c) (4) -7.720*** (c) (1) 0.329 (c) (2) -3.198** (c) (5) -6.855*** (c) (5) 0.198 (c) (1)  ? ? ? ? ? ?  -3.159** (c) (6) -12.003*** (c) (1) 0.087 (c) (7) -3.085** (c) (7) -11.543*** (-) (26) 0.167 (c) (30) -3.655*** (c) (4) -8.468*** (c) (6) 0.082 (c) (5)  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  -4.057*** (c) (1) -8.475*** (c) (4) 0.087 (c) (4) -1.710 (c) (10) -8.392*** (c) (1) 0.098 (c) (0) -4.087** (c, t) (9) -7.896*** (c, t) (1) 0.059 (c, t) (1)  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  -1.545 (-) (11) -7.822*** (-) (3) 0.111 (c) (4) -8.495*** (c) (0) -8.491*** (c) (1) 0.102 (c) (1) -3.799** (c, t) (9) -8.002*** (c, t) (1) 0.056 (c, t) (1) 
ǻOQ(Real GDP) -2.192 (c) (8) 
-13.845*** 
(c) (10) 
0.180 
(c) (19) 
-3.169* 
(c, t) (12) 
-8.268*** 
(c) (3) 
0.140 
(c) (3) 
-3.758** 
(c, t) (8) 
-17.461*** 
(c) (15) 
0.157 
(c) (15) 
ǻOQ(REER) -5.867*** (-) (1) 
-5.827*** 
(-) (7) 
0.071 
(c) (5) 
-3.048*** 
(-) (6) 
-7.459*** 
(-) (4) 
0.036 
(c, t) (4) 
-7.332*** 
 (-) (0) 
-7.324*** 
(-) (7) 
0.232 
(c) (6) 
ǻ,Qflation) -4.049*** (-) (5) 
3.620*** 
(-) (5) 
0.101 
(c) (0) 
-3.696*** 
(-) (11) 
-7.377*** 
(-) (3) 
0.162 
(c) (4) 
-3.186*** 
(-) (4) 
-3.993*** 
(-) (5) 
0.115 
(c) (1) 
ǻIntRate(M) -5.170*** (-) (2) 
-9.391*** 
(-) (5) 
0.054  
(c) (5) 
-3.935*** 
(c) (7) 
-5.343*** 
(c, t) (1) 
0.054  
(c, t) (3) 
-5.469*** 
(c) (10) 
-7.823*** 
(-) (22) 
0.268 
(c) (10) 
ǻIntRate(B) - - - -3.843** (c, t) (9) 
-6.623*** 
(-) (2) 
0.058 
(c, t) (2) - - - 
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Variable 
Canada Chile China 
ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS 
H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) 
Level 
Real BM 1.396 (c, t) (10) 
0.045 
(c, t) (10) 
0.273*** 
(c, t) (7) 
-0.097 
(c, t) (11) 
-1.240 
(c, t) (2) 
0.270*** 
(c, t) (7) 
1.764 
(c, t) (12)  
3.525 
(c, t) (1) 
0.292*** 
(c, t) (6) 
Real RM -2.157 (c, t) (12) 
-7.832*** 
(c, t) (2) 
0.157** 
(c, t) (4) 
-1.017 
(c, t) (3) 
-4.009** 
(c, t) (2) 
0.270*** 
(c, t) (6) 
2.271 
(c, t) (11) 
5.665 
(c, t) (65) 
0.259*** 
(c, t) (6) 
Real FXRcb 
-2.997 
(c, t) (12) 
-2.604 
(c, t) (4) 
0.128 
(c, t) (6) 
-1.920 
(c) (9) 
-1.912 
(c) (3) 
0.164** 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.266 
(c, t) (11) 
2.208 
(c,t) (3) 
0.270*** 
(c,t) (7) 
ln(Real GDP) -1.620 (c, t) (9) 
-0.222 
(c) (5) 
0.152** 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.250 
(c, t) (12) 
-2.504 
(c, t) (56) 
0.264*** 
(c, t) (6) 
3.476** 
(c, t) (11) 
-14.071*** 
(c,t) (10) 
0.097 
(c, t) (16) 
ln(REER) -1.071 (c, t) (2) 
-0.711 
(c, t) (0) 
0.293 
(c) (7) 
-3.020** 
(c) (9) 
-1.922 
(c) (7) 
0.184** 
(c, t) (6) 
-3.132 
(c, t) (0) 
-3.078 
 (c, t) (6) 
0.122 
(c) (6) 
Inflation  -3.002** (c) (11) 
-3.498** 
(c) (3) 
0.138* 
(c, t) (5) 
-2.813 
(c, t) (8) 
-2.128 
(c, t) (3) 
0.268*** 
(c, t) (6) 
-3.672*** 
(c) (10) 
-3.894*** 
(c) (4) 
0.087 
(c) (5) 
IntRate(M) -3.620** (c, t) (9) 
-1.933 
(c) (4) 
0.155** 
(c, t) (6) 
-4.945*** 
(c, t) (7) 
-5.885*** 
(c, t) (4) 
0.199** 
(c, t) (6) 
-1.006 
(c) (12) 
-1.457 
(c) (3) 
0.145* 
(c, t) (7) 
IntRate(B) -4.362*** (c, t) (5) 
-2.874 
(c, t) (2) 
0.141* 
(c, t) (6) - - - - - - 
First Difference  ? ? ? ? ? ?  -1.424 (c, t) (11) -12.689*** (c, t) (5) 0.362* (c) (12) -3.356* (c, t) (10) -10.647*** (c, t) (6) 0.304 (c) (6) -2.410 (c) (7) -7.103*** (c, t) (4) 0.152** (c, t) (4)  ? ? ? ? ? ?  -0.555 (c) (11) -42.074*** (c) (23) 0.085 (c) (13) -15.845*** (c) (0) -16.559*** (c) (6) 0.488** (c) (82) -1.892 (c) (11) -10.162*** (c, t) (7) 0.316 (c) (11)  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  -0.893 (c) (11) -12.358*** (c) (4) 0.162 (c) (3) -1.776* (-) (8) -8.449*** (-) (0) 0.266 (c) (1) -2.180 (c, t) (12) -5.850*** (c, t) (4) 0.069 (c, t) (5)  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  -0.914 (c) (11) -12.676*** (c) (4) 0.149 (c) (3) -1.936* (-) (8) -9.229*** (c) (1) 0.172 (c) (2) -5.096*** (c, t) (0) -5. 235*** (c, t) (4) 0.095 (c, t) (5) 
ǻOQ(Real GDP) -3.923*** (c) (0) 
-4.026*** 
(c) (2) 
0.199 
(c) (5) 
-1.787 
(c) (11) 
-19.456*** 
(c) (77) 
0.265 
(c) (16) 
-2.543 
(c) (11) 
-67.254*** 
(c) (12) 
0.071 
(c) (12) 
ǻOQ(REER) -3.045 (c, t) (12) 
-6.510*** 
(c, t) (4) 
0.078 
(c, t) (0) 
-2.149** 
(-) (11) 
-8.549*** 
(0) (12) 
0.101 
(c) (11) 
-8.975*** 
(c, t) (0) 
-8.977*** 
(c, t) (2) 
-0.097 
(c, t) (4) 
ǻ,Qflation) -3.310*** (c) (11) 
-7.156*** 
(-) (4) 
0.144 
(c) (6) 
-5.124*** 
(c, t) (7) 
-7.172*** 
(-) (4) 
0.188  
(c) (3) 
-2.846*** 
(-) (12) 
-5.333*** 
(-) (4) 
0.127  
(c) (4) 
ǻIntRate(M) -4.210*** (c) (12) 
-6.786*** 
(-) (4) 
0.083 
(c) (4) 
-7.460*** 
(c) (6) 
-18. 655*** 
(-) (8) 
0.500** 
(c) (84) 
-3.271*** 
(-) (11) 
-6.439*** 
(-) (1) 
0.131 
(c) (4) 
ǻIntRate(B) -4.173*** (c) (9) 
-7.411*** 
(-) (2) 
0.068 
(c) (1) - - - - - - 
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Variable 
Colombia Czech Republic Denmark 
ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS 
H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) 
Level 
Real BM -2.804 (c, t) (12) 
-1.171 
(c, t) (14) 
0.163** 
(c, t) (7) 
-1.907 
(c, t) (4) 
-1.505 
(c, t) (4) 
0.204** 
(c, t) (6) 
0.034 
(c, t) (9) 
-0.842 
(c, t) (13) 
0.267*** 
(c, t) (7) 
Real RM -1.146 (c, t) (12) 
-1.467 
(c, t) (84) 
0.266*** 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.426 
(c, t) (5) 
-2.642 
(c, t) (2) 
0.128* 
(c, t) (6) 
-0.829 
(c, t) (10) 
-5.232*** 
(c, t) (5) 
0.124 
(c, t) (5) 
Real FXRcb 
-0.459 
(c, t) (0) 
-0.578 
(c, t) (3) 
0.261 
(c, t) (7) 
-2.533 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.121 
(c, t) (4) 
0.084 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.748 
(c, t) (7) 
-1.696 
(c, t) (3) 
0.152** 
(c, t) (6) 
ln(Real GDP) -1.874 (c, t) (9) 
-0.950 
(c, t) (4) 
0.235*** 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.484 
(c, t) (5) 
-4.312*** 
(c, t)  
0.166** 
(c, t) (5) 
-1.057 
(c, t) (12) 
-5.691*** 
(c, t) (2) 
0.223*** 
(c, t) (6) 
ln(REER) -1.646 (c) (1) 
-1.454 
(c) (1) 
0.149** 
(c, t) (6) 
-3.156 
(c, t) (5) 
-4.035** 
(c, t) (2) 
0.114 
(c, t) (5) 
-3.087 
(c, t) (1) 
-2.067 
(c) (3) 
0.177** 
(c, t) (6) 
Inflation  -1.288 (c, t) (12) 
-2.074 
(c, t) (2) 
0.212** 
(c, t) (6) 
-1.536  
(c) (8) 
-2.064 
(c) (3) 
0.172** 
(c, t) (5) 
-2.530 
(c) (11) 
-3.467** 
(c) (0) 
0.081 
(c) (5) 
IntRate(M) -1.866 (c, t) (12) 
-2.649 
(c, t) (1) 
0.109 
(c, t) (6) 
-1.074 
(c) (1) 
-0.905 
(c) (4) 
0.148** 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.787 
(c, t) (12) 
-2.610 
(c, t) (4) 
0.201** 
(c, t) (6) 
IntRate(B) - - - - - - -2.540 (c, t) (4) 
-2.709 
(c, t) (2) 
0.209** 
(c, t) (6) 
First Difference  ? ? ? ? ? ?  -2.151 (c) (12) -10.519*** (c) (5) 0.090 (c) (15) -3.515** (c) (10) -9.972*** (c) (1) 0.104 (c) (7) -3.120** (c) (8) -10.473*** (c) (7) 0.379* (c) (10)  ? ? ? ? ? ?  -2.495 (c, t) (12) -20.890*** (c) (46) 0.164 (c) (15) -2.674*** (-) (4) -12.105*** (c) (2) 0.216 (c) (0) -5.345*** (c) (8) -16.129*** (c) (2) 0.047 (c) (8)  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  -4.001*** (c) (2) -.8.642*** (c) (4) 0.186 (c) (4) -4.050*** (-) (1) -6.659*** (c) (3) 0.190 (c) (4) -2.974** (c) (7) -7.079*** (c) (0) 0.141 (c) (2)  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  -4.003*** (c) (2) -8.526*** (c) (4) 0.188 (c) (4) -4.074*** (-) (1) -6.753*** (c) (3) 0.224 (c) (4) -5.227*** (c) (3) -7.219*** (c) (1) 0.155 (c) (1) 
ǻOQ(Real GDP) -1.564 (c) (8) 
-6.881*** 
(c) (4) 
0.258 
(c) (4) 
-2.919* 
(c) (10) 
-16.005*** 
(c) (20) 
0.102 
(c) (12) 
-2.551 
(c, t) (12) 
-27.518*** 
(c) (10) 
0.202 
(c) (13) 
ǻOQ(REER) -7.623*** (-) (0) 
-7.642*** 
(-) (1) 
0.107 
(c) (0) 
-3.785*** 
(c) (10) 
-12.120*** 
(c) (15) 
0.093 
(c) (14) 
-4.948*** 
(-) (6) 
6.784*** 
(-) (2) 
0.038 
(c) (2) 
ǻ,Qflation) -2.798* (c) (11) 
-6.498*** 
(c) (1) 
0.075 
(c) (1) 
-4.015*** 
(-) (7) 
-5.638*** 
(-) (2) 
0.042 
(c) (2) 
-5.426*** 
(-) (7) 
-6.749*** 
(-) (2) 
0.050 
(c) (2) 
ǻIntRate(M) -3.945*** (c) (8) 
-5.569*** 
(-) (7) 
0.047 
(c) (1) 
-5.833*** 
(-) (0) 
-5.968*** 
(-) (4) 
0.114 
(c) (4) 
-5.156*** 
(c) (4) 
-8.717*** 
(-) (2) 
0.056 
(c) (2) 
ǻIntRate(B) - - - - - - -6.826*** (-) (6) 
-17.109*** 
(-) (10) 
0.075 
(c) (7) 
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Variable 
Egypt Hong Kong Hungary 
ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS 
H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) 
Level 
Real BM -1.738 (c, t) (0) 
-1.801 
(c, t) (1) 
0.233*** 
(c, t) (7) 
-2.367 
(c, t) (1) 
-1.774 
(c, t) (0) 
0.193*** 
(c, t) (5) 
-3.612** 
(c, t) (8) 
-2.830 
(c, t) (65) 
0.285*** 
(c, t) (6) 
Real RM -1.421 (c, t) (1) 
-1.252 
(c, t) (3) 
0.133* 
(c, t) (4) 
-3.934** 
(c, t) (4) 
-1.551 
(c, t) (0) 
0.164** 
(c, t) (5) 
-2.947 
(c, t) (12) 
-2.615* 
(c) (10) 
0.291 
(c) (6) 
Real FXRcb 
-3.083 
(c, t) (11) 
-1.822 
(c, t) (5) 
0.128* 
(c, t) (7) 
-1.720 
(c, t) (7) 
-0.042 
(c, t) (2) 
0.146** 
(c, t) (5) 
0.408 
(c, t) (10) 
-1.309 
(c, t) (2) 
0.237*** 
(c, t) (6) 
ln(Real GDP) -1.034 (c, t) (4) 
-3.052 
(c, t) (3) 
0.158** 
(c, t) (3) 
-2.451 
(c, t) (12) 
-5.734*** 
(c, t) (11) 
0.132* 
(c, t) (5) 
2.148 
(c, t) (5) 
-5.813*** 
(c, t) (2) 
0.241*** 
(c, t) (4) 
ln(REER) (Egypt: ln(NC/USD))  -2.211 (c, t) (6) 
-4.089*** 
(c, t) (4) 
0.118* 
(c, t) (6) 
-1.471 
(c) (3) 
-1.512 
(c) (4) 
0.319 
(c) (7) 
-3.159 
(c, t) (11) 
-2.152 
(c, t) (3) 
0.077 
(c, t) (6) 
Inflation  -1.012 (c, t) (12) 
-2.628* 
(c) (6) 
0.285** 
(c, t) (6) 
-1.619 
(c) (8) 
-1.525 
(c) (4) 
0.734** 
(c) (6) 
-1.971 
(c, t) (4) 
-2.537 
(c, t) (3) 
0.180** 
(c, t) (6) 
IntRate(M) -3.071 (c, t) (1) 
-3.402* 
(c, t) (0) 
0.098 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.027 
(c, t) (7) 
-2.752 
(c, t) (4) 
0.097 
(c, t) (6) 
-1.032  
(c, t) (11) 
-3.463* 
(c, t) (4) 
0.091 
(c, t) (6) 
First Difference  ? ? ? ? ? ?  -2.980** (c) (5) -8.590*** (c) (5) 0.155 (c) (4) -5.614*** (c) (0) -5.525*** (c) (4) 0.084 (c) (1) -1.578 (c) (11) -9.828*** (c) (29) 0.311 (c) (49)  ? ? ? ? ? ?  -4.216  (c) (0) -4.214*** (c) (2) 0.209 (c) (2) -7.114*** (c) (0) -7.113*** (c) (1) 0.209 (c) (3) -1.581 (-) (11) -11.478*** (c) (17) 0.234 (c) (33)  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  -4.440*** (c, t) (1) -7.259*** (c, t) (4) 0.136* (c, t) (5) -0.131 (c) (10) -5.677*** (c) (1) 0.134 (c) (2) -8.277*** (c) (0) -8.277*** (c) (0) 0.101 (c) (1)  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  -3.504** (c) (0) -3.600** (c) (3) 0.173 (c) (4) -5.670*** (c) (0) -5.670*** (c) (0) 0.151 (c) (2) -8.281*** (-) (0) -8.264*** (c) (2) 0.164 (c) (0) 
ǻOQ(Real GDP)  -2.187** (-) (3) 
-6.997*** 
(-) (31) 
0.185 
(c) (13) 
-2.064 
(c) (11) 
-9.730*** 
(-) (15) 
0.128  
(c) (14) 
-1.490 
(c, t) (7) 
-14.986*** 
(-) (13) 
0.443* 
(c) (11) 
ǻOQ(REER) (Egypt: ¨ln(NC/USD)) -7.611*** (-) (5) 
-8.472*** 
(c) (5) 
0.146* 
(c, t) (5) 
-3.781*** 
(-) (2) 
-5.833*** 
(-) (0) 
0.135* 
(c, t) (3) 
-4.227*** 
(c) (7) 
-7.825*** 
(c) (11) 
0.100 
(c) (7) 
ǻ,Qflation) -4.435*** (c) (4) 
-6.972*** 
(-) (15) 
0.284 
(c) (31) 
-1.466 
(-) (12) 
-6.129*** 
(-) (5) 
0.169 
(c) (4) 
-3.829*** 
(c) (12) 
-5.744*** 
(-) (1) 
0.059 
(c) (3) 
ǻIntRate(M) -6.357*** (c) (1) 
-5.952*** 
(c) (10) 
0.180 
(c) (1) 
-2.804*** 
(-) (6) 
-6.318*** 
(-) (3) 
0.137 
(c) (4) 
-3.916*** 
(c) (12) 
-5.239*** 
(-) (1) 
0.133 
(c) (5) 
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Variable 
India Indonesia Israel 
ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS 
H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) 
Level 
Real BM -0.939 (c,t) (10) 
-0.010  
(c,t) (39) 
0.289*** 
(c,t) (7) 
-2.025 
(c, t) (9) 
-2.775  
(c,t) (0) 
0.220*** 
(c,t) (6) 
-2.510 
(c, t) (12) 
-2.634 
(c, t) (1) 
0.147** 
(c, t) (6) 
Real RM -1.752 (c, t) (9) 
-1.063 
(c,t) (26) 
0.257*** 
(c,t) (7) 
-1.425 
(c, t) (7) 
-3.940** 
(c,t) (0) 
0.145* 
(c,t) (5) 
-2.916 
(c, t) (12) 
-1.057 
(c, t) (5) 
0.080 
(c, t) (6) 
Real FXRcb 
-1.945 
(c, t) (12) 
-1.918 
(c,t) (3) 
0.268*** 
(c,t) (6) 
-2.101 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.371 
(c,t) (1) 
0.085 
(c,t) (6) 
-0.784 
(c, t) (1) 
1.940 
(c) (4) 
0.120* 
(c, t) (6) 
ln(Real GDP) -1.226 (c, t) (4) 
-6.658*** 
(c,t) (52) 
0152** 
(c, t) (9) 
-3.024 
(c, t) (4) 
-2.680 
(c,t) (20) 
0.133* 
(c, t) (6) 
-1.583 
(c, t) (11) 
-2.640 
(c, t) (5) 
0.241** 
(c, t) (6) 
ln(REER) -5.298*** (c, t) (3) 
-3.124 
(c, t) (2) 
0.065 
(c, t) (4) 
-3.022** 
(c) (1) 
-2.525 
(c) (1) 
0.174 
(c) (5) 
-1.560 
(c) (0) 
-1.513 
(c) (2) 
0.158* 
(c, t) (6) 
Inflation  -1.677 (c) (8) 
-2.363 
(c) (1) 
0.202** 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.643* 
(c) (9) 
-3.277** 
(c) (3) 
0.110 
(c) (5) 
-2.198 
(c, t) (12) 
-1.827 
(c) (1) 
0.227*** 
(c, t) (6) 
IntRate(M) - - - -4.034** (c, t) (1) 
-2.362 
(c) (3) 
0.117 
(c, t) (6) 
-1.645 
(c, t) (10) 
-3.278* 
(c, t) (2) 
0.154** 
(c, t) (6) 
IntRate(B) -2.496 (c, t) (10) 
-2.004 
(c) (3) 
0.068 
(c, t) (5) - - - - - - 
First Difference  ? ? ? ? ? ?  -3.481** (c) (3) -9.803*** (c) (81) 0.321 (c) (51) -1.790* (-) (8) -12.118*** (c, t) (1) 0.129* (c, t) (4) -4.391*** (c, t) (9) -8.444*** (c, t) (0) 0.042 (c, t) (0)  ? ? ? ? ? ?  -3.648*** (c) (5) -13.960*** (c) (83) 0.228 (c) (29) -3.399** (c) (10) -14.634*** (c) (16) 0.307 (c) (28) -3.958*** (-) (1) -7.717*** (-) (4) 0.176 (c) (5)  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  -1.851 (c) (10) -5.473*** (c) (5) 0.145 (c) (4) -4.377*** (c) (10) -6.635*** (c) (7) 0.043 (c) (3) -1.651* (-) (7) -6.874*** (c) (4) 0.132* (c, t) (1)  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  -1.783 (c) (10) -5.269*** (c) (4) 0.188 (c) (4) -3.750*** (c) (5) -5.276*** (-) (2) 0.059 (c) (0) -2.877*** (-) (3) -6.733*** (c) (2) 0.098 (c, t) (2) 
ǻOQ(Real GDP) -1.732 (c) (7) 
-17.433*** 
(c) (11) 
0.264 
(c) (11) 
-3.802*** 
(c) (5) 
-12.081*** 
(c) (21) 
0.139 
(c) (27) 
-3.570*** 
(c) (10) 
-12.383*** 
(c) (7) 
0.251 
(c) (19) 
ǻOQ(REER) -5.849*** (-) (6) 
-7.735*** 
(-) 9 
0.100 
(c) (3) 
-6.143*** 
(-) (0) 
-5.930*** 
(-) (6) 
0.102 
(c) (4) 
-9.759*** 
(-) (0) 
-9.755*** 
(c) (1) 
0.102 
(c) (0) 
ǻ,Qflation) -5.948*** (c, t) (7) 
-7.285*** 
(-) (3) 
0.079 
(c) (2) 
-4.147*** 
(-) (10) 
-4.341*** 
(-) (1) 
0.030 
(c) (2) 
-4.351*** 
(c, t) (11) 
-6.289*** 
(-) (2) 
0.071 
(c) (1) 
ǻIntRate(M) - - - -4.547*** (-) (7) 
-4.524*** 
(-) (7) 
0.038 
(c) (2) 
-4.281*** 
(c) (9) 
-8.688*** 
(-) (6) 
0.069 
(c) (9) 
ǻIntRate(B) -4.214*** (-) (8) 
-5.747*** 
(-) (1) 
0.035 
(c) (3) - - - - - - 
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Variable 
Japan Korea Malaysia 
ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS 
H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) 
Level 
Real BM -2.477 (c, t) (4) 
-2.540 
(c, t) (7) 
0.207** 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.591 
(c, t) (11) 
-1.444 
(c,t) (5) 
0.088 
(c,t) (6) 
-1.516 
(c, t) (11) 
-0.961  
(c,t) (3) 
0.174** 
(c,t) (6) 
Real RM -3.272* (c, t) (9) 
-2.714 
(c, t) (12) 
0.135* 
(c, t) (6) 
-0.790 
(c, t) (11) 
-2.513 
(c,t) (0) 
0.197** 
(c,t) (6) 
-2.822* 
(c) (2) 
-2.343 
(c) (4) 
0.147** 
(c,t) (6) 
Real FXRcb 
-2.096 
(c, t) (1) 
-2.239 
(c, t) (5) 
0.256*** 
(c, t) (7) 
-2.324 
(c, t) (2) 
-2.001 
(c,t) (0) 
0.218*** 
(c,t) (6) 
-2.207 
(c, t) (11) 
-1.580 
(c,t) (0) 
0.233*** 
(c,t) (6) 
ln(Real GDP) -3.202* (c, t) (6) 
-2.755 
(c, t) (4) 
0.086 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.363 
(c, t) (8) 
-6.155*** 
(c, t) (3) 
0.284*** 
(c, t) (5) 
-2.481 
(c, t) (12) 
-3.022 
(c, t) (37) 
0.232*** 
(c, t) (6) 
ln(REER) -2.704 (c, t) (12) 
-1.978 
(c) (4) 
0.163** 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.578 
(c) (3) 
-1.972 
(c) (4) 
0.084 
(c, t) (6) 
-1.609 
(c) (2) 
-1.554 
(c) (1) 
0.129 * 
(c, t) (6) 
Inflation  -2.328 
 (c) (12) 
-2.682* 
(c) (2) 
0.174** 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.160 
(c) (12) 
-3.483** 
(c, t) (3) 
0.161** 
(c) (5) 
-1.924 
(c) (9) 
-3.296** 
(c) (1) 
0.093 
 (c, t) (5) 
IntRate(M) -6.228*** (c) (11) 
-1.372 
(c) (5) 
0.229*** 
(c, t) (7) 
-2.712 
(c, t) (3) 
-2.706 
(c, t) (3) 
0.114 
(c, t) (6) 
-3.584** 
(c, t) (2) 
-2.813 
 (c, t) (4) 
0.108 
(c, t) (6) 
IntRate(B) -4.380*** (c) (11) 
-1.139 
(c) (4) 
0.280*** 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.393 
(c, t) (3) 
-3.326* 
(c, t) (4) 
0.138* 
(c, t) (6) 
-3.789** 
(c, t) (3) 
-2.885 
(c, t) (4) 
0.082 
(c, t) (6) 
First Difference  ? ? ? ? ? ?  -2.731* (c) (7) -9.369*** (c) (6) 0.356* (c) (7) -1.177 (c) (11) -8.499*** (c, t) (3) 0.147** (c, t) (3) -2.733 (c, t) (9) -6.968*** (c, t) (3) 0.140* (c, t) (1)  ? ? ? ? ? ?  -1.684* (c) (7) -14.716*** (c) (43) 0.129 (c) (19) -1.924 (c) (12) -12.358*** (c) (7) 0.100 (c) (10) -4.207*** (-) (4) -8.782*** (c, t) (3) 0.069 (c, t) (3)  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  -4.266*** (c) (1) -6.548*** (c) (4) 0.407* (c) (5) -6.263*** (c) (0) -6.186*** (c) (3) 0.205 (c) (2) -6.150** (c) (1) -5.911*** (-) (6) 0.083 (c) (1)  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  -4.393*** (c) (1) -6.833*** (c) (4) 0.354* (c) (5) -5.740*** (c) (0) -5.669*** (c) (3) 0.206 (c) (3) -6.285*** (c) (1) -5.914*** (-) (4) 0.105 (c) (0) 
ǻOQ(Real GDP) -4.010*** (c) (7) 
-7.871*** 
(c) (4) 
0.174 
(c) (4) 
-2.580 
(c) (7) 
-24.967*** 
(c) (16) 
0.330 
(c) (13) 
-1.218 
(-) (11) 
-10.065*** 
(c) (20) 
0.363* 
(c) (19) 
ǻOQ(REER) -3.690*** (-) (11) 
-7.878*** 
(-) (1) 
0.059 
(c) (3) 
-3.956*** 
(-) (2) 
-7.343*** 
(-) (3) 
0.050 
(c) (4) 
-6.621*** 
(-) (1) 
-6.262*** 
(-) (5) 
0.115 
(c) (0) 
ǻ,Qflation) -3.517** (-) (11) 
-8.475*** 
(-) (2) 
0.073 
(c) (1) 
-3.887*** 
(-) (11) 
-8.148*** 
(-) (2) 
0.027 
(c) (2) 
-4.888*** 
(-) (7) 
-6.572*** 
(-) (4) 
0.038 
(c) (4) 
ǻIntRate(M) -6.012*** (c, t) (7) 
-5.049*** 
(c) (2) 
0.105 
(c) (5) 
-5.635*** 
(-) (3) 
-6.856*** 
(-) (11) 
0.063 
(c) (7) 
-5.683*** 
(-) (0) 
-5.622*** 
(-) (1) 
0.111 
(c) (4) 
ǻIntRate(B) -3.812** (c, t) (12) 
-7.619*** 
(-) (2) 
0.113 
(c) (4) 
-7.198*** 
(-) (2) 
-7.321*** 
(-) (13) 
0.110 
(c) (9) 
-4.678*** 
(-) (3) 
-9.186*** 
(-) (4) 
0.056 
(c) (4) 
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Variable 
Mexico New Zealand Norway 
ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS 
H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) 
Level 
Real BM -1.200 (c, t ) (8) 
-0.654 
(c, t) (20) 
0.290*** 
(c, t) (7) 
-1.778 
(c, t) (0) 
-1.722 
(c, t) (2) 
0.253*** 
(c, t) (6) 
-0.386 
(c, t) (11) 
-1.223 
(c, t) (2) 
0.264*** 
(c, t) (7) 
Real RM -1.051 (c, t) (12) 
-4.647*** 
(c, t) (31) 
0.328*** 
(c, t) (6) 
-1.360 
(c, t) (12) 
-1.945 
(c, t) (3) 
0.240*** 
(c, t) (6) 
-5.191** 
(c, t) (4) 
-7.336*** 
(c, t) (2) 
0.041 
(c, t) (4) 
Real FXRcb 
-2.489 
(c, t) (9) 
-2.554 
(c, t) (2) 
0.221*** 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.131 
(c, t) (1) 
-0.863 
(c) (1) 
0.225*** 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.263 
(c, t) (10) 
-2.161 
(c, t) (2) 
0.152** 
(c, t) (6) 
ln(Real GDP) -2.846 (c, t) (12) 
-4.643*** 
(c, t) (5) 
0.092 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.876 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.435 
(c, t) (4) 
0.107 
(c, t) (6) 
-0.401 
(c, t) (12) 
-4.594*** 
(c, t) (3) 
0.300*** 
(c, t) (6) 
ln(REER) -3.090**  (c) (3) 
-2.719* 
(c) (5) 
0.089 
(c, t) (6) 
-4134*** 
(c, t) (12) 
-1.983 
(c) (4) 
0.102 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.553 
(c, t) (4) 
-2.439 
(c) (1) 
0.238*** 
(c, t) (6) 
Inflation  -2.156 (c, t) (8) 
-1.975 
(c) (4) 
0.076 
(c, t) (6) 
-3.264** 
(c) (6) 
-3.775*** 
(c) (3) 
0.123 
(c) (6) 
-3.294** 
(c) (4) 
-4.226*** 
(c) (1) 
0.255 
(c) (5) 
IntRate(M) -3.852** (c, t) (3) 
-2.908 
(c, t) (5) 
-0.075 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.387 
(c) (2) 
-2.438 
(c) (2) 
0.137* 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.773 
(c, t) (7) 
-2.005 
(c) (3) 
0.124* 
(c, t) (6) 
IntRate(B) -3.859*** (c, t) (6) 
-3.449* 
(c, t) (4) 
0.060 
(c, t) (6) 
-3.453* 
(c, t) (1) 
-2.003 
(c) (2) 
0.124* 
(c, t) (6) 
-3.116 
(c, t) (8) 
-2.539 
(c, t) (1) 
0.167** 
(c, t) (6) 
First Difference  ? ? ? ? ? ?  -4.312*** (c) (9) -11.934*** (c) (19) 0.171 (c) (20) -11.298*** (c) (0) -11.295*** (c) (2) 0.089 (c) (2) -3.374* (c, t) (12) -11.005*** (c) (1) 0.170 (c) (2)  ? ? ? ? ? ?  -1.975 (c) (11) -27.180*** (c) (14) 0.091 (c) (13) -3.909**  (c) (10) -10.897*** (c) (6) 0.196 (c) (14) -4.765*** (c, t) (10) -15.537*** (c) (4) 0.394* (c) (32)  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  -5.742*** (c) (3) -8.031*** (-) (2) 0.037 (c) (1) -8.169***  (-) (0) -8.145*** (-) (3) 0.117 (c) (2) -3.783*** (c) (3) -11.365*** (-) (0) 0.069 (c) (6)  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  -5.440*** (-) (2) -7.863*** (-) (3) 0.031 (c) (2) -9.629*** (-) (0) -9.627*** (-) (1) 0.094 (c) (2) -3.940*** (-) (3) -11.177*** (-) (2) 0.085 (c) (7) 
ǻOQ(Real GDP) -3.325** (c) (10) 
-17.791*** 
(c) (13) 
0.184 
(c) (18) 
-2.736* 
(c) (5) 
-8.323*** 
(c) (3) 
0.176 
(c) (3) 
-1.704 
(c, t) (11) 
-19.631*** 
(c) (14) 
0.280 
(c) (13) 
ǻOQ(REER) -4.212*** (-) (2) 
-9.187*** 
(-) (4) 
0.059 
(c) (4) 
-3.457*** 
(-) (12) 
-6.273*** 
(-) (0) 
0.086 
(c) (3) 
-6.136*** 
(-) (3) 
-8.090*** 
(-) (2) 
0.126 
(c) (1) 
ǻ,Qflation) -4.410*** (-) (7) 
-4.568*** 
(- ) (2) 
0.039 
(c) (4) 
-3.667*** 
(-) (11) 
-7.293*** 
(-) (3) 
0.143 
(c) (3) 
-4.735*** 
(- ) (7) 
-9.626*** 
(-) (3) 
0.051 
(c) (2) 
ǻIntRate(M) -4.974*** (-) (4) 
8.720*** 
(-) (4) 
0.051 
(c) (4) 
-2.920*** 
(-) (12) 
4.446*** 
(-) (6) 
0.082 
(c) (1) 
-5.780*** 
(-) (1) 
-4.797*** 
(-) (7) 
0.087 
(c) (2) 
ǻIntRate(B) -4.330*** (-) (2) 
-9.127*** 
(-) (3) 
0.076 
(c) (3) 
-5.357*** 
(-) (1) 
-4.371*** 
(-) (5) 
0.079 
(c) (2) 
-5.336*** 
(c) (4) 
-6.065*** 
(-) (5) 
0.067 
(c) (2) 
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Variable 
Peru Philippines Poland 
ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS 
H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) 
Level 
Real BM -0.572 (c, t) (4) 
0.046 
(c, t) (1) 
0.181** 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.693 
(c, t) (12) 
-4.999*** 
(c, t) (4) 
0.097 
(c, t) (6) 
-3.454* 
(c, t) (8) 
-0.551 
(c, t) (2) 
0.194** 
(c, t) (6) 
Real RM -0.326 (c, t) (9) 
-0.622 
(c, t) (35) 
0.260*** 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.024 
(c, t) (12) 
-2.410 
(c, t) (23) 
0.256*** 
(c,t) (6) 
-2.769 
(c, t) (8) 
-2.011 
(c, t) (1) 
0.202** 
(c, t) (6) 
Real FXRcb 
-1.551 
(c, t) (1) 
-1.080 
(c, t) (4) 
0.221*** 
(c, t) (6) 
-1.675 
(c, t) (11) 
-0.590 
(c, t) (1) 
0.186** 
(c,, t) (6) 
-3.008 
(c, t) (12) 
-2.206 
(c, t) (4) 
0.152** 
(c, t) (6) 
ln(Real GDP) -2.372 
 (c, t) (8) 
-5.012*** 
(c, t) (3) 
0.140* 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.264 
(c, t) (6) 
-9.234*** 
(c, t) (3) 
0.425*** 
(c, t) (3) 
-3.804** 
(c, t) (4) 
-4.241*** 
(c, t) (56) 
0.206** 
(c, t) (5) 
ln(REER) -1.896 (c) (0) 
-1.924 
(c) (3) 
0.110 
(c, t) (5) 
-2.225 
(c) (11) 
-1.508 
(c) (0) 
0.149** 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.832 
(c, t) (1) 
-1.668 
(c) (5) 
0.151** 
(c, t) (6) 
Inflation  -3.169** (c) (8) 
-5.985*** 
(c) (4) 
0.265*** 
(c, t) (5) 
-2.552 
(c) (8) 
-2.423 
(c) (0) 
0.155** 
(c, t) (5) 
-4.265*** 
(c) (8) 
-3.225** 
(c) (2) 
0.267*** 
(c, t) (6) 
IntRate(M) -3.078 (c, t) (9) 
-2.002 
(c) (3) 
0.093 
(c, t) (6) 
-3.480** 
(c, t) (4) 
-3.348* 
(c, t) (2) 
0.967*** 
(c) (7) 
-2.469 
(c) (10) 
-1.425 
(c) (3) 
0.198** 
(c, t) (5) 
IntRate(B) - - - - - - - - - 
First Difference  ? ? ? ? ? ?  -2.596* (c) (3) -6.453*** (c) (0) 0.303 (c) (3) -1.522 (-) (11) -14.030*** (c) (50) 0.437* (c) (16) -1.597 (-) (7) -7.430*** (c) (3) 0.146 (c) (1)  ? ? ? ? ? ?  -2.377 (c, t) (10) -15.163*** (c) (54) 0.223 (c) (17) -3.223* (c, t) (12) -17.634*** (c) (34) 0.131 (c) (17) -3.296** (c) (9) -14.308*** (c) (1) 0.207 (c) (9)  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  -4.986*** (c) (0) -4.971*** (c) (1) 0.134 (c) (4) -2.523** (-) (10) -9.226*** (c) (4) 0.119 (c) (4) -5.183*** (c) (0) -5.088*** (c) (4) 0.085 (c) (1)  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  -4.972*** (-) (0) -4.925*** (-) (1) 0.139 (c) (4) -8.131*** (c) (0) -8.082*** (c) (4) 0.075 (c) (2) -5.515*** (c) (0) -5.493*** (c) (3) 0.081 (c) (1) 
ǻOQ(Real GDP) -2.544 (c) (7) 
-29.572*** 
(c) (35) 
0.192 
(c) (15) 
-3.978** 
(c, t) (9) 
-37.959*** 
(c) (13) 
0.251 
(c) (13) 
-2.447 
(c) (3) 
-17.432*** 
(c, t) (14) 
0.362* 
(c) (12) 
ǻOQ(REER) -8.540*** (-) (0) 
-8.552*** 
(-) (2) 
0.159 
(c) (2) 
-7.074*** 
(-) (1) 
-6.654*** 
(-) (6) 
0.108 
(c) (2) 
-3.487** 
(c) (9) 
-6.479*** 
(-) (7) 
0.091 
(c) (5) 
ǻ,Qflation) -3.155*** (-) (8) 
-5.283*** 
(-) (1) 
0.125* 
(c, t) (4) 
-5.421*** 
(-) (7) 
-5.833*** 
(-) (2) 
0.031 
(c) (1) 
-4.327*** 
(c, t) (7) 
-4.764*** 
(c) (2) 
0.040 
(c, t) (4) 
ǻIntRate(M) -4.233*** (-) (0) 
-4.078*** 
(-) (4) 
0.136 
(c) (3) 
-7.590*** 
(-) ( 1) 
-7.989*** 
(-) (10) 
0.052 
(c) (7) 
-3.474* 
(c, t) (10) 
-3.219*** 
(-) (1) 
0.132 
(c) (3) 
ǻIntRate(B) - - - - - - - - - 
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Variable 
Russia Singapore South Africa 
ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS 
H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) 
Level 
Real BM -1.996 (c, t) (8) 
-1.476 
(c, t) (2) 
0.237*** 
(c, t) (6) 
-4.148*** 
(c, t) (12) 
-0.132 
(c, t) (2) 
0.202** 
(c, t) (6) 
-1.311 
(c, t) (10) 
-1.652 
(c, t) (5) 
0.269*** 
(c, t) (7) 
Real RM -1.875 (c, t) (7) 
-2.913 
(c, t) (6) 
0.198** 
(c, t) (5) 
0.036 
(c, t) (8) 
-1.200 
(c, t) (2) 
0.210*** 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.398 
(c, t) (9) 
-2.305 
(c, t) (46) 
0.292*** 
(c, t) (6) 
Real FXRcb 
-1.582 
(c, t) (7) 
-1.947 
(c, t) (4) 
0.157** 
(c, t) (6) 
-1.776 
(c, t) (12) 
-0.756 
(c, t) (3) 
0.194** 
(c, t) (7) 
-1.428 
(c, t) (4) 
-1.237 
(c, t) (5) 
0.250*** 
(c, t) (7) 
ln(Real GDP) -2.652 (c, t) (8) 
-4.823*** 
(c, t) (14) 
0.165** 
(c, t) (4) 
-2.391 
(c, t) (12) 
-3.080 
(c, t) (2) 
0.193** 
(c, t) (6) 
-3.090 
(c, t) (1) 
-2.658 
(c, t) (5) 
0.269*** 
(c, t) (6) 
ln(REER) -2.576 (c, t) (1) 
-1.428 
(c) (1) 
0.129* 
(c, t) (6) 
-1.789 
(c) (11) 
-2.455 
(c, t) (4) 
0.233 
(c) (7) 
-1.938 
(c) (1) 
-1.806 
(c) (2) 
0.123* 
(c, t) (6) 
Inflation  -2.626 (c, t) (10) 
-3.361** 
(c) (1) 
0.114 
(c, t) (5) 
-0.268 
(c, t) (8) 
-3.065** 
(c) (2) 
0.243 
(c) (5) 
-2.121 
(c) (12) 
-2.422 
(c) (1) 
0.186** 
(c, t) (6) 
IntRate(M) -3.425** (c) (10) 
-12.364*** 
(c) (6) 
0.207** 
(c, t) (6) 
-3.834** 
(c, t) (1) 
-2.531 
(c, t) (0) 
0.092 
(c, t) (6) 
-3.483** 
(c, t) (7) 
-1.522 
(c) (2) 
0.071 
(c, t) (6) 
IntRate(B) - - - -3.175** (c) (5) 
-3.344** 
(c) (0) 
0.107 
(c, t) (6) - - - 
First Difference  ? ? ? ? ? ?  -1.025 (-) (7) -7.808*** (c) (2) 0.323 (c) (2) -2.152  (c) (7) -6.760*** (c) (5) 0.243 (c) (3) -3.228** (c) (12) -6.072*** (c) (1) 0.155** (c, t) (4)  ? ? ? ? ? ?  -4.398 (c) (6) -11.551*** (c) (0) 0.232 (c) (16) -3.436** (c) (7) -15.931*** (c) (12) 0.173 (c) (39) -2.672* (c) (7) -11.454*** (c) (3) 0.220 (c) (24)  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  -2.753* (c) (6) 5.272*** (c) (1) 0.169 (c) (4) -8.050*** (c) (0) -8.136*** (c) (4) 0.276 (c) (4) -2.061** (c) (7) -6.725*** (c) (3) 0.235 (c) (4)  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  -2.849* (c) (6) -5.371*** (c) (1) 0.156 (c) (4) -8.425** (c) (0) -8.454*** (c) (3) 0.163 (c) (3) -2.002** (-) (7) -6.654*** (c) (3) 0.052 (c, t) (3) 
ǻOQ(Real GDP) -1.269 (-) (7) 
-9.336*** 
(-) (12) 
0.116 
(c) (12) 
-2.420 
(c) (11) 
-7.937*** 
(c) (9) 
0.154 
(c) (6) 
-2.856* 
(c) (12) 
-3.724*** 
(c) (3) 
0.124* 
(c, t) (5) 
ǻOQ(REER) -5.746*** (-) (0) 
-5.571*** 
(-) (7) 
0.059 
(c) (2) 
-2.075** 
(-) (10) 
-6.445*** 
(-) (2) 
0.352* 
(c) (4) 
-3.258*** 
(-) (10) 
-7.671*** 
(-) (0) 
0.081 
(c) (1) 
ǻ,Qflation) -4.815*** (-) (9) 
-3.450*** 
(-) (3) 
0.063 
(c, t) (3) 
-6.798*** 
(c, t) (7) 
-4.411*** 
(-) (2) 
0.062 
(c) (2) 
-3.610*** 
(-) (11) 
-5.490*** 
(-) (0) 
0.078 
(c) (0) 
ǻIntRate(M) -5.786*** (-) (9) 
-11.096*** 
(c, t) (0) 
0.208** 
(c, t) (5) 
-5.921*** 
(-) (1) 
-5.280*** 
(-) (11) 
0.057 
(c) (2) 
-3.260*** 
(-) (10) 
-6.529*** 
(-) (2) 
0.043 
(c) (2) 
ǻIntRate(B) - - - -4.079*** (-) (5) 
-12.044*** 
(-) (5) 
0.089 
(c) (11) - - - 
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Variable 
Taiwan Thailand Turkey 
ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS 
H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) H0= I(1) H0= I(1) H0=I(0) 
Level 
Real BM -2.324 (c, t) (9) 
-3.445* 
(c, t) (4) 
0.204** 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.720 
(c, t) (12) 
-2.139 
(c, t) (19) 
0.235*** 
(c, t) (7) 
-1.408 
(c, t) (0) 
-1.196 
(c, t) (4) 
0.232*** 
(c, t) (6) 
Real RM 0.360 (c) (3) 
-1.289 
(c) (9) 
0.188** 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.531 
(c, t) (5) 
-.5.579*** 
(c, t) (0) 
0.106 
(c, t) (5) 
-1.548 
(c, t) (7) 
-1.801 
(c, t) (3) 
0.276*** 
(c, t) (6) 
Real FXRcb 
-1.779 
(c, t) (9) 
-1.547 
(c, t) (4) 
0.268*** 
(c, t) (7) 
1.388 
(c, t) (0) 
-1.424 
(c, t) (1) 
0.260*** 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.066 
(c, t) (8) 
-1.987 
(c, t) (1) 
0.219*** 
(c, t) (6) 
ln(Real GDP) -1.826 (c, t) (11) 
-5.766*** 
(c, t) (8) 
0.268*** 
(c, t) (6) 
-3.186* 
(c, t) (11) 
-2.658 
(c, t) (84) 
0.135* 
(c, t) (6) 
-3.100 
(c, t) (12) 
-9.425*** 
(c, t) (34) 
0.142* 
(c, t) (28) 
ln(REER) (Taiwan: ln(NC/USD)) -1.802 (c) (12) 
-1.319 
(c) (1) 
0.206** 
(c, t) (6) 
-1.507 
(c) (12) 
-1.878 
(c) (5) 
0.216*** 
(c, t) (6) 
-4.237***  
(c, t) (0) 
-4.311*** 
(c, t) (1) 
0.085 
(c, t) (4) 
Inflation  -1.326 (c) (12) 
-3.722** 
(c, t) (4) 
0.194** 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.748 
(c, t) (11) 
-3.188** 
(c) (2) 
0.086 
(c, t) (5) 
-1.864 
(c, t) (8) 
-2.442 
(c, t) (2) 
0.222*** 
(c, t) (6) 
IntRate(M) -1.101 (c) (9) 
-5.343*** 
(c, t) (5) 
0.124* 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.278 
(c, t) (7) 
-2.607 
(c, t) (3) 
0.105 
(c, t) (6) 
-2.267 
(c, t) (5) 
-2.696 
(c, t) (2) 
0.265*** 
(c, t) (6) 
IntRate(B) - - - - - - - - - 
First Difference  ? ? ? ? ? ?  -2.996 (c, t) (9) -10.623*** (c) (18) 0.141* (c, t) (22) -2.123** (-) (11) -7.839*** (c, t) (7) 0.293*** (c, t) (2) -2.911** (c) (7) -9.939*** (c) (8) 0.115 (c) (9)  ? ? ? ? ? ?  -7.367*** (c) (2) -11.550*** (c) (14) 0.156 (c) (17) -3.876*** (c) (4) -16.441*** (c) (20) 0.185 (c) (17) -2.982** (c) (7) -11.876*** (c) (1) 0.339 (c) (5)  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  -3.745*** (c) (2) -7.361*** (c, t) (3) 0.102 (c, t) (4) -1.337 (c, t) (12) -7.893*** (c) (4) 0.345 (c) (5) -3.111*** (-) (7) -9.331*** (-) (4) 0.053 (c) (4)  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  -1.117 (-) (8) -6.131*** (c, t) (3) 0.092 (c, t) (5) -1.433 (c, t) (12) -7.968*** (c) (4) 0.318 (c) (5) -2.911*** (-) (7) -9.246*** (-) (3) 0.074 (c) (4) 
ǻOQ(Real GDP) -3.514** (c, t) (10) 
-23.036*** 
(c) (15) 
0.277 
(c) (13) 
-1.394 
(-) (10) 
-8.507*** 
(c) (20) 
0.212 
(c) (22) 
-2.171 
(c) (11) 
-12.045*** 
(-) (13) 
0.100 
(c) (13) 
ǻOQ(REER) (Taiwan: ǻOQ1&86' -1.944* (-) (11) 
-8.535*** 
(-) (1) 
0.088 
(c) (0) 
-7.892*** 
(-) (1) 
-7.587*** 
(-) (12) 
0.202 
(c) (9) 
-6.140*** 
(c) (3) 
-10.176*** 
(-) (5) 
0.062 
(c) (7) 
ǻ,Qflation) -3.660*** (-) (11) 
-10.791*** 
(-) (2) 
0.029 
(c) (3) 
-2.828*** 
(-) (11) 
-5.181*** 
(-) (6) 
0.033 
(c) (4) 
-4.040*** 
(c) (7) 
-7.956*** 
(-) (2) 
0.130 
(c) (2) 
ǻIntRate(M) -3.387** (c) (8) 
-13.210*** 
(c) (2) 
0.199 
(c) (2) 
-5.184*** 
(-) (4) 
-6.040*** 
(-) (2) 
0.060 
(c) (3) 
-7.125*** 
(-) (6) 
-11.707*** 
(-) (8) 
0.179 
(c) (8) 
ǻIntRate(B) - - - - - - - - - 
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Variable 
Zivot-Andrews (H0= I(1)) 
Argentina Australia Brazil Canada Chile China Colombia Czech Republic Denmark Egypt 
Level 
Real BM -4.940 (c, t) (2) 
-2.993 
(c, t) (1) 
-5.440** 
(c, t) (2) 
-3.778 
 (c, t) (1) 
-2.955 
(c, t) (2) 
-1.911 
(c, t) (2) 
-3.499 
 (c, t) (3) 
-4.854 
(c, t) (2) 
-4.868 
 (c, t) (0) 
-2.926 
(c, t) (1) 
Real RM -3.970 (c, t) (1) 
-4.028 
(c, t) (3) 
-3.794 
(c, t) (1) 
-2.921 
(c, t) (3) 
-4.106 
(c, t) (3) 
-4.633 
(c, t) (1) 
-2.843 
(c, t) (3) 
-4.560 
(c, t) (1) 
-5.977 
(c, t) (3) 
-3.671 
(c, t) (1) 
Real FXRcb 
-4.263 
(c, t) (2) 
-4.690 
(c, t) (0) 
-2.838 
(c, t) (1) 
-3.379 
(c, t) (1) 
-4.022 
(c, t) (2) 
-3.680 
(c, t) (1) 
-3.853 
(c, t) (0) 
-5.299** 
(c, t) (2) 
-3.315 
(c, t) (1) 
-2.773 
(c, t) (2) 
ln(Real GDP) -4.951 (c, t) (1) 
-4.237 
(c, t) (2) 
-7.133** 
(c, t) (2) 
-3.799 
(c, t) (1) 
-3.100 
(c, t) (3) 
-15.911*** 
(c, t) (2) 
-4.917 
 (c, t) (2) 
-3.638 
(c, t) (1) 
-2.279 
(c, t) (3) 
-5.360** 
(c, t) (0) 
ln(REER) (Egypt: ln(NC/USD)) -11.324*** (c) (1) 
-3.267 
(c) (2) 
-3.985 
(c) (0) 
-2.753 
(c) (2) 
-3.543 
(c) (2) 
-3.514 
(c) (0) 
-3.695 
(c) (1) 
-5.208** 
(c, t) (1) 
-4.368 
(c) (1) 
-5.233** 
(c, t) (2) 
Inflation  -7.329*** (c) (2) 
-6.147*** 
(c) (3) 
-4.418 
(c) (1) 
-5.906*** 
(c, t) (1) 
-3.541 
(c, t) (1) 
-6.859*** 
(c) (2) 
-5.981*** 
(c, t) (1) 
-5.839*** 
(c, t) (2) 
-5.096** 
(c) (1) 
-4.847 
(c, t) (3) 
IntRate(M) -3.733 (c) (2) 
-5.386** 
(c, t) (1) 
-5.326** 
(c, t) (2) 
-5.425** 
(c, t) (2) 
-4.016 
(c, t) (3) 
-4.005 
(c, t) (1) 
-5.550** 
 (c, t) (1) 
-6.010*** 
(c, t) (1) 
-5.635*** 
(c, t) (0) 
-4.570 
(c, t) (1) 
IntRate(B) - -3.777 (c, t) (1) - 
-4.718 
(c, t) (1) - - - - 
-5.636*** 
(c, t) (3) - 
First Difference  ? ? ? ? ? ?  -5.514*** (c) (1) -3.104 (c) (3) -5.948*** (c) (2) -4.342 (c) (3) -4.359 (c) (3) -4.584 (c) (2) -2.986 (c) (3) -6.656*** (c) (2) -7. 377*** (c) (2) -7.778*** (c) (0)  ? ? ? ? ? ?  -13.451*** (c) (0) -5.855*** (c) (3) -8.384*** (c) (0) -5.712*** (c) (3) -16.250*** (c) (0) -11.831*** (c) (2) -4.438 (c) (3) -14.164*** (c) (0) -16.019*** (c) (0) -5.017** (c) (0)  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  -5.428** (c) (1) -8.974*** (c) (0) -8.304*** (c) (0) -4.527 (c) (3) -6.604*** (c) (2) -5.679***  (c) (0) -4.916** (c) (2) -5.075** (c) (1) -7.339*** (c) (0) -5.589*** (c) (1)  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  -4.869** (c) (1) -9.055*** (c) (0) -8.308*** (c) (0) -4.474 (c) (3) -6.489*** (c) (2) -5.377** (c) (0) -4.737** (c) (2) -5.216** (c) (1) -7.428*** (c) (0) -5.414** (c) (0) 
ǻOQ(Real GDP) -9.722*** (c) (2) 
-6.719*** 
(c) (1) 
-16.743*** 
(c) (2) 
-4.651 
(c) (0) 
-3.758 
(c) (3) 
-133.204*** 
(c) (2) 
-4.954** 
(c) (1) 
-20.302*** 
(c) (2) 
-4.678 
(c) (3) 
-8.723*** 
(c) (2) 
ǻOQ(REER) (Egypt: ¨ln(NC/USD)) -6.431*** (c) (1) 
-7.404*** 
(c) (1) 
-7.964*** 
(c) (0) 
-7.125*** 
(c) (1) 
-10.363*** 
(c) (1) 
-9.271*** 
(c) (0) 
-7.684*** 
 (c) (1) 
-9.668*** 
(c) (2) 
-5.639*** 
(c) (3) 
-5.205** 
(c) (3) 
ǻ,Qflation) -6.580*** (c) (2) 
-6.497*** 
(c) (3) 
-5.877*** 
(c) (1) 
-10.239*** 
(c) (3) 
-6.702*** 
(c) (3) 
-5.968*** 
(c) (0) 
-7.464*** 
(c) (3) 
-5.818*** 
(c) (0) 
-7.164*** 
(c) (3) 
-8.145*** 
(c) (3) 
ǻIntRate(M) -6.618*** (c) (2) 
-6.152*** 
(c) (0) 
-7.973*** 
(c) (1) 
-7.332*** 
(c) (0) 
-5.999*** 
(c) (3) 
-7.304*** 
(c) (0) 
-6.553*** 
(c) (1) 
-7.500*** 
(c) (0) 
-9.489*** 
(c) (0) 
-6.512*** 
(c) (1) 
ǻIntRate(B) - -7.602*** (c) (0) - 
-6.160*** 
(c) (3) - - - - 
-6.801*** 
(c) (3) - 
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Variable 
Zivot-Andrews (H0= I(1)) 
Hong 
Kong Hungary India Indonesia Israel Japan Korea Malaysia Mexico 
New 
Zealand 
Level 
Real BM -3.687 (c, t) (1) 
-3.885 
(c, t) (2) 
-2.571 
(c, t) (2) 
-3.025 
 (c, t) (1) 
-3.640 
(c, t) (1) 
-4.659 
(c, t) (0) 
-3.566 
 (c, t) (2) 
-3.241 
(c, t) (3) 
-4.561 
 (c, t) (3) 
-3.383 
(c, t) (0) 
Real RM -4.018 (c, t) (2) 
-3.999 
(c, t) (2) 
-2.879 
(c, t) (3) 
-5.569** 
(c, t) (0) 
-3.105 
(c, t) (3) 
-3.717 
(c, t) (3) 
-4.168 
(c, t) (2) 
-7.529*** 
(c, t) (2) 
-6.226*** 
(c, t) (3) 
-8.779*** 
(c, t) (0) 
Real FXRcb 
-5.284 
(c, t) (1) 
-3.736 
(c, t) (0) 
-2.516 
(c, t) (2) 
-4.754 
(c, t) (1) 
-3.527 
(c, t) (2) 
-4.147 
(c, t) (3) 
-2.806 
(c, t) (2) 
-2.691 
(c, t) (2) 
-5.951*** 
(c, t) (1) 
-4.161 
(c, t) (1) 
ln(Real GDP) -3.566 (c, t) (3) 
-9.894 
(c, t) (0) 
-8.501*** 
(c, t) (2) 
-9.240*** 
(c, t) (3) 
-4.609 
(c, t) (1) 
-4.970 
(c, t) (3) 
-3.170 
(c, t) (3) 
-5.268** 
(c, t) (3) 
-2.558 
(c, t) (3) 
-4.221 
(c, t) (1) 
ln(REER)  -3.707 (c, t) (1) 
-3.313 
(c, t) (2) 
-4.174 
(c, t) (2) 
-6.786*** 
(c, t) (1) 
-3.493 
(c, t) (0) 
-3.731 
(c) (3) 
-4.765 
(c) (3) 
-6.351*** 
(c, t) (3) 
-4.239 
(c) (3) 
-3.516 
(c) (1) 
Inflation  -5.636*** (c, t) (1) 
-4.495 
 (c, t) (1) 
-5.385** 
(c, t) (1) 
-7.119*** 
(c) (1) 
-5.421** 
(c, t) (1) 
-3.774 
(c, t) (1) 
-6.575*** 
(c, t) (3) 
-5.442** 
(c, t) (1) 
-5.454** 
(c, t) (1) 
-5.423** 
(c) (3) 
IntRate(M) -4.008 (c, t) (2) 
-6.507*** 
(c, t) (2) 
-4.464 
(c, t) (2) 
-5.141** 
(c, t) (1) 
-4.606 
(c, t) (2) 
-6.907*** 
(c, t) (2) 
-3.796 
(c, t) (3) 
-5.830*** 
(c, t) (2) 
-4.730 
(c, t) (3) 
-3.348 
(c) (2) 
IntRate(B) - - - - - -5.212*** (c, t) (1) 
-4.076 
(c, t) (3) 
-5.410** 
(c, t) (3) 
-5.189** 
(c, t) (3) 
-3.830 
(c) (1) 
First Difference  ? ? ? ? ? ?  -6.129*** (c) (0) -9.889*** (c) (2) -4.584 (c) (3) -12.916*** (c) (0) -5.300** (c) (3) -4.493 (c) (3) -5.870*** (c) (3) -8.484*** (c) (0) -4.257 (c) (3) -11.650*** (c) (0)  ? ? ? ? ? ?  -7.651*** (c) (0) -8.808*** (c) (2) -3.963 (c) (3) -8.194*** (c) (2) -4.589 (c) (1) -5.028** (c) (3) -11.791*** (c) (1) -6.042*** (c) (1) -4.164 (c) (3) -3.515 (c) (3)  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  -6.103*** (c) (0) -8.047*** (c) (1) -5.771*** (c) (0) -7.225*** (c) (1) -4.190 (c) (3) -5.723***  (c) (1) -7.504*** (c) (1) -6.711*** (c) (1) -6.227*** (c) (3) -8.417*** (c) (0)  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  -6.719*** (c) (0) -7.818*** (c) (1) -5.667*** (c) (0) -5.839*** (c) (1) -7.587*** (c) (0) -5.885*** (c) (1) -7.311*** (c) (0) -6.680*** (c) (1) -6.109*** (c) (3) -10.087*** (c) (0) 
ǻOQ(Real GDP) -3.401 (c) (3) 
-38.304*** 
(c) (2) 
-35.192*** 
(c) (2) 
-3.539 
(c) (3) 
-4951** 
(c) (3) 
-5.158** 
(c) (3) 
-3.296 
(c) (3) 
-3.382 
(c) (3) 
-3.990 
(c) (3) 
-9.791*** 
(c) (0) 
ǻOQ(REER)  -5.245** (c) (2) 
-8.229*** 
(c) (1) 
-7.922*** 
(c) (0) 
-6.940*** 
(c) (0) 
-10.370*** 
(c) (0) 
-4.930** 
(c) (2) 
-4.147 
 (c) (2) 
-7.360*** 
(c) (1) 
-4.649 
(c) (2) 
-6.615*** 
(c) (0) 
ǻ,Qflation) -6.767*** (c) (3) 
-6.144*** 
(c) (3) 
-8.929*** 
(c) (3) 
-7.995*** 
(c) (3) 
-7.016*** 
(c) (3) 
-6.907*** 
(c) (3) 
-7.812*** 
(c) (3) 
-9.142*** 
(c) (3) 
-6.036*** 
(c) (3) 
-6.429*** 
(c) (3) 
ǻIntRate(M) -9.010*** (c) (0) 
-4.672 
(c) (2) 
-5.957*** 
(c) (0) 
-7.127*** 
(c) (2) 
-6.286*** 
(c) (3) 
-3.537 
(c) (1) 
-7.409*** 
(c) (3) 
-6.524*** 
(c) (0) 
-5.225** 
(c) (3) 
-6.312*** 
(c) (1) 
ǻIntRate(B) - - - - - -7.844*** (c) (0) 
-8.068*** 
(c) (2) 
-5.253** 
(c) (3) 
-5.122** 
(c) (3) 
-5.870*** 
(c) (1) 
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Variable 
Zivot-Andrews (H0= I(1)) 
Norway Peru Philippines Poland Russia South Africa Singapore Taiwan Thailand Turkey 
Level 
Real BM -2.914 (c, t) (2) 
-3.337 
(c, t) (1) 
-3.586 
(c, t) (3) 
-3.510 
 (c, t) (0) 
-3.348 
(c, t) (2) 
-2.963 
(c, t) (3) 
-4.165 
 (c, t) (1) 
-3.391 
(c, t) (2) 
-3.047 
 (c, t) (2) 
-4.402 
(c, t) (0) 
Real RM -4.868 (c, t) (2) 
-4.338 
(c, t) (1) 
-5.841*** 
(c, t)(3) 
-7.329*** 
(c, t) (3) 
-3.923 
(c, t) (2) 
-1.978 
(c, t) (3) 
-3.200 
(c, t) (2) 
-2.479 
(c, t) (3) 
-4.427 
(c, t) (3) 
-3.400 
(c, t) (1) 
Real FXRcb 
-2.666 
(c, t) (1) 
-3.804 
(c, t) (1) 
-4.613 
(c, t) (1) 
-3.293 
(c, t) (3) 
-3.073 
(c, t) (1) 
-3.490 
(c, t) (2) 
-3.301 
(c, t) (0) 
-3.782 
(c, t) (3) 
-3.183 
(c, t) (0) 
-3.206 
(c, t) (0) 
ln(Real GDP) -1.901 (c, t) (3) 
-3.686 
(c, t) (3) 
-2.519 
(c, t) (3) 
-6.045*** 
(c, t) (1) 
-3.067 
(c, t) (2) 
-3.273 
(c, t) (1) 
-3.756 
(c, t) (3) 
-2.512 
(c, t) (3) 
-4.198 
(c, t) (2) 
-2.807 
(c, t) (3) 
ln(REER) (Taiwan: ln(NC/USD)) -4.829 (c, t) (1) 
-3.420 
(c, t) (0) 
-3.136 
(c) (2) 
-5.193** 
(c, t) (3) 
-7.108*** 
(c) (1) 
-3.815 
(c) (0) 
-2.450 
(c) (1) 
-5.146** 
(c, t) (0) 
-6.095*** 
(c, t) (2) 
-6.683*** 
(c, t) (0) 
Inflation  -5.776*** (c) (3) 
-4.902 
(c, t) (1) 
-5.672*** 
(c, t) (1) 
-22.402*** 
(c, t) (2) 
-5.121** 
(c, t) (2) 
-4.771 
(c, t) (1) 
-6.875*** 
(c, t) (1) 
-7.163*** 
(c, t) (3) 
-6.291*** 
(c, t) (1) 
-3.633 
(c, t) (0) 
IntRate(M) -3.758 (c, t) (2) 
-6.081*** 
(c) (0) 
-5.323** 
(c, t) (1) 
-6.068*** 
(c, t) (1) 
-9.901*** 
(c, t) (2) 
-3.470 
(c, t) (1) 
-5.347** 
(c, t) (1) 
-4.425 
(c, t) (1) 
-5.551*** 
(c, t) (2) 
-5.166 
(c, t) (0) 
IntRate(B) -4.385 (c, t) (2) - - - - - 
-3.219 
(c, t) (2) - - - 
First Difference  ? ? ? ? ? ?  -11.357*** (c) (0) -8.061*** (c) (0) -5.370** (c) (3) -9.155*** (c) (0) -4.685 (c) (1) -7.181*** (c) (0) -3.930 (c) (3) -4.487 (c) (3) -4. 836** (c) (3) -8.994*** (c) (1)  ? ? ? ? ? ?  -15.252*** (c) (0) -10.355*** (c) (2) -4.019 (c) (3) -7.520*** (c) (2) -5.831*** (c) (2) -4.509 (c) (3) -5.756*** (c) (3) -8.909*** (c) (2) -6.493*** (c) (3) -12.394*** (c) (0)  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  -11.761*** (c) (0) -5.735*** (c) (0) -8.333*** (c) (1) -5.650*** (c) (0) -6.818*** (c) (0) -7.046***  (c) (0) -9.523*** (c) (0) -4.859** (c) (2) -4.280 (c) (3) -7.847*** (c) (1)  ?	 愋?ǡ ? ? ? ? ?  -11.398*** (c) (0) -6.245*** (c) (0) -7.610*** (c) (1) -6.488*** (c) (0) -6.855*** (c) (0) -7.022*** (c) (0) -9.592*** (c) (3) -4.500** (c) (2) -4.213 (c) (3) -8.218*** (c) (1) 
ǻOQ(Real GDP) -22.423*** (c) (2) 
-4.961** 
(c) (3) 
-6.265*** 
(c) (3) 
-22.181*** 
(c) (2) 
-13.651*** 
(c) (2) 
-5.179** 
(c) (0) 
-3.841 
(c) (3) 
-3.168 
(c) (3) 
-3.215 
(c) (3) 
-4.747 
(c) (3) 
ǻOQ(REER) (Taiwan: ¨ln(NC/USD)) -6.689*** (c) (3) 
-9.156*** 
(c) (0) 
-8.107*** 
(c) (1) 
-9.009*** 
(c) (3) 
-5.987*** 
(c) (0) 
-8.536*** 
(c) (0) 
-7.622*** 
 (c) (0) 
-6.345*** 
(c) (3) 
-8.436*** 
(c) (1) 
-7.859*** 
(c) (1) 
ǻ,Qflation) -9.100*** (c) (3) 
-5.218** 
(c) (0) 
-9.126*** 
(c) (3) 
-33.909*** 
(c) (3) 
-8.412*** 
(c) (1) 
-8.925*** 
(c) (3) 
-8.358*** 
(c) (3) 
-6.456*** 
(c) (3) 
-8.338*** 
(c) (3) 
-8.255*** 
(c) (3) 
ǻIntRate(M) -6.022*** (c) (1) 
-7.978*** 
(c) (2) 
-7.666*** 
(c) (1) 
-4.837** 
(c) (2) 
-4.638 
(c) (2) 
-7.139*** 
(c) (0) 
-6.516*** 
(c) (2) 
-14.458*** 
(c) (0) 
-6.218*** 
(c) (0) 
-8.780*** 
(c) (1) 
ǻIntRate(B) -7.158*** (c) (1) - - - - - 
-4.921** 
(c) (3) - - - 
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Section C: Country Data Notes 
Variable/ 
Country 
Broad Money Base Money Foreign Exchange 
Reserves 
Real GDP Interest Rates REER CPI/Inflation 
Argentina 
Definition and Source M3 (national 
definition). 
IMF IFS (59MC.ZF)/ 
Banco Central de la 
Repùblica Argentina 
(BCRA) 
Currency in circulation 
and current account 
deposits. Excludes 
foreign currency 
denominated deposits. 
IMF IFS 
(19MA.ZF)/BCRA. 
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF) 1993 prices.  
IMF IFS (99B.PYF). 
 
Deposit rate: Weighted 
average rate from 
financial institutions in 
Buenos Aires and 
surrounding areas on 
30- to 59-day time 
deposits in the national 
currency. The rate is 
weighted by deposit 
amounts. 
IMF IFS (60L..ZF). 
CPI-Based (2005=100). 
Data points are 
monthly averages. 
Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS). 
IMF IFS (64...ZF) 
Series Length 1992q1-2010q2 1993q1-2010q2 1991q1-2010q2 1994q3-2010q2 1992q1-2010q2/ 
1993q1-2010q2 
Notes An opportunity cost variable is excluded because no data on Government bill/bond rates are presented in the IFS. 
Australia 
Definition and Source M3 (national 
definition). 
IMF IFS (59MC.ZF)/ 
Reserve Bank of 
Australia (RBA). 
 
Money base (national 
definition). Currency in 
circulation, deposits of 
banks with RBA and 
other RBA liabilities to 
the non-bank private 
sector. 
IMF IFS 
(19MA.ZF)/RBA. 
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF) 2001-02 prices.  
IMF IFS (99B.RYF). 
 
Deposit rate: Average 
rate offered by major 
banks on 3-month fixed 
deposits of AUD 
10,000. IMF IFS 
(60L..ZF). 
Treasury bond yield: 2-
year non-rebate bonds 
(3-year from June 
1992). IMF IFS 
(61A..ZF). 
Based on relative CPI. 
IMF IFS (..RECZF) 
IMF IFS (64...ZF) 
Series Length 1989q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2/ 
1990q1-2010q2 
Brazil 
Definition and Source M3 adjusted to exclude 
operations committed 
with Federal Securities. 
Includes Federal 
Government and non-
resident deposits. 
Banco Central do 
Brasil (BCB). 
Currency in circulation, 
banking reserves, 
interest-bearing and 
non-interest-bearing 
required reserves. BCB 
(Via email 
correspondence). 
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF) 
Includes domestic 
government securities 
payable in foreign 
currency.  
Nominal GDP deflated 
by the GDP deflator. 
IMF IFS (99B..ZF and 
99BIPZF)/ Brazil 
Institute of Geography 
and Statistics (IBGE) 
for 2010q2 nominal 
GDP value.  
Deposit rate: Average 
rate offered by banks 
on certificates of 
deposit of 30 days or 
longer. IMF IFS 
(60L..ZF). 
 
CPI-Based (2005=100). 
Data points are 
monthly averages. 
BIS 
IMF IFS (64...ZF) 
Series Length 1995q3-2010q2 1995q1-2010q2 1995q3-2010q2 1994q1-2010q2 1995q3-2010q2/ 
1996q3-2010q2 
Notes An opportunity cost variable is excluded because of missing values in the IFS Treasury bill series (1998q3 and 1998q4). 
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Variable/ 
Country 
Broad Money Base Money Foreign Exchange 
Reserves 
Real GDP Interest Rates REER CPI/Inflation 
Canada 
Definition and Source M3 Gross (national 
definition). IMF IFS 
(59MCA.ZF). 
Currency in circulation 
and liabilities to other 
depository 
corporations.  IMF IFS 
(14...ZF and 14...ZK).  
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF) 2002 prices.  
IMF IFS (99B.RWF). 
 
Deposit rate: Rate 
offered by chartered 
banks on 90-day 
deposits in national 
currency.IMF IFS 
(60L..ZF). 
Government bond 
yield: Average yield to 
maturity of 3-5 years. 
IMF IFS (61A..ZF). 
Based on relative CPI. 
IMF IFS (..RECZF) 
IMF IFS (64...ZF) 
Series Length 1989q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2/ 
1990q1-2010q2 
Chile 
Definition and Source M3 adjusted to exclude 
central bank 
instruments and 
treasury bonds. Data 
points are monthly 
averages. Banco 
Central de Chile (BCC) 
Currency in circulation 
and monetary reserves 
of other depository 
corporations. BCC. 
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF) Linked Series.  
Base =2003. BCC. 
Deposit rate: Weighted 
average rate paid by 
banks on 30- to 89-day 
deposits in national 
currency. The rate is 
converted to percent 
per annum by 
compounding monthly 
rates of interest. IMF 
IFS (60L..ZF). 
Based on relative CPI. 
IMF IFS (..RECZF) 
Base=2008. BCC.  
Series Length 1989q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2/ 
1990q1-2010q2 
Notes An opportunity cost variable is excluded as no data on Government bill/bond rates are presented in the IFS. 
China 
Definition and Source M2 (national 
definition). IMF IFS 
(59MB.ZF)3HRSOH¶V
Bank of China 
(PBOC). 
Currency issued and 
deposits of financial 
corporations. IMF IFS 
(14...ZF)/PBOC. 
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF). 
Prior to 1992,  includes 
foreign exchange 
holdings of the Bank of 
China. Starting in that 
year, comprises foreign 
exchange holdings of 
the PBOC only.  
Abeysinghe and 
Gulasekaran (2004) for 
data up to 1999q4. 
Level series extended 
forwards based on 
growth rates sourced 
from Datastream. 
Deposit rate: 
Institutional and 
individual deposits of 
one year maturity. 
IMF IFS (60L..ZF). 
Based on relative CPI. 
IMF IFS (..RECZF) 
Datastream. 
Series Length 1989q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2/ 
1990q1-2010q2 
Notes An opportunity cost variable is excluded as no data on Government bill/bond rates are presented in the IFS. 
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Variable/ 
Country 
Broad Money Base Money Foreign Exchange 
Reserves 
Real GDP Interest Rates REER CPI/Inflation 
Colombia 
Definition and Source M3 (national 
definition). Includes 
deposits of the Federal 
Government, mortgage 
certificates issued by 
the Central Mortgage 
Bank, and bonds issued 
by other depository 
corporations. IMF IFS 
(59MC.ZF). 
Currency in circulation 
and monetary reserves. 
IMF IFS (14...ZF and 
14...ZK)/ BANREP. 
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF) Seasonally adjusted 
nominal GDP, deflated 
by the GDP deflator 
(2005=100). IMF IFS 
(99B.CZF and 
99BIPZF). 
Deposit rate: Weighted 
average rate paid by 
depository corporations 
on 90-day certificates 
of deposit (fixed-term 
deposits). 
IMF IFS (60L..ZF). 
Based on relative CPI. 
IMF IFS (..RECZF) 
IMF IFS (64...ZF) 
Series Length 1989q1-2010q2 1994q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2/ 
1990q1-2010q2 
Notes An opportunity cost variable is excluded as no data on Government bill/bond rates are presented in the IFS.  
Czech Republic 
Definition and Source M3 (national 
definition) ± 2002 to 
2010. Czech National 
Bank (CNB).  
Prior to 2002, IMF IFS: 
Broad Money 
Liabilities (35L.ZK) 
and Money + Quasi-
Money (35L.ZF). 
Break in series in 2002.  
Currency, required and 
excess reserves. CNB. 
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF) CNB Deposit rate: Average 
rate, weighted by 
stocks, offered by 
commercial banks on 
the outstanding koruna 
denominated deposits 
of non-financial 
sectors. Prior to 
January 2001, it is the 
average rate on all 
deposits weighted by 
stocks.IMF IFS 
(60L..ZF). 
Based on relative CPI. 
IMF IFS (..RECZF) 
IMF IFS (64...ZF) 
Series Length 1993q1-2010q2 1992q4-2010q2 1993q1-2010q2 1996q1-2010q2 1993q1-2010q2 1990q1-2010q2 1993q1-2010q2/ 
1994q1-2010q2 
Notes An opportunity cost variable is excluded due to missing values in the Treasury bill rate series and a relatively short Government bond yield series (beginning only in 2000) in IFS. 
Denmark 
Definition and Source M3 (national 
definition). IMF IFS 
(59MC.ZF). 
2000q3-2010q2: IMF 
IFS (14...ZK). 
1989q1-2010q2: 
Currency and net 
deposits from other 
institutions and 
individuals. Danmarks 
Nationalbank (DN). 
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF) Nominal GDP deflated 
by GDP deflator 
(2005=100).  IMF IFS 
(99B..ZF and 
99BIPZF). 
Deposit rate: 3-month 
money market rate, 
DN.  
Government bond 
yield: Secondary 
market yields of 
government bonds with 
a 10-year maturity. 
IMF IFS (61...ZF). 
Based on relative CPI. 
IMF IFS (..RECZF) 
IMF IFS (64...ZF) 
Series Length 1989q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2/ 
1990q1-2010q2 
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Variable/ 
Country 
Broad Money Base Money Foreign Exchange 
Reserves 
Real GDP Interest Rates REER CPI/Inflation 
Egypt 
Definition and Source IMF IFS.  
2001q4 onwards: 
Broad Money 
Liabilities, adjusted to 
exclude securities other 
than shares (35L.ZK -
36A.ZK).  
Before 2001q4, Money 
+ Quasi Money 
((35L.ZF). 
Currency in circulation, 
liabilities to other 
depository corporations 
and liabilities to other 
sectors. IMF IFS 
(14...ZK). 
 
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF) GDP data on a 
quarterly basis are only 
available from 2002q1 
onwards (national 
agencies as well as 
IMF IFS). As such real 
GDP is excluded from 
the set of explanatory 
variables to avoid 
problems associated 
with insufficient data. 
Deposit rate: Rate 
offered by commercial 
banks and finance 
companies on 180-day 
time deposits in 
national currency.IMF 
IFS (60L..ZF). 
There is no readily 
available data series for 
the REER (or NEER) 
from IMF IFS or BIS. 
As such, the average 
value of the NC/USD 
exchange rate 
(..AF.ZF) is used as an 
explanatory variable in 
the regression analysis. 
IMF IFS (64...ZF) 
Series Length 1989q1-2010q2 2001q1-2010q4 1989q1-2010q2 2002q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2/ 
1990q1-2010q2 
Notes An opportunity cost variable is excluded since the Treasury bill rate series is only available from 1997q1.  
Hong Kong 
Definition and Source M3 (national 
definition). IMF IFS 
(59MC.ZF)/Hong 
Kong Monetary 
Authority (HKMA). 
Currency (certificates 
of indebtedness and 
HKMA -issued notes 
and coins), clearing 
accounts of banking 
institutions with the 
HKMA (national and 
foreign currencies).  
Adjusted to exclude 
outstanding exchange 
fund bills and notes 
issued by the HKMA. 
HKMA.  
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF) 
Includes foreign 
exchange reserves of 
the Hong Kong 
*RYHUQPHQW¶V/DQG
Fund. 
Chain volume GDP 
(Reference year=2008).  
IMF IFS (99B.PSF). 
Deposit rate: Average 
interest rate on one 
month deposits of 10 
major banks. Prior to 
January 1995, the data 
refers to the maximum 
rates paid by licensed 
banks under the interest 
rate rules of the 
Association of Banks. 
IMF IFS (60L..ZF). 
Based on unit labour 
cost. IMF IFS 
(..RELZF) 
IMF IFS (64...ZF) 
Series Length 1996q4-2010q2 1998q3-2010q2 1996q4-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2 1994q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2/ 
1990q1-2010q2 
Notes The annualized yields on Exchange Fund bills of 91-day maturity (reported in the IMF IFS in the Treasury Bill Rate line) is not included in the estimation as the opportunity cost variable 
since the bulk of these are held by banks (88% at end June 2010). 
Hungary 
Definition and Source M3 (national 
definition). IMF IFS 
(59MC.ZF). 
Currency in circulation, 
current accounts of 
monetary financial 
institutions (MFIs), and 
overnight deposits of 
MFIs. Magyar Nemzeti 
Bank (MNB). 
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF) 
Includes swapped gold. 
2000 prices.  
IMF IFS (99B.PVF). 
Deposit rate: For 
deposits of up to one 
year. IMF IFS 
(60L..ZF). 
Based on relative CPI. 
IMF IFS (..RECZF) 
IMF IFS (64...ZF) 
Series Length 1990q4-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2 1995q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2/ 
1990q1-2010q2 
Notes An opportunity cost variable is excluded since the Treasury bill rate series is strongly correlated with the deposit rate both in levels and first differences. 
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Variable/ 
Country 
Broad Money Base Money Foreign Exchange 
Reserves 
Real GDP Interest Rates REER CPI/Inflation 
India 
Definition and Source Money + Quasi Money. 
IMF IFS (35L.ZF). 
Currency in circulation, 
deposits of the deposit 
money banks, and 
deposits of other 
residents. IMF IFS 
(14...ZF). 
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF) GDP at1999-2000 
prices. Data points over 
2009q4-2010q2 
derived based on 
growth rates for GDP 
at 2004-05 prices.  
Reserve Bank of India 
(RBI).  
Treasury bill yield: 91-
day auction yield.  
Datastream. 
CPI-Based (2005=100). 
Data points are 
monthly averages. 
BIS. 
IMF IFS (64...ZF) 
Series Length 1989q1-2010q2 1996q1-2010q2 1993q1-2010q2 1994q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2/ 
1990q1-2010q2 
Notes There is a lack of data on deposit rates and the call money rate series has missing values in the IFS.  
Indonesia 
Definition and Source M2 (national 
definition). Bank 
Indonesia.  
Currency in circulation, 
commercial bank 
demand deposits, 
private sector demand 
deposits, and Bank 
Indonesia certificates 
(used as secondary 
reserves). Bank 
Indonesia.  
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF) 2000q1-2010q2. GDP 
at 2000 prices.  IMF 
IFS (99B.PVF). Level 
series backdated based 
on growth rates of GDP 
at 1993 prices from 
Abeysinghe and 
Gulasekaran (2004).  
Deposit rate: Weighted 
average rate on 3- 
month national 
currency time deposit. 
IMF IFS (60L..ZF). 
CPI-Based (2005=100). 
Data points are 
monthly averages. 
BIS. 
IMF IFS (64...ZF) 
Series Length 1989q1-2010q2 1993q4-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2 1994q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2/ 
1990q1-2010q2 
Notes An opportunity cost variable is excluded because of the lack of data for the government bill/bond rate in the IFS. 
Israel 
Definition and Source M3 (national 
definition). Includes 
deposits of non-
residents. Data points 
are monthly averages. 
Bank of Israel.  
Currency in circulation, 
foreign currency and 
local currency deposits 
of banks. The deposits 
include required 
reserves and local 
currency interest 
earning deposits. Bank 
of Israel.  
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF).  
From January 1997, 
includes accrued 
interest on securities.  
Nominal GDP deflated 
by GDP deflator 
(2005=100).  IMF IFS 
(99B..ZF and 
99BIPZF). 
Deposit rate: Average 
rate offered by 
commercial banks on 
all short-term deposits 
up to one year. IMF 
IFS (60L..ZF). 
Based on relative CPI. 
IMF IFS (..RECZF) 
IMF IFS (64...ZF) 
Series Length 1989q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2/ 
1990q1-2010q2 
Notes An opportunity cost variable is excluded since the Treasury bill rate series is strongly correlated with the deposit rate both in levels and first differences. 
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Variable/ 
Country 
Broad Money Base Money Foreign Exchange 
Reserves 
Real GDP Interest Rates REER CPI/Inflation 
Japan 
Definition and Source M3 (national 
definition). Includes 
non-resident deposits in 
national currency. IMF 
IFS (59MC.ZF). 
Currency in circulation 
and current account 
deposits with the Bank 
of Japan (BOJ).  
BOJ. 
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF).  
 
Chain volume GDP 
(Reference year=1995).  
IMF IFS (99B.RXF). 
Deposit rate: Average 
interest rate on 
unregulated 3-month 
time deposits (3 million 
to <10 million yen). 
IMF IFS (60L..ZF). 
Government bond 
yield: Average yield on 
newly issued bonds 
with 10-year maturity. 
IMF IFS (61...ZF). 
Based on relative CPI. 
IMF IFS (..RECZF) 
IMF IFS (64...ZF) 
Series Length 1989q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2/ 
1990q1-2010q2 
Korea 
Definition and Source M2 (national 
definition). IMF IFS 
(59MB.ZF). 
Currency in circulation, 
reserve deposits of 
banking institutions 
and demand deposits of 
the private sector in 
national currency with 
the Bank of Korea 
(BOK)/IMF IFS 
(14.ZF). 
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF).  
 
Nominal GDP deflated 
by GDP deflator 
(2005=100).  IMF IFS 
(99B..ZF and 
99BIPZF). 
Deposit rate:  BOK 
maximum guideline 
rate on time deposits of 
1-year or more. From 
July 1996, weighted 
average rate for 
deposits of  >= 
1-year, but < 2-years. 
IMF IFS (60L..ZF). 
Government bond 
yield: Average yield on 
National Housing 
Bonds. IMF IFS 
(61...ZF). 
Based on unit labour 
cost. IMF IFS 
(..RELZF) 
IMF IFS (64...ZF) 
Series Length 1989q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2/ 
1990q1-2010q2 
Malaysia 
Definition and Source M3 (national 
definition). Includes 
non-resident deposits. 
IMF IFS (59MC.ZF). 
Currency in circulation, 
required and excess 
reserves, and deposits 
of the private sector 
with Bank Negara 
Malaysia (BNM).  
BNM. 
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF).  
 
GDP at 1987 prices. 
IMF IFS (99B..PYF) ± 
1991q1-2003q4. Level 
series extended based 
on GDP at 2000 prices 
growth rates (IMF IFS 
(99B..PXF)). Past 
values based on 
Abeysinghe and 
Gulasekaran (2004). 
Deposit rate:  Average 
rate on local currency 
3-month time deposits 
at commercial banks. 
IMF IFS (60L..ZF). 
Government bond 
yield: Average discount 
rate on 3-month 
treasury bills.IMF IFS 
(60C...ZF). 
Based on relative CPI. 
IMF IFS (..RECZF) 
IMF IFS (64...ZF) 
Series Length 1989q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2/ 
1990q1-2010q2 
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Variable/ 
Country 
Broad Money Base Money Foreign Exchange 
Reserves 
Real GDP Interest Rates REER CPI/Inflation 
Mexico 
Definition and Source M2 (national 
definition). Includes 
WKHSULYDWHVHFWRU¶V
holdings of public 
securities. IMF IFS 
(59MB.ZF). 
Currency in circulation 
and demand deposits of 
commercial and 
development banks at 
the Bank of Mexico. 
IMF IFS (14.ZK and 
19MA.ZF). 
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF).  
Includes interest 
accrued on deposits, 
securities, and other 
obligations payable, 
loans granted to central 
banks, SDR holdings, 
and the difference in 
favour of the central 
bank between the value 
of foreign exchange 
receivable and payable 
on futures in foreign 
currencies.  
GDP at 2003 prices. 
IMF IFS (99B.RVF) ± 
2003q1-2010q2. Level 
series extended 
backwards based on 
growth rates of GDP at 
1993 prices (IMF IFS 
(99B.RWF)). 
Deposit rate:  Weighted 
average rate paid to 
individuals on 60-day 
time deposits. IMF IFS 
(60L..ZF). 
Government bond 
yield: Average yield on 
28-day Treasury 
bills.IMF IFS 
(60C...ZF). 
Based on relative CPI. 
IMF IFS (..RECZF) 
IMF IFS (64...ZF) 
Series Length 1989q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2/ 
1990q1-2010q2 
New Zealand 
Definition and Source M3R. Does not include 
NZ dollar deposits 
from non-residents. 
Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand (RBNZ). 
Currency in circulation 
and other liabilities to 
banking institutions.  
IMF IFS (14.ZF). 
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF).  
 
GDP volume at 1995-
96 prices. IMF IFS 
(99B.RXF). 
Deposit rate:  Weighted 
average rate offered by 
New Zealand's six 
largest banks on 6-
month deposits of $NZ 
10,000 or more.IMF 
IFS (60L..ZF). 
Government bond 
yield: Tender rate on 3-
month Treasury bills 
(61...ZF). 
Based on relative CPI. 
IMF IFS (..RECZF) 
IMF IFS (64...ZF) 
Series Length 1989q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2/ 
1990q1-2010q2 
Notes There is strong correlation between the deposit rate and the Treasury bill rate both in levels and first differences.  
Norway 
Definition and Source M2 (national 
definition). Statistics 
Norway and IMF IFS 
(59MB. ZF).  
Currency in circulation; 
EDQNV¶FXUUHQWDFFRXQWV
and time deposits, and 
PRQH\KROGLQJVHFWRUV¶
deposits with Norges 
Bank. Statistics 
Norway and IMF IFS 
(14... ZF). 
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF).  
 
GDP 2007 prices. IMF 
IFS (99B.PTF). 
Deposit rate:  Weighted 
average rate on bank 
deposits. Statistics 
Norway. Government 
bond yield: Yield to 
maturity on 5-year 
Government bonds. 
IMF IFS (61...ZF). 
Based on relative CPI. 
IMF IFS (..RECZF) 
IMF IFS (64...ZF) 
Series Length 1989q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2/ 
1990q1-2010q2 
 
  
336 
 
Variable/ 
Country 
Broad Money Base Money Foreign Exchange 
Reserves 
Real GDP Interest Rates REER CPI/Inflation 
Peru 
Definition and Source Total liquidity in the 
banking system. 
Central Reserve Bank 
of Peru (BCRP).  
Currency in circulation, 
demand deposits in 
national currency of 
deposit money banks 
and other banking 
institutions at the 
BCRP. IMF IFS 
(19MA.ZF). 
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF).  
 
GDP at 1994 prices. 
IMF IFS (99B.PYF). 
Deposit rate:  Weighted 
average rate on all 
deposits in national 
currency. The rate is 
weighted by the 
individual banks' 
participation in total 
deposits. IMF IFS 
(60L..ZF). 
CPI-Based (2005=100). 
Data points are 
monthly averages. 
BIS. 
IMF IFS (64...ZF) 
Series Length 1993q1-2010q2 1994q1-2010q2 1993q1-2010q2/ 
1994q1-2010q2 
Notes An opportunity cost variable is excluded as no data on Government bill/bond rates are presented in the IFS.  
Philippines 
Definition and Source M4 (national 
definition). Bangko 
Sentral ng Pilipinas 
(BSP) and IMF IFS 
(59MD.ZF). 
Currency in circulation, 
required and excess 
reserves. BSP and IMF 
IFS (19MB.ZF and 
14...ZK). 
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF).  
 
GDP at 1985 prices. 
1989-2003: 
Abeysinghe and 
Gulasekaran (2004). 
2003-2010: National 
Statistics Coordination 
Board. 
Deposit rate: Weighted 
average rate offered by 
universal and 
commercial banks on 
61-to 90-day time 
deposits in national 
currency. IMF IFS 
(60L..ZF). 
Based on relative CPI. 
IMF IFS (..RECZF) 
IMF IFS (64...ZF) 
Series Length 1989q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2/ 
1990q1-2010q2 
Notes An opportunity cost variable is excluded because of missing values in the time series for the Treasury bill rate in the IFS.  
Poland 
Definition and Source M3 (national 
definition). IMF IFS 
(59MC.ZF). 
Currency in circulation 
and current account 
balances of other MFIs 
with the National Bank 
of Poland (NBP) in 
national currency.  
IMF IFS (14...ZF and 
14...ZK). 
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF).  
 
Chain volume GDP 
(Reference year=1995).  
Datastream. 
Deposit rate: 3-month 
average weighted 
deposit rate. NBP. 
Based on relative CPI. 
IMF IFS (..RECZF) 
IMF IFS (64...ZF) 
Series Length 1996q4-2010q2 1993q1-2010q2 1996q1-2010q2 1996q4-2010q2 1993q1-2010q2 1992q1-2010q2/ 
1993q1-2010q2 
Notes An opportunity cost variable is excluded since the Treasury bill rate series is strongly correlated with the deposit rate both in levels and first differences, and given that the regression 
sample size is reduced on account of the relatively short series for broad money and GDP. 
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Variable/ 
Country 
Broad Money Base Money Foreign Exchange 
Reserves 
Real GDP Interest Rates REER CPI/Inflation 
Russia 
Definition and Source Broad Money 
Liabilities (national 
definition). Includes 
private sector deposits 
with the Central Bank 
of the Russian 
Federation (CBR).  
CBR/ IMF IFS 
(59MCA.ZF). 
Currency in circulation, 
other depository 
FRUSRUDWLRQV2'&V¶
required reserves and 
correspondent accounts 
in national currency 
with the CBR, CBR 
bonds held by ODCs, 
DQGWKH&%5¶V
obligation to buy back 
securities. CBR/ IMF 
IFS (19MAA.ZF and 
14...ZK).  
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF).  
 
GDP at 2003 prices. 
IMF IFS (99B.PXF). 
Deposit rate: Rate for 
1-month time deposits 
of > Rub 300,000 up to 
end 1996. From 
January 1997, weighted 
average rate offered by 
ODCs on deposits of 
households in national 
currency with maturity 
of up to 1-year. The 
rate is weighted by 
deposit amounts. IMF 
IFS (60L..ZF). 
Based on relative CPI. 
IMF IFS (..RECZF) 
IMF IFS (64...ZF) 
Series Length 1995q2-2010q2 1995q1-2010q2 1994q3-2010q2 1994q1-2010q2 1994q1-2010q2/ 
1995q1-2010q2 
Notes An opportunity cost variable is excluded as the Treasury bill series has missing values while the Government bond yield series only begins from 2005q2 in the IFS. 
Singapore 
Definition and Source M3 (national 
definition). Monetary 
Authority of Singapore 
(MAS) and IMF IFS 
(59MC.ZF).  
Currency in circulation, 
deposits of deposit 
money banks and 
deposits of other 
residents. IMF IFS 
(14.ZF). 
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF).  
Includes gold and 
government foreign 
exchange holdings. 
From August 2000, 
excludes gold holdings. 
GDP at 2005 prices.  
Datastream. 
Deposit rate: Average 
rate offered by the 10 
leading commercial 
banks on 3-month time 
deposits .IMF IFS 
(60L..ZF). 
Government bond 
yield: Mode/average 
bid on 3-month 
Treasury bills 
(6OC..ZF). 
Based on relative CPI. 
IMF IFS (..RECZF) 
IMF IFS (64...ZF) 
Series Length 1989q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2/ 
1990q1-2010q2 
South Africa 
Definition and Source M3 (national 
definition). Currency in 
circulation and all the 
deposits of the private 
sector with the 
monetary sector. IMF 
IFS (59MC.ZF).  
Currency in circulation 
and deposits of banks 
and mutual banks with 
the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB).  
SARB. 
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF).  
Includes small foreign 
exchange holdings by 
the Government.  
GDP at 2005 prices. 
IMF IFS (99B.RYF). 
Deposit rate: 
Quoted/weighted rate, 
wholesale 88-91 day 
deposits. From January 
2008, weighted average 
rate, wholesale 32-91 
day deposits. IMF IFS 
(60L..ZF). 
Based on relative CPI. 
IMF IFS (..RECZF) 
IMF IFS (64...ZF) 
Series Length 1989q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2/ 
1990q1-2010q2 
Notes An opportunity cost variable is excluded since the Treasury bill rate and the Government bond yield are strongly correlated with the deposit rate. 
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Variable/ 
Country 
Broad Money Base Money Foreign Exchange 
Reserves 
Real GDP Interest Rates REER CPI/Inflation 
Taiwan 
Definition and Source M2 (national 
definition). Central 
Bank of the Republic 
of Taiwan (CBC).  
Currency in circulation 
and reserves of deposit 
money banks and 
Chunghwa Post Co.  
CBC.  
CBC. GDP at 2006 prices.  
CBC.  
Deposit rate: End-of-
period 1-year deposit 
rate of banks.  
CBC.  
There is no data 
available on the NEER 
and REER. The 
bilateral exchange rate 
between the New 
Taiwan Dollar and the 
US dollar is used in the 
regression analysis. 
CBC.  
Series Length 1989q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2/ 
1990q1-2010q2 
Notes An opportunity cost variable is excluded because of the lack of a long series for the government bond/bill rate. The 10-year Government bond rate series is only available from 1995. 
Thailand 
Definition and Source Broad Money (national 
definition). Money 
holders are the 
domestic sectors. 
Excludes Federal 
Government and non-
residents. 1997-2010: 
Bank of Thailand 
(BOT)/IMF IFS 
(59MEA.ZF). 1989-
1996: BOT.  
Currency in circulation, 
deposits of other 
depository 
corporations, and 
deposits of the private 
sector included in 
broad money.  
BOT. 
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF).  
 
GDP at 1988 prices.  
1993-2010: IMF IFS 
(99B.PYF).  
1989-1992: 
Abeysinghe and 
Gulasekaran (2004). 
Deposit rate: End-of-
period maximum rate 
offered by commercial 
banks on 6-month time 
deposits. IMF IFS 
(60L..ZF). 
Based on relative CPI.  
BOT. 
IMF IFS (64...ZF) 
Series Length 1989q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2/ 
1990q1-2010q2 
Notes An opportunity cost variable is excluded because of the lack of a long series for the Treasury bill rate (the series begins 2001q1). The long-term government bond yield is unchanged over 
the period 1990q3-1998q3 in the IFS.  
Turkey 
Definition and Source M2YR up to November 
2005, M3 from 
December 2005 
onwards (national 
definitions). Central 
Bank of the Republic 
of Turkey (TCMB).  
Currency in circulation, 
required and excess 
reserves of commercial 
banks in national 
currency and demand 
deposits in national 
currency of other 
sectors at the TCMB.  
TCMB.  
IMF IFS (.1D.DZF).  
 
GDP at 1998 prices. 
IMF IFS (99B.PYF).  
Extended backwards 
for the period 1989-
1997 based on growth 
rates of GDP at 1987 
prices. IMF IFS 
(99B.PZF).   
Deposit rate: Rate on 3-
month time deposits 
denominated in 
national currency. IMF 
IFS (60L..ZF). 
CPI-Based (2005=100). 
Data points are 
monthly averages. 
BIS. 
IMF IFS (64...ZF) 
Series Length 1989q1-2010q2 1994q1-2010q2 1989q1-2010q2/ 
1990q1-2010q2 
Notes An opportunity cost variable is excluded since there are missing values in the Treasury bill rate series in the IFS.  
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APPENDIX 3:  
MONETARY POLICY AND  
EXCHANGE RATE FRAMEWORKS  
(1990-2010) 
Country  Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Framework 
Argentina 1991-January 2002 
2002-2005 
2005-2010 
Currency board. 
IMF supported monetary programme. 
Monetary programme: communication of inflation 
target and projected broad money growth. 
2002: Freely falling exchange rate; 02/2003-01/2007: 
De facto crawling band narrower than/equal to +/-5%; 
02/2007-06/2009: De facto crawling band narrower 
than/equal to +/-2%; 07/2009-2010: De facto crawling 
peg. 
 
Australia 1990-1993 
1993-2010 
 
Discretionary monetary policy framework. 
Inflation-targeting framework adopted in 1993. The 
policy rate is the cash rate (the rate charged on 
overnight loans between financial intermediaries).  
1990-2010: Freely floating. 
 
Brazil 1990-1994 
1994-1998 
 
 
January 1999-2010 
Fixed peg (freely falling). 
Crawling peg (Pre-announced crawling band that is 
narrower than or equal to +/-2%). 
02-08/1999: Freely falling.  
Inflation-targeting. 
Policy rate/operational target: Selic rate, which is the 
interest rate on overnight interbank loans collateralised 
by federal debt instruments. 
09/1999-2010: Managed floating. 
 
Canada 1990-2010 Inflation-targeting framework formally adopted in 1991. 
The policy rate is the overnight rate. Operationally, 
short-term interest rates and price stability were also the 
instrument and ultimate objective respectively prior to 
the adoption of the inflation-targeting framework. 
1990-2010:  De facto moving band around the US 
dollar.  
 
Chile 1990-1999 
 
 
 
 
September 1999-
2010 
Crawling exchange rate band and announcement of 
inflation targets (1990-1998: De facto crawling band 
that is narrower than or equal to +/-5%; 12/1998-
09/1999: Pre-announced crawling band that is wider 
than or equal to +/-2%).  
Inflation-targeting.  
1985-1995: policy rate - real rate on indexed Central 
Bank of Chile paper of 90 days maturity. From May 
1995, real overnight interbank loan rate. 
De jure independent float (foreign exchange market 
intervention in exceptional instances; operations are 
transparent). De facto crawling band that is narrower 
than or equal to +/-5%. 
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Country  Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Framework 
China, P.R. of 1994-2010 
1990-1993 
September 1994 
1996 
1998-2010 
7DUJHWVRQFXUUHQF\LQFLUFXODWLRQDQGEDQNV¶ORDQV
portfolios. 
Three monetary indicators, M0, M1 and M2. 
Money supply as formal intermediate target. 
Monetary policy framework organised around inflation 
as the final target, M2 as the intermediate target and base 
money as the operational target. The central bank also 
manages short- term interbank rates. 
1994-07/2005: De facto peg; 08/2005-09/2009: Moving 
band, narrower than or equal to +/-2%; 10/2009-2010: 
De facto peg. 
 
Colombia 1990-1999 
 
September 1999-
2010 
Crawling exchange rate bands; use of intermediate 
monetary targets. 
Inflation-targeting. First implemented with reference 
paths for M3 and base money. Within the full-fledged 
inflation-targeting framework, the overnight repo 
interest rate became the policy instrument.  
1990-2009: De facto crawling band that is narrower than 
or equal to +/-5%; 2010: Managed floating. 
 
Czech Republic 1990-1997 
1997 
January 1997-2010 
De jure fixed exchange rate regime, with monetary 
targets.  
Inflation-targeting, with a managed float. Key monetary 
policy rate ± 2-week repo.  
1990-1995: De facto crawling band that is narrower than 
or equal to +/-2%; 1996: De facto crawling band that is 
narrower than or equal to +/-5%; 1997-2001: De facto 
peg; 2002-2010: De facto crawling band that is narrower 
than or equal to +/-5%. 
 
Denmark 1990-2010 1990-1999: De facto moving peg to the Deutsch Mark;  
1999-2010: De facto peg to the Euro.  
Monetary policy instruments consist of the discount rate, 
the current-account rate and Danmarks Nationalbank's 
lending rate.  
 
Egypt 1990s 
End 2000-2002 
January 2003-2010 
Pegged to the US dollar.  
Series of step devaluations. 
Initially intermediate targets of net domestic credit and 
WKHQ0ZLWKEDQNV¶H[FHVVUHVHUYHEDODQFHVDVWKH
operational target.  
From June 2005, the operational target was switched to 
the overnight interbank interest rate. 
1992-2002: De facto peg; 2003-2010: De facto crawling 
peg. 
 
Hong Kong, 
SAR 
Since 1983 Currency board. 
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Country  Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Framework 
Hungary 1990-1995 
 
March 1995 
May 2001-2010 
 
 
Fixed exchange rate against a currency basket, with a 
band. Adjustment at infrequent intervals.  
Crawling peg. 
Inflation-targeting adopted in May 2001. Pegged 
exchange rate with horizontal bands.  Effective February 
2008, de jure free floating exchange rate regime with 
Euro as reference currency. 
1990-1993: De facto crawling band that is narrower than 
or equal to +/-5%; 1994-1998: De facto crawling band 
that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%; 1999-2001: Pre 
announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to 
+/-2%; 2002-2004: De facto crawling band that is 
narrower than or equal to +/-2%; 2005-2010: De facto 
crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5%. 
 
India 1990s 
 
 
1999-2010 
Flexible monetary-targeting approach. M3 as the 
nominal anchor, base money as the operating target and 
bank reserve balances as the operating instrument.  
Since 1998-1999, a broad based multiple indicator 
approach.  
Managed floating exchange rate regime without 
preannounced path.  
1990-07/1991: De facto crawling peg; 08/1991-06/1995: 
De facto peg;  
07/1996-07/2005: De facto crawling peg; 08/2005-2010: 
De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to 
+/-2%. 
 
Indonesia 1990-July 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
July 2005-2010 
Base money as operational instrument.  
August 1997: IMF supported monetary programme with 
base money as target, with additional quantitative targets 
for central bank balance sheet items.  
In 2000, informal inflation-targeting adopted (explicit 
inflation targets). Base money remains as operational 
target.  
Inflation-targeting formally adopted in July 2005. The 
policy rate is the BI rate, and the operational target is the 
overnight interbank rate. 
1990-07/1997: De facto crawling peg; 08/1997-03/1999: 
Freely falling; 04/1999-2005: Managed floating; 2006-
2010: De facto crawling band that is narrower than or 
equal to +/-5%. 
 
Israel 1992-2010 Inflation-targeting introduced in 1992, with full 
implementation in 1994.  Short term interest rates on 
commercial bank deposits and loans with the central 
bank adopted as the policy instrument in 1995. 
1990: De facto crawling band that is narrower than or 
equal to +/-2%; 1991-1993: De facto crawling band that 
is narrower than or equal to +/-5%; 1994-2004: Pre-
announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal 
to +/-2%; 2005-2010: De- facto crawling band that is 
narrower than or equal to +/-5%. 
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Japan 1990-2010 No explicitly stated nominal anchor.  
1990-2001(March): Uncollateralised overnight call rate 
as the operating target.  
1999: Zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) implemented. 
August 2000, ZIRP lifted.   
2001-0DUFK%DQNV¶FXUUHQWDFFRXQWEDODQFHVDV
operating target (quantitative easing).  
2006: Return to ZIRP and overnight call rate as 
operating target. 
1990-2010: Freely floating. 
 
Korea 1990-1998 
 
 
 
 
 
1998-2010 
Monetary-targeting, with a variety of quantity variables 
used as intermediate targets. 1990s: M2. 1997: M2 and 
MCT (includes certificates of deposits (CD) and trust 
cash funds) due to M2 instability. Usefulness of MCT 
declined with a change to the reserve requirement 
system.   
Inflation-targeting. Overnight call money market rate as 
the operational target (target first announced in May 
1999) but two-pillar system practised. After the crisis, 
M3 was used as a reference value, with a corresponding 
supply limit on base money.  
Over 2001-2003, no M3 targets were set but the 
aggregate continued to be monitored.  
Pure inflation-targeting was adopted in 2004.  
1990-10/1994: Pre announced crawling band that is 
narrower than or equal to +/-2%; 11/1994-11/1997: De 
facto crawling peg; 12/1997-06/1998: Freely falling; 
07/1998-2010: Managed floating.  
 
Malaysia 1990-2010 
 
 
Shift from monetary-targeting to interest rate-targeting 
in the mid-1990s.  
September 1998-April 2004, the policy rate was the 3-
month Intervention Rate. From April 2004 onwards, the 
Overnight Policy Rate (OPR) has been the monetary 
policy stance indicator. It is the target for the average 
overnight interbank rate.  
Fixed exchange rate regime: September 1998-July 2005. 
De jure managed float from July 2005.  
1990-07/1997: De facto crawling band that is narrower 
than or equal to +/-2%; 08/1997-09/1998: Freely 
floating; 09/1998-06/2005: Pre-announced peg; 
07/2005-2007: De facto peg; 2008-2010: De facto 
crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5%. 
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Country  Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Framework 
Mexico 1990-1994 
1999-2010 
Exchange rate targeting with predetermined parity. 
Inflation-targeting (from January 1999).   
September 1995-2004: The monetary policy instrument was 
WKHFRPPHUFLDOEDQNV¶FXUUHQWDFFRXQWEDODQFHVDWWKH
FHQWUDOEDQN³FRUWR´ 
Since 2004, the central bank operated based on interest 
rates (the last overnLJKWLQWHUHVWUDWHFKDQJHGXHWR³FRUWR´
was in February 2005).  
January 2008: The overnight interbank interest rate was 
formally made the operating target.  
1990-1991: Pre-announced horizontal band that is narrower 
than or equal to +/-2%; 05/1992-01/1994: De facto peg; 
02/1994-12/1994: Pre- announced crawling band that is 
wider than or equal to +/-2%; 12/1994-03/1996: Freely 
falling; 04/1996-2010: Managed floating.  
 
New Zealand 1990-2010 Inflation-targeting framework adopted in 1990. Effective 
March 1999, the operating target and indicator of policy 
stance is the Official Cash Rate (the rate at which the 
Reserve Bank will borrow/lend). Previously, the daily 
settlements cash target was the main operating instrument, 
and the MCI was the operating target from June 1997 to 
March 1999. 1990-2010: Managed floating. 
 
Norway 1990-2001 
 
2001-2010 
Exchange rate targeting. Fixed exchange rate abandoned in 
December 1992. 
Inflation-targeting framework adopted in March 2001. The 
monetary policy instrument is the key policy rate which is 
the interest rate on banks' deposits up to a quota in Norges 
Bank. 
1990-1992: Moving band around the Deutsch Mark; 1992-
2010: Managed floating/ De facto band around the Euro.  
 
Peru 1991-2001 
 
 
 
 
2002-2010 
Targets for base money and monetary aggregates.  
In 2001, the central banks had as its operating target, the 
DYHUDJHRIEDQNV¶UHVHUYHEDODQFHVDQGDOVREHJLQ
announcing benchmark interest rates on central bank 
operations (overnight lending and borrowing rates).  
Inflation-targeting.  Interbank overnight interest rate as 
operating target. 
1990-1993: Freely falling; 1994-2009: De facto crawling 
band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%; 2010: De 
facto crawling peg. 
 
Philippines 1990s 
 
 
2002-2010 
Base money-targeting. In the second half of 1995, looser 
observance of base money targets with adoption of inflation 
targets.  
Inflation-targeting implemented in 2002. Main policy 
instruments are the overnight repurchase rate (RP) and 
reverse repurchase rate (RRP). 
1990-1991: De facto crawling peg; 1992: De facto crawling 
band narrower than or equal to +/-2%; 1993-08/1995: De 
facto crawling band narrower than or equal to +/-5%; 
09/1995-06/1997: De facto peg; 07/1997-12/1997: Freely 
falling/floating; 12/1997-11/1999: Managed floating; 
12/1999-2007: De facto crawling band narrower than or 
equal to +/-2%; 2008-2010: De facto crawling band 
narrower than or equal to +/-5%. 
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Country  Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Framework 
Poland 1990-1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1999-2010 
Monetary-targeting (with elements of exchange rate 
targeting) 
Period involved M2 as intermediate target (1990-1997), 
shifts between short term interest rates and base money as 
the operational target. 
From February 1998 onwards, short term interest rates 
adopted as operational target. 
Inflation targets present since 1992. 
Inflation-targeting. 
1990-04/1993: Freely falling exchange rate; 05/1993-
05/1995: Dual market; 05/1995-04/2000: De facto crawling 
band (preannounced bands); 04/2000-2010: Managed 
floating. 
 
Russia 1992-2010 Russian Ruble introduced in July 1993. Monetary policy 
generally focussed on disinflation and more recently on 
resisting the nominal exchange rate appreciation. Key 
monetary policy instruments are the refinancing rate and 
reserve requirement ratios. 
1992-07/1996: Freely falling/dual market exchange rate; 
08/1996-08/1998: Dual market; 08/1998-11/1999; Freely 
falling/dual market; 12/1999-2010: De facto crawling band. 
 
Singapore Since 1981 Managed floating against a basket of currencies of major 
trading partners and competitions. Basket, band, crawl 
framework. Intermediate target: NEER. 
 
South Africa 1990-1998 
 
 
 
 
2000-2010 
 
Monetary-targeting (M3 was used as the intermediate 
target). 
In the late 1990s, as financial liberalisation complicated 
monetary-targeting, an eclectic approach was adopted with 
a focus on numerous indicators. 
Inflation-targeting framework formally adopted in February 
2000.  The policy rate is the 7-day repo rate.  
1990-03/1995: Dual rate/Managed floating; 03/1995-2010: 
Freely floating. 
 
Taiwan 1990-2010 Monetary-targeting.  
Since 1992, M2 has been the intermediate target. Target 
zones for M2 growth are publicly announced. Base money 
is the operational target. A variety of operational 
instruments are used including open market operations, 
required reserve ratios and re-deposits of financial 
institutions.  
Managed floating exchange rate regime.  
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Country  Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Framework 
Thailand 1990- July 1997 
July 1997- May 
2000 
 
 
 
 
 
May 2000 ± 2010 
De facto peg 
IMF supported monetary-targeting programme. Daily and 
quarterly base money targets.  
July 1997- January 1998: Freely falling/free floating 
exchange rate regime.   
1998 -1999: Managed floating. 
2000-2010: Moving band that is narrower than or equal to 
+/-2%. 
Inflation-targeting. 2-week repo rate adopted as policy 
interest rate up to January 2007, which was then switched 
to the 1-day repo rate. Effective February 2008, the 1 day 
bilateral repo rate is the policy interest rate.  
 
Turkey 1990s 
 
2000 
2001-2006 
 
 
2006 
Various forms of a monetary-targeting approach with 
announcements of a predetermined exchange rate path. 
IMF supported exchange rate stabilisation programme.  
Monetary-targeting and implicit inflation-targeting. Base 
money as nominal anchor (2001-2002) and adjustment of 
short term interest rates.  
Full-fledged inflation-targeting (January 2006). 
1990-01/1998: Freely falling/managed floating;  
02/1998-01/2001: De facto crawling band that is narrower 
than or equal to +/-5%; 02/2001-03/2002: Freely falling; 
04/2003-07/2007: Freely floating; 08/2007-2010: De facto 
crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5%. 
 
Notes: 
Information on De facto exchange rate regimes is taken from Ilzetzki et al. (2011). All other text on monetary 
policy frameworks and de jure exchange rate regimes are based on various sources including central bank 
websites, various publications, and the IMF Classification of Exchange Rate Arrangements and Monetary 
Frameworks (http://www.imf.org/external/NP/mfd/er/index.aspx).  
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APPENDIX 4: BROAD MONEY MULTIPLIERS107 
 
                                                          
107
 The broad money multiplier is the ratio between seasonally adjusted broad money and seasonally adjusted base money. For each country, the average value and coefficient of variation (C.V.) are reported.  
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Average: 4.12 C.V.: 0.34
Argentina
8.0
12.0
16.0
20.0
24.0
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Average: 15.00 C.V.: 0.22
Australia
4.0
6.0
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10.0
12.0
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Average: 7.39 C.V.: 0.19
Brazil
8.0
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24.0
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Average: 14.93 C.V.: 0.22
Canada
4.0
8.0
12.0
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24.0
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Average: 16.46 C.V.: 0.17
Chile
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3.0
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4.0
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Average: 3.69 C.V.: 0.19
China
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
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Average: 6.05 C.V.: 0.14
Colombia
4.8
5.2
5.6
6.0
6.4
6.8
7.2
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Average: 5.89 C.V.: 0.09
Czech Republic
2.0
2.4
2.8
3.2
3.6
4.0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Average: 2.74 C.V.:0.17
Egypt
8.0
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12.0
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Average: 12.06 C.V.: 0.10
Denmark
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Average: 27.89 C.V.: 0.21
Hong Kong
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
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6.0
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Average: 4.45 C.V.: 0.13
Hungary
3.2
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4.0
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5.2
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Average: 4.26 C.V.: 0.11
India
4.0
6.0
8.0
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Average: 6.77 C.V.: 0.21
Indonesia
0.0
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4.0
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Average: 4.94 C.V.: 0.51
Israel
8.0
12.0
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Average: 14.62 C.V.: 0.29
Japan
10.0
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20.0
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35.0
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Average: 20.70 C.V.: 0.28
Korea
4.0
8.0
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Average: 10.09 C.V.: 0.38
Malaysia
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Average: 12.26 C.V.: 0.10
Mexico
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Average: 30.45 C.V.: 0.29
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6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
16.0
18.0
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Average: 11.93 C.V.: 0.18
Norway
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
10.0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Average: 7.27 C.V.: 0.20
Peru
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
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Average: 5.60 C.V.: 0.28
Philippines
3.6
4.0
4.4
4.8
5.2
5.6
6.0
6.4
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Average: 5.30 C.V.: 0.12
Poland
2.0
2.4
2.8
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Average: 2.52 C.V.: 0.14
Russia
7.0
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Average: 9.28 C.V.: 0.13
Singapore
11.0
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13.0
14.0
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16.0
17.0
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Average: 13.86 C.V.: 0.08
South Africa
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
16.0
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Average: 10.46 C.V.: 0.29
Taiwan
9.0
10.0
11.0
12.0
13.0
14.0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Average: 11.13 C.V.: 0.08
Thailand
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Average: 5.62 C.V.: 0.08
Turkey
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Appendix 5  
Structural Break Tests for Real Intervention Effects 
on Real Base Money Change due to Monetary Policy Framework  
Changes in Selected Countries 
Country Breakpoint 
Chow Test  
F-Statistic 
(probability) # Notes 
Asia 
China 1998q1 
 
2006q4 
0.465 
(0.855) 
0.890 
(0.521) 
Reduction in reserve requirement ratio. 
 
Subsequent large increases in reserve 
requirement ratios. 
India 2006q4 1.649 
(0.161) 
Subsequent increases in reserve 
requirement ratio. 
Indonesia 2005q2 0.580 
(0.768) 
Inflation-targeting implemented in July 
2005. Overnight interbank rate as 
operational target. 
Korea 1997q1 
 
1999q2 
0.293 
(0.938) 
1.117 
(0.364) 
Reduction in reserve requirement ratio. 
 
Implementation of inflation-targeting 
(1998) and adoption of call money 
market rate targets (from May 1999). 
Malaysia 1998q2 
 
1998q3 
 
2005q3 
1.982* 
(0.082) 
1.414 
(0.224) 
0.295 
(0.937) 
Sharp reduction in reserve requirement 
ratio. 
Fixed exchange rate regime beginning 
September 1998. 
Managed floating regime from July 
2005.  
Philippines 1995q2 0.222 
(0.802) 
Looser observance of base money 
targets in the second half of 1995. 
Implementation of inflation-targeting 
(January 2002). 
Implementation of reserve deposit 
account (RDA) in March 2006. 
 2002q1 
 
2006q2 
1.275 
(0.286) 
0.362 
(0.698) 
Thailand 2000q2 0.137 
(0.995) 
Inflation-targeting implemented in May 
2000.  
Latin America 
Argentina 2002q1 0.898 
(0.528) 
Collapse of currency board in January 
2002. 
Brazil 1999q1 2.263* 
(0.097) 
Inflation-targeting implemented in 
January 1999. 
Chile 1999q3 0.095 
(0.984) 
Inflation-targeting implemented in 
September 1999. 
Colombia 1999q3 2.281** 
(0.040) 
Inflation-targeting implemented in 
September 1999. 
Mexico 1999q1 
 
2005q2 
3.514*** 
(0.004) 
2.243** 
(0.045) 
Inflation-targeting implemented in 
January 1999. 
Last use of account balances with central 
bank as operating target in February 
2005. 
Peru 2002q1 2.574** 
(0.028) 
Inflation-targeting implemented in 2002. 
 
# The coefficients that are allowed to vary under the alternative hypothesis are the constant term and seasonal factors, 
the contemporaneous and lagged coefficients on real intervention, and the lagged coefficients on the change in real 
base money. 
***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.  
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Appendix 5:  Continued 
Country Breakpoint 
Chow Test  
F-Statistic 
(probability) # Notes 
Other Emerging Market Economies 
Hungary 2001q2 1.018 
(0.437) 
Inflation-targeting implemented in May 
2001. 
Israel 1995q1 
 
1996q2 
1.122 
(0.363) 
1.821* 
(0.090) 
Short-term interest rates adopted as 
policy instrument in 1995. 
Large interventions over February 1996-
June 1997 sterilised through interest-
bearing deposits at the central bank. 
South 
Africa 
2000q1 0.789 
(0.582) 
Inflation-targeting adopted in February 
2000.  
Turkey  2006q1 2.503* 
(0.056) 
Inflation-targeting formally adopted in 
January 2006. Short-term interest rates 
main policy tool since 2002. 
Developed Economies 
Japan 1999q1 
 
2001q1 
 
 
2006q1 
2.089* 
(0.058) 
2.542** 
(0.023) 
 
2.205** 
(0.046) 
Zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) 
implemented. 
%DQNV¶FXUUHQWDFFRXQWEDODQFHVDV
operation target from March 2001 until 
March 2006. 
Return to ZIRP. 
New 
Zealand 
2006q3 3.511*** 
(0.004) 
New liquidity framework introduced in 
July 2006. 
Norway 2001q1 0.374 
(0.864) 
Inflation-targeting adopted in March 
2001. 
 
# The coefficients that are allowed to vary under the alternative hypothesis are the constant term and seasonal factors, 
the contemporaneous and lagged coefficients on real intervention, and the lagged coefficients on the change in real 
base money. 
***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.  
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Appendix 6:   
Structural Break Tests for All Parameters  
in Baseline Real Base Money Growth Change Regressions 
Country 
Quandt-Andrews/ 
Andrews-Ploberger Tests Chow Test 
Unknown 
Breakpoint 
[Trimming] 
Sup-W  
Statistic 
(p-value) 
Exp-W  
Statistic 
(p-value) 
Regression 
Sample 
Midpoint 
F-statistic 
(p-value) 
Asia 
China 2005q3 
[25%] 
27.081 
(0.528) 
9.948 
(0.651) 
2001q1 0.625 
(0.863) 
Hong Kong 2004q2 
[35%] 
24.836 
(0.317) 
10.834 
(0.239) 
2005q1 1.204 
(0.373) 
India 2005q3 
[25%] 
55.074*** 
(0.000) 
24.115*** 
(0.000) 
2004q1 3.528*** 
(0.003) 
Indonesia 2003q4 
[25%] 
18.529 
(0.705) 
7.326 
(0627) 
2003q1 0.668 
(0.787) 
Korea 1998q1 
[20%] 
28.924* 
(0.061) 
11.217* 
(0.063) 
2001q1 1.070 
(0.403) 
Malaysia 1998q1 
[20%] 
39.981*** 
(0.001) 
16.781*** 
(0.007) 
2000q3 0.992 
(0.478) 
Philippines 1997q3 
[35%] 
11.715 
(0.295) 
3.925 
(0.324) 
2000q4 0.675 
(0.671) 
Singapore 2000q2 
[40%] 
18.574 
(0.565) 
7.206 
(0.611) 
2000q4 1.023 
(0.449) 
Thailand 2000q3 
[30%] 
35.792 
(0.168) 
14.528 
(0.203) 
2001q1 1.097 
(0.394) 
Latin America 
Argentina 2001q1 
[30%] 
38.431** 
(0.036) 
17.181** 
(0.021) 
2002q4 1.754* 
(0.091) 
Brazil 2000q4 
[25%] 
12.395 
(0.938) 
4.795 
(0.870) 
2004q1 0.593 
(0.830) 
Chile 2006q3 
[15%] 
20.271 
(0.293) 
7.500 
(0.253) 
2000q4 0.463 
(0.907) 
Colombia 2000q2 
[20%] 
34.050** 
(0.013) 
13.609** 
(0.014) 
2003q1 1.014 
(0.456) 
Mexico 2000q4 
[49%] 
51.436*** 
(0.000) 
25.618*** 
(0.000) 
2001q1 3.401*** 
(0.000) 
Peru 2003q3 
[45%] 
94.223*** 
(0.000) 
45.320*** 
(0.000) 
2003q1 1.180 
(0.119) 
 
Sup-W: Maximum of Wald statistics; Exp-W: average of exponential Wald statistics. 
The Quandt-Andrews Sup-W test statistic corresponds to the maximum of the sequence of Wald 
test statistics for different potential breakpoints. The unknown breakpoint is the date where the 
maximum statistic is recorded and therefore, the most likely breakpoint location. The Andrews-
Ploberger Exp-W test statistic corresponds to the average of the exponential of the same sequence 
of Wald test statistics.  
The distribution of these test statistics is non-standard and the p-values follow Hansen (1997). A 
portion of the sample is excluded from the test. This trimming percentage, equally split between 
the beginning and the end of the sample for each country, is the lowest percentage that allows for 
enough observations to identify subsample parameters. The standard 15% is used as minimum 
trimming where possible.   
***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.  
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Appendix 6:  Continued 
Country 
Quandt-Andrews/ 
Andrews-Ploberger Tests Chow Test 
Unknown 
Breakpoint 
QLR  
Statistic 
(p-value) 
Exp-W  
Statistic 
(p-value) 
Regression 
Sample 
Midpoint 
F-statistic 
(p-value) 
Other Emerging Market Economies 
Czech 
Republic 
2001q2 
[30%] 
13.155 
(0.586) 
5.152 
(0.471) 
2004q1 0.761 
(0.652) 
Hungary 2004q1 
[40%] 
14.917 
(0.868) 
6.533 
(0.786) 
2003q3 0.637 
(0.824) 
Israel 2004q1 
[20%] 
17.184 
(0.780) 
6.426 
(0.729) 
2000q4 0.522  
(0.901) 
Poland 2007q2 
[25%] 
10.224 
(0.970) 
3.435 
(0.965) 
2004q2 0.518 
(0.875) 
Russia 2005q1 
[30%] 
25.455 
(0.268) 
10.928 
(0.184) 
2003q4 1.323 
(0.257) 
South Africa 1995q2 
[20%] 
37.380** 
(0.013) 
15.083** 
(0.014) 
2001q1 1.058 
(0.417) 
Turkey 2001q1 
[35%] 
16.043 
(0.383) 
6.627 
(0.293) 
2003q1 0.911 
(0.533) 
Developed Economies 
Australia 1996q3 
[25%] 
23.993 
(0.491) 
10.061 
(0.382) 
2001q1 1.215 
(0.297) 
Canada  2004q2 
[30%] 
20.113 
(0.435) 
8.561 
(0.309) 
2000q4 1.134 
(0.353) 
Denmark 2004q2 
[15%] 
23.093 
(0.096) 
8.843 
(0.072) 
2001q1 1.272 
(0.271) 
Japan 2001q2 
[45%] 
30.563*** 
(0.002) 
13.435*** 
(0.002) 
2000q3 2.693** 
(0.011) 
New Zealand 2004q3 
[30%] 
39.194*** 
(0.003) 
16.850*** 
(0.002) 
2001q1 1.919* 
(0.052) 
Norway 2000q4 
[49%] 
7.719 
(0.878) 
3.860 
(0.819) 
2001q1 0.714 
(0.730) 
 
Sup-W: Maximum of Wald statistics; Exp-W: average of exponential Wald statistics. 
The Quandt-Andrews Sup-W test statistic corresponds to the maximum of the sequence of Wald 
test statistics for different potential breakpoints. The unknown breakpoint is the date where the 
maximum statistic is recorded and therefore, the most likely breakpoint location. The Andrews-
Ploberger Exp-W test statistic corresponds to the average of the exponential of the same sequence 
of Wald test statistics.  
The distribution of these test statistics is non-standard and the p-values follow Hansen (1997). A 
portion of the sample is excluded from the test. This trimming percentage, equally split between 
the beginning and the end of the sample for each country, is the lowest percentage that allows for 
enough observations to identify subsample parameters. The standard 15% is used as minimum 
trimming where possible.   
***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.  
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Appendix 7:   
Structural Break Tests for Real Intervention Effects 
on Real Broad Money Change due to Monetary Policy Framework  
Changes in Selected Countries 
Country Breakpoint 
Chow Test  
F-Statistic 
(probability)# Notes 
Asia 
China 1998q1 
 
2006q4 
1.430 
(0.204) 
1.474 
(0.186) 
Reduction in reserve requirement ratio. 
 
Subsequent large increases in reserve 
requirement ratios. 
India 2006q4 1.485 
(0.208) 
Subsequent increases in reserve 
requirement ratio. 
Indonesia 2005q2 0.659 
(0.705) 
Inflation-targeting implemented in July 
2005. Overnight interbank rate as 
operational target. 
Korea 1997q1 
 
1999q2 
0.682 
(0.665) 
2.386** 
(0.039) 
Reduction in reserve requirement ratio. 
 
Implementation of inflation-targeting 
(1998) and adoption of call money market 
rate targets (from May 1999). 
Malaysia 1998q2 
 
1998q3 
 
2005q3 
2.670** 
(0.030) 
2.877** 
(0.021) 
1.041 
(0.402) 
Reduction in reserve requirement ratio. 
 
Fixed exchange rate regime beginning 
September 1998. 
Managed floating regime from July 2005.  
Philippines 1995q2 2.487** 
(0.032) 
Looser observance of base money targets 
in the second half of 1995. 
Implementation of inflation-targeting. 
 
Implementation of reserve deposit account 
(RDA) in March 2006. 
 2002q1 
 
2006q2 
0.961 
(0.460) 
0.786 
(0.584) 
Thailand 2000q2 0.262 
(0.901) 
Inflation-targeting implemented in May 
2000.  
Latin America 
Chile 1999q3 0.616 
(0.543) 
Inflation-targeting implemented in 
September 1999. 
Colombia 1999q3 0.379 
(0.861) 
Inflation-targeting implemented in 
September 1999. 
Mexico 1999q1 
 
2005q2 
2.079* 
(0.072) 
0.443 
(0.847) 
Inflation-targeting implemented in January 
1999. 
Last use of account balances with central 
bank as operating target in February 2005. 
Peru 2002q1 0.369 
(0.894) 
Inflation-targeting implemented in 2002. 
 
# The coefficients that are allowed to vary under the alternative hypothesis are the constant term and seasonal factors, 
the contemporaneous and lagged coefficients on real intervention, and the lagged coefficients on the change in real 
base money. 
***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.  
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Appendix 7: Continued 
Country Breakpoint 
Chow Test  
F-statistic 
(probability)# Notes 
Other Emerging Market Economies 
Hungary 2001q2 1.251 
(0.254) 
Inflation-targeting implemented in May 
2001. 
Israel 1995q1 
 
1996q2 
2.294** 
(0.031) 
0.801 
(0.704) 
Short-term interest rates adopted as policy 
instrument in 1995. 
Large interventions over February 1996-
June 1997 sterilised through interest-
bearing deposits at the central bank.. 
South 
Africa 
2000q1 1.338 
(0.172) 
Inflation-targeting adopted in February 
2000.  
Turkey  2006q1 0.147 
(0.980) 
Inflation-targeting formally adopted in 
January 2006. 
Developed Economies 
Japan 1999q1 
 
2001q1 
 
 
2006q1 
1.464 
(0.215) 
1.442 
(0.220) 
 
1.209 
(0.316) 
Zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) 
implemented. 
%DQNV¶FXUUHQWDFFRXQWEDODQFHVas 
operation target from March 2001 until 
March 2006. 
Return to ZIRP. 
 
New 
Zealand 
2006q3 3.211*** 
(0.008) 
New liquidity framework introduced in 
July 2006. 
Norway 2001q1 0.724 
(0.669) 
Inflation-targeting adopted in March 
2001. 
 
# The coefficients that are allowed to vary under the alternative hypothesis are the constant term and seasonal 
factors, the contemporaneous and lagged coefficients on real intervention, and the lagged coefficients on the 
change in real base money. 
***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.  
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Appendix 8:   
Structural Break Tests for All Parameters in  
Baseline Real Broad Money Growth Regressions 
Country 
Quandt-Andrews/ 
Andrews-Ploberger Tests Chow Test 
Unknown 
Breakpoint 
[Trimming] 
Sup-W  
Statistic 
(p-value) 
Exp-W  
Statistic 
(p-value) 
Regression 
Sample 
Midpoint 
F-statistic 
(p-value) 
Asia 
China 2003q4 
[30%] 
33.478 
(0.257) 
14.006 
(0.248) 
2000q4 0.634 
(0.863) 
Hong Kong 2002q4 
[35%] 
37.737** 
(0.016) 
16.276** 
(0.014) 
2004q2 1.014 
(0.485) 
India 2005q3 
[30%] 
28.845* 
(0.064) 
11.530* 
(0.070) 
2004q1 1.054 
(0.436) 
Indonesia 2002q4 
[40%] 
1.579 
(0.158) 
1.174 
(0.232) 
2002q4 1.579 
(0.189) 
Korea 1999q2 
[15%] 
22.734 
(0.322) 
8.282 
(0.327) 
2000q2 1.055 
(0.414) 
Malaysia 1997q3 
[20%] 
31.945** 
(0.040) 
13.447** 
(0.026) 
2000q4 1.278 
(0.255) 
Philippines 1995q1 
[15%] 
32.309*** 
(0.009) 
12.994*** 
(0.007) 
2000q4 1.380 
(0.212) 
Singapore 2005q3 
[15%] 
14.942 
(0.489) 
5.388 
(0.381) 
2000q2 1.555 
(0.156) 
Thailand 1994q3 
[15%] 
22.986 
(0.226) 
8.441 
(0.217) 
2000q4 0.378 
(0.959) 
Latin America 
Argentina 2002q2 
[30%] 
52.854*** 
(0.000) 
23.292*** 
(0.000) 
2002q4 2.488** 
(0.014) 
Brazil 2004q1 
[49%] 
166.864*** 
(0.000) 
82.739*** 
(0.000) 
2004q2 2.842** 
(0.035) 
Chile 1997q4 
[15%] 
18.395 
(0.431) 
7.421 
(0.264) 
2000q4 0.507 
(0.879) 
Colombia 2002q4 
[20%] 
28.955** 
(0.023) 
11.464** 
(0.020) 
2003q1 2.819*** 
(0.009) 
Mexico 2004q1 
[25%] 
48.654*** 
(0.001) 
21.135*** 
(0.001) 
2001q1 1.318 
(0.231) 
Peru 1999q4 
[25%] 
29.208 
(0.103) 
12.367* 
(0.069) 
2003q1 1.175 
(0.338) 
 
Sup-W: Maximum of Wald statistics; Exp-W: average of exponential Wald statistics. 
The Quandt-Andrews Sup-W test statistic corresponds to the maximum of the sequence of Wald 
test statistics for different potential breakpoints. The unknown breakpoint is the date where the 
maximum statistic is recorded and therefore, the most likely breakpoint location. The Andrews-
Ploberger Exp-W test statistic corresponds to the average of the exponential of the same sequence 
of Wald test statistics.  
The distribution of these test statistics is non-standard and the p-values follow Hansen (1997). A 
portion of the sample is excluded from the test. This trimming percentage, equally split between 
the beginning and the end of the sample for each country, is the lowest percentage that allows for 
enough observations to identify subsample parameters. The standard 15% is used as minimum 
trimming where possible.   
***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.  
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Appendix 8:  Continued 
Country 
Quandt-Andrews/ 
Andrews-Ploberger Tests Chow Test 
Unknown 
Breakpoint 
[Trimming] 
Sup-W  
Statistic 
(p-value) 
Exp-W  
Statistic 
(p-value) 
Regression 
Sample 
Midpoint 
F-statistic 
(p-value) 
Other Emerging Market Economies 
Czech 
Republic 
2003q2 
[40%] 
161.008*** 
(0.000) 
78.201*** 
(0.000) 
2004q1 1.728 
(0.158) 
Hungary 2005q2 
[25%] 
22.468 
(0.253) 
9.113 
(0.474) 
2003q3 1.164 
(0.347) 
Israel 1996q2 
[25%] 
45.956*** 
(0.006) 
19.341*** 
(0.006) 
2001q1 0.805 
(0.683) 
Poland 2003q1 
[40%] 
45.170*** 
(0.005) 
20.388*** 
(0.004) 
2004q3 1.185 
(0.391) 
Russia 2000q3 
[25%] 
29.169 
(0.104) 
12.678* 
(0.057) 
2003q2 1.151 
(0.360) 
South Africa 1994q3 
[20%] 
20.763 
(0.602) 
8.517 
(0.460) 
2000q3 1.236 
(0.279) 
Turkey 2000q1 
[30%] 
46.836*** 
(0.000) 
21.064*** 
(0.000) 
2003q1 0.218 
(0.999) 
Developed Economies 
Australia 1999q1 
[25%] 
26.157 
(0.590) 
11.143 
(0.476) 
2000q4 0.934 
(0.550) 
Canada  2005q3 
[25%] 
23.494 
(0.690) 
8.712 
(0.747) 
2001q1 0.579 
(0.894) 
Denmark 1998q2 
[25%] 
16.511 
(0.361) 
6.976 
(0.203) 
2000q3 1.830* 
(0.082) 
Japan 2002q3 
[30%] 
23.938** 
(0.044) 
9.864** 
(0.030) 
2001q1 1.773* 
(0.094) 
New 
Zealand 
2003q2 
[15%] 
25.446 
(0.124) 
9.838* 
(0.097) 
2001q1 1.230 
(0.290) 
Norway 1998q1 
[25%] 
34.385** 
(0.016) 
14.382** 
(0.013) 
2000q3 1.113 
(0.369) 
 
Sup-W: Maximum of Wald statistics; Exp-W: average of exponential Wald statistics. 
The Quandt-Andrews Sup-W test statistic corresponds to the maximum of the sequence of Wald 
test statistics for different potential breakpoints. The unknown breakpoint is the date where the 
maximum statistic is recorded and therefore, the most likely breakpoint location. The Andrews-
Ploberger Exp-W test statistic corresponds to the average of the exponential of the same sequence 
of Wald test statistics.  
The distribution of these test statistics is non-standard and the p-values follow Hansen (1997). A 
portion of the sample is excluded from the test. This trimming percentage, equally split between 
the beginning and the end of the sample for each country, is the lowest percentage that allows for 
enough observations to identify subsample parameters. The standard 15% is used as minimum 
trimming where possible.   
***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.  
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Appendix 9:  
Equality Tests of the Aizenman-Chinn-Ito Trilemma Measures  
Grouped by the Boxplot Quartiles of  
Real Intervention Effects on Real Broad Money Change 
 
Upper 
quartile 
Inter-
quartile  
Lower 
quartile 
Equality  
Test 
Statistic 
 
Group  
Average [Median] 
Baseline Scenario 
Short-run coefficient for the effect of  
ǻ5HDO)XRcb RQǻ5HDO%0br 0.370*** 0.137 -0.154  
 
Monetary independence 0.413 0.394 0.445 0.619 
 
Exchange rate stability [0.423] [0.388] [0.271] 3.286 
 Financial openness 0.670 0.640 0.469 0.970 
Long-run coefficient for the effect of  
ǻ5HDO)XRcb RQǻ5HDO%0br 1.360*** 0.373*** -0.231  
 Monetary independence 0.366 0.410 0.459 1.652 
 Exchange rate stability [0.382] [0.417] [0.348] 2.253 
 Financial openness 0.599 0.637 0.543 0.219 
Robustness Analysis (1) 
Short-run coefficient for the effect of  
ǻ5HDO)XRcb RQǻ5HDO%0br 0.422*** 0.125 -0.218  
 Monetary independence 0.413 0.399 0.434 0.295 
 Exchange rate stability [0.423] [0.352] [0.346] 2.349 
 Financial openness 0.670 0.629 0.488 0.725 
Long-run coefficient for the effect of  
ǻ5HDO)XRcb RQǻ5HDO%0br 1.353*** 0.317*** -0.296  
 Monetary independence 0.367 0.407 0.467 1.760 
 Exchange rate stability [0.423] [0.417] [0.348] 3.553 
 Financial openness 0.556 0.667 0.578 0.603 
Robustness Analysis (2) 
Short-run coefficient for the effect of  
ǻ5HDO)XRcb RQǻ5HDO%0br 0.360*** 0.124 -0.225  
 Monetary independence 0.377 0.432 0.405 0.723 
 Exchange rate stability [0.423] [0.392] [0.271] 4.178 
 Financial openness 0.745 0.562 0.549 1.036 
Long-run coefficient for the effect of  
ǻ5HDO)XRcb RQǻ5HDO%0br 1.484** 0.319 -0.691  
 Monetary independence 0.354 0.431 0.417 1.407 
 Exchange rate stability [0.395] [0.390] [0.339] 1.760 
 Financial openness 0.625 0.608 0.579 0.034 
 
Notes: 
The trilemma measures are based on Aizenman et al. (2010). The monetary independence index measures the reciprocal of 
the correlation between home country and base country money market rates. A higher value indicates higher monetary 
independence. The exchange rate stability index captures the standard deviation in the exchange rate between the home 
country and the base country.  A higher value indicates higher exchange rate stability. The financial openness index is the de 
jure FDSLWDODFFRXQWRSHQQHVVLQGH[GHYHORSHGE\&KLQQDQG,WREDVHGRQUHVWULFWLRQVGHWDLOHGLQWKH,0)¶V$QQXDO
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER).  
We have averaged the annual values of the indices for each country in line with the regression sample period.  
Robustness Analysis (1) refers to the use of regression results based on robust standard errors for selected countries. 
Robustness Analysis (2) refers to the use of results from unrestricted regressions.  
The mean equality test is the single-factor ANOVA F-test. The median equality test is the Kruskal-Wallis test. 
The median equality test is used when non-normality is detected in the series being tested. 
***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level.  
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Appendix 10:  
Equality Tests of the Aizenman-Chinn-Ito Trilemma Measures  
Grouped by the Boxplot Quartiles of  
Real Intervention Effects on Real Base Money Change 
 
Upper 
quartile 
Inter-
quartile  
Lower 
quartile 
Equality  
Test 
Statistic 
 
Group  
Average [Median] 
Baseline Scenario 
Short-run coefficient for the effect of  
ǻ5HDO)XRcb RQǻ5HDORMres 0.283*** 0.032 -0.062  
 
Monetary independence 0.444 0.388 0.432 0.939 
 
Exchange rate stability [0.444] [0.366] [0.365] 0.974 
 Financial openness 0.506 0.654 0.595 0.565 
Long-run coefficient for the effect of  
ǻ5HDO)XRcb RQǻ5HDORMres 0.343*** 0.055*** -0.053*  
 Monetary independence 0.411 0.391 0.449 0.470 
 Exchange rate stability [0.398] [0.390] [0.348] 1.846 
 Financial openness# 0.610 0.682 0.454 2.238 
Robustness Analysis (1) 
Short-run coefficient for the effect of  
ǻ5HDO)XRcb RQǻ5HDORMres 0.283*** 0.047 -0.060  
 Monetary independence 0.440 0.391 0.416 0.659 
 Exchange rate stability [0.440] [0.390] [0.324] 2.401 
 Financial openness 0.506 0.709 0.520 1.546 
Long-run coefficient for the effect of  
ǻ5HDO)XRcb RQǻ5HDORMres 0.375*** 0.074*** -0.066  
 Monetary independence 0.413 0.395 0.436 0.414 
 Exchange rate stability [0.346] [0.452] [0.342] 5.428* 
 Financial openness# 0.601 0.672 0.497 1.129 
Robustness Analysis (2) 
Short-run coefficient for the effect of  
ǻ5HDO)XRcb RQǻ5HDORMres 0.257** 0.040 -0.044  
 Monetary independence 0.436 0.385 0.439 0.991 
 Exchange rate stability [0.444] [0.407] [0.299] 4.891* 
 Financial openness 0.554 0.705 0.453 1.903 
Long-run coefficient for the effect of  
ǻ5HDO)XRcb RQǻ5HDORMres 0.344** 0.070 -0.097  
 Monetary independence 0..413 0.419 0.394 0.150 
 Exchange rate stability [0.346] [0.407] [0.382] 0.817 
 Financial openness 0.601 0.633 0.550 0.172 
 
Notes: 
The trilemma measures are based on Aizenman et al. (2010). The monetary independence index measures the reciprocal of 
the correlation between home country and base country money market rates. A higher value indicates higher monetary 
independence. The exchange rate stability index captures the standard deviation in the exchange rate between the home 
country and the base country.  A higher value indicates higher exchange rate stability. The financial openness index is the de 
jure capital account openness index developed by Chinn and Ito (2008) based on restrLFWLRQVGHWDLOHGLQWKH,0)¶V$QQXDO
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER).  
We have averaged the annual values of the indices for each country in line with the regression sample period.  
Robustness Analysis (1) refers to the use of regression results based on robust standard errors for selected countries. 
Robustness Analysis (2) refers to the use of results from unrestricted regressions.  
The mean equality test is the single-factor ANOVA F-test or the Welch F-test for unequal variances.  
#
 Welch F-test statistic. The ANOVA F-test is not statistically significant.  
The median equality test is the Kruskal-Wallis test; used when non-normality is detected in the series being tested. 
***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level.  
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APPENDIX 11: COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS ± INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY DATA 
Country 
Openness Current Account Balance 
Capital Account 
Balance 
Net  Direct and 
Portfolio Investment 
Balance 
Net Other 
Investment Balance Intervention Indicators 
GDP 
per 
capita 
(Y/c) 
Exchange 
Rate 
Flexibility 
(ERF) CAO KAO CAS CAB KAS KAB DIPIS DIPIB OIS OIB FXIV RA FXIS 
Argentina 0.385 0.113 0.529 -0.462 0.647 0.140 0.750 2.363 0.125 -1.787 0.538 0.121 0.500 10.455 5.941 
Australia 0.486 0.210 0.000 -4.588 1.000 4.650 0.947 4.309 0.474 0.158 0.434 0.032 0.447 28.425 13.000  
Brazil 0.280 0.076 0.357 -1.294 0.786 2.640 1.000 3.425 0.231 -0.660 0.490 0.192 0.680 8.469 11.286 
Canada 0.807 0.166 0.550 0.041 0.550 0.135 0.368 -0.078 0.368 -0.291 0.089 0.032 0.579 29.387 8.900 
Chile 0.798 0.240 0.333 -0.064 0.714 1.315 1.000 0.656 0.429 1.452 0.656 0.233 0.596 9.855 9.857 
China 0.586 0.090 0.950 5.649 0.750 2.067 0.947 2.731 0.316 -0.207 0.986 1.398 0.948 3.165 6.050 
Colombia 0.392 0.083 0.125 -2.218 0.938 3.302 0.933 2.680 0.467 -0.044 0.276 0.113 0.583 6.994 10.125 
Czech  1.531 0.169 0.000 -2.985 1.000 4.622 0.750 4.341 0.800 -0.031 0.650 0.250 0.570 18.978 7.857 
Denmark 1.088 0.340 0.952 2.235 0.429 -0.737 0.450 -1.824 0.700 1.104 0.946 0.297 0.538 28.646 5.286 
Hong 
Kong 4.173 1.408 1.000 8.836 0.250 -2.024 0.250 -9.531 0.500 2.524 3.074 1.071 0.694 34.653 2.000 
Hungary 1.634 0.547 0.133 -6.410 1.000 7.892 0.857 4.378 0.643 2.544 1.320 0.359 0.571 14.733 9.000 
India 0.451 0.061 0.286 -0.899 1.000 3.562 1.000 1.853 0.923 1.544 0.667 0.329 0.647 2.103 7.357 
Indonesia 0.642 0.065 0.813 3.436 0.375 -0.313 0.733 1.261 0.200 -1.394 0.425 0.178 0.633 3.008 10.563 
Israel 0.893 0.163 0.400 -0.060 0.700 1.400 0.421 0.207 0.526 0.266 0.701 0.444 0.605 21.183 7.800 
Japan 0.282 0.121 1.000 2.901 0.190 -1.887 0.211 -1.643 0.474 -0.134 0.222 0.211 0.842 26.194 13.000 
Korea 0.794 0.117 0.667 1.153 0.714 0.856 0.750 0.752 0.600 0.624 0.541 0.414 0.788 18.052 9.952 
Malaysia 2.065 0.201 0.619 8.612 0.476 -4.475 0.714 0.430 0.238 -3.164 1.867 0.790 0.641 9.454 6.143 
Mexico 0.587 0.064 0.000 -1.988 0.950 2.647 0.947 3.418 0.368 -0.428 0.331 0.134 0.684 10.883 10.800 
       
    (Continued on next page) 
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APPENDIX 11: CONTINUED 
Country 
Openness Current Account Balance 
Capital Account 
Balance 
Net  Direct and 
Portfolio 
Investment Balance 
Net Other 
Investment Balance Intervention Indicators 
GDP 
per 
capita 
(Y/c) 
Exchange 
Rate 
Flexibility 
(ERF) CAO KAO CAS CAB KAS KAB DIPIS DIPIB OIS OIB FXIV RA FXIS 
New 
Zealand 0.711 0.168 0.000 -5.654 0.950 6.344 0.895 3.749 0.526 2.086 0.774 0.131 0.592 20.568 12.000 
Norway 0.885 0.416 1.000 11.286 0.143 -10.746 0.150 -9.855 0.650 1.643 1.317 0.144 0.538 39.006 12.000 
Peru 0.502 0.088 0.313 -1.831 1.000 4.085 1.000 3.927 0.600 0.805 0.793 0.326 0.600 6.176 7.938 
Poland 0.839 0.136 0.000 -4.674 1.000 6.010 1.000 4.072 0.750 2.489 0.712 0.203 0.673 13.441 11.692 
Philippines 1.072 0.114 0.450 0.279 0.650 1.764 0.895 2.456 0.526 0.435 0.563 0.414 0.636 2.664 8.550 
Russia 0.638 0.189 0.933 7.112 0.133 -3.276 0.571 0.172 0.357 -1.402 1.626 0.599 0.679 10.516 9.867 
South 
Africa 0.605 0.113 0.333 -2.397 0.667 3.380 0.800 2.476 0.350 0.340 0.211 0.183 0.613 7.382 13.476 
Singapore 4.214 0.739 1.000 17.665 0.143 -2.502 0.350 -3.995 0.100 -19.879 1.855 1.638 0.825 34.043 11.000 
Thailand 1.269 0.147 0.600 0.838 0.700 2.496 0.947 3.033 0.421 -1.113 0.955 0.751 0.763 5.823 8.650 
Turkey 0.558 0.094 0.125 -3.256 0.875 4.208 0.867 1.814 0.933 2.260 0.416 0.165 0.574 9.505 12.188 
Current account/Capital account openness (CAO/KAO):  average of the sum of the absolute value of annual inflows and outflows for each account respectively, taken as a ratio to average annual GDP. 
Current account/Capital account surplus years (CAS/KAS): number of years with net inflows into the account as a proportion of the total number of years that corresponds to the regression sample period. A country is 
recorded as a surplus country in the respective account if CAS/KAS > 0.5. Net direct and portfolio investment/Other investment balance surplus years (DIPIS/OIS) are calculated in a similar manner. 
Current account/Capital account balance (CAB/KAB): average of the annual net position in the account scaled by the average annual nominal GDP for the years that corresponds to the regression sample period, 
multiplied by 100. Net direct and portfolio investment/Other investment balance (DIPIB/OIB) are calculated in a similar manner.  
Intervention volatility (FXIV) is measured by the standard deviation of the monthly changes in foreign exchange reserves scaled by the average annual nominal GDP. Reserve accumulation (RA) is the sum of change in 
foreign exchange reserves, scaled by the average annual nominal GDP. The total surplus quarters (FXIS) refers to the number of quarters with a positive increase in reserves as a proportion of the total number of 
quarters. All data are calculated based on the regression sample period specific to each country. The data presented correspond to the real broad money growth regressions, which may differ slightly from the data that 
correspond to the real base money growth regressions.  
All balance of payments data are sourced from the IMF Balance of Payments (BOPS) Statistics (analytic presentation, annual data, USD) with various editions downloaded via ESDS International, University of 
Manchester. GDP data, in USD is sourced from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database.  
GDP per capita (Y/c) based on purchasing power parity (millions of current international dollar), taken as an annual average over the regression sample period. Source: WEO. Countries are classified into high or middle 
income countries based on the World Bank income group classifications (http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications) Italics: High income countries.  
Exchange rate flexibility is identified based on the historical de facto fine classification provided by Ilzetzki et al. (DFK\HDU¶VUHJLPHLVDVVLJQHGDQXPEHUEHWZHHQDQGZLWKODUJHUQXPEHUVUHIOHFWLQJ
increased flexibility. We use the average over the years corresponding to the regression sample period as an iQGLFDWRURIHDFKFRXQWU\¶VH[FKDQJHUDWHUHJLPHIOH[LELOLW\ (http://personal.lse.ac.uk/ilzetzki/IRRBack.htm). 
Italics: Inflation-targeting countries.  
 
 
